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Corrections for Volume LI

The Editor of the BULLETIN wishes to call attention to the following errors in Volume LI:

July 13, page 56: The last sentence in the first full paragraph in the second column should read "But at least it provides a means for the two countries to work out useful arrangements regarding future border difficulties."

September 7, page 338: The paragraph beginning at the top of the righthand column should read "Now, we have had a continuing program of assistance to Indonesia. Because of Indonesia's policy of what they call 'confrontation' with Malaysia, the volume. . . ."

October 19, page 551: The first line of the third full paragraph should read: "Between April and August 1959. . . ."

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The 25th Anniversary of the Department of State Bulletin

Statement by Secretary Rusk

On July 1st of this year the Department of State passes a special milestone—the 25th anniversary of its official periodical, the Department of State Bulletin.

The Bulletin is unique. No other government in the world publishes so complete a current record of its foreign policy. In making public this weekly compilation of documents, the United States Government recognizes that a well-informed public is vital to democracy and that the people have a right to know what their Government is doing and saying on specific issues. As I have said many times, I feel strongly that our ability to pursue effectively any major course of foreign policy is in direct relation to the degree of public understanding of and support for such policy.

In the 25 years since the Bulletin first appeared on July 1, 1939, the world has experienced immense political, economic, and social changes. Faithfully and accurately, week by week, the Bulletin has set down for the historical record this country's stand on these changes.

The first issue contained, among other documents, a statement by Secretary Hull on the peace and neutrality legislation being considered by the Congress and a message from President Roosevelt on the importance of trade in promoting a stable world. The Bulletin of December 13, 1941, carried the President's address to the Nation on that fateful December 7 Sunday and his message declaring war against Japan; it also included the declarations of war against the United States by the Axis Powers. The historic message of President Truman recommending a program of aid to Greece and Turkey to withstand Communist imperialism and the historic speech of Secretary Marshall which led to the Marshall Plan to rebuild war-torn Europe were printed in full in the Bulletin, as were President Eisenhower's open-skies proposal and President Kennedy's call for an Alliance for Progress in the Americas.

The Department first began to publish an official periodical on October 5, 1929. It was a small pamphlet called Press Releases, which, for the first time, made available to the public in printed form on a weekly basis the Department's daily mimeographed releases.

The Department of State Bulletin is the successor to that publication and to a monthly called Treaty Information. After consultation with persons and organizations outside the Government who used one or both of those pamphlets, the Department decided to combine them in a single periodical. And so, for a quarter of a century, the Bulletin has served a wide range of readers—the scholar who requires complete and accurate texts for his research, the specialist seeking reliable citations, the student struggling with his term paper, and the citizen who simply wants a firsthand source of information on U.S. foreign policy.

In its 25 years the Bulletin has served them all well. I am sure scholar and layman will join me in this anniversary salute to a highly respected arm of our public affairs program—the Department of State Bulletin.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1306 PUBLICATION 7703 JULY 6, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Why Laos Is Critically Important

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

As President [John E.] Sawyer noted in inviting me, this is the 175th anniversary of the Department of State, as well as your 175th commencement. We are not exactly the same age, however, because you, on occasion, have held more than one commencement a year. But in our early days we were about the same size—perhaps you were a little larger. At your first commencement, I am informed, you had four graduates, one professor, and four tutors. Our first Secretary of State, Thomas Jefferson, had one chief clerk, three ordinary clerks, and a French translator. As late as 1800 there were only 10 men in the Department, including the Secretary. And your undergraduates probably outnumbered our diplomatic missions overseas. For, when Jefferson stepped down as Secretary of State, we had representatives in only 5 countries—and as late as 1800 in no more than 12.

Of necessity, we grew more than you did in the next century and a quarter. But in my student days the Department of State and our Foreign Service were still relatively small. And we didn't have a very active foreign policy. For, after the First World War, we had retreated into isolation and felt comfortably secure behind the oceans. We paid dearly for the lesson that what happens across the oceans can affect us vitally. But even at the end of the second and most destructive of world wars, we were slow to realize the fundamental change in our relationship to the rest of the world

brought about by nuclear warheads and the growing range of airplanes and rockets.

Today, we can be secure only to the extent that our total environment is secure—and by "total environment" I mean the land, waters, and earth of the entire world and adjacent areas of space.

Today, thermonuclear war could destroy much of the Northern Hemisphere in hours. Even small wars are dangerous—because they may easily grow into great wars. What happens halfway around the world may affect our security quite as much as what happens on our doorstep. Universal peace is no longer just a noble ideal; it is essential to the survival of civilization and the human race. A peaceful, decent world order is the central goal of our foreign policy. If we are ever to achieve that goal, aggression must be treated as intolerable; those who practice or plan for aggression, in whatever form, must be taught that aggression is not only futile but costly to the aggressor. And if mankind is to achieve a stable peace, governments must keep their word—solemn international agreements can no longer be regarded as scraps of paper.

Background of Situation in Laos

With these self-evident truths in mind, I should like to review briefly the background of a situation nearly halfway around the world, in a landlocked, poor, rugged country about the size of Great Britain but containing only two or three million people. I refer to Laos. Laos is the scene of Communist aggression, bad faith, and duplicity.

¹ Made at commencement exercises at Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., on June 14 (press release 282 dated June 13; prepared text).

Why are we concerned about Laos? First, because of its location. On the north and northeast it has nearly 1,100 miles of border with Communist China and Communist North Viet-Nam. It also shares 1,750 miles of border with four non-Communist countries, including Thailand, the heartland of Southeast Asia, and South Viet-Nam, which is resisting an aggression directed and supplied by Communist North Viet-Nam with the support of Communist China.

In 1949 the French granted Laos independence within the French Union. But the North Vietnamese Communists managed to attract a few Lao dissidents by pledges of military help and technical advice. In September 1950 the North Viet-Nam radio announced formation of the "resistance government of the Pathet Lao." Later broadcasts claimed that this government had a "national assembly," had picked a "prime minister," and had formed a "people's liberation army." All this occurred not in Laos but in North Viet-Nam.

In 1953 North Vietnamese forces invaded Laos, taking with them their puppet Pathet Lao government and troops. When the Indochinese war was brought to an end by the Geneva agreements of 1954,² the Communists controlled two provinces of Laos. But under those agreements Laos was to be one country, the Pathet Lao forces were to be integrated into the Royal Lao Army, and all foreign military forces were to be withdrawn, excepting limited forces and two bases reserved for France. Those pledges were signed by the Communist regimes of North Viet-Nam and mainland China as well as by the Soviet Union and Poland.

But, because of Pathet Lao intransigence, those agreements did not bring peace and unity to Laos. And, in 1960, fighting among non-Communist elements gave the Communists new opportunities. When President Kennedy took office, the Soviet Union was airlifting arms and ammunition from Hanoi to Communist and neutralist forces in northeast Laos and on the strategic Plaine des Jarres. And we were sup-

porting the Government forces in the Mekong Valley.

The 1962 Geneva Accords

The Soviet Union, however, indicated that it desired an independent and neutral Laos.³ And we had no wish beyond a free Laos that could live at peace with its neighbors. Subject to a cease-fire we agreed to negotiate. Finally, new accords were signed in Geneva in July 1962.⁴

All participants "solemnly declared" their respect for the sovereignty, neutrality, and territorial integrity of Laos. They agreed, among other things, to: (1) withdraw all foreign troops in the presence of international inspectors; (2) prohibit introduction of military forces in any capacity; (3) withhold any war materiel from Laos except as "the Royal Government of Laos may consider necessary"; (4) not use the territory of Laos to intervene in the internal affairs of other countries.

Responsibility for general supervision of the accords was given to an International Control Commission (ICC) composed of representatives of Canada and Poland with India as chairman.

And all agreed also to support a Government of National Union composed of three factions, with the neutral leader Prince Souvanna Phouma as Premier.

The 14 governments which made these pledges included Communist China and Communist North Viet-Nam as well as the Soviet Union and Poland.

Record of Communist Aggression and Deception

What happened? The non-Communist nations complied with the agreements. North Viet-Nam and its Pathet Lao puppets did not. We promptly withdrew our 600-man military aid mission. North Viet-Nam kept several thousand troops and military technicians in Laos. North Vietnamese cadres are the backbone of almost every Pathet Lao battalion.

² For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of July 2, 1962, p. 12.

⁴ For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos and an accompanying protocol, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

This was, and is, of course, a major violation of the Geneva accords.

Later, North Viet-Nam sent additional forces back into Laos—some of them in organized battalions—a second major violation.

The North Vietnamese have continued to use, and improve, the corridor through Laos to reinforce and supply the Viet Cong in South Viet-Nam—a third major violation.

The Communists have continued to ship arms into Laos as well as through it—another major violation.

The Pathet Lao and the North Vietnamese Communists have compounded these international felonies by denials that they were committing them.

But there was another major violation which they could not deny. They barred freedom of access to the areas under their control, both to the Lao Government and to the International Control Commission. The Royal Lao Government, on the other hand, opened the areas under its control to access not only by the ICC but by all Lao factions.

The Communists repeatedly fired at personnel and aircraft on legitimate missions under the authority of the Royal Lao Government. They even fired on ICC helicopters. They repeatedly violated the cease-fire agreement. And this spring they launched an assault on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, driving them off the Plaine des Jarres, where they had been since early 1961.

This, in bare summary, is the Communist record of aggression, bad faith, and deception in Laos.

A Communist takeover in Laos would be as unacceptable as a Communist takeover in South Viet-Nam. The rest of Southeast Asia would be in jeopardy, and saving it would be much

more costly, in blood and treasure, than turning back the aggressors in Laos and South Viet-Nam. The loss of Southeast Asia as a whole to the Communists would be intolerable.

Need for Compliance With Present Agreements

The Communist assault on Laos, like that on South Viet-Nam, involves the larger question of whether anyone is to be permitted to succeed in aggression by terror, guerrilla warfare, and the infiltration of arms and military personnel across national frontiers. If they are allowed to gain from these assaults in Southeast Asia, the Communist advocates of militancy everywhere will feel encouraged.

Also at stake is the fundamental question of whether solemn international contracts are to be performed. All who believe in peace and in building a decent world order and rule of law have an interest in seeing that no government be allowed to gain from breaking its promises.

There is talk of negotiating new political settlements in Southeast Asia. But political settlements were reached in 1954 and 1962. The Geneva accords of 1962 were precisely agreements to neutralize Laos. No new agreements are required. All that is needed is compliance with the agreements already made.

The prescription for peace in Laos and Viet-Nam is simple: Leave your neighbors alone. It is in the vital interest of the free world that Peiping and Hanoi—and all Communists everywhere—learn, once and for all, that they cannot reap rewards from militancy, aggression by seepage, and duplicity. For our part, we certainly do not intend to abandon the peoples of Laos or Viet-Nam or other countries who are trying to remain free from Communist domination.

Making the World Safe for Diversity

by Thomas L. Hughes
*Director of Intelligence and Research*¹

General [Andrew P.] O'Meara, distinguished representatives of the armed forces of the Americas, and fellow citizens of the American Republics: When I was invited to be with you this morning, I was asked to try to give you a broad picture of worldwide problems and policies as viewed from Washington.

As I thought about how best to comply with General O'Meara's request, various alternative titles occurred to me: "The Dilemmas of a Depolarizing World," or "The Changing Shape of Conflict," or "The Predicaments of Partial Success," or "The Distractions of Diversity," or "The Continuing Communist Challenge."

In any case what I have to say this morning will have much to do with all these themes. For any overview of the world political situation today is bound to consider the new dimensions of complexity and variety that now affect the Communist and non-Communist worlds alike. Indeed, on our side they are the products of the very diversity for which we have been fighting and working to make the world safe.

Impressions of Diversity

It was a year ago this month, in his famous speech at American University,² that President Kennedy spoke of making the world "safe for diversity." Since then it has become clearer than ever before that we live at a floodtide of diversity and change in all the continents.

Of course there is the continuing fact that we are still confronted with an authoritarian ideology which seeks our destruction and which

is inventive in the means of pursuing it. But there is also the human fact of the "revolution of rising expectations" sweeping the southern continents. There is the psychological fact of cold-war battle fatigue. There is the physical fact that we are riding the crest of a revolution in science and technology. There is the frustrating fact that all of this is occurring in a world of some 120 countries, of some 120 foreign policies, of some 120 sets of national goals or national appetites.

New forms of nationalism are expressing themselves just at a time when international organizations are both more plentiful and more necessary than ever before. In many parts of the world the psychological awkwardness of the contest continues between the Communists, who say they will uproot the *status quo*, and the rest of us, who say that we do not really favor the *status quo* actually. Differing views of the world are seen from the different national capitals—the big pictures and the little pictures blurring one another even as they overlap in the varying perspectives of Mexico City, Tokyo, Baghdad, Léopoldville, Ottawa, Paris, and Saigon. In some parts of the world old ideologies are dying. In other parts the thrust for new ideologies is a prime political fact.

Leaders, governments, and people, responding to their own political necessities and current national needs, are moving ahead on different historical schedules. The last 12 months

¹ Address made at a conference of officers of the Latin American armed forces, sponsored by the U.S. Southern Command, in the Panama Canal Zone on June 8.

² BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

alone have unpredictably seen the advent of new administrations in Washington, London, Rio, Bonn, Rome, and New Delhi. There are no generally accepted international political timetables. Indeed, many of us must operate daily in a host of situations where it is clear that this generation of the world's political leaders are, understandably but often, out of phase with one another. Incidentally these asymmetrical facts of life have a great deal to do with the relevance which one nation's military, scientific, technological, political, and economic experience has for other nations—even for its good friends and allies.

On our part the “illusion of American omnipotence” is an illusion we have long since overcome, if indeed it ever existed. There was also a time when some people thought that we North Americans tended to look out on the world seeing only two kinds of people: Russians and potential manpower that we and the Russians could compete for. If ever true, those days too are gone. The thoughtful citizens of the United States increasingly understand that it is a rather honorable thing to be in an historical situation where we cannot save ourselves without helping others save themselves as well.

Two years ago Washington was preoccupied with the ominous threat of a direct nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in the crises over Berlin and Cuba. Today, while we can never neglect the possibility that such direct crises will return abruptly, we nevertheless find ourselves worrying much more of the time about crises in which the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are far less directly involved—crises like Cyprus, Zanzibar, the Congo, and Kashmir, not to speak of Laos and South Vietnam, where the U.S.S.R. claims to have little involvement and less influence.

In a sense the tide of the cold war has definitely turned. There is an unmistakable movement away from a bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers toward a more diversified world. We are moving from a period of dangerously abnormal simplicity into a period of more relatively normal diversity.

But freedom's struggle against communism is far from over and far from won. Indeed,

to the extent that the Communist threat and the danger of nuclear war have been major factors in unifying the free, non-Communist world, our very success in completing phase one of the struggle against communism threatens to complicate matters by eroding our unity for the new phase which has now begun.

I should like to examine some of the problems posed by this decomposition of the bipolar world. It is a problem very much on our minds in Washington, and I suspect it is very much on the minds of your governments as well. I take it that the main purpose of this inter-American conference is, in fact, to provide a forum for a mutually profitable discussion of the new dimensions of our ongoing struggle with international communism.

Let us review some of the essential elements of this struggle as they affect the world political scene.

Containment: Its Success and Obsolescence

In the wake of World War II the issue was stark and clear. Freedom was directly and imminently threatened by Stalinist-directed expansionism. Admittedly, our concept of containment was, strictly speaking, a negative one. It was designed to muster the necessary strength to bar the way to Communist expansion. While Moscow saw its historic mission as one of making over the world on a Communist model, the United States and other countries who joined in a series of defensive alliances set themselves the opposite goal. Our objective was not to force our institutions upon other countries but to help preserve freedom of choice against those who would deny that freedom.

Broadly speaking, the policy of containment has both succeeded and become obsolete. The conspicuous forward motion of conventional Communist armies has been stopped. Uniformed Communist troops have not spilled in force over borders since June 1950 in Korea.

The bedrock of containment has been the military strength of the free world and, in particular, the ability of the United States to deter Soviet use of nuclear weapons. We have had no illusions about Soviet magnanimity for the weak, and when, in the late 1950's, the Soviets used their Sputnik and their newly developed

ICBM to challenge us to an arms race, our determination stiffened.

We set about building a nuclear force which could withstand any Soviet attack and then retaliate with devastating effect. Sophisticated U.S. strategic weapons systems, long in development and only shortly behind the operational readiness dates of the more simplified Soviet program, were rushed to completion. Polaris submarines, largely immune from enemy attack, were deployed in the oceans around the U.S.S.R. The alert status of SAC [Strategic Air Command] bombers, both on the ground and airborne, was further improved. U.S. intercontinental missiles, notably the solid-fueled, quick-reacting Minuteman, were increasingly dispersed and hardened. This year we are spending approximately \$8 billion more on defense than we were in 1960.

There can be no question today that our second-strike capability is credible to the Soviets. They know as well as we do that the United States Air Force has 540 strategic bombers on alert which could, in the face of a surprise missile attack, take off for their targets. In contrast we estimate that the Soviets could place over the United States, on two-way missions, no more than approximately 120 heavy bombers plus perhaps an additional 150 medium bombers over Alaska and our Northwest. Today our Air Force has some 750 ICBM's on launchers. The Soviets have less than one-fourth that number in operation. We have 192 Polaris missiles deployed. The Soviets have substantially fewer submarine-borne missiles in operation. Those they do have cannot be launched while the submarine remains submerged, and they have a range of less than a third of Polaris's 1,500 miles.

Clearly a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union would have to be an irrational decision. No one can guarantee against that, but the likelihood of it has receded.

Yet if our nuclear strength is a relatively firm hedge against nuclear attack today, it is by no means a cure-all for the host of remaining political problems. Nuclear threats cannot be invoked lightly. The United States could employ its nuclear forces only upon the gravest provocation. Even assuming for an instant that an

American surprise attack on the Soviet Union were not morally repugnant, as every American President of the nuclear age has declared it to be, it would still have to be ruled out on grounds of impracticality. Even in the most optimistic appraisal of the potential results of a nuclear exchange, i.e., one in which the U.S. was assumed to have the advantage of striking first, the casualties to the West would still number in the tens of millions of lives.

Maintaining a Strategic Advantage

We recognize that for the foreseeable future a major portion of our military expenditures will have to continue to be devoted to maintaining our strategic advantage. But the largest items in our mammoth defense budget are consciously being appropriated in the profound hope that the weapons systems which they finance will never be used. Thus our nation's leaders of both political parties are willing to cope with the domestic problems of spending billions of dollars on missiles which, if our policies are successful, will not be launched.

We intend our strategic advantage not only to deter actual Soviet aggression but to limit Soviet ability to use nuclear weapons for purposes of intimidation. The Cuban missile crisis showed to what lengths the Soviet Union might go in order to improve its strategic leverage upon both North and South America—although the relatively careless manner in which the Soviets attempted to install their offensive missiles, and the speed with which they withdrew them, suggest strongly that the Communist leaders in Moscow miscalculated badly the risks they thought they were running. We think that the Cuban crisis taught the Soviets a lesson, and we do not expect them to miscalculate so rashly again.

Since, however, the purpose of our nuclear forces is to deter aggression and contribute to the avoidance of nuclear war, we have no desire to amass megatons as a miser hoards gold. We are deeply interested in probing every possible approach to effective arms control if it would afford a safer means to assure stability and security.

Our interest in arms control and disarmament

is sometimes misunderstood. I wish to assure any of you who may be worried that this effort is one we are undertaking with our eyes wide open. We know what we are doing. The tentative steps already taken in the direction of arms control are designed to create more security, not less. We have far too great an investment in our present military strength ever to jeopardize it without proportionate gain. We have no intention of gambling with it whimsically or amateurishly.

We will, however, look both to continued improvement of our own defenses and to responsible disarmament measures to the degree that either points to our main objective: increasing the safety of the free, non-Communist world. We recognize that an unchecked arms race, together with the possible spread of increasingly devastating weapons to more and more countries, takes us further away from the kind of security which might otherwise eventually be ours under an international peace-keeping system providing a reliable means of effective, enforceable arms control.

The Need for Flexibility

In the meantime, as the likelihood of a surprise nuclear attack, or even a surprise conventional attack, by the Soviets has decreased, the necessity for a more diversified and rapidly reacting capability to meet local crises has become more important. A variety of threats requires a variety of possible responses. We realize all too well that the so-called nuclear stalemate does not rule out the possibility of other forms of Communist military aggression. We ourselves have been committed to developing forces capable of an increasingly flexible response to the variety of military threats which fall short of general nuclear war. As a result, U.S. military options have steadily increased, U.S. ability to meet less-than-outright aggression has improved, and U.S. "command and control" capabilities to insure reliability and conformity to our larger national objectives have become more sophisticated. We have aided, and will continue to aid, other free, non-Communist countries in building up their own defenses to meet the new conditions. Thus the free, non-Communist world will possess gradu-

ated capabilities both to deter Communist or Communist-sponsored external threats at varying levels of intensity and to respond to the diversified aggression of Communist-supported internal insurgency.

Pursuing this policy of graduated deterrence and flexible response, we have consciously been promoting a worldwide mobility of our forces—not only strategic but tactical as well. Thus, while our strategic strike forces remain ready for action on an instant's notice, our tactical aircraft, ground forces, and naval units are increasingly able to bring U.S. military elements to virtually any part of the world where they may be needed. Tactical fighter aircraft take off in the Far East and land a few hours later in Arizona. Army divisions are moved by air to Europe and back again, without losing their operational readiness. American naval power from either the Atlantic or the Pacific Oceans can go on short notice to patrol the Indian Ocean. The U.N. peacekeeping force now on Cyprus was transported there largely by American air power.

I think we should be quite clear about the purpose of all this. If, as Mr. Khrushchev has declared, deliberate nuclear war is unthinkable, and if deliberate conventional war between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. is also less likely because it may so easily turn into a nuclear war, it does not follow that international violence is unthinkable. In fact, to the degree that the Communists forsake or postpone the use of major violence to achieve their ends, the danger of lesser levels of violence is probably increased.

Thus at the same time as the Cuban crisis we had a sudden, limited attack with conventional forces by Communist China upon India, in the isolated and forbidding terrain of the Himalayan Mountains. Thus there have been guerrilla training, sabotage planning, and infiltration and subversion of free Latin American countries proceeding from Cuba. Thus harassing actions short of violence, as well as acts of suspicious but anonymous violence, occur in much of the non-Communist world.

Often these situations produce requests for immediate, on-the-spot U.S. action. Often they bear within themselves the potentialities of escalation to vastly destructive proportions.

There has been nothing yet to indicate that the Communists will leave their neighbors in peace, or that they will refrain from deliberate subversion and the fomenting of violence in other countries, or that they will restrain themselves from infiltrating cadres to stiffen and direct guerrilla warfare in violation of international agreements.

The fact that Communist military aggression from within a country is becoming more frequent, and the fact that it is more complicated to deal with, do not make it less dangerous. By far the greater part of the Viet Cong forces in South Viet-Nam are South Vietnamese, and the preponderance of Viet Cong weapons come not from Communist countries but from capture, purchase, and local manufacture. Thus, while controlling the war from Hanoi, the Communists are able to claim that the conflict in South Viet-Nam is internal, and even, with their customary hypocrisy, that it is a war of resistance against American imperialism. In Laos similar tactics are being pursued, with the same objective of gaining control over the entire country. In Cuba the revolution was ostensibly led by non-Communist Cubans. Certainly it was supported by millions of non-Communist Cubans. It was only after the revolution succeeded that the relationship with Moscow became overt.

This is in truth a more sophisticated and dangerous form of aggression, when the leaders of an aggressive war cannot be located, when their sources of supply can rarely be interdicted, when enemy forces are usually not outsiders, and when truces do not halt the conflict. These factors reinforce the underlying wisdom of policies designed to foreclose, at level after level on the scale of military violence, the options open to the Communists for using force to gain their purposes. These policies must proceed. They are more important than ever now that outright military aggression across national boundaries appears less likely than previously. For, while Communist methods have changed, and the nature of the Communist threat is changing, Communist objectives remain unchanged. Indeed the increased diversification and sophistication of the Communist military threat has been matched by a diversification and

sophistication of the economic and political threats as well.

Soviet Economy: Perseverance Through Strain

I mentioned what seems to me to have been the Soviet miscalculation in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. There was another earlier Soviet miscalculation in 1958, in the first flush of new-found optimism over Sputnik. Soviet leaders apparently assumed that they would not only be able to mount a new strategic challenge to the free world but that at the same time they could continue a rapid and balanced rate of economic growth sufficient to provide for consumer needs at home and effective economic aid abroad.

As it happened, the Soviet planners were proved wrong. Moscow's own statistics show how, under the pressure of a Soviet-initiated arms race and as a result of other flaws in the Soviet economic system, national income growth rates declined from an average of 9.5 percent per year between 1956 and 1959 to 6 percent in 1962 and 4.5 percent last year. At the same time the Soviet leadership had been promising more prosperity to its citizenry and whetting existing appetites for consumer goods. The result has been an ongoing debate in the Soviet hierarchy over the proper allocation of resources for new investment. The principal claimants—military expenditures, heavy industry, and consumer goods including agriculture—have tended to be relatively evenly matched. It has been a debate which no one has really won. Even though the economic situation deteriorated badly as a result of crop failures recently, the tendency has been to postpone any radical changes in the structure of the Soviet economy.

It is possible that these economic strains were a major factor last year in the Kremlin's willingness to conclude the limited test ban agreement and thus initiate a period of reduced tensions. At the same time, it would be unrealistic for us to assume that the Soviet Union is so poor that it has no freedom of choice in assessing its own priorities. For example, it might seem that, pressed as they are, the Soviets would cut back on foreign aid programs. Yet precisely at this time of economic adversity, Moscow is

once again showing its willingness to tighten its belt if that is necessary to take advantage of political opportunities. Soviet commitments in foreign economic aid are rising again. New commitments in the first 5 months of this year are in excess of \$600 million. The record high in the past was \$859 million for all of 1959.

Moreover, in the aid field, as elsewhere, Moscow's flexibility is often enhanced by the authoritarian nature of its government. Its capacity for making rapid decisions at tactically useful moments contrasts with our own sober and methodical requirements which flow from our democratic form of government, from our Congress, and from our Bureau of the Budget. Thus the U.S.S.R. has the ability to offer additional credits to countries even though previous ones are not fully used, as it has recently done for the steel mill at Bone, Algeria. The U.S.S.R. has agreed to aid projects and announced firm commitments to them even before preliminary cost estimates, detailed surveys, or feasibility studies by the Soviets are made—Egypt's Aswan Dam and India's proposed Bokaro steel mill are examples. In both these cases the U.S.S.R. has benefited doubly by picking up projects previously considered by the U.S. which we, for one reason or another, were unable to assist.

In addition the U.S.S.R. aid authorities are able, when political needs require, to offer grants to recipients who, for political or economic reasons or both, hesitate to become obligated to Moscow for credits. Nepal, Yemen, and Kenya have been beneficiaries recently of this practice. Moreover, there is no strong outcry in the Soviet leadership or the Soviet press when the Kremlin permits comingling of Soviet aid with Western assistance. Today, for instance, the Soviets are building a school in Ethiopia which will be staffed by teachers being trained in the U.S.

Soviet flexibility is also illustrated by an occasional extension of an open line of credit for a fixed amount without any specific projects being mentioned. The \$100 million credit extended last fall to Algeria was merely for "economic development." Thus the Soviet economic offensive continues, flexible and unabated.

The Communist Rift

The growing rift between Moscow and Peiping is also, of course, contributing to profound changes in the Communist world. Viewed broadly, a falling out among our potential enemies is a welcome development and one which, like so many other recent developments, calls for flexible responses on our part. But the Sino-Soviet rift, like the other changes, does not mean that the net Communist threat is receding everywhere or anywhere. On the contrary, the rift may diversify and intensify the threat at least in some areas, just as the ingredients and forms of the challenge will certainly be heavily conditioned by it.

The vilification of one another by the Soviet and Chinese Communists is having far-reaching effects upon the international Communist movement. Not even the epochal struggle between Stalin and the Trotskyites had such effects—the Trotskyites were outcasts from the start without the advantage of command over the most populous state in the world.

These effects cut two ways. On the one hand, the dispute has seriously tarnished the image of Communist unity as well as the authority and universality of Communist dogma, both of which have traditionally been essential to the elan of the Communist movement and its appeal to potential supporters. After all, a worldwide argument among Communists about fundamentals makes it painfully clear that Marxism is hardly a scientific method capable of producing clear answers to social problems.

On the other hand, the Sino-Soviet recriminations have greatly accelerated the fragmentation of control within the world Communist movement. Loosened controls have permitted Communist states and parties to pursue their objectives with greater freedom. Indeed, some of them are likely to benefit by the removal of prior handicaps. Local Communist leaders will have a wider range of choice and a freer hand in pursuing those policies which they regard as most effective in their own national environments.

As each attacks the other and defends its own position, Moscow and Peiping are bidding for the support of Communists throughout the

world. The Soviets still have the backing—in one degree or another—of most party leaders and organizations, although the degree of support for Soviet tactics has tended to be more and more qualified. Even those parties most opposed to the Chinese Communists' theoretical propositions have been reluctant to support the Soviets in any effort to impose sanctions on the Chinese, lest their own freedom of action be curtailed by a resurgence of tightened control within the movement. The Chinese have gained the support of half a dozen foreign parties and have been actively supporting the formation of new Chinese-oriented Communist organizations. Above all, the mere existence of a rival Chinese line has weakened the established Soviet authority and encouraged greater independence among and within all parties.

In Hungary the other day, Khrushchev said that communism now stood for "better goulash and better ballet." While we may take it for granted that communism still means more than that to Khrushchev himself, it surely means more than that to Mao.

We may in one country or another find ourselves faced with rival Communist parties—one Moscow-oriented and the other Peiping-oriented, one seeking to infiltrate the existing government or a broadly based opposition by means of united-front tactics, while the other takes the road of revolutionary violence. We may face two or more enemies in a given situation instead of one.

This erosion of Communist unity does not by any means end the dangers of communism, but we should not gloss over it as insignificant. The result for us may be a two-front struggle, but it is not a deliberate deception contrived or arranged between the two Communist capitals. Instead, the whole Communist tradition of doctrinal discipline authoritatively interpreted, of party discipline ruthlessly enforced on an identifiable membership, of a disciplined worldwide subversive order of battle supported by a single power center which ultimately decides on timing and tactics—this whole Communist tradition is itself undergoing contradictions and is at the verge of breaking up. In the process of breaking up, the splinters may become exceedingly sharp.

For instance, competition with Communist China imposes upon the Soviet Union a new need to demonstrate to critical Communist audiences that the Soviet Union is not derelict in its revolutionary duty. It is not surprising, therefore, that a new emphasis on national liberation movements has appeared in Soviet public statements in the past 6 months. The extent to which Moscow will translate into action its avowed support for violence for these purposes remains to be seen. But at the least, the Soviet Union may be less likely to counsel restraint to those who champion violence, a factor which adds to the probabilities that the Communist challenge is an abiding, not a subsiding, one.

The Disarray of Safety

Returning to our side of the Iron Curtain, we should note that holes are now being poked into it from the Baltic to the Black Sea. If containment was a negative policy—a policy of blocking communism's outward thrust into the free world—we now have an opportunity, a marginal but growing one, to pursue a positive policy of influencing developments in certain parts of the Communist world. In some ways we can contribute to the evolution of healthier trends.

I have in mind particularly the resurgence of nationalism in Eastern Europe. In part because of the weakening of controls within the bloc as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, the countries of Eastern Europe are increasingly able to pursue their own interests and to seek better relations with the West. We should not expect too much. But by judiciously responding to their approaches, we can aid these countries in their efforts to detach themselves a little further from Soviet control—and to move toward policies of their own which may become more expressive of their national interests than of old-style Communist ambitions for world conquest.

Yet in order to do so, we shall once more have to pursue increasingly flexible policies. Of course, one man's flexibility is another man's inconsistency. Doubtless there will be those who find elements of inconsistency in a policy which treats different Communists differently.

Indeed, the problem of coping with such seeming inconsistencies will be with us more and more. For if we continue to succeed in moderating the Communist threat, and in encouraging individual Communist countries to pursue less dramatically threatening policies toward us, we shall move into a period in which the whole pattern of international politics, familiar since World War II, will tend to blur.

Basically, containment was a simple policy, and, because the threat of nuclear war was so compelling, it tended to claim everyone's attention. Because containment was essentially a defensive policy, it tended to reinforce a conservative outlook, more often than not putting us in the position of reacting to others' initiatives. Our fundamental objective then as now was not to impose our political attitudes or institutions upon others but to help other countries preserve their freedom of choice against Communist expansion.

Today, at the moment of our success, we are finding that the very diversities we have sought to preserve are emerging in public, claiming attention themselves, and creating the appearance of considerable divisiveness among friends. The world seems to be less sharply divided into the Communist and the free. The once satellite countries of Eastern Europe are somewhat freer than they used to be. They are, says Khrushchev, "too big to spank." Benefiting by the contrast with Peiping, Moscow itself seems milder. Our preoccupation with the Soviet threat appears to many to be lessening. Alliances seem less secure. It has become something of a journalist's cliché to talk of the "disarray" in NATO and the OAS.

As the process of diversification continues in both the Communist and non-Communist worlds, thoughtful commentators worry that our alertness to Communist actions and our capacity to counteract them may wane. The warning is appropriate. These dangers exist, and we must guard against them. Let us hope, however, that they add up more to appearances than reality—that they are surface manifestations, not of decay, but of the growing pains of the Atlantic and American communities.

The question for all of us in the free, non-Communist nations is how to operate in this

possibly safer, more diverse world. In the day-to-day business of foreign affairs one becomes almost nostalgic for the terror of the cold war. Things were more easily organizable then. Fear tended to cement alliances more closely, and policy could afford the luxury of slogans and simplification. But these were the incidental benefits of our proximity to Armageddon. Now, with the process of depolarization coinciding with the arrival of an apparently safer world, we shall have new opportunities as well as new dangers. It is important not to jeopardize the opportunities, just as it is essential not to indulge in self-delusion or false optimism over the prospects of a sudden epidemic of peace.

The Revolutionary Situation

Here in the free, non-Communist world, as we concentrate more and more on internal subversion and the counterinsurgency measures necessary to counteract it, there are several things of which we should beware.

Let us beware of any lingering notion that the United States has the solution for everyone else's problems. No country in the world is less isolationist today than we. But we cannot come in and settle your problems for you. We know as well as you do that after all is said and done, after all our aid has come and gone, the problems remain yours, not ours.

Let us beware of any residual notion that it benefits a country to keep its Communist threat—that a local Communist menace can be a natural resource, like oil or diamonds, easily convertible into U.S. support. The day is gone, if it ever existed, when an alleged Communist menace would trigger an automatic Pavlovian response in Washington. In the months and years ahead, the United States will not necessarily respond most to those who have the most Communists.

Let us beware of thinking that all internal violence can be charged off to Communist influence, when that influence may often be merely one element among others. We cannot make the world behave the way the words behave. It will be increasingly important for us in our own minds to separate Communists from non-

Communists at a time when the Communists are trying harder than ever to cloud over that distinction. We must avoid becoming entangled in the very confusions which the Communists themselves will be working overtime to cause.

For all of us engaged in the fight against communism there will be a new premium on the carefulness of our own analysis, the accuracy with which we choose our targets, and the wisdom which we employ in our tactics. In each situation we confront we must try to identify clearly the real problem, the real enemy, and the real opportunity.

Let us beware of giving the Communists more credit than they deserve. There are two sides to this notion of Communist "targets of opportunity." The Communists may have chosen the target, but the society concerned, by its previous lack of action, has provided the opportunity. There is something else about the phrase that bothers me. Even the notion of a "target of opportunity" somehow makes the problem seem small, episodic, surprising, unexpected, and manageable by minimum effort. The phrase does not convey the endemic, historic, pervasive scale of the native-born revolutionary situations which actually confront much of the free, non-Communist world. Many of these are situations not in any sense dependent upon Communist sponsorship or inspiration, situations which would have been here to plague us if Marx, Lenin, Mao, or Khrushchev had never been born.

Infiltration is indeed a new form of aggression. Guerrillas, saboteurs, organizers, agitators, are indeed a new dimension of the threat. But in a larger sense, ideas are no respecters of boundaries. The fact that danger crosses a frontier should cause us to look at the conditions which attract the infiltrator in the first place, which make him choose this country rather than another as his target. Let us beware of thinking that people inside vulnerable societies can be insulated from revolutionary danger just by posting guards in the watch-towers on the frontiers, along the coastlines, and in the airport waiting rooms, or by making the customs officials more vigilant.

Likewise the probable new push of the Soviet-

oriented wings of the Communist parties toward popular-front activities will require even greater discrimination, sensitivity, and political skill to combat. But the fact that popular fronts can once more be organized should itself constitute an early warning of danger, as well as a confession of past failure to meet real problems. It means that that particular society is already sufficiently sick and many of its people sufficiently frustrated for such a regrouping on the left to occur. It means that the objective situation itself is a stormy petrel of genuine danger, of serious disease in the body politic, of growing odds against any kind of "stability."

In Cuba the revolution came first and the deliverance to communism came afterward. The Communists do not have to get out in front. They do not necessarily advertise themselves in advance. They count heavily on our own errors.

So above all let us beware of thinking that the problems which have attracted Communist attention are therefore somehow not real problems, or that once the Communists have been rounded up, jailed, or deprived of their civil rights, the problems themselves will somehow go away. In all likelihood these problems are not synthetic or artificial. In all likelihood they will not go away until they are met. In all likelihood we ignore them at our peril. In all likelihood there is no ultimate postponement except at the cost of a worse and more final reckoning.

Much depends on how we look at the world. Security, after all, has meaning only for those who have something to preserve. Some people who have things to preserve take a deeply pessimistic view, regarding the *status quo* as substantially nonviable, impossible to perpetuate much longer. If we take this view, then most of what we do becomes a deliberate holding operation and we hope only to escape at the end, luckily with our relics, lives, and perhaps our fortunes, but just in time. In the meantime our spiritual climate becomes reduced to the sheer enjoyment of one more banquet feast, knowing that the handwriting is already on the wall.

A more enlightened conservative view holds out the hope for prolonging the *status quo* by

adjusting it under various rules of enlightened expediency. This way protest may be placated and the predictable upheaval will perhaps be put off to the successor generation.

But the real conservatives in today's world are likely to be more radical. Looking at the world with their eyes open, they have a non-doctrinaire appreciation of both the enormous problems and the remaining opportunities—opportunities for partnership, joint venture, and genuine cooperation before time runs out. They realize that radical measures are essential if anything is to be conserved, and they know that not everything is worth conserving. They will deliberately separate themselves from the latter distractions, work hard to broaden the indigenous centers of society, and concentrate their efforts in those points and places which are key—not only because of their potentiality for influence but also because of their capacity for democratic leadership.

I can think of no propositions more widely accepted in Washington than these. Our Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, Thomas C. Mann, who regretted very much indeed that he could not be here today, and whose special greetings I bring to you, had this to say less than a month ago:³

I should like to state in the very beginning—and to say it very clearly—that the Government and people of the United States do not forget that their own nation was born in revolution. Nor can we forget that the process of social, economic, and political change in our country has been continuous since 1776. It still goes on. We still seek that kind of change which will bring about the greatest good for the greatest number of our people.

We therefore have a natural sympathy and affinity for those governments who seek change and progress. Those governments which institute bold, soundly conceived programs of reform designed to achieve

national and individual freedom,
a high and sustained level of economic growth,
a greater degree of social justice, and
equal opportunity for all to rise as high in society as
their talents and efforts will take them,
will find warmhearted sympathy in Washington.

That Secretary Mann's position is supported in depth by the highest authority of the United

³ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 857.

States Government is equally clear. President Johnson himself recently said:⁴

To struggle to stand still in Latin America is just to "throw the sand against the wind."

We must, of course, always be on guard against Communist subversion. But anticommunism alone will never suffice to insure our liberty or fulfill our dreams. That is going to take leadership, leadership that is dedicated to economic progress without uneconomic privilege, to social change which enhances social justice, to political reform which widens human freedom.

Likewise at his meeting with the ambassadors at the White House on May 11, 1964, to review the Alliance for Progress, President Johnson proclaimed:⁵

. . . we will continue to join with you to encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle.

But the charter of the alliance is not confined to political democracy. It commands a peaceful, democratic, social revolution across the hemisphere. It calls upon us to throw open the gates of opportunity . . . to the poor and to the oppressed. It asks that unjust privilege be ended and that unfair power be curbed.

The President said, "We say now, if a peaceful revolution is impossible, a violent revolution is inevitable."

The Latin American Frontline

President Johnson was addressing himself to this hemisphere—to those "20 nations . . . who take strength from the richness of their diversity."⁶ And what he said has particular relevance to this hemisphere because of the changing world challenge we have been discussing this morning. For at the height of the cold war, the American Republics were geographically not on the frontlines. Although presumably no one wanted to be closer to the frontlines, there was a feeling in some quarters that less attention was being paid to our hemispheric problems because of their distance from the fray.

The converse is true under today's conditions

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 854.

⁶ For an address by President Johnson on the third anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, see *ibid.*, Apr. 6, 1964, p. 535.

of nuclear stalemate. Today the problems confronting this hemisphere move more and more to the forefront. They become less and less distinguishable from the problems which the new forms of Communist aggression present worldwide. Vast oceans protect us less against these new forms than they did against the old. Targets for Communist attention in the Americas are now as inviting as they are anywhere in Africa, or the Middle East, or in South and Southeast Asia.

Indeed, Latin America may appear to Moscow and Peiping to be especially valuable experimentally. In a sense the Communists may think they can risk more in Latin America. Cuba was a risk. The Communists lost gravely there in October 1962, but they by no means lost everything. Moreover, there is a special advantage which the Communists think they see in this hemisphere. They hope to manipulate in a direct way whatever specific anti-United States feeling they can find. They tell themselves that they can find it here in the Western Hemisphere more than elsewhere, and they would like to exploit the opportunity for as much as it is worth.

This hemisphere of ours has a rich and politically honored tradition against "intervention" from the outside, a feeling which we North Americans came to respect after a few unhappy and misguided attempts to infringe upon it ourselves in the Central American and Caribbean areas two generations ago. Yet as Communist-inspired threats to the peace and violations of human rights begin to occur increasingly within countries, rather than by direct aggression across borders, the ambit of our common interest grows. It does so in spite of our deep convictions for "sovereignty" and against "intervention." We all in fact have a stake in each successful popular government in the hemisphere.

In this connection the international community too will have to address itself increasingly to new, imaginative, and legal means for the internal safeguarding of our common interests. Recent United Nations activities in the Congo, Cyprus, and now Cambodia are hopeful examples of international action legitimatizing international intervention, just as the OAS action

at the time of the Cuban missile crisis provided a necessary legal basis for inspection-by-reconnaissance over Cuba against a threat which endangered the whole hemisphere.

Then too there is another form of international involvement going on which will affect us more and more—an increasing internationalization of specialists. Military experts and advisers from various countries will be called upon, often under international auspices, for service in a variety of ways in foreign lands. Increasing attention is being paid to the new role of armies in transitional societies: the active furtherance in an orderly manner of the processes of progressive change. Successful experience in Latin America could become an invaluable laboratory for useful transplantation elsewhere.

But most of all, this new, diverse, differentiated world confronts us all with choices—with opportunities for deliberate preferences in the reordering of our priorities.

For you as for us, there will be decisions on the proper allocation of resources to and within your military budgets. There will be decisions on how to shape and keep power appropriate to your real needs.

For you as for us, it will be necessary to warn against overoptimism, false assumptions, and temptations toward collective streaks of indecisiveness. There will be the problem of acting when action is required, at the same time as we resist impulses for cheap victories, short-term results, simple slogans, and easy solutions.

For you as for us, there will be the necessity to follow several policies at once, taking initiatives all the while we hedge against their failure. There will be certain inherited and declining situations which seem to have gone beyond the point of reversal or arrest. There will be new claims on your attention and new appeals for your support.

For you as for us, answering the demand for economic and social progress will become essential, not only as an ideological preference but as a strategic necessity. In the struggle we face, economic growth and social reform are as critically important as military strength itself. We in the United States are still committed wholeheartedly to all three.

As the leaders of the American armed forces, you have a unique chance to influence these developments in a favorable direction. In many cases you alone can provide the crucial margin of influence which will spell success or failure. You know, better than most others, that power cannot indefinitely become a substitute for people. In the very nature of your work you have opportunities to set the course of your countries toward progress rooted in popular involvement, motivation, training, civic action, and citizenship—identifying yourselves with, and working among, the people whom armies and navies and air forces are supposed to serve. I know that there is a growing appreciation in Washington and elsewhere that many of you are already doing just that.

Everywhere all of our efforts are increasingly mixing civilian and military ingredients. Combating subversion is a typical case in point. But the subversion of the Communists cannot be met by subverting the constitution in the process. In the long sweep of history the subversion of the right may be just as dangerous in terms of probable results for the hemisphere as the subversion of the left. The situation itself is revolutionary. We have the choice of joining the revolution and channeling it into the most constructive possible paths, or opposing it and delivering its leadership to forces which can destroy most that we hold dear. Much of what I have said, indeed, adds up to a requirement for a "revolution from above."

Predicament and Prophecy

So I return to my beginning. The searching questions remain: Can we cooperate as well without the cementing fear of imminent nuclear catastrophe? Can we continue to organize for the "common defense" at the time when that defense is becoming more complicated? Can we join in creating the only lasting immunity against aggression from without or within—the quick and effective building of better societies?

Of course there are still a good many ways in which the world can stumble into world war III.

We could all be brought up short again by a sudden new crisis pitting us against the U.S.S.R. once more on familiar cold-war lines. But in the absence of such a crisis, all of us who cherish freedom will have to work harder together if we are to maintain our unity and cohesion in this new world with its emerging diversities and its requirements for flexibility. We shall have to consult one another more frequently and have to search harder for new and more imaginative forms of cooperation. We can less and less rely on our enemies to do our political thinking for us.

From all over the world this many-sided challenge is taking on a new urgency: Act now, white men, brown men, black men, Asians, Africans, Europeans, and Americans. Act now, together, creatively, ahead of chaos, so that this new opportunity is not lost, so that the tragic debacles of China and Indochina and Cuba need not become a pattern of an even larger tragedy. Act now, for in the next 10 years positive ideas, dedicated people, and peaceful action may do what no extra amount of guns, bombs, and bloodshed can ever accomplish later.

As we consider the challenge to this hemisphere, we can remember with profit the lesson of Bolívar's life and work—that revolutions can stagnate if they are not followed by the release of creative social energy. In the despair of his last days on earth, the Liberator lamented: "To serve a revolution is to plow the sea." "We must fearlessly lay the foundation of South American liberty," he had warned at an earlier moment of victory. "To hesitate is destruction." His warning, unheeded, had become prophetic.

And so too the time has come for each of us, in his own way, in his own position of responsibility, in his own American Republic, to heed the words of Lincoln, as poignant for our own generation as they were a hundred years ago:

"The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present. The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion. As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country."

The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy in an Era of Expanding Frontiers

by George C. McGhee

*Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany*¹

That the American Bankers Association has accorded a diplomat a place in the crowded schedule of its monetary conference seems to me an encouraging sign of our times. This opportunity to meet and talk with you is very welcome, since it is my firm belief that representatives of private endeavor such as you, and representatives of government such as I, do indeed have much in common to discuss. This is why I have chosen as my subject "The Parallel Roles of Business and Diplomacy in an Era of Expanding Frontiers."

As I hope to show, we have entered this era by having together progressively broken down barriers between nations to the flow of trade, capital, and ideas. Another barrier which we would, in my view, do well to dismantle completely is the notion that public policy and private activity have their own spheres of action and that these spheres are, so to speak, separated by a fence. It happens that I have spent some years on each side of that figurative fence, as a businessman as well as a government servant. This experience has convinced me that any arbitrary division of public and private interests does not correspond to the realities of the second half of the 20th century. To plan wisely for the period ahead, we need a better and a broader concept of the respective functions of business and government and how they interact.

In these remarks I shall try to outline such a

concept. In brief, the proposition I submit to you is that: There is but one sphere of action for both business and government and that is the whole complex world of today, in which the affairs of nations and individuals alike are interlocked. Within that sphere, the interests and objectives of business and government do not diverge but run parallel. It is the task of government to provide a framework of public policy within which private endeavor can bring its full energies to bear on the challenge of building a safer and more prosperous free society. In overwhelming measure, however, the actual work of building must lie in the hands of private businessmen.

It is the responsibility of government to act when there is any distortion in the relations between nations which prevents private enterprise from fulfilling its normal role. Reciprocally, it is the responsibility of private enterprise to use its opportunities wisely and on its own to seek further avenues for economic progress with imagination and perseverance.

It is not a question of one leading and the other following. At times, governments must act before the pent-up potential of private endeavor can be released. At other times, it is business which, through its exploration of new territories, creates the impetus for an adjustment of public policy. Opportunities for initiative change from one to the other as conditions change in the world sphere in which both business and government operate. The present moment of history—and it is my hope that I shall

¹ Address made at the 11th annual monetary conference of the American Bankers Association at Vienna, Austria, on May 19.

be able to convince you of this—is, in my judgment, one in which the Western World must look chiefly to you, and to your colleagues in business, to take the initiative.

I would like to illustrate the parallelism between the actions of business and government by reviewing the contributions of both to the extraordinary progress made by the Western World since the war. I think we can be justly proud of the achievements of both. Diplomacy has succeeded in creating a new framework of economic stability and freedom. Business has responded by building a greatly strengthened productive base and by creating a new network of international business relationships—within this framework. Business and diplomacy have, in this historic era, performed complementary, not competitive, roles. One would have been meaningless without the wholehearted support of the other.

The Concept of International Cooperation

Virtually all of the major diplomatic decisions taken in the industrial West since the war have been linked by a common purpose, even though the link is not always obvious. The majority of Western statesmen have put aside notions of narrow national advantage to pursue—with a large measure of success—the new concept that greater advantages are attainable through international cooperation. Such men as Schuman and Monnet in France, Bevin in the United Kingdom, Spaak in Belgium, De Gasperi in Italy, Adenauer and Erhard in Germany—and Marshall and Clayton in the United States—have already won a place in history as creators of such a concept.

This radical change in the political relationships within the Western World was possible, however, only because businessmen as well as statesmen worked to achieve it. In essence, the new policy represents a declaration of faith on the part of governments in the willingness and ability of private enterprise to accept new challenges. It calls upon businessmen to exchange the assurance of protection in limited national markets for the opportunity to compete in broader markets. It relies upon the talents and imagination of business to give sub-

stance to the dream of a new Europe and a new kind of partnership between Europe and America.

But let us go back to the beginning. The war left in its wake a bewildering array of interrelated problems. Europe lay in economic chaos. The social and political structure of many European nations had been destroyed or severely shaken. The weakness of Western Europe encouraged internal political division and whetted Communist appetites for subversion and aggression. The need for action was politically urgent.

Considered in purely economic terms, the immediate problem in Europe was a shortage of both private and public capital for reconstruction. Furthermore, it was not only the basic facilities of industry which needed rebuilding. The entire payments system had broken down. As Will Clayton described the situation in his famous memorandum of May 1947 to General Marshall:

Europe is steadily deteriorating. The political position reflects the economic. One political crisis after another merely denotes the existence of grave economic distress. Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving. More consumer's goods and restored confidence in the local currency are absolutely essential if the peasant is again to supply food in normal quantities to the cities. . . .

The Marshall Plan and the OEEC

The first step was a political one: a recognition on the part of the United States that action was needed because the fate of Western Europe was important to Americans. To meet the situation the United States launched the Marshall Plan. I want to emphasize, however, that the purpose of the Marshall Plan was not just to rebuild Europe with government funds. It was to restore that part of the framework for economic activity which had been damaged. The injection of capital did, indeed, produce the desired effect of reactivating the payments system and thus released the enormous energies of the private sector. Farmers could again send their produce to the consumer markets with confidence that the currency they received in payment would remain stable and could be exchanged for goods which the cities could again

manufacture. Raw materials again flowed to factories. The international payments system began to work again. The Marshall Plan was a vivid example of the complementary roles of government and private business activity.

I am sure most of you appreciate, however, that the Marshall Plan also had positive political goals. One aim was to halt the Communist drive to enter and subvert governments, revive the popular-front concept, and capture control of non-Communist organizations of all kinds. The Marshall Plan helped to restore faith in democratic institutions by showing that they were able to respond effectively to urgent needs. It gave the lie to Lenin's dogma that, because of the inherent contradictions of capitalism, capitalist states cannot cooperate for a constructive purpose but must inevitably fall into conflict.

It is of interest to note statistics which show, in some measure, the political effect which economic rehabilitation, in concert of course with other factors, had in Western Europe. In France, the number of seats held by Communists in the National Assembly decreased from 163 in 1946 to 103 in 1951. In Italy, the Communist Party's share of the vote fell from 31 percent in 1948 to 23 percent in 1953. In Belgium and Holland, Communist strength deteriorated markedly from the high point of 1945-46 to a level at which it constituted no threat to orderly government in the early fifties. In the Federal Republic of Germany, the Communist Party dropped from 5.7 percent of the vote in 1949 to 2.2 percent in 1953.

The Marshall Plan also had a second political goal. It looked beyond the chaos of the moment toward the creation of a new kind of Europe, one free of the national rivalries which twice had plunged the world into war. The plan was framed, by the farsighted statesmen who guided it, to give impetus to political integration in Western Europe. It was also intended to develop among Europeans the habit of working together toward common goals.

But here again, the objective was not simply that of integrating governmental aims but of establishing a framework within which private interests could act with greater freedom and confidence. Today one need only contemplate the growing number of European-wide business concerns which got their start under the Mar-

shall Plan to realize how private business has responded to the idea of a European-wide economic entity.

One of the major instruments of postwar economic policy has been the Organization for European Economic Cooperation—the OEEC. This organization embraced 17 European countries, with the United States and Canada participating as associates. The OEEC was founded in Paris in 1948, in a period of general shortages, internal price controls, and rationing. Foreign trade was subject to a restrictive regime of quotas. As long as these restrictions were maintained, tariffs played only a secondary role in limiting trade.

Most countries, in the early postwar years, were obliged to try to balance their trade on a rigid bilateral basis. From its inception, the OEEC worked to break down these walls of protectionism. As one of its first acts, it adopted a Code of Liberalization. Each member of the OEEC undertook, on a regional basis, progressively to dismantle its quantitative restrictions to trade. In order to lubricate this process of liberalization and to facilitate multilateral settlements, the European Payments Union was founded.

Private initiative throughout Western Europe responded quickly to these new opportunities for trade and investment. Exports to member countries rose from \$7.6 billion in 1948 to \$13.5 billion in 1953. During the same period the real gross national product of the area advanced from \$132 billion to \$172 billion a year, a gain of over 30 percent. These exports and imports are but the statistical expression of the cumulative effects of the activities of tens of thousands of private manufacturers and traders, whose energies had been released by governmental action.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Political and economic measures, however, were not of themselves sufficient to meet the total problem that the Western nations faced at that time. In fact, they could not have succeeded had not the governments concerned also taken unprecedented politico-military steps to defend the Atlantic community from the threat of Soviet aggression.

The Czechoslovakian coup d'état and the Berlin blockade, in 1948, shattered postwar hopes of East-West cooperation. America and Europe had to look urgently to their defenses. Their response was in the pattern set by their experience of cooperation in economic matters. They created the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, an alliance unique in history in that it placed national forces, in peacetime, under international command. NATO provided the shield of security and the sense of confidence which were vital to Europe's reconstruction and the continuing dynamic development of the Atlantic community.

The sharing of defense responsibilities among the NATO partners has vastly increased the security of each—and of all. At the same time it has permitted the Atlantic community confidently to devote large resources to productive purposes, despite the constant external threat. This has been possible because NATO has successfully met that threat. Twenty-five NATO divisions—representing no fewer than seven NATO nations—guard the eastern bastions of Atlantic freedom. The presence in Germany of the equivalent of six divisions of American troops testifies to the United States' energetic fulfillment of its own NATO commitments and to America's recognition that the defense of Europe and the United States is inseparable.

There is, however, no cause for complacency. Advances in military science, and the continued presence of powerful Soviet armies in Eastern Europe, require continual modernization and further strengthening of NATO's military might, particularly its conventional forces. In the nuclear field, too, the formation of a seaborne multilateral force—now under consideration by eight nations—will provide an important diversification and strengthening of the NATO deterrent and a means whereby Europe may play a more extensive nuclear role in its own defense.

Like most of the postwar institutions we have created, NATO also fulfills a multiple purpose. In its early years NATO was necessarily preoccupied by the menace of military aggression in Europe. Since that period, however, developments in the world political situation have compelled the alliance to take a broader view of its responsibilities in meeting the total threat to our democratic institutions. The members

of the alliance have made NATO an effective forum for political consultation. Day by day, in the North Atlantic Council, the representatives of 15 nations exchange views and information on a wide variety of international issues affecting the vital interests of the free world.

Like the Marshall Plan, NATO has also given additional scope to private enterprise and has provided a new stimulus to its ingenuity. For reasons of security and greater rationalization of effort, NATO has encouraged as broad a production base as possible—embracing large segments of the private sector. While there are many examples of cooperative production efforts which have given the alliance new and better weapons, one of the most outstanding is certainly the unprecedented common effort to produce the F-104G Starfighter. In this vast program, which has now involved expenditures of over \$3 billion, such famous names in aircraft manufacture as Lockheed, Fiat, Messerschmitt, and Fokker have combined their technical skills to contribute to the common defense of the West.

The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

Another early postwar achievement of diplomacy was the establishment in 1947 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—the GATT. Not only did the GATT keep under strict surveillance the application of the quantitative restrictions and exchange controls which, at that time, were the operative barriers to trade. Looking ahead to the era in which quotas would be eliminated, the GATT began a series of multilateral negotiations to reduce tariffs. The tariff negotiations under GATT were lengthy and difficult—the most recent conference, the so-called Dillon Round, lasted almost 2 years. They achieved, however, very substantial reductions in tariff levels on a world-wide basis.

There is still considerable work to be done under the GATT, not only in the tariff field but also in removing nontariff obstacles to trade. The most immediate and important challenge ahead is the Kennedy Round negotiations, which have just had their formal opening at Geneva.² The success of these negotiations is

² For background, see BULLETIN of June 1, 1964, p. 878.

an imperative not just for the Atlantic nations but for the whole free world.

The Process of "Building Europe"

The postwar development of international cooperation also encouraged Europeans to take steps, among themselves, toward more comprehensive economic and political unification. M. Schuman's proposal in 1950 for a Coal and Steel Community was the first step in this direction. After the failure of the proposal for a European Defense Community in 1954, European statesmen again sought new ways of achieving progress toward European political unification. The result was the Treaty of Rome of 1957, establishing both the European Economic Community and EURATOM.

The United States Government welcomed and supported the establishment of both these communities. Our support was primarily based on their importance as leading toward an eventual political union of Europe. We also recognized, however, that the establishment of a unified European economic area, although it posed risks of discrimination against us, would ultimately result in a greatly increased flow of trade and investment between Europe and America—to the economic advantage of both.

On both sides of the Atlantic we are having problems of adjustment as this new European entity is being created. This process of reciprocal adjustment will continue and will provide headaches for us all. However, we must not let our difficulties cause us to lose sight of the larger economic and political advantages. It was, in fact, the stimulus of the EEC which prompted the establishment of the European Free Trade Association—and the United States Trade Expansion Act—both important steps toward reducing trade barriers in the Western World.

The process of "building Europe," as the proponents of European unity call it, is far from complete. Yet it is certainly more than begun. It is universally recognized that the European Economic Community has had the political effect of drawing its members closer together. There have been checks in the movement toward unity. A major one was the failure of the negotiations for British entry into

the EEC. Indeed, there is not at present full agreement among Europeans on either the membership or the nature of the Europe of the future they are seeking to create. It seems clear, however, that a great majority of Europeans favor further steps toward integration, and I am confident that, in the long run, this desire will find fruition in a great political act of union.

In the meantime, much freer movement of goods, labor, and capital among the Common Market countries has made it possible for the first time to rationalize production on a European-wide basis and thereby to benefit directly almost 200 million consumers. A more complete "division of labor" within Europe has been achieved. American private traders have also participated substantially in the new opportunities that have been created in the Common Market area. This is shown by the fact that U.S. exports to the Common Market rose from about \$2.4 billion in 1958 to something like \$3.9 billion in 1963.

Moreover, many American firms, desiring to share in the rapid growth of the Common Market, have invested heavily in building new manufacturing and assembly plants in the EEC area. These investments have brought about a healthy cross-fertilization of ideas and production techniques across the Atlantic. Most Common Market countries recognize, as do the Germans, that these investments stimulate competition and increase productivity within Europe. They help provide new markets for European manufacturers. They also have the important effect of accelerating the overall economic integration taking place within the Atlantic world.

International Monetary Cooperation

An important goal of more than a decade of postwar economic diplomacy was the achievement of currency convertibility within the Atlantic world. This goal had been set at the 1944 monetary conference at Bretton Woods. There the twin institutions—the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank—were established with the view to bringing about a new multilateral monetary order in the postwar period. With the economic gains I have de-

scribed, most European members of the Atlantic community were able by 1958 to announce full or partial convertibility of their currencies.

Primarily because of its profound impact, the advent of currency convertibility has brought in its wake some difficult problems of adjustment. However, the postwar habit of consultation has continued to expand—particularly in the field of international monetary cooperation. I have in mind the periodic discussions within the IMF itself; the Economic Policy Committee and Working Party III of the OECD, the successor of the OEEC; the monthly meetings in Basel of central bankers; the cooperative study of the world's payments system now underway by the Group of Ten;³ and the London gold pool. This cooperation has made it possible to respond effectively, and sometimes with lightning rapidity, to the new strains of a convertible world.

Within this larger framework, the Common Market as an institution has also begun to attack the problem of inflation on a Community-wide basis. The measures announced last month in Brussels will certainly assist in assuring more stable monetary conditions among the Six. It is a concomitant of its successful integration in trade that the Common Market achieve an increasing degree of integration in fiscal and monetary policies—looking toward the full economic union scheduled for 1970. In this instance, inflationary pressures throughout Europe, but particularly in Italy, provided the problem and the stimulus. The Community has recognized that, when a member suffers difficulties of this kind, the matter is of concern to the whole Community.

All these achievements of postwar diplomacy—the Marshall Plan, the OEEC, NATO, the GATT, the Common Market, and currency convertibility—have one vital element in common: the recognition that decisions of one country affect the interests of others. The recognition of interdependence in economic matters, and the establishment of rules and institutions aimed at reducing or eliminating national economic barriers, contrast sharply with the “beggar thy neighbor” attitude which prevailed between the two world wars. It was this attitude

that contributed greatly to the spreading of the Great Depression throughout Europe and North America during the 1930's. It is interesting and instructive to recall that, here in this lovely city of Vienna, the depression was triggered in Europe when self-defeating decisions taken outside Austria caused the failure of the *Kreditanstalt*.

While this complex of postwar institutions has prevented many of the abuses of former times, its greatest value has been in the scope it has given to private initiative. We on the governmental side are proud that we have been able to create this institutional framework. You on the private side can, in my opinion, be equally proud of the dramatic way in which you have responded to the opportunities thus opened up.

Your accomplishments and those of your colleagues and clients have indeed been remarkable. The combined GNP of the Atlantic area rose from about \$450 billion in 1950 to almost \$1,000 billion last year. The foreign trade of the Atlantic nations has almost doubled during the past 10 years—from roughly \$50 billion in 1953 to over \$90 billion today. The new economic activity this trade reflects has provided 20 million additional jobs since 1950. These new figures demonstrate the rapid increase in prosperity made possible by an international rationalization of private productive effort.

But this is by no means the entire story. The increasing integration of our economies has certainly brought us all closer together in a number of ways. How far the process has gone in affecting our daily lives was impressed upon me recently when my daughter asked me whether I had heard the latest definition of what it is to be a typical American. A typical American, she said, is a man who drives home from an Italian movie in his German car, sits down on his Danish furniture, and writes with his Japanese ballpoint pen on Irish stationery to his Congressman, complaining about too much gold outflow from the United States. Our movement toward Atlantic integration has, however, not only given us greater prosperity and fullness of life; it has created greater unity and through greater unity greater strength.

I am, of course, well aware that serious political and economic problems still confront the Atlantic community. Our diplomacy does not

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615.

take them lightly. Considered in isolation from the general trend of our affairs, some of them seem formidable. In economic matters, the Europe of the Six is able to speak with one voice and the United States is able to consult and negotiate with this entity to our mutual advantage. There is, however, no representative at the international conference table who speaks for Europe on the political plane. There one hears many voices—sometimes strident voices—representing purely national interests. The major Continental European powers are often not in accord. Consultation with us thus becomes a process much more complex and much less fruitful than it could be if Europe were a political entity. As a result, Europe's collective "weight" in world affairs is much less than it should be.

Those who focus their gaze only on the difficulties we are encountering will find the catalog discouraging. Let me point out, however, that a good many of our current concerns are the product, not of stagnation in the Atlantic community, but of its tremendous achievements. We would not be worrying about imperfections in the organization of Europe and an Atlantic partnership if we had not already advanced such a long way toward establishing both. In the perspective of almost two decades of development, the state of our Atlantic world gives businessmen and diplomats alike just reason for pride—and for confidence in the future.

The Atlantic World and the Developing Nations

We all know that we cannot stand still. We on the government side must continue to cope with new problems as they arise and to seek to create even greater opportunities for private endeavor. However, I submit that, at the present stage, the function of diplomacy within the Atlantic community consists more of striving to perfect existing institutions and concepts than of creating new ones. The key internal political forces which will shape our future have already been set in motion.

Indeed, the real challenge to our diplomacy today lies in a new direction. It is to make possible the expansion of our horizons beyond the confines of our Atlantic world, to our rela-

tions with the vast areas and peoples of the developing countries. Here diplomacy is beginning a new chapter of history. Here, during the decades ahead, the task of both diplomacy and private business is to establish a new dimension to their cooperation.

While we recognize that we have much to learn about the complicated process of development, it seems to me that some of the basic principles that have worked so well in bringing prosperity and integration to our Atlantic world are applicable. Large transfers of public as well as private capital will be required; security against the threat of invasion or subversion must be assured; impediments to trade must be reduced or eliminated; stable monetary conditions must be attained; and above all there will need to be created a governmental and institutional framework which gives scope and stimulation to private enterprise. In meeting the challenges of the less developed world, there will be a need for all of the energy and creativeness, as well as the patience and understanding, which both diplomacy and business can provide.

A successful Kennedy Round will in itself create new opportunities for a further substantial expansion of trade—not just among the Atlantic nations but between us and the developing world. The success of this effort, of course, not only depends on the diplomatic skills of the various nations represented at the conference but the extent to which private businessmen throughout the West support these negotiations and take advantage of the new trade opportunities which the negotiations will create.

In providing for the future, we must also be prepared to work cooperatively to strengthen the processes for adjusting payments balances between countries. Much remains to be learned as we seek to develop a dependable adjustment mechanism within the context of payments freedom. We cannot, however, safely rely upon the outcome of uncoordinated policies or the resultant of random forces to do the job for us.

Another major task both for the Atlantic nations and the developing countries is to insure the continuing stability of the world's payments system and the adequacy of international liquidity. This matter, as you know, is currently

being studied by the Group of Ten. Since Secretary [of the Treasury Douglas] Dillon and Under Secretary [of the Treasury Robert V.] Roosa will surely have much to say to you on this subject, I will do no more than mention it as a further important area in which the interests of government and business coincide.

Other government problems will remain. New ones will doubtless emerge. Broadly viewed, however, the Kennedy Round tariff reductions and the further strengthening of the international payments system will bring the Atlantic community to the threshold of a new era, in which a major responsibility for further economic expansion will rest in private hands. To maintain what has been achieved, and to build upon it, will be a task for you, for your European colleagues, and for your clients on both sides of the Atlantic.

This task will not be easy. It involves much more than the exploitation of new trade opportunities. The maintenance of our newly won freedoms requires economic statesmanship of the highest order—combined with a long-term perspective. The high degree of integration we have achieved cannot survive if our private firms cry for national protection whenever they feel the pinch of competition. Our industrial associations cannot just be pressure groups for new restrictions on trade, denouncing a product because it is “foreign”—or because it was produced elsewhere with less expensive labor. Such attitudes can destroy the precious framework of freedom which we in government have in the postwar years striven so hard to build, and which you in business have so strongly supported.

Pattern of Parallel and Reciprocal Roles

Summing up, we have traced the roles of government and business in the postwar years. The pattern which emerges is one of parallel and reciprocal actions. I hope you will grant that, in the dark days following the war when the economic weather was so bad as to be considered almost hopeless, diplomacy demonstrated its ability to act courageously and decisively. With an improvement in climate, pri-

vate enterprise responded vigorously and boldly. Further diplomatic moves, some of which are still in train, have again enlarged the sphere of potential private achievement. Now, again, the next move is up to you.

Within the business community, you bankers will have an especially important part to play. You are more than just the financiers of trade and industry. You are also the advisers and counselors of business leadership. In two important ways, your advice will be influential in determining whether we of the Western World rise fully to the challenges we face.

One is the opportunity you have to stimulate responsible discussion of the problems and potentialities which lie ahead both for business and for government. You can do much to insure that questions of business and governmental policy are considered in an Atlantic-wide perspective—indeed, in a free-world perspective, which is their true context today.

The other and even more important service you can perform is to aid business in identifying and grasping the myriads of opportunities for private enterprise which have been created by parallel public and private action in the postwar years. If you can assist in guiding the energies of private enterprise into the channels which now lie open to receive them, you will indeed help to make this era of expanding frontiers an era of triumph for free men.

Your vision must leap over oceans and national boundaries. You must advise your clients in Chicago—or Topeka—of opportunities in Frankfurt—or Lagos—just as your predecessors advised Eastern investors of opportunities in California. Some day you and your European colleagues will find it as natural to carry on business intercontinentally as you now find it to deal with your fellow bankers throughout the United States.

A wide field for achievement lies before you. I am confident that you will, as you pursue your task, find your Government at your side—not hindering but ready to help you over the difficult paths. I am confident that you, for your part, will discharge your own responsibilities with broad vision and high purpose.

U.S. and Japan Inaugurate Transpacific Telephone Cable

Following is an exchange of remarks between President Johnson and Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda on June 18 inaugurating a new transpacific telephone cable from Hawaii to Japan.

White House press release dated June 18

President Johnson

This is an historic and happy occasion. The new cable between our countries is another welcome step toward transforming the Pacific from a barrier to a bridge between Asia and America.

I am sure better communications will mean even better understanding between our peoples.

We are proud this symbol of the strong bonds of friendship between the United States and Japan is being placed in service this year when the Olympic games focus the eyes of the world on your country and your capital city.

May I take this opportunity to express to you and your countrymen the sympathy and concern of my countrymen for the suffering and sorrow inflicted by the earthquakes this week.

We are proud to work with your country in the labors of the free world, Mr. Prime Minister, and it is my great pleasure to talk with you in this way tonight.

Prime Minister Ikeda

Thank you very much for your gracious message, Mr. President, which I just listened to on this newly installed means of communication.

Today the transpacific cable for which both Japan and the United States have long yearned is successfully opened. We can indeed congratulate ourselves for this achievement. In behalf of the people and Government of Japan, I should like to express my heartfelt felicitation to you, Mr. President, and to the people of the United States.

The rapid progress made in the field of science and technology has brought about revolutionary changes in the field of electric telecommunications. The role such changes have played in

the advancement of man's well-being is immeasurable.

In political, economic, cultural, and other areas of our endeavors, the relations between Japan and the United States have become closer than ever. This newly created physical bond across the Pacific, in addition to the recent development in the satellite communications, will enable our peoples even more to deepen our mutual understandings and encourage our cooperative works. The fact that we can now exchange our voices between Tokyo and Washington more clearly and speedily than ever will benefit greatly not only the relations between Japan and the United States but also our common effort to achieve peace and prosperity in the world.

Mr. President, we deeply appreciate the sympathy you and the people of your country have extended to us on the earthquake disaster in northwest Japan.

Being grateful to share with you, Mr. President, the privilege of being the first user of this cable, I should like to extend on this occasion my greetings to you, Mr. President, and to convey the deep feelings of friendship and good wishes of the Japanese people to the people of the United States.

President Announces Determination On Credit Guarantees for Rumania

Following is the text of a letter from President Johnson to Carl Hayden, President pro tempore of the Senate. An identical letter was sent on the same day to John W. McCormack, Speaker of the House of Representatives.

White House press release dated June 15

JUNE 15, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In compliance with Title III of the Foreign Aid and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1964, this is to inform you that I have determined that it is in the national interest for the Export-Import Bank to issue guarantees in connection with the sale of United States products and services to Rumania. This determination is in addition to the deter-

mination relating to agricultural products of which I informed you on February 4, 1964¹ and is intended to cover all types of United States products and services.

These guarantees will be limited to sales on short and medium term credits.

The Export-Import Bank will report the individual guarantees to the Congress as they may be issued.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Four U.S. Nuclear Reactors Placed Under IAEA Safeguards

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission released on June 11 the following announcement, which had been distributed to the public media that day at Vienna by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

The Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency today [June 11] approved an agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Agency whereby four reactors in the United States will be placed under Agency safeguards against diversion to nonpeaceful ends.

The four reactors concerned are the Yankee Nuclear Power Station in Rowe, Massachusetts; the Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor; the Brookhaven Medical Research Reactor; and the Piqua Organic Moderated Power Reactor.² The most important of these is the Yankee Power Reactor, both because of its size and the fact that it is the first power plant with a thermal capacity of more than 100 megawatts to be placed under the IAEA expanded safeguards system which was finally approved by the board in February of this year.

The Yankee Reactor, owned by the Yankee Atomic Electric Company, is a pressurized,

light water nuclear power plant producing electricity for the New England area. It is fueled with slightly enriched uranium, and its annual plutonium production is estimated at over 80 kilograms. The output has been raised to 600 megawatts thermal (175 MWE) although it was originally designed for only 392 megawatts thermal. The plant is privately owned and operated.

The International Atomic Energy Agency Director General was informed in April of this year that the United States intended to invite the Agency to apply its safeguards to this facility, and this intent was also announced by the U.S. Representative at the Disarmament Conference in Geneva.³

An agreement for such an application of IAEA safeguards has in the meantime been drafted by the U.S. authorities and the Agency secretariat, and the board today approved the agreement which will be in force for five years. The Yankee Reactor will be open for inspection "at all times", but it has not yet been decided if Agency inspectors will make frequent inspection trips from Vienna or have an inspector stationed at the facility.

The Brookhaven Graphite Research Reactor with a capacity of 20 MWT will also be open for inspection at all times because of its large inventory of highly enriched fuel. The Medical Research Reactor in Brookhaven has a capacity of 3 MWT and the Piqua Power Reactor of 45.5 MWT; the latter started to produce electricity in November 1963.

The last three reactors have been inspected by IAEA under its safeguards system since mid-1962, but the agreement covering this phase was drawn up mainly to make it possible for the Agency staff to gain experience in the practical application of safeguards. The agreement now approved by the board covers full safeguards arrangements in accordance with the Agency statute.

The cost of the safeguards arrangements under this agreement will be borne by IAEA.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 24, 1964, p. 298.

² The two research reactors are located at Brookhaven National Laboratory on Long Island in New York, and the Piqua reactor is located at Piqua, Ohio.

³ For text of a statement made by Adrian S. Fisher on Mar. 5, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

In Session as of June 30, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament Geneva Mar. 14, 1962-

Scheduled July Through September 1964

U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Customs Administration: 4th Session.	Bangkok	July 1-
14th International Film Festival	Karlovy Vary, Czechoslovakia.	July 4-
BIRPI Industrial Property Seminar for Latin America	Bogotá	July 6-
FAO Intergovernmental Committee for the World Food Program: 5th Session.	Geneva	July 6-
27th International Conference on Public Education	Geneva	July 6-
5th European Civil Aviation Conference	Strasbourg	July 6-
ANZUS Council: 11th Meeting	Washington	July 13-
IMCO Panel on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 1st Session	London	July 13-
U.N. ECAFE Subcommittee on Metals and Engineering: 10th Session.	Tokyo	July 13-
PAHC Permanent Executive Committee and the Darien Subcommittee.	México, D.F.	July 13-
U.N. Economic and Social Council: 37th Session	Geneva	July 13-
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 6th Session.	London	July 20-
U.N. ECAFE Working Party on Telecommunication Experts: 2d Session.	Tokyo	July 22-
17th International Film Festival	Locarno	July 22-
IA-ECOSOC Committee of Governmental Experts in Aviation: 2d Meeting.	Santiago	July
South Pacific Commission: Final Meeting on Revision of Commission.	Wellington	July
8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Viña del Mar, Chile . .	Aug. 1-
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th Session.	London	Aug. 4-
ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology	Bangkok	Aug. 4-
UNESCO International Conference on Youth	Grenoble	Aug. 23-
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Ottawa	Aug. 31-
3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.	Geneva	Aug. 31-
17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	August
South Pacific Commission: Regional Education Seminar	Nouméa	August or September
ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session	Montreal	Sept. 1-
3d FAO Regional Conference for Africa	Tananarive	Sept. 3-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Costs . .	Geneva	Sept. 7-
ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference	Madrid	Sept. 7-
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 10th Session . . .	Washington	Sept. 8-
U.N. ECA Industrial Coordination Conference in West Africa . .	Bamako, Mali	Sept. 15-
U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.	New York	Sept. 15-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcommittee on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain.	London	Sept. 21-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, June 19, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty; BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congress; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session	Geneva	Sept. 21-
2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Health	Beirut	Sept. 21-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry	Geneva	Sept. 21-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session	Rome	Sept. 22-
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session	Auckland	Sept. 22-
BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee	Geneva	Sept. 28-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 28-
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session	Geneva	Sept. 28-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Meeting	Copenhagen	Sept. 28-
International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly	Caracas	Sept. 30-
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Session	Manila	September
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting	San José	September
Inter-American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Directing Council	Montevideo	September
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports	Lima	September
PAHO Directing Council: 15th Meeting	México, D.F.	September
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Education	Santiago	September
U.N. ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage Techniques	Paris	September
UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference	Cairo	September
UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session	Paris	September
UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Survey Methods	Toulouse	September

U.N. Security Council Condemns Apartheid in South Africa; Sets Up Committee To Study Sanctions

Following are two statements made by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative, in the Security Council, together with a resolution adopted by the Council on June 18.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 16

U.S./U.N. press release 4415 and Corr. 1

I want to express the appreciation of my delegation to the distinguished Ambassador of Norway and to the other conferees who have produced the resolution that has just been introduced after prolonged and careful consideration. Pending the introduction of a resolution, we have refrained from speaking at this session of the Security Council on the subject of *apartheid*. However, now that a resolution is before the Council for action, I should like to take the liberty of expressing the views of my Government on the subject of racial discrimina-

tion in the Republic of South Africa and on the resolution that has been introduced.

The *apartheid* policies of the Government of South Africa not only offend the principles set forth in the charter; they challenge our determination to uphold these principles, and they challenge the ability of the United Nations to find the best means of influencing the course of South African history toward peaceful change.

South Africa's racial policies have forced upon the United Nations the task of trying to persuade a member state to alter a course of action which affects not only its own peoples but the racial situation in the world at large. The United Nations' task is not only to help the majority of the peoples of South Africa to fulfill their legitimate aspirations but also to avoid a racial conflict which could seriously trouble peace and progress in Africa and throughout the world.

Ever since the seventh session in 1952, the Assembly first, and then the Security Council, have sought to express the United Nations' convictions and impress its influence upon a situation which, because it involves violations of the charter and because it may become even more serious, is a situation of international concern.

In the world of today no nation can be entirely "sovereign," no nation can ignore the impact of its national acts on the rest of mankind. In a recent address delivered at the University of California, the Secretary-General of the United Nations in comparing the evolution of the League of Nations and the United Nations stated this idea very clearly: "The basis," he said, "of both the League of Nations and the United Nations is the pledge by sovereign states to cooperate, a pledge which involves some measure of sacrifice of sovereignty in the common interest We are now moving away quickly from the world of compartmentalized self-sufficiency into a world where human solidarity daily becomes more essential."

In the second place, Mr. President, in their continuing concern for the situation in South Africa, the member states of this organization have adhered to the concept that the freedom of men anywhere is the concern of men everywhere. This concept is not only expressed in the 55th article of our charter and in the Declaration of Human Rights but is inscribed on the hearts of men of good will universally.

Finally, Mr. President, the member states of the United Nations have considered the policy of *apartheid* to be a racial issue and therefore of concern to all men. They consider it racist in its origins, arrogant in its implementation, and, in its consequences, potentially dangerous for all.

For many years the United States Government has urged the Government of the Republic of South Africa, both within and outside the United Nations, to abandon this policy.

I would add, Mr. President, that opposition to *apartheid* in this country springs from the very roots of our historical and political ideals. It is intensified by the determined efforts we have now set in motion in this country to realize fully the society these ideals prescribe, one which affords equal and just treatment to all our

citizens without regard to race or religion, and without discrimination of any kind.

New Developments in South Africa

Since last the Security Council turned its attention to the question of *apartheid*, new developments in South Africa have increased our concern. Just last week we learned with profound regret of the life sentences imposed on eight of the defendants in the Rivonia trials, including some of the most prominent leaders in the struggle against *apartheid*, although we were, of course, relieved that death sentences were not imposed. The sentences and the actions that led to them are yet another distressing sign of the tragic interaction between repression and violence which in South Africa today continues to frustrate any progress toward conciliation and negotiation. The basic philosophy of the laws under which the defendants were charged, the law under which persons are detained for the purpose of providing evidence, and the whole legislative and administrative machinery which takes away the rights of all in trying to preserve them for a minority, is cause for deep concern.

Since the Security Council last considered *apartheid*, the promulgation of new laws of the kind described in the report of the Special Committee on Apartheid, the further additions to the military forces of South Africa that might be used for internal suppression, and the passage by the South African Parliament of the discriminatory Bantu Laws Amendment bill, all these indications give us little hope that the Government is changing its view of the status of nonwhites in South Africa.

There is no doubt in our minds that seeds of violence are planted by each one of these repressive acts based upon the repugnant philosophy of *apartheid*. There is an increasingly dangerous interaction between repression and violence, and time is running out in which to turn the spiral down—toward a peaceful solution. The moving statement of Nelson Mandela, spoken in his defense at the Rivonia trial, presented to the world the anguish and frustration of those struggling against the injustices of South Africa's racial policies.

Since the adoption of the Security Council's resolution of 4 December,¹ the Council has received two reports from the Special Committee on Apartheid² and the report of the Secretary-General³ which contained the report of the group of experts which he appointed under the terms of that resolution. We have examined the various conclusions and recommendations of these bodies with care. While we have a number of reservations about certain aspects of these reports, and in particular do not subscribe to the recommendations in paragraph 121 of the report of the group of experts, we share the intense concern which they reflect.

We very much regret that the South African Government did not choose to afford the group of experts an opportunity to visit South Africa and thus to enhance the objectivity and accuracy of their report. Such a visit would, we think, have facilitated the group's task.

Their report places particular emphasis on the need for what they term a "National Convention" to help to bring about a peaceful resolution of the situation. The United States has consistently held that the ultimate solution in South Africa must be worked out by the peoples of South Africa themselves, worked out on the basis of a free and equal exchange of views between all segments of the population, worked out on the basis of give and take.

The first link in such consultation must be the establishment of communication. We would hope the South African Government for its part would respond favorably to such a concept, would cooperate with the United Nations, and would seek such assistance, both within and outside the United Nations, as might be useful.

We also see merit in the concept of a special training and education program for South Africans to be established under the auspices of the United Nations. Such a program would afford to those South Africans who have chosen to leave their country, or who have little access to higher education within their country, a

chance to pursue their studies elsewhere. The United States is prepared to examine opportunities to contribute to such a program, both financially and in terms of scholarship and other facilities at American educational institutions. There is much interest throughout the world in such a program and much willingness to help in providing educational opportunities for South Africans. In the past, however, there has been some difficulty in finding the best way of applying offers of assistance. We would envisage that such a program, if established, would provide a useful central point for administering effectively educational assistance for South Africans.

U.S. Position Concerning Sanctions

Much has been said here in the Council and elsewhere on the question of sanctions. My Government continues to believe that the situation in South Africa, though charged with somber and dangerous implications, does not today provide a basis under the charter for the application by the Security Council of coercive measures. Nor can we support the concept of an ultimatum to the South African Government which could be interpreted as threatening the application of coercive measures in the situation now prevailing, since in our view the charter clearly does not empower the Security Council to apply coercive measures in such a situation.

However, the group of experts has suggested that a study of sanctions be undertaken. My Government has given this proposal serious and prolonged consideration and would be prepared to support the initiation of a properly designed study and to participate in it. But—and let me be explicit—our willingness to see such a study go forward under certain circumstances or our willingness to participate in such a study represents in no way an advance commitment on the part of my Government to support at any specific time the application under the charter of coercive measures with regard to the South African situation or any other situation; nor should this position be interpreted as relating to our view of the situation in South Africa today or what it may become tomorrow. We do feel that such a study, if agreed to by

¹ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson on Dec. 4 and text of the resolution, see BULLETIN of Jan. 20, 1964, p. 92.

² U.N. docs. S/5621 and S/5717.

³ U.N. doc. S/5658 and Corr. 1.

the Security Council, could make a contribution to a fuller understanding on the part of the Council. While our support for such a study, and agreement to participate in it, is without any commitments or implications as to our future actions, we think that if and when a situation arose in which sanctions might be appropriately considered under the charter—a situation which does not today exist—the availability of a detailed, practical, and expert study would have considerable utility.

Mr. President, like other members of the United Nations, we continue to search for practical means of bringing about in South Africa the changes we all seek. In a spirit of fairness we must search for means and steps which would have a practical and beneficial effect on the present situation. This has been the spirit of the resolutions adopted by the Council last August⁴ and December, and we believe that it is the spirit of the resolution just introduced by the distinguished representative of Norway. Needless to say, we will continue to adhere to the past resolutions of the Security Council, and we will continue to search for ways of impressing upon the Government of South Africa the conviction of our Government and people that only through a policy of justice and equity for all its peoples can it look forward to a peaceful future.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 18

U.S./U.N. press release 4416

I want to intervene briefly to express once again the appreciation of the United States delegation both to the sponsors of this resolution and to the several delegations which have worked so hard and so long to reach an agreement on its terms. As the representative of Norway said the day before yesterday in introducing the resolution, it represents a compromise but we feel a valid compromise which may well prove helpful toward the solution of this stubborn problem which has vexed the world

⁴For U.S. statements made in the Security Council on Aug. 2 and 7, 1963, and text of a resolution adopted on Aug. 7, see BULLETIN of Aug. 26, 1963, p. 333.

community and our debates for so many years.

Mr. President, I am afraid that the distinguished representative of Morocco has misunderstood my statement of the day before yesterday. What I said was that my delegation could not subscribe to the recommendations of the group of experts contained in paragraph 121 of the report. I call to your attention that that paragraph reads in part as follows:

If no satisfactory reply is received from the South African Government by the stipulated date. . . we recommend that the Security Council . . . then take the decision to apply economic sanctions in the light of the result of the examination recommended . . . above.

What we cannot subscribe to, Mr. President, is the concept of an ultimatum to South Africa that, unless it complies with the recommendations for a convention by a stipulated date, economic sanctions will automatically be applied, regardless of the factual situation.

Secondly, I am sorry that the Soviet Union could not support a resolution calling for a study of measures which might be taken by this Council in accordance with the charter to influence the repugnant racial policies of South Africa. In our opinion another rhetorical cold-war attack on the United States, which could have been copied from a hundred similar attacks by the Soviet Union, is not a substitute for some positive action about the sad situation in South Africa.

As I said the other day, the United States will continue to search for practical means which will assist in bringing about the changes that I am sure we all seek. We will not only use our best efforts to implement effectively this present resolution, but we will continue to adhere to past resolutions. Paragraph 12 of the resolution that we have just adopted reaffirms provisions contained in resolutions adopted in August and December last. At those times my Government defined its position on these questions and affirmed its adherence to these provisions. I wish to reaffirm United States adherence to these provisions with, of course, the same understanding set forth in August and December by the representative of my Government.

Finally, Mr. President, let me express the hope, which I am sure is common to all of the representatives here present, that when we next meet on this question we will be able to perceive more improvement in the racial situation in South Africa than we have heretofore.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁵

The Security Council,

Having considered the question of race conflict in South Africa resulting from the policies of *apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa, brought to the attention of the Security Council by fifty-eight Member States in their letter of 27 April 1964,

Being gravely concerned with the situation in South Africa arising out of the policies of *apartheid* which are contrary to the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations and inconsistent with the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as South Africa's obligations under the Charter,

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the Special Committee on the Policies of *Apartheid* of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the report of the Group of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General pursuant to the Security Council resolution of 4 December 1963 (S/5471),

Recalling the resolutions of the Security Council of 7 August 1963 (S/5386), 4 December 1963 (S/5471) and 9 June 1964 (S/5761),

Convinced that the situation in South Africa is continuing seriously to disturb international peace and security,

Deploring the refusal of the Government of the Republic of South Africa to comply with pertinent Security Council resolutions,

Taking into account the recommendations and conclusions of the Group of Experts,

1. *Condemns* the *apartheid* policies of the Government of the Republic of South Africa and the legislation supporting these policies, such as the General Law Amendment Act, and in particular its ninety-day detention clause;

2. *Urgently reiterates* its appeal to the Government of the Republic of South Africa to liberate all persons imprisoned, interned or subjected to other restrictions for having opposed the policies of *apartheid*;

3. *Notes* the recommendations and the conclusions in the Report of the Group of Experts;

⁵ U.N. doc. S/5773; adopted by the Council on June 18 by a vote of 8 (U.S.) to 0, with 3 abstentions (Czechoslovakia, France, U.S.S.R.).

4. *Urgently appeals* to the Government of the Republic of South Africa to:

(a) renounce the execution of any persons sentenced to death for their opposition to the policy of *apartheid*;

(b) grant immediate amnesty to all persons detained or on trial, as well as clemency to all persons sentenced for their opposition to the Government's racial policies;

(c) abolish the practice of imprisonment without charges, without access to counsel or without the right of prompt trial;

5. *Endorses* and subscribes in particular to the main conclusion of the Group of Experts that "all the people of South Africa should be brought into consultation and should thus be enabled to decide the future of their country at the national level";

6. *Requests* the Secretary-General to consider what assistance the United Nations may offer to facilitate such consultations among representatives of all elements of the population in South Africa;

7. *Invites* the Government of the Republic of South Africa to accept the main conclusion of the Group of Experts referred to in paragraph 5 above and to co-operate with the Secretary-General and to submit its views to him with respect to such consultations by 30 November 1964;

8. *Decides* to establish an Expert Committee, composed of representatives of each present member of the Security Council, to undertake a technical and practical study, and report to the Security Council as to the feasibility, effectiveness, and implications of measures which could, as appropriate, be taken by the Security Council under the United Nations Charter;

9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide to the Expert Committee the Secretariat's material on the subjects to be studied by the Committee, and to co-operate with the Committee as requested by it;

10. *Authorizes* the Expert Committee to request all United Nations Members to co-operate with it and to submit their views on such measures to the Committee no later than 30 November 1964, and the Committee to complete its report not later than three months thereafter;

11. *Invites* the Secretary-General in consultation with appropriate United Nations specialized agencies to establish an educational and training programme for the purpose of arranging for education and training abroad for South Africans;

12. *Reaffirms* its call upon all States to cease forthwith the sale and shipment to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in South Africa;

13. *Requests* all Member States to take such steps as they deem appropriate to persuade the Government of the Republic of South Africa to comply with this resolution.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Antarctica

Recommendations, including agreed measures for conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted at Brussels June 2, 1964, at the Third Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting. Enters into force upon notification of approval by all governments whose representatives are entitled to participate in Antarctic treaty consultative meetings.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Japan, June 15, 1964.

Oil Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollution of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

Acceptance deposited: Italy (with reservations), May 25, 1964.

Postal Services

Universal postal convention with final protocol, annex, regulations of execution, and provisions regarding air mail with final protocol. Done at Ottawa October 3, 1957. Entered into force April 1, 1959. TIAS 4202.

Adherence: Algeria, May 28, 1964.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.

Acceptance deposited: Liberia, May 26, 1964.

Enters into force: May 26, 1965.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.¹

Notification of approval: Denmark, May 4, 1964.

BILATERAL

Germany

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9 and May 23, 1959 (TIAS 4369), approving the procedures for reciprocal filing of classified patent applications in the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany. Effected by exchange of notes at Bonn January 14 and May 28, 1964. Entered into force May 28, 1964.

Liberia

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of January 11, 1951, as amended (TIAS 2171, 3140, 3955, 4460, 4733), relating to a military mission to Liberia. Effected by exchange of notes at Monrovia December 17, 1963, and April 24, 1964. Entered into force April 24, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Informational Media Guaranties. Agreement with Pakistan, amending the agreement of February 12 and May 1, 1954, as amended. Exchange of letters—Dated at Karachi August 10, 1962, and April 15, 1963. Entered into force April 15, 1963. TIAS 5535. 4 pp. 5¢.

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of March 19, 1960. Exchange of notes—Signed at Lisbon June 3 and December 4, 1963. Entered into force December 4, 1963. TIAS 5536. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Jordan. Signed at Amman February 11, 1964. Entered into force February 11, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5537. 10 pp. 10¢.

Weather Stations—Continuation of Cooperative Meteorological Program. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at México February 14, 1964. Entered into force February 14, 1964. Operative January 1, 1964. With memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5540. 13 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Sudan. Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered into force March 2, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5541. 9 pp. 10¢.

Defense—Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa March 6, 1964. Entered into force March 6, 1964. TIAS 5543. 2 pp. 5¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Sudan, relating to the agreement of March 17, 1959. Exchange of notes—Signed at Khartoum March 2, 1964. Entered into force March 2, 1964. TIAS 5544. 3 pp. 5¢.

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Norway, amending the agreement of May 25, 1949, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 16, 1964. Entered into force March 16, 1964. TIAS 5545. 6 pp. 5¢.

Mutual Defense Assistance—Administrative Expenditures. Agreement with Belgium, amending Annex B to the agreement of January 27, 1950. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels February 6 and March 11, 1964. Entered into force March 11, 1964. TIAS 5546. 3 pp. 5¢.

¹ Not in force.

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*283	6/15	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*284	6/17	Sullivan: foreign policy conference, Cleveland (excerpts).
†285	6/17	Williams: "Africa South of the Equator."
*286	6/18	G. Lewis Jones to direct FSI senior seminar (biographic details).
*287	6/19	Program for visit of Turkish Prime Minister.
*288	6/19	Program for visit of Greek Prime Minister.
*Not printed.		
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.		

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa*.

Most of the content of this volume relates to wartime problems, particularly the defense of the Near East and Africa against Axis penetration or attack. Among the compilations of particular interest are those on United States policy regarding the postwar political organization of Greece, the problems of coalition warfare as they affected Iran, and the attitude of the United States toward the entry of Turkey into the war and toward the future status of Palestine.

Copies of *Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume IV, The Near East and Africa* (publication 7665) may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for \$4 each.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LI, No. 1307



July 13, 1964

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Europe and the Atlantic Alliance

by W. W. Rostow

*Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council*¹

I have come today to share with you some thoughts about the future of Europe and the Atlantic alliance. It is natural that we should all address ourselves to this subject because we have been passing through a period of pause and of debate. The reasons for the pause and the debate are clear enough.

First, the outcome of the Cuba missile crisis brought to an end a period of intense crisis and confrontation with the Soviet Union, which began with the launching of the Sputnik at the end of 1957 and continued down to October 1962. The central front has been quiet now for some time.

Second, the failure of British entry into the Common Market early in 1963 raised fundamental questions about the future of European organization as well as the future character of relations between Europe and the United States.

¹Address made before the Assembly of the Western European Union at Rome, Italy, on June 24 (press release 292 dated June 23).

Essentially, what we have all been discussing, in the light of these and other events, are two questions:

Are NATO and the Atlantic connection still necessary, now that the confrontation with the U.S.S.R. in Central Europe has abated?

Is European integration still feasible and desirable, given the course of affairs within Europe over the past year and a half?

And it is to those two questions that I shall address myself this morning.

Our Agenda

It may be useful to begin by trying to set down the agenda Western Europe and the United States must address. Only by assessing the tasks with which history confronts us can we judge whether they can best be dispatched in partnership between the United States and a uniting Europe or in some other way.

Here are some of the critical problems that we must grip effectively in the days and months and years ahead.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1307 PUBLICATION 7712 JULY 13, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

First: there is the need for defense. Soviet military capabilities remain as formidable as they ever were. Soviet armies are still poised just beyond the Elbe, with powerful reserves capable of being summoned promptly from the East. Hundreds of Soviet missiles are still targeted on Western Europe. We demonstrated in the Berlin and Cuban crises that power exists in the West capable of neutralizing this Soviet military establishment and capable of rendering fruitless Soviet efforts to exploit that power for diplomatic advantage. That demonstration, however, would not have been fully effective without integrated Western military power and the highest degree of political concert in the West. If we dilute or fracture that integrated power, or if we fragment that political unity, I have no doubt that we would see a revival of the pressures and methods of the period 1958-62. The first task of the West remains the continued mobilization not merely of collective Western strength but also the collective will to defend the vital interests of the West. For the oldest and most basic reasons, therefore, we still need a vital NATO.

Second: The growing strength, confidence, and pride of Western Europe require that Europe share more substantially the burdens and responsibilities in the field of nuclear arms. I have in mind here both aspects of that problem: sharing in the process of deterrence and sharing in the process of moving as rapidly as conditions permit toward a world of effective arms control. These are, literally, life-and-death issues for all our peoples, and the wholesome fact of European revival requires that Europe play a large role in resolving them.

Third: The forces of nationalism and humanism are on the rise within the Communist world at a time when it is being subjected to the strains of the Sino-Soviet split. This hopeful historical movement poses for all of us searching questions and responsibilities, for none of us has ever accepted the notion that Europe ends on the Elbe. How shall we move peacefully toward the application of the principle of self-determination in Germany? What shall our policy be toward an increasingly assertive and liberal Eastern Europe? What shall our policy be toward the Soviet Union itself?

Fourth: The great continental regions to the south of us—Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—are moving to modernize their societies and to assert the dignity of their status on the world scene. The future of those of us who live in the rich and comfortable northern parts of the free world—the future of our children and grandchildren—will substantially depend on the outcome of these powerful revolutionary impulses. Specifically, there is the question: How can we best help these peoples to the south through trade and aid—and, I would add, through human comradeship—in this momentous and challenging era of transition? How can we help them through this great historical adventure in ways which maximize the chance that they emerge as independent and increasingly democratic societies. The recent United Nations Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva dramatizes the economic dimensions of this problem vividly. It will evidently rise on our common agenda in the future.

Fifth: The changes to the south of us have posed for them and for us a searching set of regional conflicts. Some of the new nations—or newly assertive nations—have reacted against what they regard as unfair or unsatisfactory postcolonial settlements. This clash of nationalism within regions of the developing world has yielded a set of dangerous problems: in Southeast Asia, within the Indian subcontinent, in the Middle East, in Africa, and even in the Mediterranean. Although these clashes arise from strong nationalist impulses, every one of them is subject to the most active exploitation by the Communists. Each is capable of producing dangerous degeneration in regional conditions or war itself. These clashes—whether they are resolved pacifically or lead to violence—vitally concern us all. From this concern, and from the capability which we share for affecting the issue, flows another major task for the West.

Sixth: In Southeast Asia, in the Caribbean, and in Africa the Communists are still pressing the technique of what they call wars of national liberation. In particular, there are those among the Communists who believe that the training of men for insurrection, their illegal infiltration across frontiers, and their supply

with arms and money are the last best hope for the extension of Communist power. We in the West have been forced to frustrate a whole array of Communist aggressive techniques since Stalin launched his offensive against the West in 1946. We now must demonstrate that we can sterilize and render futile this method of aggression, which President Johnson has designated "a deeply dangerous game."² On our success or failure in this task may depend whether the years ahead are years of war or of peace, for surely we in the West, who have faced down so many threats to vital positions over the years, will not passively accept their loss by this low-grade but dangerous form of aggression.

Seventh: We shall confront the implications in the foreseeable future of the acquisition by Communist China of a nuclear capability. That capability is likely to be of limited direct military significance and easily capable of deterrence by arms available to the West. Nevertheless, it will pose for us all the possibilities of nuclear confrontation with a second Communist power, and it may set in motion important political and psychological problems, in Asia and elsewhere, of concern to us all. Shaping the ways in which we will meet these problems is a major task for the West.

European Unity and Atlantic Partnership

I return now to the question that I posed at the start: the future of the Atlantic alliance and of European organization.

One way of putting this question is this: Would it be wiser for us to face the array of problems that I described, each of us on his own, or shall we face these problems together? Is there a sufficient basis of common interest among us to come to grips with them on the basis of partnership between the United States and a uniting Europe? Or shall we each devise policies which reflect narrow national interests and concerns in approaching them?

So far as we in Washington are concerned, we are convinced that the problems of defense; nuclear deterrence and arms control; the linked

problems of German unity, policy toward Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union; the problems of trade and aid with the developing countries; the problems of regional instability; the problem of Communist insurrectional aggression; and the problem of the Chinese Communist nuclear capability should all be gripped as nearly as possible on a communal basis.

And we believe, now as in the past, that the best way to move toward a communal basis is by going forward toward both European unity and Atlantic partnership.

We need European unity because, if Europe accepts as a legitimate part of the Atlantic agenda the array of global issues to which I referred earlier, it is much more likely to come to grips with them effectively on a united rather than a fragmented basis.

This is evident when we look at the problems and opportunities we face in Eastern Europe. It is already clear from the experience of the postwar generation that European unity has not merely been a source of strength in the face of Communist pressure, not merely a source of mutual confidence and prosperity; it has also been a demonstration to the governments and peoples of Eastern Europe of the continued viability of the West and a powerful pole of attraction to them.

None of us can now foresee the kind of Europe which will emerge in time from the processes of change going forward to the East. Our broad objectives in that area are, I believe, shared on both sides of the Atlantic. We wish to see the present division of Germany and Europe ended by peaceful steps. We wish to assist in constructive ways in the evolution of nations now under Communist rule. There can be little doubt that this objective will best be advanced by the emergence of an integrated Europe which pursues in unity a constructive policy toward the East.

The same principle holds good when we look at problems and opportunities in the southern half of the globe. We are talking here about regions whose population in 1980 will be, as nearly as we can calculate, 2.3 billion human beings: 410 million in Africa, 1.4 billion in free Asia, 145 million in the Middle East, 375 million in Latin America. Whatever their vicissitudes, these peoples will and should advance in

²For remarks made by President Johnson at the University of California at Los Angeles on Feb. 21, 1964, see BULLETIN of Mar. 16, 1964, p. 399.

the generation ahead in their ability to absorb and use the tools of modern science, technology, and industry.

In working with these peoples—in trying to deal constructively with the problems they pose for the world community—it is hard to believe that the classic nation-state of Europe, with a population of 50 or 60 million, can, by itself, be an effective unit. To deal with the problems before us, Europe must generate a global vision of its interests and possibilities, and that global vision is only likely to emerge as Europe moves toward integration—as it achieves a unity sufficient to concert the use of its enormous material, political, cultural, and spiritual resources.

But even an integrated Europe will lack—as does my own country—the power, by itself, to meet many of these problems: the problems of defense, of effective policy toward the Communist nations, and of sustaining the cause of freedom to the south.

These are tasks which can only be successfully dispatched if Europe and the United States address them in closest concert. It was in recognition of this need that wise statesmen on both sides of the Atlantic have wished, since the war, to parallel progress toward European unity with progress toward an increasingly intimate Atlantic partnership.

But this partnership can only flourish if it is solidly based on a genuine European and American desire to share fully both the burdens and the responsibilities of power. This will involve changes for both Europe and the United States. Since the war my country has carried the lion's share of both the burdens and responsibilities. Now it must learn to share the responsibilities on a basis of equality and mutual respect. And Europe must come to share the burdens in the degree that its growing resources permit.

This is what partnership between the two great continents means and requires.

Making Partnership Work—the Nuclear Issue

To illustrate the sharing of burdens and responsibilities let me discuss two fields in which new common action is urgently needed: nuclear defense and political consultation.

I turn first to nuclear defense.

The Soviet Union has built up a powerful array of MRBM's threatening Europe. In the face of this threat General [Lyman L.] Lemnitzer, like General [Lauris] Norstad, has proposed that MRBM's be deployed to Allied forces in the European area.

There are, broadly speaking, three ways in which we could respond to this proposal.

We could refuse outright. This could weaken the notion of Atlantic partnership by indicating that we were unwilling to extend it to the field of strategic weapons. It would weaken the concept of European unity by leaving untouched the present divisive gap between those major European powers which have a share in ownership and operation of strategic weapons and those which do not. This gap seems unlikely soon to wither away by itself. And if we cannot respond to the natural desire of major European countries to play a larger role in strategic deterrence by constructive measures, pressures for a further extension of individual small national programs may grow, with all the attendant dangers.

Alternatively, we could agree to deploy MRBM's under the same "two key" system that was used for first-generation IRBM's and that is still used for shorter range tactical nuclear weapons on the central front. Under this system, the missiles are nationally owned and manned by the Allied country buying the missiles, and the warheads would be released for use by bilateral decision of that country and the United States. However, creation of such new nationally manned and owned strategic missile forces could stimulate fears and rivalry in the West and be troubling in terms of East-West relations.

If we are not to refuse MRBM's, and are not to deploy them under national manning and ownership, the alternative is to deploy them under multilateral manning and ownership.

That is the origin of the proposed multilateral missile fleet.

Creation of this force may prove to be a critical turning point in the affairs of the alliance. There is little doubt in our minds that the role of Europe in the operation of strategic nuclear weapons will expand. The question is: Shall

we proceed in this field on an integrated basis, or shall the alliance fragment on this fundamental issue along national lines?

We in Washington have learned how powerfully the nuclear problem shapes political attitudes within nations and among nations. We think further fragmentation of our nuclear capabilities and policies will weaken the alliance at its foundations. On the other hand, we are confident that a decision to go forward with the MLF [multilateral force] will serve as the basis for greater unity in the alliance, not merely in the field of military policy itself but in the field of arms control and in other areas.

Nations joined in an integrated nuclear venture are bound to be drawn closer together in ways that none of us can now fully foresee. They will have to determine common positions on arms control negotiations affecting this venture; they will be taking part in such negotiations as countries with a tangible stake in the outcome, not as bystanders. They will have to consult closely about the conditions under which the force would be placed in a state of alert or used, and this will inevitably involve them in intimate consultation about a variety of political situations which bear upon the availability or use of nuclear weapons.

In short, in deciding whether to go forward with the MLF we are deciding not merely how to share nuclear power; we are taking decisions which will influence the future political organization of the West. We are choosing between national approaches and a new step toward integration in the deepest sense of the word.

It is because this fundamental issue is involved that we have wished to leave the structure of the MLF sufficiently flexible to adjust as Europe moves toward unity. As the European Action Committee indicated in its recent statement, the MLF could be the beginning of a true partnership between the United States and Europe in the nuclear field.

Making Partnership Work—Political Consultation

The second field of forward movement in partnership I wish to discuss is that of political consultation. This bears on many of the tasks I mentioned earlier. Our efforts to advance German unity and constructive evolution in Eastern

Europe, our attempts to sustain the cause of freedom and progress in the less developed countries—all of these must be gripped through more effective processes of political consultation.

Evidently our perspectives on these problems within the Atlantic area are not identical. Evidently, if we are to devise common policies, we must consult with a new intensity over a much wider range than in the past, understanding that consultation means assumption of responsibility and of risk as well as the mutual giving of advice. We are anxious to see the agenda of the Atlantic alliance expanded in ways which would permit us increasingly to grip these problems on a communal rather than a separate basis.

We hold this view for two reasons.

First, we are convinced that our common interests in the face of these problems are far more weighty than our differences and that serious and sustained consultation could bring us toward roughly common conclusions as to appropriate courses of action.

Second, we are convinced that, without such movement toward concert on the problems which confront us on a global basis, our unity on the minimum essential and continuing tasks of NATO could be endangered. We have all seen over the years problems arising outside the NATO area itself which put strains on the NATO alliance internally. We have thus far successfully weathered such strains. But it would be unwise for us not to reckon that a successful North Atlantic alliance will require in the future a much higher degree of concert on global problems than was required over the past 15 years.

It is for these two fundamental reasons—the existence of basic common interests and the danger of not building our policy upon them—that we are prepared to attack the problem of extending political consultation within the Atlantic alliance.

This means being willing to go forward in closer consultation with those countries that are ready and willing to proceed. This may sometimes be less than all 15 NATO nations, if some wish to remain aloof. Some problems will, perhaps, be dealt with in smaller groups, but all NATO members should be kept generally informed.

It means being willing to bring policymaking officials from home governments, who are directly concerned with the problems under discussion, together as often as necessary—a process which has proved of critical importance in the development of the European Community.

It means being willing to strengthen the role of the Secretary General and the international staff, as necessary to make these procedures work. We are all impressed with the role played by the commissions in the European Communities, and by the Secretary-General in the U.N. as catalytic agents in the process of agreement. There are lessons to be learned here as we seek to improve Atlantic political consideration.

And, finally, it means being willing to structure this consultation in ways that will enable Europe to achieve growing influence as it moves toward unity. The consultation that we envisage would do just this. To the extent that European nations could concert among themselves about the issues under discussion, their ability to affect the agreed outcome would surely be enhanced.

Progress Toward a New, Stable World Order

As we assess the changes that have taken place over the past year and a half, and as we scan the horizons ahead, we in Washington believe that we were all wise when we committed ourselves after the war to work toward both European unity and an intimate Atlantic connection. It is perhaps worth recalling that we did this not merely to meet Stalin's direct and brutal challenge. On both sides of the Atlantic the movement for European unity and the Atlantic partnership reflected an acknowledgment of errors made by all of us between the two world wars. These two pieces of architecture, in which a generation of men on both sides of the Atlantic have invested their best talents, reflect an awareness of the tragic mistakes we made between the wars in returning to old-fashioned nationalism. It is not too much to say that the Second World War was an unnecessary product of those mistakes.

Now there are forces at work in the world which could lead us in one of two directions. There are forces of fragmentation and of violence which, in many quarters of the globe, could

easily get out of hand, plunging us from a precarious peace into chaos. But there are also forces now in play which could take us toward peace and stability in the generation ahead. It does not lie outside our common capabilities to organize in the next generation a new world order to replace that which was shattered in 1914 and never replaced.

The time for pause and debate is drawing to a close. In the MLF, in the Kennedy Round, and in the array of issues and opportunities presented to us from outside the NATO area itself we are confronted with matters which require decision. We believe that what our common interests demand is a new surge of energy and determination to solve these problems in common—a phase of rapid forward movement in both Atlantic and European unity. We believe that the possibilities of building a new and stable world order in the generation ahead depend on such forward movement in the face of our agenda.

Progress toward that objective—and there can be no other rational objective in a nuclear age—requires continued Western unity, patience, dedication, and common effort. If we in the Atlantic world emerge from this period of pause and debate with a new surge of energy and creativeness with respect to both Western unity and the Atlantic alliance, I believe we have it in our power to make the Berlin and Cuba crises of 1961 and 1962 a nearly bloodless but decisive turning point in the cold war. We could move on together to a peaceful resolution of the cold war, which would not merely preserve but enlarge and enrich that common Western heritage which can only be maintained in the second half of the 20th century if we work together in common loyalty to that heritage.

ANZUS Council To Meet at Washington

Press release 294 dated June 24

The Governments of Australia and New Zealand have accepted the invitation of the United States Government to hold a meeting of the ANZUS Council in Washington on July 17 and

18, 1964. Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake will represent New Zealand, Minister of External Affairs Paul Hasluck will represent Australia, and Secretary of State Dean Rusk will represent the United States.

The last of these annual meetings was held on June 5 and 6, 1963, in Wellington, New Zealand.¹ The ANZUS Council meetings rotate each year among the capitals of the signatory nations and provide the medium for discussion and exchange of views in implementation of the ANZUS pact.

Right of Unrestricted Air Access to Berlin Reasserted by U.S.

Following is the text of a Department statement read to news correspondents on June 23 by Richard I. Phillips, Director of the Office of News, in response to inquiries about Tass reports on Soviet notes delivered to the embassies of the United States and Great Britain at Moscow on June 20.

We did receive a note concerning flights from the United States to Berlin. We are studying the note and will be consulting with our allies who have received similar notes. The notes say that the flights are "illegal" in the absence of agreement between the airline and the authorities of the so-called "German Democratic Republic," and that the Soviets will withhold as to these flights what they term their "guarantee of flight safety."

The rights of the three Western Powers to air access to and from Berlin arise from the Allied defeat of Nazi Germany and have been confirmed by Four Power agreements establishing the Berlin air corridors. These rights of access are for unrestricted flight by Allied aircraft and are without restriction as to the origin or destination of such flights.

The three Western Powers, pursuant to Four Power agreements and procedures of long standing, file flight plans in the Berlin Air Safety Center and pass them to the Soviets

solely for their information, so that they may adjust their own flights accordingly.

These agreements do not call for any statement by the Soviets of a "guarantee of flight safety."

These flights are continuing on a normal basis. The U.S. Government will hold the Soviet Government responsible for the safety of all American aircraft in the Berlin air corridors.

Three Western Powers Reaffirm Desire for German Reunification

Following is the text of a tripartite declaration which was released simultaneously at London, Paris, and Washington on June 26 and was also made available at Bonn, where, in a separate declaration, the Federal Republic of Germany expressed its support for the aims of the tripartite declaration.

Press release 300 dated June 26

The Governments of France, the United Kingdom and the United States, after consulting with the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany, wish to state the following with regard to the agreement signed by the Soviet Union and the so-called "German Democratic Republic" on June 12, 1964. This agreement, among other things, deals with questions related to Germany as a whole and to Berlin in particular.

1. As the Soviet Government was reminded before the signing of this agreement, it is clear that any agreement which the Soviet Union may make with the so-called "German Democratic Republic" cannot affect Soviet obligations or responsibilities under agreements and arrangements with the Three Powers on the subject of Germany including Berlin and access thereto. The Three Governments consider that the Soviet Union remains bound by these engagements, and they will continue to hold the Soviet Government responsible for the fulfillment of its obligations.

2. West Berlin is not an "independent political unit". Within the framework of their responsibilities regarding Germany as a whole,

¹ BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 967.

the Four Powers have put the German capital, the city of "Greater Berlin," under their joint administration. Unilateral initiatives taken by the Soviet Government in order to block the quadripartite administration of the city cannot in any way modify this legal situation nor abrogate the rights and responsibilities of the Four Powers in regard to Berlin. While reserving their rights relating to Berlin, the Three Western Powers, taking account of the necessities for the development of the city, have authorized, in accordance with the agreements of October 23, 1954, the establishment of close ties between Berlin and the Federal Republic of Germany, including permission to the Federal Republic to ensure representation of Berlin and of the Berlin population outside Berlin. These ties, the existence of which is essential to the viability of Berlin, are in no way inconsistent with the quadripartite status of the city and will be maintained in the future.

3. The Three Governments consider that the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is the only German government freely and legitimately constituted and therefore entitled to speak for the German people in international affairs. The Three Governments do not recognize the East German regime nor the existence of a state in eastern Germany. As for the provisions related to the "frontiers" of this so-called state, the Three Governments reiterate that within Germany and Berlin there are no frontiers but rather a "demarcation line" and the "sector borders" and that, according to the very agreements to which the agreement of June 12 refers, the final determination of the frontiers of Germany must await a peace settlement for the whole of Germany.

4. The charges of "revanchism" and "militarism" contained in the agreement of June 12 are without basis. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany in its statement of October 3, 1954, has renounced the use of force to achieve the reunification of Germany or the modification of the present boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany. This remains its policy.

5. The Three Governments agree that the safeguarding of peace and security is today more than ever a vital problem for all nations and

that a just and peaceful settlement of outstanding problems in Europe is essential to the establishment of lasting peace and security. Such a settlement requires the application in the whole of Germany of the principle of self-determination. This principle is reaffirmed in the United Nations Charter, which the agreement of June 12 itself invokes. By ignoring this principle, the agreement of June 12 seeks to perpetuate the arbitrary division of Germany, which is a continuing source of international tension and an obstacle to a peaceful settlement of European problems. The exercise of self-determination, which should lead to the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom, remains a fundamental objective of the Three Governments.

6. The Three Governments are convinced that such a settlement should be sought as soon as possible. This settlement should include progressive solutions which would bring about German reunification and security in Europe. On such a basis, the Three Governments are always ready to take advantage of any opportunity which would peacefully reestablish German unity in freedom.

U.S.-Canada Committee Reviews Current Defense Problems

Joint Communiqué

Press release 297 dated June 25

The Canada-United States Ministerial Committee on Joint Defense met today (June 25) at the Department of State.

Today's meeting, the fourth since the Committee's establishment in 1958, grew out of discussions last year at Hyannis Port between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Pearson.¹ In keeping with the need for continuing close cooperation between the two countries in defense matters, President Johnson and Prime Minister Pearson decided during their talks last January,² that the Ministerial Committee on

¹ BULLETIN of May 27, 1963, p. 815.

² For text of a joint communiqué, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 199.

Joint Defense should meet during the first half of 1964.

Previous meetings were held at Paris in 1958; Camp David, United States in 1959; and Montebello, Canada in 1960.³

Among the subjects discussed by the Ministers were the changing nature of the threat to the North American continent and measures to meet that threat; the current developments in NATO; the desire of both countries for an effective arms control and disarmament program; and international peacekeeping activities. Particular attention was given to a review of the defense production sharing program under which industry in the two countries is utilized on a continental basis so as to meet most equitably the equipment needs of mutual defense.

The United States was represented by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, and the United States Ambassador to Canada W. Walton Butterworth. Canada was represented by Secretary of State for External Affairs Paul Martin, Minister of National Defence Paul Hellyer, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon, Associate Minister of National Defence Lucien Cardin, Minister of Defence Production Charles Drury, and the Canadian Ambassador to the United States C. S. A. Ritchie.

President Names New Ambassador to Saigon, Reiterates U.S. Policy

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

On June 19 Ambassador Lodge [Henry Cabot Lodge, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam] informed me that he must return to private life as soon as possible. I have informed Ambassador Lodge that I must, of course, respect his decision, and accordingly I have accepted his resignation to take effect as

³ The first meeting was held at Paris in December 1958 during the regular annual ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council; for texts of communiqués issued at the close of the second and third meetings, see *ibid.*, Nov. 30, 1959, p. 789, and Aug. 1, 1960, p. 172.

¹ Read by the President at his news conference on June 23.

soon as he returns. This nation has been most fortunate to have Ambassador Lodge's distinguished and dedicated service in a post of the highest importance for the last year.

I intend to nominate General Maxwell D. Taylor to be Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam, succeeding Ambassador Lodge. General Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is an officer of outstanding quality. His remarkable career has shown a devotion to democracy, commitment to freedom, and understanding of the ways of Communist terrorism and subversion which in my opinion fit him in an unusual measure for this new and demanding assignment.

I also intend to name Mr. U. Alexis Johnson [Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs], whose nomination as Career Ambassador is now before the Senate, to hold the new post of Deputy Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam. Mr. Johnson will proceed to Saigon immediately and will act as the chief of our mission there until General Taylor's arrival.

Mr. Johnson is an outstanding career diplomat, the Department's most experienced authority on Southeast Asia, with experience both in the field and in senior posts in the Department of State; he is ideally qualified to support General Taylor in the management of the American team in Viet-Nam.

I am deeply pleased that these two distinguished Americans have agreed, on short notice, to take up these new assignments—I got their agreement late yesterday and last evening—and I am satisfied that together they will give the United States the best possible field leadership in support of our embattled friends, the people of South Viet-Nam.

I wish to announce that I intend to nominate General Earle G. Wheeler to take the place of General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Let me take a moment to read you Ambassador Lodge's letter and my reply:

JUNE 19, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Herewith I tender my resignation as Ambassador to Vietnam. I do so entirely for personal reasons.

My thanks go to you for your unfailing devotion to problems connected with American policy in Vietnam, for your guidance, courtesy, consideration and for

enabling me to have this opportunity to serve the United States. And my heartfelt gratitude goes to the late President Kennedy, who appointed me.

Although in a dangerous position, the Republic of Vietnam is on the right track and the Vietnamese are to be commended for their determination not to submit to any foreign domination, whatever the source. Persistent and patient execution of existing civil and military plans will bring victory—provided hostile external pressures are contained, which I am sure they can be. This is indeed a time to persist and not to get discouraged or impatient. I am sure we will persist.

With respectful regard,

Very sincerely yours,

HENRY CABOT LODGE

JUNE 23, 1964

DEAR AMBASSADOR LODGE: I accept with deep regret your resignation as Ambassador to Viet Nam. I hereby authorize you to make your farewell call to General Khanh and to depart at your convenience thereafter. I hope to see you at once on your return, to hear your final report and to offer best personal wishes on your return to private life.

Your readiness to assume the duties of American Ambassador to Viet Nam in a time of danger and difficulty was in the great tradition of disinterested public service. Those who carry on after you will find encouragement in your example. Your departure will mean no change in the steadfast determination of the United States to support the Government and the people of South Viet Nam in their struggle for peace and security, which means an end of Communist terror and an end of external aggression. As you say, we will persist.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

I have stated our policy as I see it in Viet-Nam on other occasions, and statements to the press which I read, the letter that enunciated that policy written by President Eisenhower on October 1, 1954, and released on October 25, 1954.² I have referred to it in various public addresses, but for your benefit and the benefit of the American people, I would like to make a brief statement restating that policy for those that may not have gotten it, or in order to at least repeat it.

The policy of the United States toward South-

east Asia remains as it was on June 2d, when I summarized it in four simple propositions:

First, America keeps her word.

Second, the issue is the future of Southeast Asia as a whole.

Third, our purpose is peace.

Fourth, this is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.

In these last weeks there has been particular concern with Laos. There again the problem is caused by the aggressive acts of others and by their disregard for their given word. Our own actions, and what we have said about them, are governed by the legitimate desires of the Government of Laos. Where the International Control Commission has been kept out, our airmen have been sent to look—and where they are fired on, they are ready to defend themselves. This armed reconnaissance can be ended tomorrow if those who are breaking the peace of Laos will simply keep their agreements. We specifically support full compliance by everyone with the Geneva accords of 1962.

I have said before that there is danger in Southeast Asia. It is a danger brought on by the terrorism and aggression so clearly, if secretly, directed from Hanoi. The United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war. But the United States is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace—but not of weakness or timidity.

I should like to repeat again that our purpose is peace. Our people in South Viet-Nam are helping to protect people against terror. They are also helping—and they will help more—in increasing agricultural production, in expanding medical help, and building a sense of hope. They are helping—and they will help more—to give confidence to those who seek to help themselves, and modern equipment to those who can use it, and friendly counsel to those who are giving leadership. These are proud people, and the task of building their peace and progress is their own; but they can count on our help for as long as they need it and want it.

² For a statement by President Johnson on June 2, in which he read the letter of Oct. 1, 1954, from President Eisenhower to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 953.

President Johnson Discusses Cyprus Situation With Prime Ministers of Turkey and Greece

President Johnson held talks regarding the situation in Cyprus with the Prime Minister of Turkey, Ismet Inonu, who visited Washington June 22 and 23, and with the Prime Minister of Greece, George Papandreou, who was in Washington June 24-26. Following are texts of exchanges of greetings and joint communiques released at the close of the visits of the two Prime Ministers.

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER INONU

Exchange of Greetings, June 22

White House press release dated June 22

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a pleasure to meet with you again and to welcome you once more to our United States. The American people remember with deep appreciation your visit here last year in our national hour of sorrow upon the death of our beloved President, John F. Kennedy. For myself, I shall never forget my own visit to your country 2 years ago and the great outpouring of friendship for America which your people demonstrated so generously in your cities and your countryside.

From that visit I remember especially the conversations we were privileged to have together, Mr. Prime Minister. I was inspired by both your vision and your determination to lead Turkey toward the fulfillment of the dreams of the great Ataturk, at whose side you once worked.

The history of your land is ancient; the history of our land is young. Yet Turkey and

the United States have much in common. We share alike a zeal to safeguard our independence, to uphold democratic values under the rule of law, and to seek after those solutions which will be peaceful and permanent. We are not only good friends, but we are close allies. We have marched together in arms. We stand together as partners in NATO. We work together as associates in CENTO.

We welcome you, Mr. Prime Minister, as a leader of a nation united with us in a determination to preserve world peace and, through collective security, to stand steadfast against the threat of Communist aggression. Above all, Mr. Prime Minister, we welcome you as a friend who comes representing a strong and stalwart people for whom the American people have only the warmest feelings of friendship and respect. I am confident that in our discussions this friendly spirit will prevail, as we work together toward the solutions of problems which trouble us all.

PRIME MINISTER INONU

Mr. President, on behalf of my wife and myself I wish to thank you from the bottom of our hearts for this sincere and splendid welcome. I have no doubt that the people of Turkey look upon this visit as another occasion to cement the deep-rooted and lasting friendship between our two countries. Our two peoples have always been conscious of having common ideals and of having linked our destinies.

We in Turkey believe that friendship between countries is based not on transitory interests but on a common faith in ultimate justice and unwavering principles.

Mr. President, friendships are proved in trying times. If my visit can help to bring better understanding of the problems and issues that now interest our part of the world, my mission will be useful.

We believe in peace, but we also know that peace cannot be lasting unless it is based in justice. For your great country we in Turkey have always borne the most sincere feelings of esteem, confidence, and good will.

For Mrs. Johnson and yourself, Mr. President, my wife and I have such deep personal regard that your gracious welcome is both touching and overwhelming. We are happy and honored to be the guests of a great President of the United States.

To you, Mr. President, to your gracious wife, and to those of the great American public who can hear me, on behalf of ourselves and the people of Turkey, I say, once again, thank you.

Joint Communique, June 23

White House press release dated June 23

Prime Minister Inonu of Turkey and President Johnson have discussed all aspects of the problem of Cyprus. Both leaders welcomed the opportunity presented by the Prime Minister's visit at the President's invitation for a full exchange of views.

The discussion, proceeding from the present binding effects of existing treaties, covered ways in which present difficulties might be adjusted by negotiation and agreement. The urgent necessity for such agreement upon lasting solutions was underlined.

The Prime Minister and the President also considered ways in which their countries could strengthen the efforts of the United Nations¹ with respect to the safety and security of the communities on Cyprus.

The cordial and candid conversations of the two leaders strengthened the broad understanding already existing between Turkey and the United States.

The President and the Prime Minister expressed their conviction that their peoples are devoted to common democratic principles, to individual freedom, to human dignity and to peace in justice.

¹ See p. 64.

VISIT OF PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU

Exchange of Greetings, June 24

White House press release dated June 24

PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Mr. Prime Minister, it is a proud privilege for me to welcome you to the United States this morning and to express my deep personal appreciation for your coming to our country at this time.

This country and your country are bound together by ties that are both ancient and modern. The founders of these United States drew deeply from the wisdom and the ideals of ancient Greece in formulating the concepts of our own free and democratic society. In this 20th century, your country and mine have stood stalwartly together to defend those enduring ideals against aggressors and to advance their fulfillment among our people.

We are friends in freedom; we are allies in NATO for peace; we are coworkers in the common labors of progress and prosperity. These are strong and welcome bonds. We are bound together also, Mr. Prime Minister, by close and lasting ties of kinship. Americans harbor a very warm affection for those of your countrymen and their dependents who have honored us through the years by coming to live in our midst as neighbors, as friends, and as leaders in American life.

In recent months, occasions of grief have brought us close together in moments of national sorrow. Last November Queen Frederika came to our country as a representative of your country at the time of the tragic death of President Kennedy. Only a short time later, Mrs. Johnson made a sad mission of mourning to attend the funeral of your beloved King Paul, whom we had been privileged to meet so happily on our visit to your land only 2 years ago.

Today I am confident that your visit and the talks that we shall have together will again affirm the close and cordial relations between Greece and the United States. With diligence and understanding, we shall seek to chart a course that will preserve the union and harmony of free nations, militantly opposed to Communist aggression.

We in America know that the people of Greece yield to no other people in the world in their devotion to freedom and independence and in their desire to keep the peace won and maintained by such great sacrifice from free men in our times.

Mr. Prime Minister, it is to that cause of peace that our efforts are dedicated today.

PRIME MINISTER PAPANDREOU

Mr. President, I thank you for your kind welcome. I regard it as a great privilege that upon your friendly invitation I find myself in the Capital of the mighty American democracy, the great friend and ally of Greece, and before this famous mansion which has housed so many illustrious promoters of human achievement, of liberty and justice.

I am happy that I shall be given the opportunity to become personally acquainted with the present great leader of the United States, the champion of peace, as well as with members of his administration and of the Congress of the United States.

Your concern for the maintenance of peace and freedom is shared by the Greek nation and by myself. Greece has always tried for the promotion of peace. A people that has suffered as much as ours from the violence of war and the reverses of history can only long for peace, but no peace can be durable without justice and no settlement of problems can be right and just if it is not based on democracy and freedom.

In the past there existed a distinction between the world of ideals and the world of politics, between a policy based on idealism and a policy based upon realism. Nowadays they have merged into one, and the policy is today the more positive the more it is in consonance with ideas. This constitutes the glory of our times, the glory of the free world whom you are called upon by history to lead.

My country does not forget that the United States, through the doctrine which bears the name of one of your great predecessors, President Truman, has been instrumental in the defense of Greece against aggression, as well as in the rehabilitation of the country, exhausted and devastated by cruel years of war.

Greece also feels proud to be represented in your great democracy by a number of citizens of Greek descent who constitute a living link between the two nations, and of our national cultural ties to the world of American civilization.

Mr. President, I welcome this opportunity to bring to you and to the people of the United States the cordial salute of the people of Greece.

Joint Communique, June 25

White House press release dated June 25

During the visit to Washington of the Prime Minister of Greece conversations were held between Mr. George A. Papandreou and the President of the United States, the Secretary of State, and other officials of the United States Government.

The conversations, which were conducted in an atmosphere of friendship and warm cordiality, have contributed to the strengthening of the close ties between Greece and the United States.

The visit provided the opportunity to the Greek Prime Minister and the President of the United States to review various aspects of the international situation and to discuss subjects of mutual interest.

The President of the United States and the Greek Prime Minister had a sincere and useful exchange of views on the Cyprus situation. Both expressed full support of the efforts undertaken by the Security Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations for the establishment of peace in the island and for rapidly finding a permanent solution. The Greek Prime Minister explained in detail the Greek position on the problem. He emphasized that a permanent solution should be based upon the principles of democracy and justice. The two leaders reiterated their determination to make every effort to increase the understanding among allies.

The Greek Prime Minister expressed the deep appreciation for the generous support of the United States Government and people in the hard struggle of the Greek people for their freedom and welfare.

Africa South of the Equator

by *G. Mennen Williams*
*Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

In this second half of the 20th century, we have been privileged to witness one of the great movements in world history—Africa's march to freedom and independence. Today there are 34 independent nations in Africa, and others are on their way. Thirty of those new nations achieved independence in the last 12½ years, and all but two—Algeria and the Congo—made the transition in relatively peaceful circumstances.

This march has brought to many lands a triumphant flowering of human dignity, and it has reinvigorated international affairs in the world of free men. But it also has brought new trials and tribulations to many of those new nations, as they struggle to break through the shackles of poverty, ignorance, and disease to catch up with the more developed portions of the world.

Africa is an immense continent. It is more than three times the size of the United States, yet it has a population of only some 265 million people. The continent faces severe handicaps. Its people have an annual per capita income of only \$120; 85 percent of its inhabitants are illiterate; and its health problems are characterized by the fact that one out of five children dies before reaching his teens. Africa has few people with technical and other middle skills and few managers and professional people. As a result, most of the continent's productivity is low. Africa also is handicapped by a shortage of industry and by an inadequate network of

transportation, communications, and other services left by the former colonial powers.

Nevertheless, I believe Africa has a promising future, despite the very real difficulties which have manifested themselves in economic and political ups and downs. The continent is rich in both human and material resources, although they are greatly in need of development.

Both will be developed, however, because it is in the interest of Africa and the world, including the United States, that they be developed. Our assistance, and that of other free-world nations, not only provides Africans with an alternative to Communist overtures, but it plays the positive role of helping Africans improve their well-being and develop a peaceful and prosperous continent.

Africa's mineral resources are well known, and their importance to the United States is substantial. Africa is the source of 60 percent of the world's gold and 90 percent of its diamonds. It produces three-fourths of the world's cobalt and significant amounts of petroleum, iron ore, and bauxite. In addition, it is an important source of such vital modern metals as copper, chrome, manganese, antimony, and uranium.

The continent's hydroelectric potential is estimated at 40 percent of the world's water-power supply, but it is so far little developed.

African agriculture is still almost marginal on the whole. It produces only about 5 percent of the world's agricultural products, although it has more arable land than the United States, which produces 16 percent. Where modern agriculture is practiced, however, agricultural productivity rises sharply.

¹ Address made before a Department of State foreign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18 (press release 285 dated June 17).

Africans have been quick to see the desirability of continental and regional cooperation—to settle political disputes through the Organization of African Unity, to maximize economic growth by elimination of trade barriers, to plan regional enterprises through the U.N. Economic Commission for Africa and other regional organizations.

All of this activity is reflected in concrete progress in various parts of the continent. In trade, for example, African exports increased 42 percent between 1952 and 1961. Ethiopia's gross national product increased annually by 4.8 percent between 1957 and 1961, to take another example. In the important field of education, Nigeria allocated 19.4 percent of its budget to education and Ghana 18 percent in fiscal year 1963. These few statistics indicate that Africans are trying—and succeeding in their efforts—to make economic and social progress.

There are areas, however, where there is much unfinished business in Africa. Many of these areas are below the Equator, and I would like to discuss three with you today—the Congo, East Africa, and South Africa. In the interest of time, I will omit such important areas as the Rhodesias, Nyasaland, and the Portuguese territories, but I am prepared to comment on those countries in the question period if you desire.

The Congo

Just 4 years ago this month, the large Republic of the Congo came to independence and almost immediately was engulfed in civil war. Three of its then-six provinces—Kasai, Katanga, and Orientale—attempted to secede, and the Communist bloc was doing all it could to fan the flames of disorder. The Congolese Government decided to ask for U.N. assistance in reuniting the country and preserving its territorial integrity, and the United States fully supported such action. Through the medium of the United Nations, an East-West confrontation and Communist penetration were averted in Central Africa. When the Katangese secession movement collapsed in January 1963, a period was put to that unhappy chapter in the short history of the fledgling Congo Republic.

The end of secession was not the end of the Congo's problems, however. The nation still faces grave problems which will grow more acute with the withdrawal of U.N. forces in the next 12 days. Today the question of the Congo's continued existence as a geographic entity settles squarely on the shoulders of the Congolese themselves, and we are increasing our efforts to help the Congolese protect their internal security. Today there are two serious revolts against the authority of the Central Government—one in Kwilu Province in the west, which began in January, and the other in Kivu in the east, which began in April.

A third area of potential difficulty is Katanga in the south. Elements of former rebel chief Moise Tshombe's gendarmes, once 12,000 strong, are still present in outlying areas of Katanga Province or are just across the border in the Portuguese territory of Angola. Those forces, which probably include some mercenaries, represent a latent threat to the Congo Government.

We are watching Congolese developments very carefully. While there is little doubt that Communists outside the Congo are encouraging the Kwilu and Kivu revolts—and some of the leaders of those revolts have contacts with Communists—communism as a force behind the revolts is almost nonexistent. Much of today's trouble is due to tribal differences, economic dissatisfaction, and opposition to the Central Government.

We are most anxious to assist the Congolese Government to develop its ability to preserve internal security. For more than a year now, the United States has been providing military equipment, such as ground and air transportation, to help in the training of the Congolese National Army. Our efforts have been linked with those of Belgium, Israel, and Italy, who are performing the actual training of the Army.

On the economic side, there are still serious problems for the Congo to face, but I was pleased to find many signs of a clear economic upturn and an encouraging growth of business and financial confidence during my brief visit to the Congo last month. Of particular significance, relations between the Congolese and the Belgians have improved greatly in recent months, and an important Belgian aid program recently was announced.

Today there are some 50,000-60,000 Belgian educators, technicians, businessmen, clergy, and persons with other specialties presently working in the Congo and assisting the Congolese people. The giant copper and cobalt mining company, Union Minière du Haut-Katanga, is back in full production as well. Although noting that its 1963 profits were down, largely as a result of exchange losses caused by the devaluation of the Congolese franc last November, its recent annual statement added that order and security in Katanga had improved and that its 1964 copper production should be as high as last year's.

East Africa

Turning to East Africa, there have been many interesting and significant developments recently in that part of the continent. Probably the most striking was the recent formation of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar. The change of government in Zanzibar last January was an explosive issue which created problems for the mainland governments of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda. While the revolt was initially one of the dissatisfied black African majority against the ruling Arab minority, pro-Communist elements played an important part in the revolution. They then moved into key posts in the revolutionary government, where they began to work closely with the Chinese and Soviet bloc Communists. The United Republic, which was formed in May, is a new governmental arrangement developed by the Zanzibaris and Tanganyikans themselves to better meet their mutual needs and aspirations. We feel it is an excellent example of the way Africans work out solutions to African problems on their own initiative.

East Africa has long been noted for its regional cooperation. An East African Common Market, shared by Kenya, Uganda, and Tanganyika, has existed since 1922. This Common Market is directed by a body known as the East African Common Services Organization (EACSO). A closely related organization, the East African Currency Board, administers a common currency for the East African countries and Aden. Through EACSO, the 25 million people of the area's countries share a common tax administration, common

research facilities, and common services in such fields as telecommunications, postal facilities, customs, tariffs, civil aviation, railways, and harbors.

In recent months the distribution of regional revenues and the location of East African industry became the subject of intense criticism, and there was a possibility that the Common Market might break up. Last month at a meeting in Nairobi, however, the three heads of state—Jomo Kenyatta, Milton Obote, and Julius Nyerere—agreed upon a new East African Common Market agreement to redress existing imbalances.

Traditionally, Kenya has dominated the entire East African market. Under the new agreement, Kenya will restrict its exports to Uganda and the United Republic in fields where those countries have unused capacity in existing plants and where they want to expand their industries. In addition, an allocation of new industries is to be worked out under which each of the three countries will produce certain types of products exclusively for the entire East African market. We believe this is an important step in giving added impetus to the already high degree of cooperation in East Africa.

South Africa

In the Republic of South Africa, *apartheid* is a tragic problem involving both whites and nonwhites whose families have lived in the area for centuries, building up one of the highest standards of living in Africa. The deadlock between nonwhite aspirations and the white-controlled Government's attempt to hold the line is already having extensive repercussions elsewhere, especially in newly independent Africa and the U.N.

The Republic of South Africa is much in the news recently because of incidents connected with its policy of repression.

Last week eight leaders in the resistance to *apartheid*—black, white, and Indian—were sentenced to life imprisonment in the widely publicized Rivonia trial.

Last week Justice Minister [B. J.] Vorster announced in the South African Parliament that he intended to recommend renewal of the

controversial 90-day detention clause. By this clause the police may arrest without charge and hold in solitary confinement any person suspected of having information about certain types of political offenses or about plans to commit them. Persons can be arrested and held for successive 90-day periods; and as many as three terms in a row, separated only by moments, have been imposed on the same individual. This clause must be re proclaimed by the State President by June 30 to remain in effect. Should it be allowed to lapse, as Mr. Vorster said he might recommend later, at least for a while, the law says it can be re proclaimed again at any time for periods not to exceed 12 months without renewal. Large numbers of South African lawyers, doctors, scholars, and others have protested against the clause as an invasion of civil and human rights. Spokesmen of all major religions—Moslem, Protestant, Jewish, and Catholic—have appealed to the Government to let it lapse.

On May 23, two South African policemen entered a small general store in South Africa's Natal Province and served notices of renewed and intensified restrictions on the proprietor of the store, an elderly Zulu ex-chief—the famed Albert Luthuli, President General of the African National Congress and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize. Five years ago he was served with two notices restricting him to his local district on the grounds that his activities invited hostility between black and white and furthered the objects of communism. Now he is restricted for another 5 years and limited to Groutville, a small mission reserve. Nothing he says or writes can be published in South Africa except by special permission, and he cannot have visitors from outside this small farming reserve except by permission of the Government.

All three of these matters—the Rivonia trial, the 90-day detention clause, and the restrictions on Chief Luthuli—have brought many letters of protest to our Congressmen and Senators, as well as to the executive branch, from both individual Americans and organizations. Our leading labor and church organizations have issued official statements deploring the cycle of increasing repression and violence in South Africa.

While our desire—together with our efforts—to get the races together in South Africa stems from principle and morality, it arises equally from a major interest in the security of the United States. The hard fact of the matter is that the United States has an important interest in peace and stability everywhere. And we have a particular concern in South Africa to prevent giving the Communists an opportunity for subversion and to prevent the possibility of setting race against race.

So, in brief conclusion, the continent of Africa is challenged to bring new order in those areas where there is adversity. There have been troubles and there will be others, but some of them have been solved and more than a little progress has been made. Despite the prevalence of problems, I am optimistic for the long-run future of the continent.

United States and Panama Continue Discussions

Department Statement

Press release 291 dated June 23

Ambassadors [Jorge] Illueca and [Robert B.] Anderson announced today [June 23] that they have been conferring on a continuing basis with reference to the procedural matters involved in the meetings between the Panamanian and United States delegations in order to resolve any differences that might exist between the two countries.¹

They are formulating the substantive problems which will be the subjects of their proceedings. There is a high degree of cordiality and understanding between the two delegations, each appreciating the problems of the other. Meetings will continue on a day-to-day basis. At such times as there are significant developments appropriate news releases will be made in order to keep the people of both Republics informed.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 27, 1964, p. 655.

The Resurgence of the United Nations Security Council

by Joseph J. Sisco

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

As I was scanning a large Midwest newspaper recently, a poem caught my eye. It was one of those rhymes in which the words have been shoehorned into the meter that plague most newspaper editors and their readers alike, but this one had a ring of reality to it. With apologies to lovers of fine literature in the audience, I'd like to read it to you now:

I'm so weary of chaos in Laos
I'm so weary of fights in Algiers
I'm so weary of Castro—and all that fiasco
Of violence, fury and fears.

I'm gonna go out to my garden
There contemplate wind, sun and sky
And good things of earth—that have real worth
In a world gone so sadly awry.

Though some will question the merit of this little verse as poetry, I doubt whether many of us, including the people who have addressed you from this platform today, would deny having shared the sentiment at one time or another. It has a certain attraction to those of us who burn the midnight oil night after night in the Department of State, coping with the profusion of crises that keep popping around the globe and which, more likely than not, wind up in the United Nations. Every crisis these days seems to have a U.N. angle.

"In the Good Old Days"

The U.N. used to be largely a seasonal business. Today it's strictly year round. In fact, I get the feeling at times that we are somewhat in the same fix as the newly successful businessman who was questioned by the tax col-

lector about his earnings for the year. "Young man," he said, "I've been so busy making it I haven't had time to count it yet!"

In the early history of the United Nations there was an annual lull between sessions of the General Assembly and we had time to count the crises. But look at what happens now.

The 18th General Assembly, which ended last fall, was a phenomenally busy one. The Assembly considered over 100 items—peacekeeping, peacemaking, colonial issues, human rights, U.N. finances, economic development, and others—involving the interests, aspirations, and policies of 112 countries. More and more, committees of the Assembly are meeting during what used to be the off season.

And there are more international conferences, too. The U.N. Trade and Development Conference of 119 members has just wound up a 3-month session. This is only the beginning of a dialog between developed and developing countries about their economic and trade policies.

But the most dramatic thing is that we have had over 100 sessions of the Security Council since last June. There have been very few periods in the history of the United Nations when the Council has been busier.

So it's fair to ask just what this frenetic activity is all about and what it means for us as Americans. In short, I think it's time to take stock, even if, like the businessman, we can't

¹ Address made before a Department of State foreign policy conference at Cleveland, Ohio, on June 18.

really afford to stop what we're doing to count what we've done.

Council Action During the Past Year

Since last June the Security Council has considered nine major issues. I need hardly remind you of the outstanding ones; almost by definition they are the most intractable and most dangerous conflicts around the world.

Early this year the Security Council established the U.N. Force for Cyprus. This week it is meeting to extend the mandate of the Force and the mediator for an additional period of service.²

In April the Council called on the Secretary-General to provide assistance to Yemen and the United Kingdom, who are having differences over the Yemen-Aden border.

In another series of meetings the Security Council focused once again on the Kashmir dispute—exhorting the parties to work out their differences and to use the third-party help of the Secretary-General.

Just 2 weeks ago the Council established a U.N. Commission made up of Brazil, the Ivory Coast, and Morocco to look into the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border situation and to come up with recommendations within 45 days on how to make the poorly defined border more secure.³

And just this week the Council is again airing the South African *apartheid* issue.⁴

You might ask: Does all this motion mean progress toward a more peaceful world? The answer to this question depends on the yardstick used.

If by progress we mean long-range solutions at one fell swoop, the answer is obviously "no." If by progress we mean success in avoiding something worse, the answer is just as obviously "yes."

The U.N. Force and the U.N. mediator have not provided the final answer to the critical Cyprus issue. But the U.N. presence has at least helped to keep a lid on the situation so that through mediation and the helping hand of in-

terested countries a more lasting solution can be found without blowing up the eastern Mediterranean world in the process.

The U.N. commission dealing with the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border cannot be expected to solve the difficulties in Southeast Asia. But at least it provides a means for the two countries to work out useful arrangements reterranean world in the process.

Kashmir still escapes solution, as it has for over a decade. But the Council is a place where the parties can talk instead of fight—and where they can be pressed to get together and try again for a solution.

The troubles between the United Kingdom and Yemen over Aden may not dissolve suddenly. But at least the U.N. is ready to help the parties if they desire.

The Council's action obviously will not end *apartheid* in South Africa. But the Council can at least marshal world opinion in favor of meaningful consultations between all parties concerned.

This all illustrates that there are no quick panaceas in international politics. The long and drawn-out problems are toughest both for citizen and policymaker. Diplomacy consists of tough, day-by-day decisions designed to keep conflicts from becoming crises and crises leading to incidents and incidents erupting into war; it consists of actions by ourselves or in conjunction with allies or within the framework of regional or world organizations to seek peaceful resolution of threats to the peace and prompt restoration of peace when it is broken.

Some of the situations I mentioned are still in the headlines; others have moved to the back pages or out of the news altogether. And we were involved in each of them—a reflection of our position as a world power.

Why the Resurgence of the Council

For many years the intended role of the Security Council was hampered by one veto after another cast by the Soviet Union. In 1950 it became necessary to pass the "Uniting for Peace" resolution to provide a mechanism for the General Assembly to act quickly when the Council could not act. Many observers began to talk of the demise of the Security Council as

² See p. 64.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 1002.

⁴ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1964, p. 29.

though it had become a vestigial organ, like the human appendix. Its current resurgence is therefore all the more interesting at this time.

There are good reasons why the Security Council is more than ever in the thick of things.

First, despite the principle of sovereign equality among the member states, everyone knows that there are very great differences in power and influence and responsibility in the workaday world of nations. The framers of the charter realized this perfectly well when they designed the Security Council and gave it primary responsibility for keeping the peace. As you know, the five major powers of the postwar world were made permanent members and the six other members are elected on a rotating basis to provide a broad geographic representation.

So the composition of the Security Council gives recognition to the reality of disparate national strengths and assigns major responsibility to the major powers—which plainly is the way it ought to be.

We face the question of expansion of the Council within the next year. With a hundred-percent increase in the size of the U.N. membership since the charter was signed, it is understandable that the new members consider they are not adequately represented on the Council. Since the suggested increase of the Security Council from 11 to 15 would require the first charter amendment, it must be viewed in the context of the whole constitutional development of the United Nations, including the importance we attach to the principle of collective financial responsibility.

Second, the Security Council is small enough to make prompt and effective action possible and flexible enough to cope with a wide variety of peacekeeping problems. In practice the Council has approached the cases brought before it not from the point of view of rigid legal norms—which was one of the characteristic failures of the League of Nations—but as the highly political body it is, seeking the best agreement it can reach by debate, negotiation, and compromise—the very stuff of practical political action.

Third, the renewed primacy of the Security Council in peacekeeping matters is a reflection of the growing realization that maintenance of the peace is in the common interest of all U.N.

members, whatever their ideological and other differences may be. It is also a recognition by the small powers that in many of the tough problems big-power involvement is necessary. All but a handful of states committed to militant violence are gradually accepting the idea that any serious breach of the peace raises the danger of ultimate nuclear annihilation, that all states therefore share a common interest in peaceful resolution of the inevitable disputes that will plague the world for a long time to come, and that international peacekeeping machinery offers a safe and effective way to deal with such disputes.

It is worth noting that since the Lebanese crisis in 1958 the Soviet Union has not blocked a U.N. peacekeeping operation with a veto. Regardless of the fundamental differences which remain, there seems to be greater recognition of the utility of the U.N. as a buffer, as a third party which can help avoid big-power confrontation.

More than 40 nations already have contributed troops to the various U.N. peacekeeping forces in Korea, the Middle East, the Congo, and Cyprus; and other nations, including especially our own, have contributed logistical support and other services.

I do not think it is too much to hope that we may be approaching something like an international consensus—with the conspicuous exception of Communist China—on the need for peaceful settlement of disputes among nations and on the corollary need for international machinery to keep the lid on dangerous situations while solutions are being worked out at the conference tables.

This in general is why the United States welcomes the new-found vigor and relevance of the Security Council and hopes that it will continue to play its role as the major instrument of the world community for keeping and repairing world peace.

And this is why the United States has supported improvements in the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations, why we welcome the recent steps by the Canadians, the Nordic countries and the Netherlands, and just recently by Iran, to earmark troops for U.N. emergency service, and why we shall continue to press for

adequate planning, training, resources, and financing so that the U.N. can have a flexible callup system when forces are needed. The peace of the world should never go up in smoke and nuclear debris for want of a few thousand men or a few million dollars in the nick of time. We have, on several occasions, been uncomfortably close to that outrageous predicament and do not want it ever to happen again.

Let me be clear about one other thing. The peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations is not in any sense a substitute for national defense capabilities or the regional machinery such as the Organization of American States or NATO. It is supplementary and complementary to national and regional responses to conflict and crisis.

The Charter of the United Nations explicitly confirms the inherent right of all states to national defense. The charter also recognizes explicitly the competence of regional organizations and, in fact, exhorts parties to disputes to try to solve them within a regional framework before bringing them to the United Nations.

So instead of restricting the options open to us in dealing with threats to peace and security—as some people seem to fear—the peacekeeping machinery of the United Nations extends the range of available options for U.S. policy and action. In this significant sense, the U.N.'s capacity to defend the peace is part of our own capacity to defend the peace—an asset which is no less valuable to us because it is shared with the other members of the U.N.

The United Nations and Southeast Asia

Now let me turn, finally, to Southeast Asia, which concerns all of us these days.

The U.N. has, in fact, been in business in Southeast Asia more than most people think.

The Security Council overrode Soviet opposition and sent a commission to Laos in 1959, which helped quiet matters temporarily.

U Thant's representative has been busy trying to ease relations between Thailand and Cambodia.

When some doubted the feelings of people in Sabah and Sarawak toward union with

Malaysia, a U.N. commission sent out a survey team and confirmed that they favored it.

The U.N. worked out and helped administer a peaceful solution to the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands over the former colony of Dutch West New Guinea.

The U.N. Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East has developed a broad blueprint for the Lower Mekong Basin, and some work has already been done on projects along the tributaries of the Mekong. If the Communists would stop their aggression against their Southeast Asian neighbors, such regional economic development schemes could bring great benefits to Cambodia, South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Thailand.

The Assembly sent a group this past fall to South Viet-Nam to make an impartial inquiry into alleged violation of human rights.

And, as was mentioned previously, the U.N. is in business on the Cambodian-South Viet-Nam border issue.

Today we hear criticism that the United Nations is not doing enough—that it should take on the peacekeeping job in that whole troubled peninsula that used to be Indochina.

Why isn't the U.N. doing more?

This question has to be considered in historical context. The recent history of Southeast Asia is one of trying to make the Geneva agreements on Viet-Nam and Laos work the way they were supposed to work.

The military assistance which this Government is giving to the Government of Viet-Nam is not an *alternative* to a political settlement; it is in *support* of a political settlement reached long ago. That settlement has been violated deliberately and systematically by regimes outside the Republic of Viet-Nam to the point where the independence of Viet-Nam—formally guaranteed by the signatories of the Geneva agreement—is threatened.

So there is no question of military action versus political settlement; the military action that is taking place is to enforce a political settlement long since reached but long since breached by Viet-Nam's northern neighbors. We help the Vietnamese defend themselves against armed subversion from the outside to prove, once and for all, that aggression simply

does not pay. As Secretary Rusk said recently:⁵

All that is needed to restore peace in Laos and Vietnam is for the Communists to live up to the agreements they have already made. All that is needed is for the Communists to stop their aggressions, to go home, to leave their neighbors alone.

It is manifest that the members of the U.N. would not agree to take this job off our hands and let us go away and forget it. Our power and determination are needed to persuade the Communists that it is in their interest to stop aggression and start keeping the promises they made at Geneva in 1954 and 1962. If this happens, the nations of the area will need international help in protecting their independence and developing their economies. The U.N. might have a role to play here as the situation develops.

All this suggests, in conclusion, that if the United Nations has been busy in recent months, it is unlikely to be less busy in the months and years ahead. If the Security Council does not set a new record for meetings held or crises dealt with in each succeeding year, it at least is likely to deserve the role of primary peacekeeping organ assigned it by the founding fathers.

And it is in the peacekeeping field that the U.N. has best served the interests of the United States and the cause of peace. If we are ever to have a secure system of world order, it will grow from a surer system of settling more and more kinds of disputes, in more and more parts of the world, without recourse to arms. And this, after all, is the purpose—and the promise—of a charter the Senate ratified by 89 votes to 2, and a United Nations Organization which, 19 years later, we find increasingly worthy of our growing support.

United States Agrees To Lend Brazil \$50 Million

U.S./U.N. press release 4420 dated June 24

The United States and Brazil on June 24 signed an Alliance for Progress agreement under which the United States will loan Brazil

⁵ *Ibid.*, June 8, 1964, p. 886.

\$50 million in support of that nation's program of stabilization, development, and reform. The loan, from the U.S. Agency for International Development, provides for repayment over 40 years, including a 10-year grace period. Interest is at $\frac{3}{4}$ percent during the grace period and 2 percent per year during the remaining 30 years.

The signing of the agreement took place in New York, due to the presence there of U.S. and Brazilian officials.

The loan is additional to understandings now being reached for the financing of various specific projects designed to promote the economic development and social progress of the Brazilian people, and supplements the supply of U.S. agricultural products to Brazil under the Food for Peace program.

Brazil also expects to obtain debt relief through negotiations taking place in Paris with the United States, Japan, and European creditors. Such negotiations are expected to be concluded in the near future.

The \$50 million loan will be used so as to generate a cruzeiro counterpart which can be used for noninflationary financing of basic activities such as maintaining the expanding employment and increasing agricultural productivity. Specifically, these counterpart funds will be used predominantly to finance low-cost housing, for working capital for industry, and to expand agricultural credit for medium and small farmers, who have limited access to the credit market.

Within the spirit of the Charter of Punta del Este, the Brazilian Government is formulating a comprehensive program of development, stabilization, and reform which can serve as a basis for later discussions with international institutions and the governments of the United States and other friendly countries of Brazilian needs for external assistance.

A number of measures in line with the objectives of development, stabilization, and reform have already been taken, such as those designed to reduce the budgetary deficit, to increase foreign exchange earnings, to expand private investment, to institute a large-scale program of low-cost housing, and to increase agricultural productivity.

U.S., U.S.S.R. To Consider Joint Study on Desalting of Sea Water

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

I am happy to announce that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to explore the possibility of scientific cooperation on methods of desalting sea water, including the possible use of nuclear power. As an initial step, the meeting of U.S. and Soviet representatives will be held in Washington on July 14 and 15 of this year. The purpose of the initial meeting will be, first, to discuss the general problem of desalting; two, to review the present activities and plans of the two countries in this area; three, to consider possible areas of cooperation. The representatives will then advise their respective governments as to the best way to proceed.

The chairman of the U.S. delegation will be Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. He succeeded Dr. Jerome Wiesner. The U.S. delegation will also include representatives of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S. Department of the Interior.

I hope that this meeting will lead to effective scientific cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union and what could become a very important activity of great economic significance to many areas of the world.

Attorney General To Administer Austrian Assets Agreement

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER²

DESIGNATING THE ATTORNEY GENERAL AS THE OFFICER AUTHORIZED TO ADMINISTER THE PROVISIONS OF THE AUSTRIAN ASSETS AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 30, 1959

Under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by Article I of the Agreement entitled "Agreement Between the United States of America and the Republic of Austria Regarding the Return of Austrian Property, Rights and Interests," which was signed at Washington on January 30, 1959,³ and was ratified by


¹Read by the President at his news conference on June 23.

²No. 11158; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 7981.

the United States on March 4, 1964, pursuant to the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States on February 25, 1964, I hereby designate the Attorney General of the United States as the officer authorized to administer and give effect to the provisions of that Agreement.

The Attorney General is authorized to delegate any of the functions conferred upon him by this order to any officer or employee of the Department of Justice.

As used in this order, the term "functions" includes duties, powers, responsibilities, authority, and discretion.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 22, 1964.

U.S. and New Zealand Sign Air Transport Agreement

Press release 293 dated June 24

The United States and New Zealand on June 24 signed a bilateral air transport services agreement in Wellington. The agreement, which was initialed *ad referendum* on March 11, 1964,⁴ was signed on behalf of their Governments by K. J. Holyoake, Prime Minister of New Zealand, and Herbert B. Powell, United States Ambassador to New Zealand.

The new agreement replaces the 1946 air transport services agreement between the United States and New Zealand.⁵ In addition to bringing up to date several articles of the 1946 agreement, the new agreement incorporates certain amendments to the routes which were exchanged between New Zealand and the United States in 1946. The routes agreed upon will permit an airline designated by New Zealand to operate to Los Angeles via the Society Islands or via Honolulu, and to operate the "Coral Route" in the South Pacific via American Samoa. The United States airline will be able to operate to and beyond Auckland and Christchurch via, *inter alia*, the Society Islands.

³Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5577.

⁴For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 549.

⁵Treaties and Other International Acts Series 1573, 4645, 4789, 5085, and 5374.

U.S.-Japan Science Committee Concludes Fourth Meeting

The United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation met at Washington, D.C., June 23-26. Following are an announcement of the meeting, remarks made by Secretary Rusk before the Committee on June 23, and the text of a joint communique released at the close of the meeting on June 26.

ANNOUNCEMENT OF MEETING

The Department of State announced on June 22 (press release 289) that the United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation would hold its fourth series of meetings at Washington, D.C., June 23-26.¹ The Committee, composed of distinguished scientific leaders of the two countries, advises the respective Governments on ways of strengthening cooperation between the United States and Japan. At its forthcoming meeting, the Committee will study a report from the two Governments on the status of the cooperative science program conducted under its aegis. It will consider possible new areas of scientific cooperation. The Committee is also expected to discuss ways in which the scientists of both countries can combine their knowledge and efforts in research which could lead toward prediction of the time and place of earthquakes and tidal waves, problems of vital importance to both Japan and the United States.

The United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation is one of three high-level U.S.-Japan consultative bodies which Prime Minister Ikeda of Japan and President Kennedy, during Prime Minister Ikeda's visit to Washington in June 1961, agreed to establish to strengthen the partnership between the United States and Japan.² The other committees are the Cabinet-level Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs and the United States-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange.

¹ For names of the members of the U.S. and Japanese delegations, see Department of State press release 289 dated June 22.

² For text of a joint communique, see BULLETIN of July 10, 1961, p. 57.

The Committee on Scientific Cooperation has held three meetings to date: December 1961 in Tokyo, May 1962 in Washington,³ and May 1963 in Tokyo. The Committee and its cooperative science program, administered on the United States side by the National Science Foundation, has already achieved scientific cooperation of benefit to both countries. The Committee has concentrated on the promotion of the exchange of scholars and scientific information and materials, and the encouragement of joint research projects in specified scientific areas. These areas include: earth sciences of the Pacific area, animal and plant geography and ecology of the Pacific area, medical sciences, and hurricanes and typhoons. Geophysical studies of Pacific volcanoes and deep-sea seismic studies are among the cooperative research projects initiated to date. Japanese and American scientists have also met to discuss such subjects of common concern as cancer chemotherapy and education in the sciences.

REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK

I have the liveliest personal interest in the work of this joint Committee on Scientific Cooperation. I am very pleased to be with you at this fourth joint session of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation. I have just this moment left President Johnson, who asked me to extend to you his personal greetings on behalf of the U.S. Government. For me it is a special pleasure to see a number of old friends. In a former capacity I enjoyed many close associations in the scientific community both in the U.S. and Japan.

When they met in June 1961, Prime Minister Ikeda and the late President Kennedy agreed on the importance of a closer relationship between our two countries especially in the fields of economic, cultural, and scientific affairs. Both Prime Minister Ikeda and President Kennedy felt that each of us had a great deal to do for each other, that we have much to learn from each other.

³ For texts of joint communiques issued at the close of the first and second meetings, see *ibid.*, Jan. 8, 1962, p. 66, and June 11, 1962, p. 954.

President Johnson is dedicated to that same objective. One of his first decisions as President was to ask Prime Minister Ikeda to reschedule the third meeting of the U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, postponed by the tragic event of last November while the American delegation was en route over the Pacific. This was done in spite of the heavy pressures of legislative demands upon both your Cabinet and upon ours.⁴ As I said in Tokyo in January,⁵ nothing can testify better to the reality of the partnership that exists between our two countries. That partnership is rooted in common interests and purposes and ideals.

The efforts of this Committee have been watched with a great deal of interest by both Governments. In the short space of less than 3 years your discussions and recommendations have underlined the importance of scientific research to national development. It was the marriage of education with research and experimentation that explained the dramatic development of our own country in the past 50 years. So both our countries, as well as many others, have a strong practical interest in your efforts to develop means, for example, of predicting the time and place of earthquakes and tidal waves. You have found many other areas of useful cooperation, and we are confident you will find still others.

Our Governments realize this partnership that exists between us should not be exclusive or narrow. For they know neither of our countries can achieve enduring prosperity and peace apart from the rest of the world. Among our most common interests is that of building a decent world order. This includes, among other things, helping the developing countries to modernize their economic and social systems. For men everywhere have come to believe that modern science and technology can make possible a decent standard of living for all. That reliance is important because in the next two or three decades we shall discover whether science

and technology can provide an answer which in the past has been provided by aggression, invasion, the taking of resources from other peoples. Neither stability nor moral satisfaction is to be found in a world which is divided between a few rich and very many poor.

So your Committee has great responsibilities and great opportunities. It is a genuine pleasure to have you with us once again, and I wish you continuing success in extending cooperation in science between our two countries. To the extent that we can do so, we spin the infinity of threads that bind people together and remind ourselves that, despite our trivial differences, frail man, confronted with a sometimes hostile physical universe, is bound together more importantly by the fact of his humanity than he is separated by the emotions and the fears among men themselves. So this is the great prospect; this is the great vision which scientific cooperation can meet. It cuts across ideological lines.

Just today we have announced cooperation with the Soviet Union on the desalination of sea water.⁶ One-third of our own country needs advances in this field. International cooperation, certainly, is needed because it is time for man to think of himself as man and to try to cooperate within the family of man. It is too late to take another view. We cannot afford to consult our historical fears, our ambitions, our appetites. We must think of ourselves as men.

TEXT OF JOINT COMMUNIQUE

The fourth meeting of the United States-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation was held at the Department of State, Washington, D.C., June 23-26, 1964. Dr. Harry C. Kelly, Head of the United States Delegation, and Dr. Kankuro Kaneshige, Head of the Japanese Delegation, served as Co-Chairmen of the Committee.

The Committee expressed its confidence that the joint enterprises undertaken by scientists of the two nations during the past three years have established a firm basis for expanding scientific cooperation between the United States and Japan. The work already underway shows that international cooperation in the sciences contributes not alone to the advance of knowl-

⁴For text of a joint communique released at the close of the third meeting of the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, see *ibid.*, Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235.

⁵*Ibid.*, p. 230.

⁶See p. 60.

edge but also to the improvement of understanding among nations and the attainment of world peace.

The Committee received reports from panels in each of the seven areas of cooperation and agreed to transmit several of the recommendations to their governments. The names of Panels serving the seven areas in which activity has been sponsored by the Committee for the past three years are:

- (1) Exchange of Scholars.
- (2) Exchange of Scientific and Technical Information and Materials.
- (3) Earth Sciences of the Pacific Area.
- (4) Animal and Plant Geography and Ecology of the Pacific Area. (The name of this Panel was changed to "Biological Sciences").
- (5) Medical Sciences.
- (6) Education in the Sciences.
- (7) Hurricane and Typhoon Research.

As an addition to the joint research projects already underway, the Committee agreed to recommend to the respective governments that drug abuse be designated an appropriate field for joint research in the area of the medical sciences, since the abuse of drugs is a growing problem in both countries, and its pattern in the U.S. and Japan has certain features in common, differing from that in many other countries.

The next meeting of the Committee will be held in Tokyo in June, 1965.

Captive Nations Week, 1964

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS the joint resolution approved July 17, 1959 (73 Stat. 212) authorizes and requests the President of the United States of America to issue a proclamation each year designating the third week in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time as freedom and independence shall have been achieved for all the captive nations of the world; and

WHEREAS the cause of human rights and personal dignity remains a universal aspiration; and

WHEREAS this nation is firmly committed to the cause of freedom and justice everywhere; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate and proper to manifest to the people of the captive nations the support of the Government and the people of the United States of America for their just aspirations:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week beginning July 12, 1964, as Captive Nations Week.

I invite the people of the United States of America to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to give renewed devotion

to the just aspirations of all people for national independence and human liberty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this eighteenth day of June in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-eighth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

President Asks for Tariff Study on Stainless Steel Flatware

White House press release dated June 23

The President on June 23 requested the Tariff Commission to begin an investigation for the purpose of advising him on the probable economic effects of a change in special tariff restrictions on imports of stainless steel table flatware.

The restrictions on stainless steel flatware were first imposed on November 1, 1959,¹ after an escape-clause investigation established the need for such action. The situation in the industry has since been reviewed each year by the Commission, the most recent review having been completed in the fall of 1963 under the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962. The act also provides, in section 351(d)(2), for a full-scale review of the probable economic effect of the "reduction or termination" of restrictions should the President or the Tariff Commission call for one.

The Commission's annual review indicated that there have been improvements in domestic production and sales of stainless steel flatware since the escape-clause action went into effect, and that in the same period imports have been reduced to about half their previous volume.

The President, in referring the case to the Tariff Commission, announced that the Com-

¹ No. 3594; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 7971.

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 16, 1959, p. 727.

mission's annual review had been submitted to him by his Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Christian A. Herter, and was accompanied by the views of the interagency committees responsible to Governor Herter's office.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

- Food for Peace: Nineteenth Semiannual Report on Activities Carried on Under Public Law 480, 83d Congress, as Amended, Outlining Operations Under the Act During the Period July 1 Through December 31, 1963. H. Doc. 294. Undated. 139 pp.
- Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems During the Period January 1-June 30, 1963. H. Doc. 297. April 14, 1964. 90 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Hearings before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 10502. Part VII (including appendix and index). May 5-6, 1964. 180 pp.
- Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Report of the House Foreign Affairs Committee on H.R. 11380. H. Rept. 1443. June 1, 1964. 75 pp.
- Recent Developments in the Soviet Bloc. Report on hearings before the Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. H. Rept. 1442. June 1, 1964. 19 pp.
- Establishing the Roosevelt Campobello International Park. Report to accompany H.R. 9740. H. Rept. 1466. June 9, 1964. 12 pp.
- Ninth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference, June 11, 1964. Report of the United States House delegation to the conference held in Paris, November 4-8, 1963. H. Rept. 1478. June 11, 1964. 51 pp.
- Aircraft Engines. Report to accompany H.R. 1608. S. Rept. 1081. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Certain Wools. Report to accompany H.R. 2652. S. Rept. 1082. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Instant Coffee. Report to accompany H.R. 4198. S. Rept. 1084. June 16, 1964. 4 pp.
- Manganese Ore. Report to accompany H.R. 7480. S. Rept. 1085. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Double Taxation of Certain Tobacco Products. Report to accompany H.R. 8268. S. Rept. 1086. June 16, 1964. 5 pp.
- Certain Particleboard. Report to accompany H.R. 8975. S. Rept. 1087. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Metal Scrap. Report to accompany H.R. 10463. S. Rept. 1089. June 16, 1964. 5 pp.
- Temporary Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries. Report to accompany H.R. 10466. S. Rept. 1091. 5 pp.
- Copying Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 10468. S. Rept. 1092. June 16, 1964. 2 pp.
- Certain Natural Graphite. Report to accompany H.R. 10537. S. Rept. 1093. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Alumina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 9311. S. Rept. 1094. June 16, 1964. 3 pp.
- Roosevelt Campobello International Park. Report to accompany S. 2464. S. Rept. 1097. June 19, 1964. 12 pp.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Votes Extension of Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Security Council on June 19, together with the text of a resolution adopted unanimously by the Council on June 20.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4417 dated June 19

Before proceeding to the substance of my remarks, may I first express the appreciation of my Government to the Secretary-General for his statesmanlike efforts in behalf of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean during these past few months. The recruitment and deployment in Cyprus of a peacekeeping force of between six and seven thousand men with all of the attendant problems of negotiations, logistics, headquarters, staffing, command arrangements, and force directives is an operation of considerable magnitude and difficulty. The United Nations has met this test in a manner worthy of its best traditions. In mounting this peacekeeping operation and in the selection of personnel to direct the operation in the field, the Secretary-General has once again demonstrated his instinct for finding the right man for the job.

General [P. S.] Gyani, Commander of the United Nations Force, and General [R. M. P.] Carver, his deputy, have been both skillful and patient in dealing with the complex and frustrating problems which the United Nations Force has encountered. We are hopeful that General [K. S.] Thimayya, a distinguished compatriot of General Gyani and for whom we have the highest regard, will find it possible to respond favorably to the Secretary-General's request that he replace General Gyani, who we understand finds it necessary to leave Cyprus.

The Secretary-General's Special Representative, Señor Galo Plaza, has labored with extraordinary energy, dedication, and quick grasp of the situation to resolve some of its most difficult aspects. Also in response to the resolution that we adopted on March 4,¹ the Secretary-General designated a distinguished Finnish diplomat, Ambassador Sakari Tuomioja, who continues his patient efforts to find a peaceful solution and an agreed settlement of the political problem confronting Cyprus. For his success, as we have so often repeated, restoration of tranquil conditions on the island is imperative. For this reason particularly, we all owe a debt of gratitude to those states—Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, New Zealand, Sweden, and the United Kingdom—whose soldiers and police make up the United Nations peacekeeping force. Without their perseverance there would be little hope for a return to law and order, for improvement in the relations between the communities, and for an ultimate solution of the conflict in the interest of world peace.

But the United Nations Force has made progress since it became operational about 3 months ago. There have been encouraging forward steps—eliminating fortifications, arrangements for harvesting the crops, and so forth—in the implementation of the program outlined in the Secretary-General's April 29 report.² Nevertheless it is clear, as the Secretary-General has stated in his report to us of June 15,³ that the withdrawal of the Force at this time would lead to an early resumption of the fighting, which might well develop into a still more serious conflict. With the mandate to restore normal conditions uncompleted, my Government believes that the first order of business in this Council is to assure an extension of the United Nations Force in the island. For this reason we heartily support the resolution placed before the Council by the distinguished representative of Brazil. I think it is clear that whatever shortcoming may exist in the mandate of the Force, it is unlikely that we could agree at this time on any changes in the balanced resolution so laboriously constructed in February.

¹For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466.

²U.N. doc. S/5671 and Corr. 1.

³U.N. doc. S/5764 and Corr. 1.

The mandate of the Force permits it to take firm action where necessary. And it is heartening to note that with increasing firmness the fighting has subsided. For example, with respect to the situation in the Kyrenia Pass area, the Secretary-General's report states:

Although better armed with heavy weapons and in greater numerical strength, there are no signs of the Greek Cypriots resuming their attacks in the St. Hilarion area, and the location of permanent UNFICYP posts with the forward troops of both sides has clearly acted as a deterrent to any positive offensive action.

In the light of recent incidents which have endangered the lives of men of the Force, it has been made clear to both sides that a repetition of such incidents will result in the removal of any post used as a base for fire against troops of UNFICYP, using force if necessary after due warning has been given.

Mr. President, we applaud such resolute purpose, and we believe that continued vigorous implementation of the mandate will contribute more and more to law and order if—and I emphasize if—the parties will avoid further acts and utterances that aggravate the fears and tensions.

In this connection we find the increased importation of arms most serious. The greater the quantity of arms wielded by the two sides, the more difficult is the task of the peacekeepers. The Secretary-General has expressed his grave concern on that score in his report. The units in the Force and the Force Commander have done likewise. On May 28, I remind the Council, General Gyani stated:

One of the major obstacles in the way of the United Nations force is the irresponsible and senseless conduct of armed men of both communities who do not appear to have any discipline or to be responsible to any established authority, but have been acting on their own reckless initiative, regardless of the unfortunate and serious consequences of their acts. Too many unauthorized people in Cyprus are carrying too many weapons. In the hands of these thoughtless and irresponsible elements these weapons become a major factor in the delay in a return to normal life. It is absolutely essential that these elements of the population, both Greek Cypriote and Turk Cypriote, should be restrained and disciplined and their weapons removed from them. Until such action is taken, violence and a sense of insecurity will necessarily pervade the country and the tasks of the United Nations will be correspondingly made more difficult and its chances of success limited.

Mr. President, I welcome the statement by

the representative of the Soviet Union here this afternoon that weapons do not help in the solution of conflicts.

We believe that the competitive inflow of arms into Cyprus aggravates the tension between the two communities in the island, a tension which is reflected at the very center of governmental decisionmaking. The two elements of the Government, whose cooperation is the very basis of the nation's constitution, are not acting together and are presenting the United Nations and its members not only with dangerous military possibilities but with baffling legal and political problems.

As to whether particular actions by public officials or governmental bodies relating to conscription or to arms importation are constitutional, it seems to us it is not for us or any organ of the United Nations to decide. But it is all too clear that, whatever may be the constitutional situation, the importation of arms into an island already stuffed with armament, and the raising of armed forces beyond original intention or current requirements by anyone, are clearly contrary to the letter and the intent of the Security Council resolution of March 4. The Secretary-General himself raises a question about these actions; and, in our view, they are more than questionable. Whether from the standpoint of internal security in Cyprus or United Nations responsibility there, those actions are certainly of dubious legality, unhelpful and unwise.

The United Nations Force, in order to succeed in implementing its mandate, must have the full cooperation of the two communities in Cyprus. And in this connection we are deeply shocked over the practice of taking hostages and particularly the incident involving the apparent abduction and disappearance of members of the United Nations Force.

If the United Nations is to pacify Cyprus, it must have much greater cooperation from the two communities—cooperation not just in the fields included in the program the Secretary-General outlined in his report of April 29, but cooperation to stop the increase of armaments on the island.

This applies also to all members of the United Nations, as operative paragraph 1 of the March 4 resolution makes clear in these words:

Calls upon all Member States, in conformity with their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations, to refrain from any action or threat of action likely to worsen the situation in the sovereign Republic of Cyprus, or to endanger international peace. . . .

This responsibility applies, we believe, particularly to the parties to the international agreements with respect to Cyprus. For this reason a favorable atmosphere for the work of the United Nations, both of its force on Cyprus and its mediator, requires that all states, and these states in particular, refrain from any type of military action, support, or supply which adds to tension on the island.

We have heard, Mr. President, the charges by the distinguished Foreign Minister of Cyprus [Spyros Kyprianou] that the threat of military intervention by Turkey is the basic cause of tension and violence in the island. We have heard, on the other hand, the charges by the distinguished representative of Turkey [Orhan Eralp] that continued armed attacks by Greek Cypriots on Turkish Cypriots and unconstitutional action by President Makarios and his Government in conscripting new forces and in seeking heavy arms abroad are what threaten peace and provoke possible intervention. It is not our purpose, nor is it feasible for the Security Council at this time, to sift all of these charges and to discover the truth. There is doubtless truth on both sides. It is inescapably clear, however, that the actions of each party cited by the other are in fact creating mistrust and fear, undermining rather than building confidence between the two communities, making infinitely more difficult a just and final solution, and, indeed, threatening not only to raise to appalling proportions the conflict in Cyprus but even to destroy peace in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. President, these dire eventualities must not occur. This is the obligation of the United Nations peacekeeping force, and most particularly this is the responsibility of the parties directly concerned. We appeal to them that, rather than leveling bitter charges against each other, they consider prayerfully what each can himself do to lower tension and to restore confidence. It is never too late for magnanimity, and ultimately it is only by magnanimity and

mutual concession that this grievous problem will be resolved.

It is not for my Government to say what that solution should be. We do believe, however, that the parties should take steps without delay which can set the stage for a negotiated solution acceptable to all concerned. We do not expect a solution can be reached without concessions and sacrifices or that it can be entirely satisfactory to either side, but a solution must be found. It should be lasting, just, and without humiliation to any of those concerned. The process of achieving such a solution must begin and without delay. The first and most urgent step, it seems to us, is the passage of the resolution before us.

Before concluding, Mr. President, I should like to call to the Council's attention paragraphs 126 and 127 of the Secretary-General's report, in which he notes that financial pledges have been received sufficient to cover the cost of the first 3 months of the United Nations Force operation, but that more than \$7 million in additional pledges will be required to cover the cost of a further 3 months. Mr. President, only a relatively small number of countries—some 20 to date—have carried the financial burden of supporting the United Nations operation in Cyprus. My Government, in response to the Secretary-General's appeal for voluntary contributions, pledged \$2 million toward the cost of the first 3 months' operation, and it also transported most of the United Nations contingents to Cyprus at no cost to this organization.

The maintenance of international peace and security is set forth in article 1 of the Charter of the United Nations as its first purpose. When peace is threatened anywhere, it should certainly be the concern of all members of this organization. I would, therefore, appeal urgently to all members to respond to the request of the Secretary-General so that the success of this operation on Cyprus may not in any way be prejudiced by lack of financial support.

Finally, Mr. President, in view of the critical situation, we hope that the Council will proceed to vote as quickly as possible on the joint draft resolution now before us so as to give the Secretary-General adequate time to make the nec-

essary administrative, financial, and other arrangements for the extension of the United Nations Force on Cyprus.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION⁴

The Security Council,

Noting that the report by the Secretary-General (S/5764) considers the maintenance in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force created by the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 (S/5575) for an additional period of three months to be useful and advisable,

Expressing its deep appreciation to the Secretary-General for his efforts in the implementation of the Security Council resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 13 March 1964,⁵

Expressing its deep appreciation to the States that have contributed troops, police, supplies and financial support for the implementation of the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964,

1. *Reaffirms* its resolutions of 4 March 1964 and 13 March 1964;

2. *Calls upon* all Member States to comply with the above-mentioned resolutions;

3. *Takes note* of the Report by the Secretary-General (S/5764);

4. *Extends* the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-Keeping Force established under the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 for an additional period of three months, ending 26 September 1964 (S/5575).

United States Delegations to International Conferences

International Labor Conference

The Department of State announced on June 25 (press release 296) that the United States would be represented by the following tripartite delegation at the 48th session of the International Labor Conference at Geneva, June 17–July 9.¹

REPRESENTING THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES

Delegates

George L-P Weaver, Assistant Secretary of Labor for International Affairs

⁴ U.N. doc. S/5778; adopted unanimously on June 20.

⁵ U.N. doc. S/5603.

¹ For names of the advisers to the tripartite delegation, see Department of State press release 296 dated June 25.

George P. Delaney, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Substitute Delegates

John F. Skillman, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Commerce

Roger W. Tubby, Ambassador, U.S. Mission, Geneva

Congressional Advisers

Kenneth Keating, U.S. Senate

Robert P. Griffin, House of Representatives

Alternate Congressional Advisers

Albert H. Quie, House of Representatives

Adam Clayton Powell, House of Representatives

James Roosevelt, House of Representatives

REPRESENTING THE EMPLOYERS OF THE UNITED STATES *Delegate*

Richard Wagner, Chairman of the Executive Committee, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, and Vice Chairman of the Board, Champlin Oil and Refining Co., Chicago, Ill.

REPRESENTING THE WORKERS OF THE UNITED STATES *Delegate*

Rudolph Faupl, International Representative, International Association of Machinists, Washington, D.C.

Secretary of Labor W. Willard Wirtz is attending the meeting as a "visiting minister."

These annual meetings have as their purpose the discussion of means of improving working conditions and labor standards throughout the world. At this year's conference special attention will be focused on proposals to amend the ILO constitution so as to provide for suspension of countries found by the United Nations to be pursuing a declared policy of racial discrimination.

Current U.N. Documents:

A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Cambodia-South Viet-Nam Border Dispute: Letters from the representative of Cambodia: S/5728, June 2, 1964, 5 pp.; S/5765, June 15, 1965, 2 pp.; S/5770, June 17, 1964, 1 p. Note of President of the Security Council designating members of Committee

of Experts, S/5749, June 5, 1964, 1 p. Letter from the representative of United Kingdom, S/5777, June 19, 1964, 2 pp.

Letters from the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey on the Cyprus dispute: S/5740, June 3, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5743, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5744, June 5, 1964, 4 pp.; S/5746, June 5, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5747, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5748, June 5, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5753, June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5754, June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5755, June 8, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5762, June 10, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5766, June 15, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5768, June 16, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5774, June 18, 1964, 6 pp.; S/5779, June 22, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5781, June 23, 1964, 3 pp. Reports by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus: S/5764, June 15, 1964, 40 pp. and map; S/5764/Corr. 1, June 16, 1964, 1 p.; S/5764/Add. 1, June 19, 1964, 2 pp.

Letters and report on question of *apartheid* in South Africa: S/5745, June 5, 1964, 1 p.; S/5658/Add. 3, June 8, 1964, 5 pp.; S/5757, June 9, 1964, 1 p.; S/5759, June 9, 1964, 1 p.

Letters from the representatives of Haiti and the Dominican Republic on border incidents: S/5750, June 8, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5750, June 9, 1964, 1 p.; S/5763, June 10, 1964, 1 p.

General Assembly

Report on the Implementation of the Current Programme for 1963 (Including the Complementary Assistance Programme and Other Projects), submitted by the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. A/AC.96/229. April 15, 1964. 48 pp.

Note on the Situation of Refugees in Nepal submitted by the High Commissioner. A/AC.96/241. May 4, 1964. 10 pp.

International Law Commission. Report on the Sixth Session of the Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee (Cairo, February-March 1964) by Eduardo Jiménez de Aréchaga, Observer for the Commission. A/CN.4/172. May 11, 1964. 20 pp.

Measures To Implement the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Report of the Secretary-General. A/5698. June 8, 1964. 39 pp.

Opening Date of the Nineteenth Regular Session of the General Assembly (November 10, 1964). Note by the Secretary-General. A/5708. June 15, 1964. 5 pp.

Letter dated June 3, 1964, from the representative of Kuwait to the Secretary-General on the Question of Aden. A/AC.109/83. June 17, 1964. 3 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Latin America. Social Development of Latin America in the Postwar Period. E/CN.12/660. April 15, 1964. 169 pp.

Teaching of the Purposes and Principles, the Structure and Activities of the United Nations and the Specialized Agencies in Schools and Other Educational Institutions of Member States. Report of the Secretary-General and the Director-General of UNESCO. E/3875, April 15, 1964, 266 pp., and Corr. 1, May 27, 1964, 8 pp.

Social Commission. Report on the World Social Situation: Planning for balanced social and economic development in the United Arab Republic. E/CN.5/346/Add. 10. April 24, 1964. 62 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards. Signed at Vienna June 15, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency accepts the initial inventory of materials, equipment, and facilities which are within the scope of the Agency safeguard system. *Signatures:* Greece, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Automotive Traffic

Customs convention on the temporary importation of private road vehicles. Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into force December 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964.

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. *Acceptance deposited:* Somali Republic, June 10, 1964.

Load Line

International load line convention. Done at London July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 47 Stat. 2228.

Accession deposited: Algeria, April 11, 1964.

Narcotic Drugs

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 31, 1914, for the United States February 11, 1915. 38 Stat. 1912.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Rwanda, May 5, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: June 23, 1964.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960.¹

Acceptance deposited: United Kingdom, June 11, 1964.²

¹ Not in force.

² With a declaration.

BILATERAL

France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, 4694, 5128), for co-operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Greece

Protocol supplementing convention of February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion of taxes on estates of deceased persons. Signed at Athens February 12, 1964.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: June 23, 1964.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement for the application of safeguards to United States reactor facilities. Signed at Vienna June 15, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which the Agency accepts the initial inventory of facilities and materials to be placed under Agency safeguards.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 23, 1964. Entered into force June 23, 1964.

Korea

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of March 18, 1964 (TIAS 5547). Effected by exchange of notes at Seoul June 15, 1964. Entered into force June 15, 1964.

New Zealand

Air transport services agreement. Signed at Wellington June 24, 1964. Entered into force June 24, 1964. Air transport services agreement of December 3, 1946, as supplemented (TIAS 1573, 4645, 4789, 5085, 5374). *Terminated:* June 24, 1964 (replaced by agreement of June 24, 1964, *supra*).

Spain

Agreement amending agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles of July 16, 1963 (TIAS 5427). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 15 and 17, 1964. Entered into force June 17, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Robert C. Creel as Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, effective June 24. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 295 dated June 26.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Peru. Signed at Lima February 13, 1964. Entered into force February 13, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5539. 17 pp. 10¢.

Education—Educational Foundation and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Iceland. Signed at Reykjavik February 13, 1964. Entered into force February 13, 1964. TIAS 5542. 10 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea. Signed at Seoul March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. With exchanges of notes. TIAS 5547. 10 pp. 10¢.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Bolivia, relating to the agreement of September 23, 1955. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz March 4, 1964. Entered into force March 4, 1964. TIAS 5548. 3 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of October 19, 1963. Exchange of letters—Signed at Taipei February 3 and March 18, 1964. Entered into force March 18, 1964. TIAS 5549. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Portugal, amending the agreement of November 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Dated at Lisbon March 23 and April 3, 1964. Entered into force April 3, 1964. TIAS 5550. 5 pp. 5¢.

Boundary Waters—Saint Lawrence Seaway Suspension of Tolls on the Welland Canal. Agreement with Canada, continuing the agreement of July 3 and 13, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa March 31, 1964. Entered into force March 31, 1964. TIAS 5551. 2 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Ivory Coast. Signed at Abidjan March 10, 1964. Entered into force March 10, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5552. 9 pp. 10¢.

Atomic Energy—Cooperation for Civil Uses. Protocol with Japan, amending the agreement of June 16, 1958, as amended. Signed at Washington August 7, 1963. Entered into force April 21, 1964. TIAS 5553. 5 pp. 5¢.

Technical Cooperation—Continued Application to Tanganyika of the U.S.-U.K. Agreement of July 13, 1951. Agreement with Tanganyika. Exchange of notes—Dated at Dar es Salaam December 9, 1963. Entered into force December 9, 1963. TIAS 5554. 2 pp. 5¢.

Education—Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with Belgium and Luxembourg, amending the agreement of October 8, 1948, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Brussels April 2, 1964. And exchange of notes—Signed at Luxembourg March 12 and April 2, 1964. Entered into force April 2, 1964. TIAS 5555. 11 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia. Signed at Tunis April 7, 1964. Entered into force April 7, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5556. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. TIAS 5557. 2 pp. 5¢.

North Pacific Fur Seals. Protocol with Canada, Japan, and U.S.S.R., amending the Interim Convention of February 9, 1957. Signed at Washington October 8, 1963. Entered into force April 10, 1964. TIAS 5558. 20 pp. 15¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with India. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5559. 6 pp. 5¢.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Jamaica. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington March 31 and April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964. TIAS 5560. 3 pp. 5¢.

Peace Corps Program. Agreement with Ivory Coast. Exchange of notes—Dated at Abidjan April 5 and 21, 1962. Entered into force April 21, 1962. TIAS 5561. 4 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: June 22-28

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to June 22 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 285 of June 17.

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*290	6/22	U.S. participation in international conferences.
291	6/23	Discussions with Panama.
292	6/23	Rostow: "Europe and the Atlantic Alliance."
293	6/24	Air transport services agreement with New Zealand.
294	6/24	ANZUS Council meeting.
*295	6/26	Creel designated Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs (biographic details).
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297	6/25	Canada-U.S. Committee on Joint Defense.
*298	6/26	Program for visit of President of Costa Rica.
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1965: International Cooperation Year

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International Cooperation Year." This 5-page pamphlet discusses this theme by pointing out that "international cooperation is a fact of life . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century."

As the pamphlet suggests, "Perhaps we can make two things of the Year: a massive opportunity for public education about America's role in international cooperation, and a chance to speed up some very concrete tasks on international institution building, by including them as special targets to shoot for in 1965." The article concludes by listing 10 specific targets at which we might aim.

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
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The Universal Appeal of the Declaration of Independence

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is an exceptional honor to speak here, in this historic place, on this historic day. I am mindful that I am following in the immediate footsteps of two Presidents whom I have had the high privilege of serving as Secretary of State. President Kennedy spoke here 2 years ago today,² and President Johnson, as Vice President, a year ago.

All of us, as Americans, have a deep feeling about the Hall in which were born the two fundamental documents of our national life: the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. As Secretary of State, I have special further interest in this neighborhood, because very near here—at 13 South Sixth Street—stood the first home of the Department of Foreign Affairs of the United States, which later became the Department of State.

For Americans this annual festival is—and,

let us hope, always will be—glorious, an occasion for reviewing our national achievements, for pride and gratitude, and for sober reflection on the unfinished business of freedom. But we who celebrate this day in 1964 can draw courage and hope from the fact that just 2 days ago a great civil rights bill has become the law of the land—a bill designed to make all our citizens free, just as 188 years ago here we made our nation free.

The Fourth of July is important to us as the anniversary of our national independence. We would celebrate it even if as a nation we were much less than we are. And other nations would join us in celebrating it, if only because we were the first colony in the modern world to break away.

But the importance of the Fourth of July does not lie, exclusively or primarily, in the fact that we won our national independence and became a great military power with formidable material accomplishments. It lies rather in the

¹ Made at Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa., on July 4 (press release 313 dated July 3).

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 23, 1962, p. 131.

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ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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ideas and ideals about men and their relationships to each other to which we have been committed since our national birth. It is these which make the Fourth of July a date of historic significance.

The great document of July 1776 was a declaration not only of independence but of representative government and of the rights of man.

The burden of complaint of the American colonists was that a tyrannical king was depriving them of their historic rights. And, in fact, the British people had been building their liberties, bit by bit through centuries, in their development of the common law and the evolution of parliament and the legislative bodies of the American Colonies.

The Rise of the Democracies

But the Declaration did not rest its case solely on the particular violations of limited liberties previously won. It proclaimed the great general propositions:

... that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.

These principles were set forth not as the special property of the inhabitants of the British Colonies in North America but as universal truths, applicable to all men and for all time. And, over the decades, the appeal of these principles has endured and broadened.

The strength of those simple notions, the willingness of men to fight for them, has brought down one despotism and one empire after another. Those were the ideas which inspired the rise of the democracies of Western Europe, the liberators of Latin America, and the evolution of the British Commonwealth. Since the Second World War they have led to the creation of more than 50 new nations.

The basic propositions of our Declaration of Independence may be found in the constitutions of many countries. And some of them are embodied in the Charter of the United Nations. Its preamble says the "peoples of the United Nations" are "determined . . . to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity

and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small. . . ." Article 55 speaks of "respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and pledges the United Nations to promote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion."

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the various conventions on specific human rights subscribed to by members of the United Nations help to promote human rights.

Unhappily these principles and commitments are often breached. Unfortunately, also, many nations, both old and new, which call themselves republics or democracies are not.

But these ideas and ideals have gripped the minds of ordinary men and women in all parts of the world. Their translation into practice may be slow and uneven—and marked by setbacks here and there—but it continues.

The most powerful opponents of these basic ideas today are the leaders of the principal Communist states. But even the Communists recognize the appeal of such words as "freedom" and "democracy." They call their governments "republics" or "people's republics" or "democratic republics," although not one of them has a government chosen in a free election. They even apply the label of "wars of liberation" to the sort of gangster wars of terror and aggression they are waging against the people of Laos and South Viet-Nam.

In the Communist world we can see the centrifugal force of national traditions and interests. Most of the smaller Communist states of Eastern Europe are reaching out for more autonomy. And within at least some of the Communist states we can see persistent, if still limited, yearnings for more personal liberty—for more freedom to speak and travel and act, for better protection against arbitrary punishment, for more influence on the decisions of those who rule.

The commitments which our forebears made for us to history in Independence Hall—in the Declaration and in the Constitution—are both our driving force as a nation and the central concern of our foreign policy. The prime ob-

jective of our foreign policy, as of our military power, is to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity."

Making the Total Environment Secure

We can no longer secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity by isolating our nation, our continent, or our hemisphere from the rest of the world. The speed of modern communications and transportation and the range and destructiveness of modern weapons have erased the margins of distance and time which until the end of the Second World War contributed greatly to our security.

Today we can be secure only to the extent that our total environment is secure—and by total environment we mean not only the land, waters, and air of the earth but space as far out as instruments can be projected capable of affecting significantly human affairs.

Our endeavors to make our total environment more secure move simultaneously along several lines.

First of all, it is essential to repel—and to do all we can to prevent—aggression by whatever means. To deter aggression, we maintain, with our allies, massive retaliatory forces and increasingly strong and mobile conventional forces. And as President Johnson has made clear, we are determined to help those who are victims of such aggressions as are now going on in Southeast Asia—guerrilla warfare and terrorism directed from the outside and sustained by infiltrating trained men and arms across national frontiers. We shall soon be meeting with our partners in the Organization of American States to take additional steps to insure that Cuba does not serve as an effective base for that type of aggression in Latin America.

While we do our part in deterring and repelling aggression, we also seek areas of agreement—and of cooperation—with our adversaries. We believe that the Soviet leaders recognize a common interest with us in reducing the dangers of a great war. We most earnestly hope that they will open their doors, as we are willing to open ours, to the sort of inspection which will make possible genuine progress in reducing armaments. At the same time, we

heartily favor increasing contacts between our people and those of the Eastern European states and the Soviet Union. And we welcome cooperative undertakings such as the work on desalinization of water on which Soviet scientists and our own recently agreed.³

In President Johnson's words, "... our guard is up but our hand is out."⁴ He has made it clear that we will continue to discuss any problem, to examine any proposal, to make any agreement, to take any action, which might lessen the danger of war without impairing the interests and security of the free world.

Building the Free World

However, foreign policy is not concerned solely with our adversaries. We apply ourselves night and day to the great task of building the free world.

Two years ago today, President Kennedy spoke here on the grand theme of "interdependence"—with particular emphasis on our hopes for a closer and stronger Atlantic partnership "as a nucleus for the eventual union of all free men." A closer and even more effective partnership with other advanced nations of the free world—those of the Atlantic and Japan and others in the Pacific—remains a major goal of our policy.

We are equally interested in closer and more effective partnership with other free nations—in Latin America, in Asia, and in Africa. All of the advanced nations of the free world have an immense stake in seeing the developing countries make economic, social, and political progress in freedom.

The peoples of the new nations and of many older ones are aflame with expectations of a better life. Many have discovered what others had learned earlier—that national independence does not automatically bring economic and social improvements. But all of them are determined to move ahead. The whole world knows that modern technology enables men to rise above bare subsistence.

Few, if any, of the new nations are as favorably situated as we were when we won our inde-

³ *Ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 60.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

pendence. We had already been educated in political and even economic independence to a notable degree before our Revolution. We had before us a rich continent, capable of producing an array of items much wanted on the world market. We had no *ancien régime* to contend with within our boundaries. We had a fairly homogeneous and only tolerably contentious people. We were underpopulated to such a degree that our normally high regard for the individual man had economic as well as philosophic support. Moreover, we had many talented and educated leaders.

To the new nation of the late 20th century, the American's story must sound improbably easy. Many countries now emerging must improvise educational systems after independence. Many must struggle to sell commodities on a world market where demand is not adequate and prices are sagging. Many have social tensions and constant political instability at home. Some have limited resources. Many are heavily populated. Few have an adequate supply of leadership and trained men for the many roles independence requires. And to advance economically they must master quickly difficult technologies and complex problems of organization and administration.

How should we, the prototype of new nations, regard our successors in the stream of developing nations? With understanding, since they are now where we were once. With patience, since their tasks are even harder to solve than were our own. With support, as we were assisted by older nations during our own beginnings. And with confidence in ideas and ideals which have inspired the rise of the peoples of Latin America, Asia, and Africa to the "separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle them."

These are not simple requirements. The winds of freedom blowing around have kicked up quite a storm, and the United States is often buffeted. But since the storm really began on these shores, let us ride with it, with grace and poise. If the new nations request advice, we are here to offer our services. If they ask for and can use assistance, it is clearly in our interests to provide it. Through our aid programs,

through the Peace Corps, through the Alliance for Progress, through the activities of American companies overseas, through the activities of our churches, and foundations, and other private institutions—through these, and many more channels, including the millions of Americans who go abroad as tourists, let us constantly demonstrate the meaning of a free society and our abiding interest in freedom for others.

In judging the performance of others, let us never forget that democracy is a difficult system to operate. Very few nations have been able to make it work consistently. But people keep coming back to it, keep trying to make it work, because government with the consent of the governed is that form of government fully consistent with the dignity of man.

Improving Our Own Society

While we help others to move ahead economically and socially and to achieve political stability in freedom, we must keep everlastingly at the task of improving our own society. A nation with our pledges to ourselves and to mankind cannot tolerate discriminations based on religion, race, or color. A nation with our productive capacity cannot tolerate slums, whether rural or urban. And we must begin to attack our pockets of poverty in a more systematic way, as President Johnson has proposed, even though we shall not wipe them out overnight.

We owe these things to ourselves. I am interested in them as a citizen, but also as Secretary of State. For whatever improves our national life also strengthens freedom in the world struggle in which we are engaged. We are the trustees, the leaders, of the cause of freedom. Our enemies rejoice in our blemishes. The friends of freedom, who are a great majority of mankind, expect us to set a splendid example.

The ultimate objective of our foreign policy is a decent world order—the kind of world outlined in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. Week by week, and day by day, we are working our way toward

that goal—developing the institutions of international cooperation, of peacemaking and peacekeeping, weaving the infinity of threads that bind peoples around the world closer together, building, bit by bit, the common law of mankind.

The ideas and ideals we stand for and have done so much to nurture and defend in the last 188 years are, we believe, shared by a great majority of the human race. As President Johnson put it, in signing the Civil Rights Act, "Today in far corners of distant continents the ideals of those American patriots still shape the struggles of men who hunger for freedom." They give us allies and friends among ordinary men and women everywhere—including behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains. They have never had greater validity or wider support than they have now. They are the most powerful ideas on earth, and the story of 2,000 years of striving points to the victory of freedom.

Mrs. Anderson Addresses Bulgarian People on U. S. Independence Day

Following is a translation of an address in the Bulgarian language made by Mrs. Eugenie Anderson, American Minister to Bulgaria, for broadcast on July 4 from Sofia over Bulgarian television and radio.

Press release 312 dated July 2, for release July 4

Good evening. Once again I have the pleasure to speak to you, the Bulgarian people, on America's Independence Day.¹ I appreciate this opportunity and wish to thank the Bulgarian Government for this courtesy.

As the American Minister in Sofia, I bring you peaceful and friendly greetings from President Johnson and the American people. On this day we celebrate the cause of freedom, and we greet all those peoples who, like ourselves, want to help build a world free of war and want.

¹ For the text of an address made by Mrs. Anderson on July 3, 1963, see BULLETIN of July 22, 1963, p. 141.

Now I have been living in your beautiful country for nearly 2 years. During this time I have visited many of Bulgaria's historic shrines. I have wandered the old streets of Koprivshtitsa. I have stood in the churches of the martyrs at Batak and Perushtitsa. I have visited your Constitution Hall at Turnovo. These famous places have evoked my admiration for Bulgaria's struggle for its independence.

As you know, my country also achieved its independence from foreign domination less than 200 years ago. Our nation was founded on the revolutionary principles of equality, freedom, and justice.

We are still engaged in fulfilling these ideals. We are striving to improve our democracy. Just 2 days ago President Johnson signed an historic law. This will strengthen our Constitution's guarantee of equal opportunities to all Americans irrespective of race, creed, or national origin.

Also we are working to provide ever better living conditions for our own people. But we believe that our nation, and indeed all humanity, can thrive only in a peaceful world. This must be a world which offers all men hope for improving their lot, for escaping privation and drudgery. We want to cooperate in lifting the ancient burdens of mankind.

Only a few months ago, we Americans—and all those who cherish freedom and peace—lost a valiant friend. When John F. Kennedy was so suddenly taken from us, we felt as if a light had gone out. Now President Johnson has won the trust and affection of the American people. The same purposes for which President Kennedy lived are shared by our new President and by the American people. Today, President Johnson fights for peace, human rights, and a decent livelihood for the world's needy people.

And so, in closing, on behalf of President Johnson and the American people, we reaffirm our unchanging commitment to peace, freedom, and human welfare. In this spirit we celebrate American Independence Day, and in this spirit we wish the Bulgarian people well.

The Single Goal of Peace

Address by President Johnson

Following are the foreign policy portions of an address made by President Johnson at a Swedish celebration at Minneapolis, Minn., on June 28.

White House press release dated June 28; as-delivered text

The Bible counsels us: "To everything there is a season, and a time to every purpose under the heaven . . . a time of war, and a time of peace."

So I come today to speak to you in the hope that, after decades of war and threats of war, we may be nearing a time of peace. Today, as always, if a nation is to keep its freedom it must be prepared to risk war. When necessary, we will take that risk. But as long as I am President, I will spare neither my office nor myself in the quest for peace. That peace is much more than the absence of war. In fact, peace is much the same thing in our world community as it is here in your community, or in the small community of Johnson City, Texas, where I grew up.

If, in your town, every morning brings fear that the serenity of the streets will be shattered by the sounds of violence, then there is no peace. If one man can compel others, unjustly and unlawfully, to do what he commands them to do, then your community is not a place of peace. If we have neither the will nor a way to settle disputes among neighbors without force and violence, then none of us can live in peace. If we do not work together to help others fulfill their fair desires, then peace is insecure. For in a community, as in the world, if the strong and the wealthy ignore the needs of the poor and the oppressed, frustrations will result in force. Peace, therefore, is a world where no

nation fears another, or no nation can force another to follow its command. It is a world where differences are solved without destruction and common effort is directed at common problems.

Such a peace will not come by a single act or a single moment. It will take decades and generations of persistent and patient effort. That great son of Sweden, Dag Hammarskjöld, once said:

The qualities it requires are just those which I feel we all need today—perseverance and patience, a firm grip on realities, careful but imaginative planning, a clear awareness of the dangers—but also of the fact that fate is what we make it. . . .

With these qualities as our foundation, we follow several goals to the single goal of peace. And what are those goals? First is restraint in the use of power. We must be, and we are, strong enough to protect ourselves and our allies. But it was a great historian who reminded us that: "No aspect of power more impresses men than its exercise with restraint."

We do not advance the cause of freedom by calling on the full might of our military to solve every problem. We won a great victory in Cuba because we stood there for many days, firm without using force. In Viet-Nam we are engaged in a brutal and a bitter struggle trying to help a friend. There, too, we will stand firm to help maintain their own freedom and to give them counsel and advice and help as necessary.

Second is the search for practical solutions to particular problems. Agreements will not flow from a sudden trust among nations. Trust comes from a slow series of agreements. Each

agreement must be fashioned as the products of your famous craftsmanship are fashioned, with attention to detail, with practical skills, with faith in the importance of the result.

And so, even while we are caught in conflict in one part of the world, we labor to build the structure of agreement which can bring peace to all the rest of the world. In this way we have signed a treaty already ending nuclear tests in the atmosphere. Already we have cut back our production of atomic fuel and weapons. Already we have established a "hot line" between Washington and Moscow. Already we are meeting with the Soviets to pool our efforts in making fresh water from the oceans. These agreements, by themselves, have not ended tensions or they have not ended war. But because of them we have moved much closer to peace.

And the third point that I want to bring up is respect for the rights and fears of others. We can never compromise the cause of freedom. But as we work in our world community we must always remember that differences with others do not always flow from a desire for domination. They can come from honest clash of honest beliefs of goals. And in such cases our strength does not entitle us to impose our interest. Rather, our desire for peace compels us to seek just compromise. And we must also recognize, although this is very hard to do, that other nations may honestly fear our intentions or the intentions of our allies. There is no need for such fear. For we in America seek neither dominion or conquest. But where it exists, we must work to dispel that fear.

The fourth point that I want to make is cooperation in solving the problems which are greater than immediate conflicts. Most of our neighbors in the world live in the midst of hunger and poverty. Most of our neighbors live in the midst of disease and ignorance. We are proud of the fact that here in America, across the world, American workers and American food and American capital are building industry and are expanding farms, are educating the young and are caring for the sick and are feeding the hungry.

We will continue to seek such cooperation. No peace and no power is strong enough to stand for long against the restless discontent

of millions who are without hope. For peace to last, all must have a stake in its benefits.

Fifth is the ability to adjust disputes without the use of force. It is, in short, the pursuit of justice. We can find guidance here in our own country's historic pledge to the rule of law. That is a pledge to abide by the law and to accept its settlements. It is a pledge to submit to courts and to be satisfied by court decisions. It is a pledge to respect, uphold, and always obey the law of the land. For if any take grievances and disputes into their own hands, the safety and the freedom of all is in peril. "Due process" is the safeguard of our civilization. As a President of the United States and as an individual citizen, I stand totally committed to the integrity of justice and the enforcement of the law. But legal government depends upon law-loving and law-abiding citizens. Today the key to peace in our own land is obedience to the great moral command that no man should deny to another the liberties the Constitution creates, as the law defines those liberties. And it rests on the even more hallowed rule that, whatever our disagreements, we treat others with the peaceful respect that we reserve and desire for ourselves. So, too, we seek a world community in which answers can win acceptance without the use of force. For this purpose, all the machinery of international justice is useless unless it is infused with the good faith of nations. On a worldwide basis, we place much hope in the United Nations.

Twenty years after World War I the League of Nations was discredited. Twenty years after World War II the United Nations is, thank God, a stronger force for peace than ever before. Our support—the steadfast support of nations like Sweden—has made that possible. And let any of those who might choose to criticize the United Nations always remember that where the United Nations has gone, from Iran to the Congo, the Communists have not conquered. This is not because the United Nations supports our cause or because it exists just to help us against our enemies. It is because the United Nations is on the side of national independence, on the side of peaceful justice, of self-determination, of human freedom; and that is the side that we are on, too.

These are the several tasks—these are the several paths that we take to peace. At times in the solitude of my office, peace seems discouragingly distant. My days are often filled with crisis and conflict. Yet each time that I come here among the people of my country I feel new hope and renewed faith. There was a legendary figure who, each time his feet touched the earth, redoubled his strength. Your friendship and your warmth and your wishes are equally the source of my strength.

I want to remind you finally, as I finish, that it is with the people and not with their leaders that the final question whether the liberties and the life of this land shall be “preserved to the latest generations.” If you can do this, if you do do this, then our children’s children will gladly remember us in the ancient phrase: “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called the children of God.”

President Orlich of Costa Rica Visits Washington

President Francisco J. Orlich of Costa Rica visited Washington June 30–July 2. Following is the text of a joint communique released on July 1 at the close of talks between President Johnson and President Orlich.

White House press release dated July 1

The President of Costa Rica, Francisco Orlich, and President Johnson have concluded friendly discussions on matters of mutual concern.

The two Presidents discussed the Alliance for Progress and the contribution it is making toward the economic and social development of the Hemisphere. They expressed their satisfaction with its achievements in Central America and the Hemisphere since President Kennedy’s visit to San José, and reaffirmed their faith in the goals of the Alliance. They noted especially the intimate relationship which exists between the practice of effective representative democracy and the achievement of social and economic progress, and they renewed their determination

to encourage democratic ideals throughout the Hemisphere. President Johnson expressed his admiration for the leadership which Costa Rican people have given over the years, by their example, to the accomplishment of this objective.

President Orlich reviewed the efforts of the Central American countries to promote their economic well-being through the Central American Common Market. President Johnson expressed gratification that these efforts had already made a significant contribution to the economic development of Central America. The two Presidents discussed the participation of private enterprise in the Central American Common Market, and the fundamental importance of cooperation between the public and private sectors in creating sound and healthy conditions in which each can make its most effective contribution. They agreed that a responsible and vigorous private sector is an essential element of a free and democratic society, and is indispensable to the success of the Central American Common Market and the Alliance for Progress.

President Orlich outlined the economic situation in his country, and expressed appreciation for the understanding and friendly cooperation of the United States. He gave special praise to the United States Navy Seabees, who are cooperating with Costa Rica to relieve flood conditions, which have been seriously aggravated by the eruption of Irazu Volcano. President Johnson assured President Orlich of the continued and sympathetic cooperation of the United States in the present natural disaster afflicting Costa Rica, and of the desire of the United States to help Costa Rica achieve further economic and social progress in keeping with the Charter of Punta del Este.

The Presidents noted the continued efforts of subversive agents trained in Cuba and other Communist countries to create unrest and undermine democratic governments in Latin America. They agreed that each country must adopt effective measures to defend itself against such activities, and that the Organization of American States should take meaningful steps to demonstrate the collective will of the American Republics to resist such aggression.

The Presidents concluded their talks by expressing satisfaction that relations between their two countries had reached a high level of mutual understanding and respect. They

pledged themselves to continued cooperation within the Organization of American States to achieve the objectives of the Alliance for Progress.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 1

Press release 307 dated July 1

Secretary Rusk: Before those boxes get rolling let me make an administrative comment. There is no special significance in the timing of this press conference. I have not had one in some time. But I do plan to take next week off and get a few days' rest. I gather that many of you will be traveling to San Francisco to take account of the events out there; and so it may be a little time before we can have another one, and so I thought I'd put myself at your disposal today. So with that and without a prepared statement, why not begin?

Q. Mr. Secretary, since you mentioned San Francisco, one of the most discussed issues around town today is whether the conflict in the policies in Viet-Nam is a suitable subject for political debate this year. What is your view as Secretary of State?

A. Oh, I think the situation in Southeast Asia is proper for public discussion. It is a major commitment of the United States to do what we can to assist the countries of Southeast Asia to maintain their security and their independence. We have a large involvement there of men. We invested very large resources in the security and independence of southeastern Asia. These are matters of public interest which deserve public discussion.

It has not been my experience thus far in meeting with congressional committees in executive session or otherwise that these are issues that lend themselves to partisan debate. We are all stockholders in these problems. Both parties are stockholders.

Viet-Nam was divided in 1954. Southeast Asia was exposed to infiltration and penetration from North Viet-Nam during the fifties. We all have a stake in the outcome. We all are interested in the right solutions. But I have not felt that the balances of judgment on these matters have turned on partisan lines.

These are serious questions to which, I think, serious leadership of both parties ought to address themselves in terms of the national interest and the interest of the American people.

So I would suppose that there will be in the weeks and months ahead, as there has been in the months past, a very lively public discussion of these matters. I do not quite see where the basis is for making these discussions specifically partisan in character, because they are not partisan issues in that sense.

Future of the Congo

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United Nations is pulling its forces out of the Congo after 4 years, and the Secretary-General's report¹ was not optimistic about the future, and there are a number of predictions of widespread chaos to follow. I wonder if you could give us your assessment of the future of that area.

A. Well, first, I think we ought to recall that, for the past 4 years or more, after President Eisenhower made the decision that the Congo problem as far as the United States was concerned ought to be a problem for the United Nations, the United Nations has undertaken a very large peacekeeping operation in the Congo

¹ U.N. doc. S/5784.

with a large investment both of men and materials. And just yesterday we saw the repatriation of the last of the United Nations military forces in the Congo.

This has been a remarkable achievement these past 4 years on the part of the United Nations in preserving the peace and providing a vast amount of technical assistance and training and giving that country, which is as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, a chance to evolve in unity without complete disruption, without vast civil wars; and so this has been a major contribution.

Now, at the present time the Congo is at a very important moment. Its government has resigned, as expected, in connection with a constitutional position. There is a referendum on the constitution underway, which I think will end on July 10. I presume that at that time there will be formed a provisional government, after which more permanent arrangements will be worked out.

President [Joseph] Kasavubu and the Congolese leaders are carrying a very heavy responsibility at the present time to try to find a solid political basis on which this vast country with its many tribes and many traditions and many differences can work together in harmony. We do not despair of that at all despite the fact that there are obviously some very serious problems involved. But the present situation, which changes almost on an hourly basis, is that conversations and consultations are going on among the Congolese leaders to see if they can find a consensus on the basis of which a government can be formed which can lead this vast and potentially progressive and prosperous country into the future.

Meanwhile the U.N. resolutions remain in effect. One of these resolutions requests member governments to be of assistance to the Congo as they try to work out their problems. And we therefore hope that all governments on the outside will be completely sympathetic and helpful to the Congolese leaders in trying to meet their difficult situation. It is obviously a situation on which one cannot go very far in prediction. But we do believe that the Congolese leaders can find a basis for moving ahead now

and taking advantage of the base which was provided by 4 years of relative peace and considerable strengthening of the administrative, technical, and educational apparatus of the country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps you could clarify this aspect of the Congo situation for the record, sir. For a considerable period of the U.N. activity there, the U.N.—part of the U.N. operations and part of the United States' concern was directed against Moise Tshombe and the Katanga separatist situation. I realize that the United States position was that the concern was with the separatist element of that and there was no United States position that the United States was opposed to Tshombe in the Central Government. Could you clarify the present attitude of the United States toward that general situation?

A. Well, let me remind you that there were some difficulties at one time between Mr. Tshombe and the U.N. over the issue of the secession of Katanga and that we were supporting the U.N. on that issue, and, therefore, there was some tension between us and Mr. Tshombe and his colleagues, who were supporting secession.

But on the other hand, even at that time, in January 1963, we said that we understand that the object of the U.N. is to be a peaceful Katanga, reintegrated into the Congolese state in the Congo. "There is no desire to deny Mr. Tshombe a place in the future political life of the Congo, but this will depend on the Congolese people and on Mr. Tshombe himself."²

Now, in reminding you of what we have said before on that point, I would caution you that I do not have in front of me a list of all the other Congolese leaders about whom you might ask similar questions on which our answers might be similar. In other words, my comment today is not especially related to Mr. Tshombe.

Basically, we feel that this is an internal political matter for the Congolese and that it is for the leaders of the Congo—the authentic leaders of the Congo—from the various dis-

²For a Department statement of Jan. 4, 1963, see BULLETIN of Jan. 21, 1963, p. 91.

tricts, provinces, tribes, traditions, now to pull themselves together and form a government that can lead that country into the future.

U.S. Objective in Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, returning to Southeast Asia, in the event that the Communist forces do not heed advice to halt aggression there, what further steps do you feel it is necessary for the United States to take to preserve the security and freedom of these countries?

A. Well, I find it very difficult to talk with any precision about the future. I realize that everyone's interest focuses upon the future. That is perfectly understandable.

What is very simple is our purpose in Southeast Asia. I think the present facts in Southeast Asia are very clear and are generally known.

Now, the reason why we cannot be clear about the future is that there are many governments and authorities participating in the writing of this scenario—the governments and peoples of Southeast Asia; the governments members of SEATO, of which we are a prominent member; the authorities in Khang Khay, that is the Pathet Lao authorities in Laos, in Hanoi, Peiping, Moscow; the three governments on the ICC [International Control Commission].

Therefore, without being in a position to know what these various scenario writers are going to be doing and deciding, it is not possible for just one of us to put together a picture of the future.

What seems to me to be very simple is that the United States' objective, as President Johnson stated at his press conference,³ and again in his speech on Sunday,⁴ is peace in Southeast Asia. That is why we are there. We want a peace that will leave the peoples of Laos and South Viet-Nam and other countries of that region in control of their own destinies. It is just as simple as that. A peace that will—in which the countries of that area, particularly Hanoi and Peiping, will leave their neighbors alone. A peace that will make it possible for

the United States to be content with the security of the peoples and governments of that area.

And so we have to think about how we can best obtain it.

Now, peace, obviously, is not obtained by going out and looking for war, although there is always the risk of further development in dangerous confrontations of this sort.

Peace ought to be possible in Southeast Asia without any extension of the fighting. Therefore, the first objective of our policy and our desire in Southeast Asia is to exploit that possibility. I say that it ought to be, because there are firm agreements, precise agreements, subscribed to by all those involved in this present situation, which were intended to provide peace and which could provide peace if they were lived up to.

Peace, on the other hand, cannot be attained by acquiescence to aggression. And there is aggression in South Viet-Nam, and aggression in Laos, in contravention of solemn agreements. In both cases this aggression is inspired and supplied by the Communist regime in Hanoi, with the political backing and help of the Communist regime in Peiping.

This violates solemn international commitments of 1954 and 1962. And so it has to be, I think, an object of our policy to make it possible for that kind of aggression to be successfully resisted by the people of Southeast Asia.

A third element is the fact that peace in those circumstances cannot be obtained by military power alone. The Communists know it. They are working on that basis. We know it. We are working on that basis.

And that is why the United States' support of the Republic of South Viet-Nam is based not on military activity alone but on a broad-based program of economic and political and sociological support for the people and the Government of South Viet-Nam.

And that is why our policy in Laos is based on diplomatic efforts to sustain the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and the strengthening of the forces which are opposing the Communist Pathet Lao.⁵

³ For a statement made by President Johnson at a press conference on June 23, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 46.

⁴ See p. 79.

⁵ See p. 88.

One of the most encouraging elements in that situation is that we see no indication, no serious indication, of any widespread interest among the people of Southeast Asia for any answer coming out of Hanoi.

The problem that the villager in the countryside faces in South Viet-Nam is, for example, whether he is free to cooperate with the Government without having his throat cut at night. Because the Viet Cong are not engaging in any serious way the armed forces of South Viet-Nam—they are attacking the people and the elementary structure of government in the countryside, the undefended, unarmed elements of the population—the district leader, the schoolteacher. And therefore the problem of the armed forces is to find and fix in order to be able to fight these elusive, hard core of Viet Cong, who may number in the range of some 30,000, reinforced by some volunteers from the not, shall we say, professionals.

But there is no popular wave of interest in the political solutions that are offered by Hanoi, no desire to pick up communism as a way of life.

The problem is that of combining the steady building of the structure of life in the countryside with the minimum security that makes that possible so that life can go on. And in much of the country, certainly more than half of the country, this is possible and is moving on. There are some critical provinces in the delta area, for example, where this is not yet possible, and a great deal of effort is being expended and will be expended on those particular provinces.

And so we are backing to the fullest extent the willingness, the readiness, the desire, the ability of the peoples of Southeast Asia to work out their own way of life.

Our objectives there, again, are very simple.

The future is clouded with uncertainty. But this is of necessity the case.

I know that everyone would like to see the future clearly. So would we in government. I am sure other governments would like to do the same. But perhaps mercifully that is withheld from ordinary human beings, and we don't have the crystal balls that will tell us what all those involved in this situation will be doing and deciding in the next weeks and months.

But our own purposes and determinations there are very simple.

The U.N. Role in Southeast Asia

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you reply to men like Senator [Wayne] Morse who say that the United States is an outlaw nation and has become, in his words, the greatest threat to peace in the world because we have not turned the Southeast Asia problem over to the United Nations for settlement?

A. Well, we had discussions of that in committee and elsewhere.

The United States is pressing for full compliance with solemn agreements—agreements, as in the case of Laos, which have been subject to major, persistent, callous violations by the other side. All that we want in this situation is compliance with those agreements in Laos. They were designed for the neutrality, the independence, and the security of that country.

Now, we, therefore, believe that both our purposes and our action are in full accord with international law and international practice in these situations. We are faced by opponents who have shown historically a contempt for commitments and agreements. So I would not suppose there is any real point on the question of our being an outlaw.

As far as the United Nations is concerned, the United Nations has been involved in Southeast Asia in a variety of ways. In 1959 the Security Council sent a commission to Laos. A U.N. representative has been working for some time on the border problems between Cambodia and Thailand. Last year the General Assembly sent a mission of inquiry, you will recall, to look into alleged violations of human rights in Viet-Nam.

There is a very substantial U.N. activity going on in connection with the development of the Lower Mekong Basin, involving several of these states. And just 4 weeks ago the Security Council authorized a committee of inquiry to see what should be done to avoid further incidents on the frontier between Cambodia and South Viet-Nam.⁶

⁶ For background, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 1002.

Now, on this last instance, the Cambodian commission of inquiry, Hanoi and Peiping have blasted the very idea of such a commission. The Viet Cong along the Cambodian border have said that they can't guarantee the safety of this commission if they come into areas—so-called “liberated” areas—of South Viet-Nam. In other words, the other side is saying to the United Nations, “Stay out of it; we are not going to let you function.”

The U.N. Charter presupposes that, if there is existing machinery for the settlement of disputes (you might wish to look at article 33), the full resources of existing machinery should be utilized and exhausted before these matters come to the United Nations. Now, there was a 14-power conference on Laos, for example, and those governments are in contact with each other in considerable detail about what can be done to restore the peace and to bring about compliance with the Geneva accords.

I should think that it would be expected that if you were to go to the United Nations today, for example, on Laos, you would be told to use the existing machinery to the fullest and report back, or something of that sort; that those who have signed the agreement should consult among themselves and try to find an answer.

Further, in the absence of a decision by Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone, then someone has to assist these countries in the actual engagement of the enemy, that is, the aggressor.

In general, there has only been one instance, and a very special instance, in which the United Nations forces, as such, have been able to take on what amounted to a combat situation. That was in Korea, which was possible because at that time the Soviet Union was not sitting at the Security Council table and was not there to cast a veto.

I doubt very much that the United Nations would be able to put forward forces that would give the kind of support that is required in Southeast Asia, in the absence of a decision by Hanoi and Peiping to come off of it and to abide by agreements.

U.N. forces are extremely valuable in peace-keeping operations, in peace-watching operations. But operations which are in the presence

of the kind of fighting going on in Southeast Asia would be something that, I think, the United Nations would find very difficult. But I would add that, just as the Cambodian case came to the Security Council, it is entirely possible that some of these other situations might come to the U.N. at some point. But the question of timing, and under what circumstances, and with what prospect of success, and in the light of what proposed United Nations action—these matters can be better assessed.

I don't, at the moment, believe that either the Laotian question or the South Vietnamese question can be measurably moved toward a peaceful solution simply by throwing them overnight into the U.N. Security Council.

Optimism on Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge returned from his post in Saigon with some qualified optimism about the situation in South Viet-Nam. I wondered, sir, if you share that sense of optimism?

A. Yes, I must say that I do. I am one of those people in town who read every day the complete and detailed operational report that comes in every day from South Viet-Nam—reports that cover the military operations, the political and psychological situation. And I must say that, as I read those reports on a day-by-day basis, I find myself wondering about the morale of the Viet Cong.

Now, we know this is a mean and distressing and frustrating kind of contest in which the South Vietnamese are engaged and in which we are engaged, in which we are losing men every week. But because it is frustrating for us does not mean that it is entirely pleasant for the other side. And I think they have very serious problems—not only in fact, in terms of losses, disruptions, but in terms of morale. So I am not pessimistic about the situation. It is difficult, it is going to take some time, it is going to take more of the heroic job being done by South Vietnamese and Americans and others in that situation. But I don't feel any sense of despair whatever.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you indicated a reasonably relaxed hands-off attitude toward the possible

emergence of M. Tshombe as a figure in the Central Government. Would you feel equally relaxed about Mr. [Antoine] Gizenga's release and return to political life?

A. Well, I wondered whether I should comment at all about Mr. Tshombe as an individual, because I would be inviting a list of other personalities there.

Why don't we just wait and see how these consultations among Congolese leaders will work out? If it is Mr. Gizenga, then I can think of another dozen that can be named. I don't want to go into a political glossary of the Congo at a time when they are all discussing with each other.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. Some of the confusion and concern in this country about Southeast Asia seems to stem from the fact that the administration blows hot and cold on the issue. Last week the emphasis seemed to be on our willingness to go to war to protect our interest and position in Southeast Asia. This week the emphasis seems to be on our passion for peace and the fact that there are no military solutions out there for the problem. How do you explain what seems to be very inconsistent about the approach here?

A. Well, I don't want to engage myself in a debate about the problems faced by you gentlemen when you are reporting stories on the pressures of deadlines and so forth, but let me point out to you that these changing fads may be changing trends in the way in which entire speeches are reported. For example, when the President was speaking the other day, I saw fewer references than I would have suspected—than I would have expected—to his sentence in which he said, “. . . as long as I am President, I will spare neither my office nor myself in the quest for peace,”⁷ in connection with the preceding sentence that talked about the necessity for risking war.

I think if you take full paragraphs—and I am thinking now of the President's June 23d statement, his opening statement on Viet-

Nam—that the context has been complete. I think everyone knows that what we want is peace out in that part of the world. Everyone knows that it's a risky and dangerous situation. Everyone knows that much depends upon what others are going to decide, just as well as on what we do.

Now, I don't know how you can parse the future any more precisely than that. Let's see. But there is no doubt about our own objective there. And I'm not aware of any differences of weight being given week by week to these various elements in the situation. The purpose remains the same.

Supervision of South Viet-Nam Borders

Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech today Ambassador Lodge said the proper supervision of the borders between South Viet-Nam and its neighbors was absolutely essential for ending aggression in Viet-Nam and achieving peace in Southeast Asia. Do we have any new measures, or any new ways of carrying out old measures, which will effectively meet this need of supervising the borders?

A. You will recall at the Security Council when this question came up we proposed as one of the solutions there a U.N. force on the order of, say, 1,200 men which would be able to assist in watching and policing those borders, in order that those frontiers would not be violated in either direction, that Cambodia's neutrality would be fully guaranteed not only against the South Vietnamese armed forces, who might have been involved in one or two incidents across those borders, but against the Viet Cong, who have abused those borders.

But there was not sufficient support in the United Nations to constitute that kind of force. What was done was to send a commission of three members—the Ivory Coast, Brazil, and Morocco—to go out and have a look at this border situation and make recommendations. Now, we know that the authorities in Saigon have not the slightest interest in committing incidents across the border of Cambodia. We also know that the Viet Cong operate—they cross back and forth across those borders, and, when the Viet Cong and the forces of South

⁷ See p. 79.

Viet-Nam get into a scrap along those borders, the fighting can go across the border. And this creates a great distress, quite understandably, in Phnom Penh.

So we would like to see effective steps taken to insure the integrity of those borders from any quarter. And we know that Saigon would welcome such steps, because it would be a great relief from their point of view. And this would be an additional insurance to Prince Sihanouk that no one is plotting against the integrity of the borders of Cambodia, because this just isn't in the picture—that is, no one in the government.

The Cyprus Situation

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you visualize precisely Mr. [Dean] Acheson's role in the Cyprus situation, and how do you visualize precisely General de Gaulle's role in the Cyprus situation?

A. Well, I'm not entirely clear that either one of them has a very operational role at the moment. What we have been concerned with is that there be peace on the island that would give all the parties a chance to get in touch somehow with each other, primarily through the United Nations media, to try to find a permanent solution of that baffling and dangerous situation.

Now, two of the parties involved are NATO members—Greece and Turkey—and it may be that friends of Greece and Turkey can be of some assistance in helping the U.N. mediator find some points of common interest or common contact in this situation. But this is a matter that is still for discussion and still under negotiation. And I think there is very little that I can add this afternoon on that point.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. As far as General de Gaulle is concerned, I'm not informed of any particular role that he is playing or plans to play.

Q. Mr. Secretary, we haven't heard much about Cuba here recently. Could you give us your latest report on the progress of Soviet troop withdrawals from Cuba, and also has the Soviet Union directly or indirectly given the

United States an idea of how they plan to dispose of those SAM missiles in Cuba?

A. No. I can only refer you to what the President said in his recent press conference [April 23]. The Soviet military personnel, we believe, are leaving the island steadily, that there are further withdrawals. We are not getting into the numbers game that you remember of some months ago.

But on your last point, as to whether the Soviets have informed us about the disposition of the SAM sites, they have not informed us of the dispositions they have made or have in mind.

Gentlemen, as you know, I have a ceremony coming up in a few minutes in connection with the 40th anniversary of the Rogers Act establishing the Foreign Service. So if you will excuse me, I think I will withdraw.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

Consultations Held at Vientiane on Situation in Laos

*Joint Communiqué*¹

On May 26, 1964 the British Chargé d'Affaires in Vientiane, acting as representative of the British Co-Chairman of the International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question held at Geneva in 1961/62, and in response to a request from the Prime Minister of Laos in a letter of May 19 addressed to the representatives of both Co-Chairmen, invited representatives of each of the signatory powers to attend consultations under Article 4 of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos, signed at Geneva on July 23, 1962.² The consultations opened at the British Embassy in Vientiane on June 2 and the final meeting was held on June 29. They were presided over by the British Chargé d'Affaires.

2. Heads of Mission representing the Governments of Canada, Thailand, the U.S.A. and

¹ Released at Vientiane, Laos, on June 29.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

the Republic of Vietnam took part in the consultations on the basis of this invitation.

3. The Ambassador of India also participated in the consultations on the understanding that:

(A) He regarded the consultations merely as informal consultations among ambassadors of certain Geneva powers in Vientiane;

(B) He did not regard the ambassadors' meetings in Vientiane as consultations envisaged under Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration, nor as a substitute for a 14-power international conference which his Government strongly supported;

(C) His participation would be aimed at, besides an exchange of views on the situation in Laos, the convocation of 14-power consultations under Article 4 of the Geneva Declaration and/or an international conference.

The Ambassador of India was consequently unable to associate himself with any statement in the nature of a finding on the military situation as set out in paragraph 6 below or with any proposal concerning matters of which the I.C.S.C. [International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos] was or should be seized, in view of India's status as a supervisory power and chairman of the I.C.S.C. He expressed the view that the Commission was the only body charged by the Geneva Conference to make investigations into violations of the cease-fire and to furnish appropriate reports to the Co-Chairmen. He also expressed the view that the Commission should be requested to make a speedy investigation into the present military situation and to report urgently to the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference if it had not already done so.

4. The consultations were intended to provide for an exchange of views between the participating countries aimed at finding ways and means to bring about an improvement in the situation in Laos, and as a means of supporting and strengthening the Government of National Union. The Prime Minister [Prince Souvanna Phomma] held regular and frequent exchanges with the chairman of the consultations and the Laotian Government made available any information requested by the consultants; in this way

the Government was associated with the consultations, maintaining contact and showing its continuing interest in the proceedings. The Prime Minister expressed his satisfaction with the work carried out during the consultations.

5. The representatives agreed that the deteriorating military situation in Laos presented a grave threat to the peace of South-East Asia. They agreed to call on the Co-Chairmen in the way each thought appropriate, to do everything in their power to urge all parties concerned to bring about an immediate cease-fire throughout the Kingdom and withdraw all forces to the positions which they held before the recent fighting. The cease-fire and withdrawal should be controlled and verified by the I.C.S.C.

6. During the meeting a detailed assessment of recent developments in the military situation was made by the representatives of Canada, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Republic of Vietnam. (India did not participate in this assessment for the reasons set out in paragraph 3 above.) On the basis of this assessment the five representatives condemned the recent Pathet Lao attacks on the neutralist forces of General Kong Le, attacks clearly made with North Vietnamese assistance, as being in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements. In the course of this study evidence was produced concerning the use by North Vietnam of Laos territory to interfere in the internal affairs of the Republic of Vietnam. The conclusions of the assessment and the action which these representatives are recommending in the way each thinks appropriate to the Co-Chairmen are set out in the document annexed to this communique.

7. The representatives were agreed that the Geneva Agreements, if carried out in a constructive spirit, provide the necessary framework to assure the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos. They considered, in relation to the work of the I.C.S.C. and the duties imposed on it by the Geneva Protocol, certain recommendations that might be made to the Commission by the Co-Chairmen under Article 8 of the Protocol. They considered in particular recommendations relating to: the resump-

tion of full participation in the work of the Commission by the Polish Commissioner; the importance of the continued and effective functioning of the Commission in full enjoyment of security and immunity for members of the Commission and its personnel; the provision of all facilities to the Commission to move without hindrance in Laos for the purpose of carrying out investigations; and the according of maximum co-operation by the Royal Laotian Government and all political groups in Laos to the Commission in order to enable it to perform its functions under the Geneva Agreements.

8. The representatives looked forward to a stabilization of the political situation in Laos which would ensure the willing co-operation of all the principal political groups in the country and enable the Government of National Union, with Prince Souvanna as Prime Minister, to discharge its responsibility for the execution of the cease-fire as contemplated under Article 9 of the Protocol to the Geneva Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos. To this end they expressed the hope that an early meeting could be held between the leaders of the political parties and urged the Co-Chairmen to use their influence to bring this about.

9. The meeting also discussed on an exploratory basis and without commitment the nature of prior conditions that would be necessary if agreement were ultimately to be reached on the holding of a new international conference on the Laotian question. In this context reference was also made to other proposals for consultations on the Laotian question.

CALL FOR CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL³

The undersigned representatives of the signatories of the Geneva Accords meeting in Vientiane have, at the request of the Prime Minister of Laos, studied recent developments in the military situation in Laos with particular attention to the breaches of the terms of the Geneva declaration on the neutrality of Laos on July 23, 1962 and the protocol to this declaration. They have reached the following conclusions:

(1) There has been a general offensive by Pathet Lao forces in the Plain of Jars area and eastern Xieng

Khouang province which started at the beginning of February 1964, culminated in a large scale attack launched on May 16, and is still continuing. This general offensive is in accordance with the pattern of encroachment by Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese forces which has been observed since the signature of the Geneva agreements in July, 1962.

(2) The Neutralist forces of General Kong Le are at present grouped in areas to the west and south of the Plain of Jars, where they are continuing to resist attacks. Pathet Lao propaganda that these forces have been wiped out is thus demonstrably untrue.

(3) Though the Neutralist forces of General Kong Le have suffered some individual desertions, there were no defections of units as claimed by the Pathet Lao.

(4) The so called "true Neutralist" forces of Colonel Deuane are not numerically strong enough nor have they the equipment to have launched unaided an attack of the scale that has taken place against a much larger force, well equipped and supported by artillery, tanks, and attack and transport aircraft of the Royal Laotian Air Force, not to mention causing the displacement of thousands of refugees.

(5) There is therefore no truth in the allegations that the recent fighting has been between different Neutralist factions.

(6) There is indisputable evidence of North Vietnamese involvement in the offensive. This has taken the form of North Vietnamese fighting cadres as well as extensive logistic support. A study of the Pathet Lao forces, the undeveloped area from which they are forced to recruit and the lack of any industrial capability within their territory shows clearly that they have been, and still are, incapable of producing the sophisticated weapons used by them, or the trained technicians or soldiers to serve these weapons. Bearing in mind the growth of the Pathet Lao forces from very small beginnings to their present strength, it is obvious that this could only have taken place with the use of instructors from outside and with the inclusion of foreign cadres within their organisation to ensure their continuous and progressive efficiency. All Pathet Lao road communications run into North Viet Nam and it is self-evident that such cadres and logistic support come from North Viet Nam and are trained North Vietnamese soldiers and technicians.

(7) As a result of their recent operations the Pathet Lao and their allies are in a tactically advantageous position from which to conduct further military operations and are in fact continuing their offensive.

(8) There is furthermore firm evidence of the systematic use of Lao territory by the North Vietnamese for the infiltration of men and arms into South Viet Nam. This evidence concerned frequent occasions between July 23, 1962 and April 1964 on which large parties of North Vietnamese cadres and combatants passed through Laotian territory in breach of Article 2(i) of the Geneva declaration and of Articles 4 and 6 of the protocol to this declaration.

³ Signed on June 29 by the representatives of Canada, Thailand, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Republic of Viet-Nam.

2. In the light of these conclusions and of the great dangers inherent in the present situation for the sovereignty, independence, neutrality, unity and territorial integrity of the Kingdom of Laos and for the peace of South-East Asia as a whole, and acting on behalf of their governments, the representatives call for an immediate end to the fighting throughout Laos.

3. The representatives agreed to invite the co-Chairmen in the way each thought appropriate:

(a) To address an urgent appeal for an immediate ceasefire to all parties in Laos;

(b) To call for a withdrawal of Pathet Lao forces to the positions held on February 1, 1964;

(c) To call all North Vietnamese forces to withdraw from Laotian territory and to desist from any further use of Laotian territory for the purpose of interfering in the internal affairs of the Republic of Viet Nam;

(d) To call on the International Commission for Supervision and Control to submit a report on the situation without delay;

(e) To provide general guidance to the International Commission for Supervision and Control to assist it in its duties to control and verify the ceasefire and withdrawal under (b) and (c) above, and to report to the co-Chairmen on the action it takes (drawing attention to any hindrance encountered in the carrying out its duties) on the observance of the ceasefire and on the progress made with and date of completion of the withdrawal;

(f) To call on the Royal Lao Government authorities and on all military commanders and other persons exercising authority in any area of Laos which the Commission judges it necessary to visit in carrying out the request at (e) to give the Commission every assistance in its task.

U.S. Embassy at Zanzibar Converted to Consulate

Press release 302 dated June 29

The State Department announced on June 29 that on June 27 the United States Embassy, Zanzibar, was converted to a consulate.

This action came in response to a request from the Government of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar that arrangements be made by those countries having embassies in Zanzibar to convert their embassies to consulates.

The Government of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar has also informed the American Embassy and other diplomatic

missions in Dar-es-Salaam that diplomatic representatives who had presented their credentials to President [Julius] Nyerere of Tanganyika before April 26 are now regarded as being accredited to the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar and that there is no need to present fresh credentials.

Frank C. Carlucci, who has been the American Chargé in Zanzibar, will remain as U.S. consul.

Assistant Secretary Williams Visits Malagasy Republic and Malawi

The Department of State announced on July 1 (press release 305) that Assistant Secretary Williams would depart that day for a 1-week visit to the Malagasy Republic and to Malawi. He will visit the Malagasy Republic on July 3 and 4 before going to Nyasaland on July 5 as a member of the official U.S. delegation to the ceremonies in which Nyasaland becomes the independent nation of Malawi.

U.S. Presents Independence Gifts to Malawi

Following is the text of a statement made by Rufus E. Clement, Personal Representative of the President of the United States, at the presentation of the United States' independence gifts to Malawi at Blantyre, Malawi, on July 4. Dr. Clement is president of Atlanta University.

Press release 314 dated July 3, for release July 4

It is a great privilege and a joy for me to be here in this lovely land, among the people of Malawi, as we celebrate your great move into the community of independent nations.

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago this day, July 4, 1776, the United States of America shed its colonial bonds. As Americans at home and abroad commemorate our national independence, I have a special honor. President

Lyndon B. Johnson has asked me, as his Personal Representative and as America's Special Ambassador, to present to you, Mr. Prime Minister [Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda], our country's independence gifts to the people of Malawi.

Our gifts are radio broadcasting equipment and mobile health facilities, which are intended respectively to expand Malawi's mass communications and popular education services and to help increase the physical welfare and general well-being of your people.

Mindful of Malawi's need for nationwide communications, we are presenting to you two medium-wave radio broadcasting transmitters, as well as relay equipment and towers. To help assure effective operation of these installations, my country's gifts also comprise a certain number of related technical training scholarships.

With these new facilities, which will begin operation next October, Malawi will have a greatly increased capacity to see that its citizens in all regions know more about their homeland and about the events shaping their continent and the world in which we live. A related and equally important potential of this broadcast equipment is that of popular instruction by radio, which accords with Malawi's educational development program.

Mindful of your desire to improve the health and thereby the productive capacity of your people, our gift of a mobile medical unit combines a self-sufficient X-ray unit with mobile medical clinic facilities.

These gifts reflect the United States' desire to help Malawi speed its development. Politically and economically strong nations in Africa, we believe, are in the best interests of the people of Africa and of the United States.

In its careful pursuit of independence, Malawi has clearly indicated its desire for a nationhood in which all of its people's welfare will be increased. It is with much pleasure that I now present these gifts to the Government and people of Malawi. May they serve you well.

Rumania Makes Final Payment Under 1960 Financial Agreement

Press release 308 dated July 2

On July 1 the Rumanian Government made a payment of \$500,000 to the Government of the United States, thus completing its payment obligations under a financial agreement concluded between the United States and Rumania on March 30, 1960.¹


The 1960 agreement provided for Rumanian payment of \$24,526,370 on a lump-sum basis in settlement of the claims of U.S. nationals arising out of war damage, nationalization, and commercial and financial debts. The lump-sum settlement included \$22,026,370 in assets of the Rumanian Government and Rumanian corporations which had been blocked in the United States during World War II, and \$2,500,000 to be paid by the Rumanian Government to the U.S. Government in five installments between July 1, 1960, and July 1, 1964.

President Increases Membership of Trade Negotiations Committee

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER²

AMENDMENT OF EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 11143, RELATING TO THE PUBLIC ADVISORY COMMITTEE FOR TRADE NEGOTIATIONS

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States, it is ordered that Executive Order No. 11143 of March 2, 1964³ (29 F.R. 3127), be, and it is hereby, amended by substituting "45 members" for "40 members" in subsection (b) of Section 1 thereof (48 CFR § 2.1(b)).



THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 23, 1964.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4451.

² No. 11159; 29 Fed. Reg. 8137.

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 506.

United States and NATO Members Sign New Agreement for Cooperation in Exchange of Atomic Information

Following are texts of a message to the Congress from President Johnson concerning a new agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information, together with accompanying documents and the text of the agreement.

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated June 30

Letter of Transmittal

To the Congress of the United States:

On May 16, 1964, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission jointly recommended to me, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, a proposed new agreement to provide for cooperation in the exchange of atomic information with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member nations.

The new agreement will supersede an existing agreement executed in 1955,¹ and will do two things:

a. It will extend the types of information which we can exchange with NATO. This expanded area of information is needed to enable our Allies to make effective use of nuclear delivery systems being provided them by the United States under bilateral procedures and agreements following creation of NATO atomic stockpiles in 1957.

b. It will permit NATO member countries to share in information which the U.S. has

hitherto been exchanging only with the NATO organization itself under the 1955 agreement. This will make these countries' role in alliance planning in the nuclear field more effective.

This new agreement thus represents a logical and useful step in our continuing and varied efforts to ensure wider Allied participation in NATO nuclear defense. Such wider participation is necessary on both military and political grounds. It is needed to enhance the effectiveness of NATO defense. On political grounds, it is needed to reinforce NATO cohesion by meeting our Allies' legitimate desire to make a constructive contribution to nuclear defense.

Therefore, I have authorized the Secretary of State to execute this new agreement between the Government of the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member nations to provide for the cooperation relevant to the exchange of atomic information for NATO planning purposes.

In accordance with the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, I am submitting to each House of the Congress an authoritative copy of the signed agreement, together with a letter from the Secretary of State, a copy of the joint letter from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission recommending my approval of the agreement, and a copy of my approval memorandum.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 30, 1964.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3521.

Letter to the President From Secretary Rusk

June 22, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to forward to you with a view to its transmission to the Congress, pursuant to the Atomic Information [Energy] Act of 1954, as amended, an authoritative copy of an agreement between the Parties of the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information.

The Agreement was signed on behalf of the United States on June 18, 1964, pursuant to the authorization granted in your memorandum of May 19 to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission. A copy of this memorandum was transmitted to the Department of State.

A total of ten nations have signed the Agreement and the remaining member states are expected to sign in the near future.

Faithfully yours,

DEAN RUSK

Letter to the President From Chairman of Atomic Energy Commission and Secretary of Defense

MAY 18, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: There is hereby submitted for your consideration and approval a proposed agreement between the Government of the United States and the other parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information.

The proposed Agreement would supersede the "Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Cooperation Regarding Atomic Information" signed in Paris on 22 June 1955. In 1958, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 was amended by Public Law 85-479 to permit increased cooperation with our allies.

While the 1955 Agreement played an important part in enabling the United States to communicate to NATO certain atomic information necessary to the Alliance, the proposed new Agreement will provide for more extensive cooperation by permitting the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the individual NATO member nations to receive the kind of atomic information that is necessary to an increasing understanding and knowledge of and participation in the political and strategic consensus

upon which the collective military capacity of the North Atlantic Alliance depends.

This agreement establishes an improved framework under which such cooperation may be carried out. In accordance with the provisions of Section 144b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, Article I of the Agreement provides that the United States will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to make substantial contributions to the mutual defense and security, cooperate by communicating to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its Member States, while they continue to make such contributions, atomic information in accordance with this Agreement, provided the United States Government determines that such cooperation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defense and security.

Article II provides that other NATO nations will, to the extent they determine necessary, transmit atomic information of their own origin and of the same types as provided for in the proposed Agreement under terms and conditions the same as, or similar to, those in the proposed Agreement.

Article III of the Agreement provides for the communication of atomic information necessary to the development of defense plans, the training of personnel in the employment of and defense against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and the development of compatible delivery systems for atomic weapons.

Article IV of the Agreement stipulates that the cooperation under the Agreement will be carried out by the United States in accordance with its applicable laws, and makes clear that there will be no transfer under the Agreement of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data. This Article also provides that the information communicated by the United States shall be used exclusively for the preparation or implementation of NATO defense plans or activities and the development of delivery systems in the

common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article V of the proposed Agreement outlines the procedures for the safeguarding of information communicated under the Agreement. It is significant to note that the information transmitted under the Agreement shall not be communicated or exchanged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of that organization except that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may communicate, unless it is otherwise specified by the United States, information to its member nations as is necessary to carry out functions related to NATO missions. This article also provides that the member nations will not communicate information received under this agreement to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the Member States concerned. Member States may, however, communicate such information to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or, when authorized by the United States, to other Member States requiring the information for functions related to NATO missions.

Article VI provides that other provisions of the Agreement notwithstanding, the United States may stipulate the degree to which any atomic information made available under the Agreement may be disseminated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or its Member States.

Under Article XI the proposed Agreement would supersede the 1955 NATO Agreement and all information previously transmitted under the terms of the 1955 Agreement would be considered to have been communicated under the new Agreement.

The new Agreement would remain in force until terminated by unanimous agreement of the parties or superseded by another agreement.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization is making and the NATO Member States, in participating with the United States in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are making substantial and material contributions to the mutual defense and security. It is the view of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that this Agree-

ment is entirely in accord with the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended. It is the considered opinion of the Department of Defense and the Atomic Energy Commission that the performance of the proposed Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security. Accordingly, it is recommended that in accordance with Section 123b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, you:

A. Determine that the performance of the proposed Agreement will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security of the United States; and

B. Approve the proposed Agreement and authorize its execution for the Government of the United States in a manner designated by the Secretary of State.

The Secretary of State concurs in the foregoing recommendations.

Respectfully yours,

GLENN T. SEABORG
Chairman
Atomic Energy
Commission

ROBERT S. McNAMARA
Secretary of Defense

Memorandum of Approval

MAY 19, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE CHAIRMAN, ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION

SUBJECT: New NATO 144b Agreement

In your joint letter to me of May 18, 1964, you recommended that I approve a proposed new NATO 144b Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and all other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for cooperation relevant to the exchange of atomic information for NATO planning purposes.

Having considered your joint recommendations and the cooperation provided for in the proposed new agreement, including security safeguards and other terms and conditions of the agreement, I hereby:

(1) determine that the performance of this proposed new agreement will promote and will

not constitute an unreasonable risk to the common defense and security; and

(2) approve the proposed agreement and authorize its execution for the Government of the United States in a manner designated by the Secretary of State.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES TO THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY FOR CO-OPERATION REGARDING ATOMIC INFORMATION

PREAMBLE

The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, signed at Washington on 4th April, 1949,

Recognising that their mutual security and defence requires that they be prepared to meet the contingencies of atomic warfare, and

Recognising that their common interest will be advanced by making available to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states information pertinent thereto, and

Taking into consideration the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, which was prepared with these purposes in mind,

Acting on their own behalf and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

In accordance with and subject to the requirements of the United States Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, the Government of the United States of America will, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization continues to make substantial and material contributions to the mutual defence and security, co-operate by communicating, from time to time, to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and its member states, while they continue to make such contributions, atomic information in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement, provided that the Government of the United States of America determines that such co-operation will promote and will not constitute an unreasonable risk to its defence and security.

ARTICLE II

Paralleling the undertaking of the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement, the other member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization will, to the extent they deem necessary, communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements, and to member states atomic information of their own origin of the same types provided for in this Agreement. The terms and conditions governing these communications by other member states will be the subject

of subsequent agreements, but will be the same or similar to the terms and conditions specified in this Agreement.

ARTICLE III

The Government of the United States of America will communicate to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, including its military and civilian elements, and to member states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization requiring the atomic information in connection with their functions related to NATO missions, such atomic information as is determined by the Government of the United States of America to be necessary to:

- (a) the development of defence plans;
- (b) the training of personnel in the employment of and defence against atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy;
- (c) the evaluation of the capabilities of potential enemies in the employment of atomic weapons and other military applications of atomic energy; and
- (d) the development of delivery systems compatible with the atomic weapons which they carry.

ARTICLE IV

1. Co-operation under this Agreement will be carried out by the Government of the United States of America in accordance with its applicable laws.

2. Under this Agreement there will be no transfer by the Government of the United States of America of atomic weapons, non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons, or non-nuclear parts of atomic weapons systems involving Restricted Data.

3. The atomic information communicated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement shall be used exclusively for the preparation or implementation of NATO defence plans and activities and the development of delivery systems in the common interests of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

ARTICLE V

1. Atomic information communicated pursuant to this Agreement shall be accorded full security protection under applicable NATO regulations and procedures, agreed security arrangements, and national legislation and regulations. In no case will the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or its member states maintain security standards for the safeguarding of atomic information less restrictive than those set forth in the pertinent NATO security regulations and other agreed security arrangements in effect on the date this Agreement comes into force.

2. The establishment and co-ordination of the security programme in all NATO military and civilian elements will be effected under the authority of the North Atlantic Council in conformity with procedures set forth in agreed security arrangements.

3. Atomic information communicated by the Government of the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement will be made available through channels for

communicating atomic information now existing or as may be hereafter agreed.

4. Atomic information communicated or exchanged pursuant to this Agreement shall not be communicated or exchanged by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or persons under its jurisdiction to any unauthorized persons or, except as provided in paragraph 5 of this article, beyond the jurisdiction of that Organization.

5. Unless otherwise specified by the Government of the United States of America, United States atomic information provided to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization may be communicated by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to its member states as necessary to carry out functions related to NATO missions, provided that dissemination of such atomic information within such member states is limited to those specific individuals concerned with the NATO missions for which the information is required. Member states agree that atomic information so received from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or otherwise pursuant to this Agreement will not be transferred to unauthorized persons or beyond the jurisdiction of the recipient member state; however, such information may be communicated to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or, when authorized by the Government of the United States of America, to other member states requiring the information for functions related to NATO missions.

ARTICLE VI

Other provisions of this Agreement notwithstanding, the Government of the United States of America may stipulate the degree to which any of the atomic information made available by it to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or member states may be disseminated, may specify the categories of persons who may have access to such information, and may impose such other restrictions on the dissemination of information as it deems necessary.

ARTICLE VII

1. A Party receiving atomic information under this Agreement shall use it for the purposes specified herein only. Any inventions or discoveries resulting from possession of such information on the part of a recipient Party or persons under its jurisdiction shall be made available to the Government of the United States of America for defence purposes without charge in accordance with such arrangements as may be agreed and shall be safeguarded in accordance with the provisions of Article V of this Agreement.

2. The application or use of any information communicated under this Agreement shall be the responsibility of the Party receiving it; the Party communicating the information does not provide any indemnity or warranty with respect to its application or use.

ARTICLE VIII

Nothing in this Agreement shall be considered to supersede or otherwise affect bilateral agreements be-

tween Parties to this Agreement providing for co-operation in the exchange of atomic information.

ARTICLE IX

For the purposes of this Agreement :

(a) "Atomic weapon" means any device utilising atomic energy, exclusive of the means for transporting or propelling the device (where such means is a separable and divisible part of the device), the principal purpose of which is for use as, or for development of, a weapon, a weapon prototype, or a weapon test device.

(b) "Atomic information" to be provided by the Government of the United States of America under this Agreement means information which is designated "Restricted Data" or "Formerly Restricted Data" by the Government of the United States of America.

ARTICLE X

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon receipt by the Government of the United States of America of notification from all Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are willing to be bound by the terms of the Agreement.

2. The Government of the United States of America will inform all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, and will also inform the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, of each notification and of the entry into force of this Agreement.

3. This Agreement shall remain in force until terminated by unanimous agreement or superseded by another agreement, it being understood, however, that termination of this Agreement as a whole shall not release any Party from the requirements of this Agreement to safeguard information made available pursuant to it.

ARTICLE XI

Notwithstanding the provisions of Article VI(4) of the Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for Co-operation regarding Atomic Information, signed in Paris on 22nd June, 1955, the present Agreement shall upon its entry into force supersede the above-mentioned Agreement, it being understood, however, that information communicated under that Agreement shall be considered for all purposes to have been communicated under the provisions of this Agreement.

ARTICLE XII

This Agreement shall bear the date on which it is opened for signature and shall remain open for signature until it has been signed by all the States Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty.

In witness whereof the undersigned Representatives have signed the present Agreement on behalf of their respective States, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and on behalf of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Done at Paris this 18th day of June 1964, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally

authoritative, in a single original which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America shall transmit certified copies thereof to all the signatory and acceding States.

Foreign Policy Aspects of U.S. Immigration Laws

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

I appreciate this opportunity to appear before you to discuss a very important problem. I refer to the effect on the operation of our foreign policies of the national-origins system which is the basis of our immigration laws.

The administration has proposed in H.R. 7700 and S. 1932 the progressive elimination of the national-origins system from our immigration laws. I should like to discuss with you the foreign policy aspects of our immigration laws and of the administration's proposals from the point of view of the Department of State. Others will discuss internal or national aspects of the administration's proposals.

Under the national-origins system, the primary objective was to maintain the ethnic balance among the American population as it existed in 1920. This system preserves preferences based on race and place of birth in the admission of quota immigrants to the United States. This results in discrimination in our hospitality to different nationalities in a world situation which is quite different from that which existed at the time the national-origins system was originally adopted.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been placed in the role of critical leadership in a troubled and constantly changing world. We are concerned to see that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives.

What other peoples think about us plays an important role in the achievement of our foreign

policies. We in the United States have learned to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity, and all the other factors which truly determine a man's value to society. We do not reflect this judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold to immigration laws which classify men according to national and geographical origin. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand the reaction to this policy of a man from a geographical area, or of a national origin, which is not favored by our present quota laws. Irrespective of whether the man desires to come to the United States or not, he gets the impression that our standards of judgment are not based on the merits of the individual—as we proclaim—but rather on an assumption which can be interpreted as bias and prejudice. Inasmuch as our immigration laws are regarded as the basis of how we evaluate others around the world, their effect on people abroad, and consequently on our influence, can readily be seen.

There have been times in the past when we have been accused of preoccupation with the peoples of the West to the neglect of Asian peoples in the Far East. Unfortunately, the national-origins system gives a measure of support and credence to these observations.

Progressive Liberalization of Immigration Laws

Actually, Mr. Chairman, we are not quite as prejudiced as we sometimes appear. Congress has progressively liberalized our immigration laws to permit the reunion of families. We admit the native-born from our sister Republics in the Western Hemisphere on a nonquota basis without discrimination as to origin or place of birth. Congress has also found it desirable over the years to pass special laws providing for the admission, generally on a nonquota basis, of immigrants of different races and circumstances who have been uprooted and displaced by political upheavals. In these special laws we have exhibited a generosity of spirit and a complete absence of concern about the origin, race, and place of birth of the refugees whom we have admitted to our shores under circumstances of need.

I don't have to remind you, Mr. Chairman,

¹ Made before the subcommittee on immigration and nationality of the House Committee on the Judiciary on July 2 (press release 309).

and the members of the committee, of the fine record Congress established in passing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, and the "Fair Share" Refugee-Escapee Act in 1960. These acts, for all practical purposes, exempted refugees from the quota restrictions which would have delayed their entry into this country for many years.

More recent legislation has clearly reflected the intent of the Congress to relieve pressures created by quota restrictions. On five separate occasions since 1957 the Congress granted non-quota status to quota immigrants who had been waiting for visas for an extensive period of time. While I shall not indulge in a statistical presentation, I should like to remind this committee that, as a result of this liberalizing policy of the Congress, only 34 percent of the 2,599,349 immigrants who came to the United States from 1953 through 1962 were quota immigrants.

What is needed, basically, is to bring our immigration laws into line with the real character and disposition of the American people, who are at heart and in fact hospitable, kindly disposed, and interested in all races and cultures. This is so because we know from actual experience that immigrants previously admitted, regardless of race and place of birth, have made their distinctive contribution to what is America today.

President Kennedy, in a special message to the Congress on July 23, 1963, said:²

The most urgent and fundamental reform I am recommending relates to the national origins system of selecting immigrants. Since 1924 it has been used to determine the number of quota immigrants permitted to enter the United States each year. Accordingly, although the legislation I am transmitting deals with many problems which require remedial action, it concentrates attention primarily upon revision of our quota immigration system. The enactment of this legislation will not resolve all of our important problems in the field of immigration law. It will, however, provide a sound basis upon which we can build in developing an immigration law that serves the national interest and reflects in every detail the principles of equality and human dignity to which our nation subscribes.

President Johnson in January 1964 said:³

This bill applies new tests and new standards which we believe are reasonable and fair and right. I refer specifically to: What is the training and qualification

of the immigrant who seeks admission? What kind of a citizen would he make, if he were admitted? What is his relationship to persons in the United States? And what is the time of his application? These are rules that are full of common sense, common decency, which operate for the common good.

That is why in my state of the Union message last Wednesday [January 8, 1964],⁴ I said that I hoped that in establishing preferences a nation that was really built by immigrants—immigrants from all lands—could ask those who seek to immigrate now: What can you do for our country? But we ought to never ask: In what country were you born?

The Administration's Proposals

The administration's proposal would eliminate the national-origins system on a gradual basis by reducing all established quotas by 20 percent each year for 5 years. The present total of quota authorizations would be maintained, except initially all minimum quotas and subquotas would be increased from 100 to 200. These minimum quotas would have the 20-percent reduction each year applied to them.

A quota reserve pool is established by section 2 of the bill before the committee, under which all numbers would be allocated by the fifth year. In each of the 5 years constituting the period of transition, the pool would consist of (1) the numbers released from national-origin quotas each year, under the 20-percent progressive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned to the old quotas but unused the previous year because insufficient demand for them existed in the assigned quota area.

Experience has shown that we have approximately 50,000 visa numbers annually which are unused and are not available for reallocation to other quota areas. These unused numbers are chiefly from the United Kingdom and Irish quotas.

In the fifth year all quota allocations would be made from the quota reserve pool, which would then become a worldwide quota. So that no one country could enjoy a disproportionate amount of numbers from the pool based on registrations of relatively long standing, the bill provides that no one country could

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 19, 1963, p. 298.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 10, 1964, p. 211.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

receive more than 10 percent of the total authorized quota numbers.

A strict "first come, first served" basis of allocating visa quotas would create some problems in certain countries of Northern and Western Europe, which under the national-origins system enjoyed a situation where quota numbers were readily available to visa applicants. To apply the new principle rigidly would result, after a few years, in eliminating immigration from these countries almost entirely. Such a result would be undesirable, not only because it frustrates the aim of the bill that immigration from all countries should continue but also because many of the countries so affected are our closest allies. At a time when our national security rests in large part on a continual strengthening of our ties with these countries, it would be anomalous indeed to restrict opportunities for their nationals here. Therefore the bill allows the President to reserve up to 50 percent of the pool reserve for allocation to qualified immigrants who could obtain visas under the present system but not under the terms of the bill before the committee, and whose admission would further the national security interests in maintaining close ties with their countries.

Policy on Asian Immigration

Also involved in this is the issue of our immigration policy toward Asian persons, to which I now wish to address myself. Perhaps the most discriminatory aspect of the present law is the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle, which requires persons of Asian stock to be attributed to quota areas not of their place of birth but according to their racial ancestry. This feature of the present law is indefensible from a foreign policy point of view. It represents an overt statutory discrimination against more than one-half of the world's population.

Here again our request is not that the Congress drastically depart from existing policy, but rather that it pursue to a conclusion a development which began more than 20 years ago. As your committee is well aware, the Congress, at the request of President Roosevelt, eliminated in 1943 the Chinese Exclusion Laws and established for the first time a quota for the

immigration of Chinese persons. This well-considered and cautious beginning of a revision of our policy of excluding Asian persons has been followed by progressively liberal amendments to our laws. In 1952 the drafters of the Immigration and Nationality Act eliminated race as a bar to naturalization and thereby to immigration. Asian spouses and children of American citizens were given the same non-quota status as enjoyed by any person of non-Asian ancestry. The only discriminatory features affecting Asian persons which then remained were the establishment of an upper limit of 2,000 for the so-called minimum quotas in the Asian area, and the rule that the quota of an Asian person born outside the Asian sphere be governed by ancestry rather than by place of birth. The Congress in 1961 removed the 2,000 limit on the number of Asian immigrants from minimum quota areas. The only remaining discriminatory provision of the law now, therefore, is the one requiring that an Asian person be charged to an Asian quota even if he were born outside the Asian area in a quota or nonquota country.

The restrictive effect of this rule has been significantly tempered during the last decade as a result of the special legislation to which I referred earlier. The very liberal policy which found expression in these special measures, as distinct from the letter of the general law, is best illustrated by the volume and composition of immigration from some of the major countries of the Far East. During the 10-year period from 1953 to 1963, a total of 119,677 immigrants came to the United States from China, Japan, and the Philippines. 109,654 of these were nonquota immigrants, and less than 10 percent were quota immigrants. These facts may startle those who read in our immigration laws that Japan has an annual quota of 185, the Philippines a quota of 100, and that China has a total of 205 quota numbers a year. Any increase in the volume of immigration resulting from the proposed amendments would be rather limited against the actual volume of Asian immigration into the United States between 1953 and 1963. We deprive ourselves of a powerful weapon in our fight against misinformation if we do not reconcile here too the letter of the law

with the facts of immigration and thus erase the unfavorable impression made by our old quota limitation for Asian persons.

I urge you most earnestly to eliminate this last vestige of discrimination against Asian persons from our immigration laws. This action would bring to a logical conclusion the progressive policy the Congress has followed since 1943.

Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago

Consistent with the foregoing, I should like to urge you to accord equal status to all immigrants born in our American sister Republics. It has always been the policy of the Congress to recognize the common bond uniting the Americas by exempting from any quota restrictions those immigrants who were born in independent countries of the Western Hemisphere. When the Congress in 1952 formulated the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, it included in the list of nonquota countries all those which were independent at that time. Meanwhile, our neighbors in the Caribbean—Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago—have become independent. The wording of the law required that we proclaim for each of these areas quotas of 100. We have had serious representations from these countries concerning these quota restrictions which are interpreted as discriminatory measures. Jamaica and Trinidad are among our best friends in this hemisphere, and their friendship is of considerable significance to us.

Assistant Secretary [for Inter-American Affairs Thomas C.] Mann will expand upon this in later testimony. Mr. Abba P. Schwartz, Administrator, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, will also present a statement on the refugee aspects of the administration's proposal.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, without going into the economic aspects of the administration's proposals, on which others will testify, I wish to conclude with a few general considerations.

Present-day immigration is very different in volume and makeup from the older migration on which most of our thinking is still based; and its significance for this country is considerably different. Immigration now comes in limited volume and includes a relatively high

proportion of older people, females, and persons of high skill and training.

The significance of immigration for the United States now depends less on the number than on the quality of the immigrants.

The explanation for the high professional and technical quality of present immigration lies in part in the nonquota and preference provisions of our immigration laws that favor the admission of highly qualified migrants. But still more it depends on world conditions of postwar economic and social dislocations, discriminations, and insecurities in various parts of the world that have disturbed social and occupational strata not normally disposed to emigrate and have attracted them to the greater political freedom and economic opportunity offered in the United States. Under present circumstances the United States has a rare opportunity to draw migrants of high intelligence and ability from abroad; and immigration, if well administered, can be one of our greatest national resources, a source of manpower and brainpower in a divided world.

It should be emphasized that there has been no relaxing of the qualitative criteria for admissibility to the United States, and that no relaxation of these mental, moral, economic, and ideological criteria is proposed in S. 1932 or H.R. 7700.

I urge you, Mr. Chairman, and members of this committee, that you give most careful consideration to the President's proposals embodied in H.R. 7700 and S. 1932.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on July 1 confirmed the following nominations:

Sam P. Gilstrap to be Ambassador to Malawi. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated June 26.)

U. Alexis Johnson to be Career Ambassador.

Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor to be Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 311 dated July 2.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Consular Convention Ratifications Exchanged by U.S. and Japan

Press release 306 dated July 1, for release July 2

Instruments of ratification of the consular convention between the United States and Japan, signed at Tokyo on March 22, 1963, were exchanged on July 2 in Washington. The exchange was made by Secretary Rusk and the Japanese Ambassador, Rynji Takeuchi, in a brief formal ceremony at the Department of State. This action completes the procedures required for bringing the convention into force. By its terms, the convention will enter into force on August 1, 1964, 30 days after the exchange of ratifications.

The convention defines and establishes the duties, rights, privileges, exemptions, and immunities of consular officers of each country in the territory of the other country. The convention with Japan is comparable to consular conventions concluded by the United States with other friendly countries in recent years.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification that it considers itself bound: Niger, September 10, 1963.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Adherence deposited: Niger, June 5, 1964.

Trade

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, with annexes and schedules and protocol of provisional application. Concluded at Geneva October 30, 1947. TIAS 1700.

Admitted as contracting party (with rights and obligations dating from independence): Togo, March 20, 1964.

Cuba on May 25, 1964, signed the following:

Fifth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 3, 1955.¹

Sixth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva April 11, 1957.¹

Seventh protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 30, 1957.¹

Eighth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva February 18, 1959.¹

Ninth protocol of rectifications and modifications to texts of schedules to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva August 17, 1959.¹

BILATERAL

China

Agreement amending the agreement of April 3, 1956 (TIAS 3571), providing for disposition of equipment and materials furnished by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of January 30 and February 9, 1951 (TIAS 2293). Effected by exchange of notes at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, 1964.

Iran

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 USC 1701-1709), with exchange of notes of November 18, 1963, and June 11, 1964. Signed at Tehran November 17, 1963. Entered into force November 17, 1963.

Japan

Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963.

Ratifications exchanged: July 2, 1964.

Enters into force: August 1, 1964.

United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078, 5397), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 29, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

¹ Not in force.

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313	7/3	Rusk: Independence Hall, Philadelphia, Pa.
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†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

1965: International Cooperation Year

On November 21, 1963, the General Assembly of the United Nations named 1965 "International Cooperation Year." This 5-page pamphlet discusses this theme by pointing out that "international cooperation is a fact of life . . . the most important fact of life in the second half of the 20th century."

As the pamphlet suggests, "Perhaps we can make two things of the Year: a massive opportunity for public education about America's role in international cooperation, and a chance to speed up some very concrete tasks on international institution building, by including them as special targets to shoot for in 1965." The article concludes by listing 10 specific targets at which we might aim.

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THE
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BULLETIN



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Secretary Rusk Interviewed on German Television

Following is the transcript of an interview between Secretary Rusk and Gerd Ruge of the All-German Television Network (First) recorded at Washington and broadcast at Hamburg, Germany, on July 9 as part of a documentary entitled "Change in the White House—the Evolving of American Policy."

Q. Has there been any change in the process of policy and decisionmaking under President Johnson? Has President Johnson stressed different foreign policy questions from those which were important under President Kennedy?

A. Well, under our constitutional system an enormous responsibility falls upon the President of the United States, and of course each President is going to have differences of style and differences in his own personal method of operation. Well, all Presidents will lean very heavily upon the great departments of government and, in the case of foreign policy, upon the Department of State. But these differences don't affect very much the underlying basic policy of the American people. These policies

turn upon the kind of country we are, the kind of people we are, what we hope for in the world ahead of us, on the one side, and then, on the other side, the shape of this turbulent world scene outside the United States. These policies are bipartisan in character. They have been consistent since World War II.

Let me illustrate. The American people really do believe that governments derive their just power from the consent of the governed. This is why we react instinctively to colonial questions as we do. This is why we are so deeply concerned about what is happening in Eastern Europe and why we believe in the self-determination of the German people. This is why we can get along so much better with democracies than with dictatorships, and this is why we are concerned about some of our own problems in our own society and with not living up to this basic idea.

Another elementary notion in our foreign policy is to be found in the United Nations Charter. The underlying crisis of our day is the picture of the world as devised in the United Nations Charter under attack from the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1309 PUBLICATION 7716 JULY 27, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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Communist notion of a world revolution. Now, we are deeply committed to the United Nations Charter kind of world. We have some differences in policy, but these are basically nonpartisan in character.

President Johnson took over after our tragedy last November with great understanding of the main lines of American policy. He had been personally involved in them for the last 15 years, and he is active with an energy and a sure hand that has given great confidence to all people. I think he feels the human aspects of foreign policies as much as any President I have seen. Because he really does know that foreign policy involves every home and every community and every country, and his own personal background leads him to feel these matters very deeply because he knows that policy is people, and he feels that very strongly. As I say, he is a man of great energy who doesn't rest until he knows we have done everything that we can to bring a little peace and decency into a particular situation.

Q. Do you feel that the present state of détente in international relations is any different or any more lasting than earlier periods of relaxation of tension?

A. This word *détente* is a very confusing word, and I think we have to be very careful about it, because there are those who think that we have entered an entirely new chapter. I myself don't find that in the present situation. It is true that there have been certain agreements—the nuclear test ban treaty—there is a little more trade, perhaps. And we have some certain agreements about outer space, a little more cooperation, a little more sobriety perhaps between the NATO countries, on the one side, and the Warsaw Pact countries on the other. We still have very large and potentially dangerous questions unresolved—for example, Germany and Berlin, Cuba, Southeast Asia—so that this struggle, this underlying struggle between the forces of freedom and the forces of coercion is still with us. Mr. Khrushchev has said there is no ideological coexistence, and that means that the Communists have not abandoned their idea of the world revolution; and so long as that is true I think it's very hazardous to speak

about a *détente* as though the major problems have been solved. They have not been. We must use the time we have to try to prepare ourselves to find solutions to some of these problems. But those solutions have not been yet found.

Germany and Eastern Europe

Q. In what ways can relations with the Eastern European nations be developed? What can Germany's role be in this process? How would this process influence the problems of Berlin and of a divided Germany?

A. Oh, I think so. I think the great interest all of us have in an area like Eastern Europe—and I would include the Soviet Union in this—is to try to reinforce the natural and instinctive and decent relationships between the people themselves. I think one can say with a fair confidence that the people of the Warsaw Pact countries and the people of the NATO countries would like to see peace established, and it is the problem of the governments to try to find a way to bring about this great desire of people on both sides of the Curtain. But there are problems.

Now, I would think that the smaller countries of Eastern Europe do show signs of a nostalgic historic interest in their ties with the main center of Western civilization in Western Europe. They are part of Europe; they feel it from the cultural, scientific, educational impetus and from their background; and to a lesser extent they are interested in improving their relations with the United States. I think this is all to the good. I think one of the most important things which happened in the last 2 years has been the improvement of the relations between the Federal Republic and a number of the Eastern European countries. This is good, not just because here are fellow Europeans coming into contact with each other; it also is a means to reduce that fear of Germany which is in the background of the European history for the past 50 years.

So, I think, these are the constructive ideas and, as these movements go forward, people's attitudes will change and new opportunities will open up. Now, we know that after 17

years of tension that tension has not moved toward the reunification of Germany. We can't guarantee that a reduction of tension will move in that direction, but the more normally people can feel toward each other the greater are the opportunities to bring up a lasting solution to some of these difficult problems.

Consultation on Problems of Common Interest

Q. In what ways can the process of cooperation and consultation in the Western alliance be improved in regard to problems of common interest in Europe, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world?

A. Well, I think that—in the first place, let me say, I believe that the NATO alliance today is just as unified as ever on the central issue of security in respect to threats from the East. I think there is no problem on that point whatever, and today NATO is stronger in military terms than it has ever been in its history. But there are some problems of coordination of policy. There is the question as to how Europe is going to organize itself, and, until that question is answered by Europeans, then we cannot be certain as to what the eventual organization of NATO ought to be. There are some difficult questions arising because in NATO there are those who carry very heavy responsibilities in other parts of the world—the United States, Britain, France, and others.

We, ourselves, have 42 allies around the globe. Now, we believe, sitting where we do and with our responsibility, that the interest of the free world in the security of free nations is indivisible. Therefore we would hope that the NATO countries would recognize that, in an area like Southeast Asia, what we are trying to do there is exactly what we have wanted to do and have tried to do successfully in Europe. It is to help free countries maintain their security and independence. Now, Europe is a long way away from Southeast Asia, and I think in NATO we have not yet found a way to develop common policies based upon the indivisible interest of the free world right around the entire globe. We are improving, we have discussed at great length, and consultation goes forward, but, as yet, we have not found a completely satisfactory answer to this rather difficult question.

Ambassador Kohler Makes Fourth of July Address on Moscow TV

Following is a translation of an address in the Russian language made by American Ambassador Foy D. Kohler for broadcast on Moscow television on July 4.

Good evening, friends. I am grateful for the opportunity to speak briefly to you about what our national holiday, the Fourth of July, means to Americans in the Soviet Union and elsewhere around the world.

One hundred and eighty-eight years ago today, delegates from the Thirteen American Colonies, meeting in Philadelphia, voted to declare these colonies free and independent states. Already in a state of armed rebellion against the British King, they listed their grievances and proclaimed their intention to be free. They closed their Declaration of Independence with these great words:

And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.

Thus began the independent life of the United States of America. John Adams, one of the revolutionaries, wrote, "The river is passed, and the bridge cut away." The American experiment had begun. Since that Fourth of July, 1776, the American people, like other people who look into their revolutionary past for inspiration, have always paid special homage to this day. Abraham Lincoln, the great emancipator of the slaves, once remarked that all his political philosophy sprang from the thoughts and the ideals of the makers of the American Revolution. That American philosophy is nowhere better summarized than in the words of the Declaration itself. "We hold these truths to be self-evident," it proclaims, "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among Men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed."

It therefore seems to us particularly fitting that the great congressional debate of our day

on the question of civil rights has reached a positive conclusion on the eve of the Fourth of July. When the Senate passed the civil rights bill, President Johnson said:¹

... this bill is a renewal and a reinforcement, a symbol and a strengthening of that abiding commitment to human dignity and the equality of man which has been the guiding purpose of the American nation for 200 years.

I am happy to inform you that the day before yesterday this bill was signed into law.

We thus take pride in what representative United States Government has accomplished this Fourth of July in connection with one of the most urgent of American national problems. The debate, it would be noticed, took place in the American tradition begun in 1776—publicly, open to the eyes of the world, and with due regard for the processes of law.

Americans also take heart today in the fact that their Government and political system have survived the deep and dreadful shock occasioned by the violent death of a beloved and respected leader. The vitality and continuity of the American system have been vividly demonstrated since that fateful day in November. Without losing a step and with the overwhelming support of the American people, our new President has moved with vigor and imagination to carry forward President Kennedy's passionate search for justice without violence at home and for peace with honor abroad.

I know that in this quest for peace we have a common goal. As American Ambassador to the Soviet Union and as an American citizen who has long known and respected the Soviet people, I am personally pleased to note—and to have participated in—the various small, but hopeful, steps we have taken during the past year to improve United States-Soviet relations. These include, between ourselves, such steps as the establishment of the direct line between Washington and Moscow, the conclusion of a new exchanges agreement, the signing of a consular convention, a series of agreements to ex-

¹ For text of an address made by President Johnson at San Francisco, Calif., on June 19, 1964, see White House press release dated June 19.

plore the possibilities of increased scientific cooperation in such varied areas as space research and desalination; and, with others, such steps as the agreement to ban nuclear tests and to refrain from orbiting nuclear weapons.

We believe we must continue to work hard to improve understanding between our two great peoples. We look forward to the day when there will be a free movement of our people back and forth. We would like to receive far more Soviet citizens in the United States. We have much to share with each other, and the exchanges that take place today of writers, artists, musicians, doctors, scientists, students, athletes, and engineers are only a fraction of what we should be doing.

Americans by nature tend to be optimists. We are also realists and do not underestimate the seriousness and complexity of the problems that divide us in many parts of the world. But let me assure you that we have faith that we can and must resolve these differences without war. Only peace will give our two peoples the chance to realize in full measure the rights in which we believe, and the basic aspirations I am sure we share, for "life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness" for all. That is the hope of all Americans as we celebrate the 188th anniversary of the American Revolution.

Letters of Credence

Luxembourg

The newly appointed Ambassador of Luxembourg, Maurice Steinmetz, presented his credentials to President Johnson on July 7. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 318 dated July 7.

Netherlands

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Netherlands, Carl Willem Alwin Schurmann, presented his credentials to President Johnson on July 7. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 317 (revised) dated July 7.

The Need To Explore Inner Space

by *Lucius D. Battle*

*Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs*¹

I am very glad to be with you here and am grateful for the warmth of your welcome.

We are nearing the Fourth of July, with its perennial appeal to public speakers—frequent or infrequent. But what I plan to say has more to do with a national “Declaration of *Interdependence*” this country has made in recent years than with our historic Declaration of Independence. Though that great revolutionary document, with a message which still reverberates around the world, always suggests ample and inviting themes.

One real, and personal, reason for welcoming your invitation lies in the fact that I have just completed 2 years in the job I hold—with responsibility for the educational and cultural programs of the Department of State. This is not long enough to know everything I would like to know about this extremely varied and sensitive activity. I say “sensitive” because it deals with *people* primarily, with their minds, their aims and aspirations, their various skills and talents, present and potential. But 2 years is a logical time for assessment.

Let us look at the scope and shape and meaning, as I see them, of the complex area we call educational and cultural affairs. Let us see how these activities have come to play a significant role in our foreign relations.

Now for a word about a word: “interface.” I understand that “interface” is a technical term in geometry. Looking back on my schoolboy

days, I do not recall my jousts with geometry with any special enthusiasm. But I’m told “interface” has become a meaningful word in the great enterprises of aerospace, too. It has an imaginative use, I think, in the titles for this series of talks.² For it invites our attention—in the idea of a common boundary, or interface, between subjects—to the increasing interconnections and interactions between education and foreign policy in this country and to their implications for all of us today.

There is growing recognition of this relatively new, and relatively undeveloped, area of our foreign relations. We in international educational activities are grateful to this university for its leadership in this field—a leadership we have known before in other forms, both institutional and individual.

And so you have staked out the subject and provided the occasion, and I thank you for doing both. I take it my role is to be a sort of guide for a tour over the common ground where education and foreign policy meet—and to be open for questions when the tour ends!

As a veteran of many after-dinner and after-luncheon speeches, I have learned of the utility of the summary at the outset of what a speaker intends to say. Not just the generalities I have so far used, but a specific synopsis—like those some magazines use at the beginning of an article. I have done this a number of times, usually with good effect. But not always. Not so long ago, after completing an address which

¹Address made at the first of the series of 1964 World Affairs Previews at the summer session at the University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Nebr., on July 2 (excerpts released as press release 310).

²The general topic assigned to Mr. Battle was “Education/Foreign Policy Interface.”

I had begun with a brief synopsis, a member of the audience came up to me. He complimented me warmly on my synopsis and then said: "But you didn't say what you said you were going to say!" Apparently I had drifted off my announced wavelength. I will try to keep a steady signal, loud and clear, here today.

What, then, is my synopsis? And what is the title—"The Need To Explore Inner Space"—all about? Here it is.

A Synopsis

1. Our ultimate security lies in the minds of men—in "inner space." Wars will not start in outer space; if they come, they will start in inner space—in men's minds, in ignorance, in prejudice, in overweening pride.

2. Educational exchanges and related activities play a unique and a key role in reaching men's minds; they enable people to see and hear for themselves. They assist the formation of attitudes and approaches based on understanding, rather than fixed answers which may be obsoleted in an evolving, changing world. They encourage informed attitudes in place of horseback opinions and other glib and perhaps glittering answers. It is the essence of successful diplomacy in our time—a time when more people have more to say about their diplomacy and participate more fully themselves as "citizen diplomats"—to recognize that the road to peace requires great endurance and persistence. Attitudes and approaches based on understanding, and adaptable to new facts or requirements, offer the best prospect of enabling us resolutely to stay the course.

Educational exchanges and related activities have the further advantage of providing a ladder for the national, as well as individual, advancement so much desired throughout the world—not only in emerging and newly developing lands, but in more mature societies as well.

3. I want to tell you something of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which I have the honor to head. It conducts programs and initiates new activities where needed, but its essential function is that of a *blending or fusing* agency.

It blends or fuses the resources and skills

within government. That is, it gives policy guidance and coordination to other agencies and departments having programs in international education. It also blends or fuses with government programs and activities the resources and skills of the great private sector, *outside government*, where this is mutually desirable. Through these varied activities, the Department is able to achieve a stronger total effort than it could alone, or than individual organizations could achieve alone.

4. In conclusion, education and foreign policy *do* have a common boundary, *do* interact, in the world today.

We do not suppose the influence of educational exchanges and related activities on world peace can be instant. But we believe it can be important, over time. With passage of the Fulbright Act in 1946 and subsequent legislation, this country has written a "Declaration of *Interdependence*" through exchanges—a declaration that mutual exchanges can do much to bring about mutual understanding.

For exchange is an influence working for mutual understanding—in men's minds, in that inner space where we know the ultimate course of our civilization on this little outpost in stellar space will inevitably be determined.

Public Interest in International Affairs

So ends my synopsis. Now, any of you who feel this is enough can nod off for an early afternoon siesta—for the remainder of these remarks. If you want to hear more, that is all right too. In fact, I will be very pleased. So for those now ready to take the grand tour, let me say that I will try to keep on the track, as I indicated earlier, and move at a good pace.

First of all, why do we come together in the summer of 1964 to talk about "education and foreign policy"? We would not have done so two decades ago. What has happened in the world in 20 years? Why are activities we group under the convenient banner of "education" meaningful to all of us, individually, and hopeful as a means of greater understanding among nations?

The period since World War II has seen a profound deepening of citizen involvement in international activities. Diplomacy is no

longer conducted between governments alone; whole peoples are now vastly more involved:

- through travel;
- through eyewitnessing or hearing, by television or radio, great international events as they actually take place;
- through growing familiarity with the work of peacekeeping machinery, such as the United Nations;
- through having foreign students and other foreign visitors in their communities and in their homes;
- through participation in nongovernmental organizations—church groups, fraternal associations, world affairs councils, colleges and universities, labor unions, community hospital-ity centers, women's clubs, and many more—that conduct or support international educational activities.

You can think of many other examples for such a list.

By and large, the widening spread of information and understanding among the peoples of the world is making government more and more responsive to what people know and how people feel. There is, therefore, a broadening base for foreign policies in many parts of the world. This is an important new element in diplomacy.

We can see the growth of public interest and participation in international affairs in States like Nebraska and others of the Midwest. Nebraska's international roots run deep. Two centuries ago there were English, Spanish, and French claims to this territory. In 1763 Spanish claims were recognized, later French. It became part of the United States, as you know, in Thomas Jefferson's great real-estate transaction, the Louisiana Purchase. Later, the waves of immigration from Germany, Sweden, what is now Czechoslovakia, and from other European countries formed strong connections between the Old World and the New.

Geography played a part in the relative weakening of many of these connections in the late 19th and 20th centuries. Our seaboard held their ties to the Old World more firmly than did many sections farther inland. For one thing, trade and travel to east coast and west

coast ports—the great flow and counterflow of persons and of goods—helped to keep fast and enlarge the traditional connections of our coastal areas with other parts of the world.

So there came a time when many Americans let it be known that they preferred to be let alone, and to go it alone. These views were perhaps most marked in the period between the wars. Involvement in international affairs for many persons consisted largely of the simple, if painful, act of paying taxes.

How far the pendulum has swung since World War II is dramatically apparent to all of us. The United Nations, the atom bomb, the Strategic Air Command, the jet airplane, Fulbright scholarships, Sputnik, emerging nations, outer space, Telstar—these few words are enough to evoke the whole new world of the postwar era.

Growing Concern for Education

So it is in such a world—a world in great tension in spite of, and to a degree because of, its great technological advances—that we have seen education become a more central concern in all our thinking, individual, national, and international.

We have come to realize, as individuals, that the increasingly complex and technical processes of our lives can be managed successfully only by enlarging the educational opportunities for all our citizens.

We have come to realize, too, as nations—in the early stages of development and in advanced stages as well—that education is truly a ladder of national growth and progress, and perhaps mankind's last best hope of peace on earth.

Confidence in the efficacy of education to help individuals and nations achieve their goals is probably the most widely accepted of all the common beliefs of men today, the world around. This is true in nations on both sides of the various curtains—Iron, Bamboo, and any other. It is truly a great current of our time.

It is now but a simple step to see that international education offers opportunities for developed nations to assist the less developed. And it offers the less developed a means of rising to higher levels of economic and social stability,

where they can strengthen the whole structure of world security.

Viewed in these broad, historical terms, the wide-ranging system of exchange we know today appears to have been foreordained and inevitable. Exchange of people and through them of knowledge was clearly one of the most hopeful means available to the hand of man for building—slowly, but securely—the foundations of enduring peace.

Ironically, perhaps, these means to peace were first found in war—or in the aftermath of war, in foreign currencies held to our credit in other countries from the sale of surplus war materials. The Fulbright Act of 1946, which made use of these funds, was truly a case of “beating swords into plowshares.”

Exchanges between nations could, however, be no overnight solution to problems of misunderstanding and distrust. They could not be expected to bring political problems to neat solutions. But they could help to build mutual understanding. They could ease man’s progress on what Secretary Rusk has called “the toilsome path to peace.”³ And they could perhaps do more. No one can say where the limits may lie when men first identify the interests they share and then go on to find new areas of agreement they find they *can* share. This is the kind of hope that lies at the base of President Johnson’s call to continue to “build bridges,” as he said, “across the gulf which has divided us from Eastern Europe.”⁴

But this is only a part of the almost worldwide system of exchanges we have developed in this country in less than 20 years.

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs

Let me describe it in terms of what my bureau does. The bureau’s activities touch, in some degree at least, much of the whole field—the work of private organizations, agencies of the U.S. Government, and multigovernmental organizations like UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization]. We can get a general view of the field, as well as a closeup of my bureau.

³ BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 530.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 922.

There is one simple guide I would like to offer to give a clearer picture of what my bureau, essentially, is. You know of government *lending* agencies we have had—the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, the Home Owners Loan Corporation, and others. You know, too, of *mending* agencies—the Marshall Plan for Western Europe, for example, and the American Red Cross, which operates under congressional charter, and others. You hear, too, of *spending* agencies.

I would like you to think of our bureau as a *blending* agency. For it is our principal function to blend or fuse public and private sources of support, or “moneypower,” and private and public sources of manpower. All activities, however varied in sponsorship or support, are pointed steadily toward the goal of furthering mutual understanding.

The total complex of State Department activity in this field is centered in CU, as our bureau is known in Department shorthand. A Division of Cultural Relations was first established in 1938. Our bureau, as such, goes back only about 5 years, however. It has had Assistant Secretary status only 3 years.

It is one of the larger bureaus in the Department. We have approximately 400 employees and an annual budget of approximately \$56 million, a substantial portion of which still comes from foreign-currency balances owned by the United States in other countries.

We conduct exchanges with 135 countries and territories. With 48 of these countries there are agreements providing for binational commissions—sometimes called United States Educational Foundations—which help to administer overseas the exchanges authorized under the Fulbright-Hays Act.

We also serve as the coordinating point in the Government for all of the activities in international education conducted by some 25 agencies. Seven of these agencies, which have the principal programs, come together periodically as members of the Interagency Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Sitting with me on this Council are the U.S. Commissioner of Education, the Director of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA), the Director of the Peace Corps, and representatives of

the Agency for International Development (AID), the Bureau of the Budget, and the Defense Department.

A "People Program"

But let us not get lost in bureaucracy. Let us remember that we are engaged primarily in conducting a *people* program. Most of our money goes into grants to enable *people* to study, or teach, or lecture, or conduct research, or observe our society, or meet with and talk with their counterparts in other countries, or pursue some other academic or related informational purpose. *People* are the carriers of the ideas, the aims and aspirations, the questionings and curiosities we seek of each other.

In proper academic fashion, I ought to go to a blackboard for the next few minutes and put down some figures. I want you to see, in quantitative terms, what I mean when I say this is a *people* program.

In fiscal year 1963 we exchanged some 8,300 persons—5,800 coming to the United States and 2,500 going from the United States. Counting about 2,000 renewal grants for that year, we had roughly 10,300 people under our grants, in varying degrees of support.

Since 1949, the total of grantees under State Department programs has been about 85,000. Some 60,000 have come here in that time, and some 25,000 Americans have gone to other countries. These are impressive figures for such a program in such a short time—impressive, too, as evidence of the steady congressional and public support this program has had since its inception.

During 1963, on the academic side, we sent out several categories of Americans to study, to teach, to lecture in a university, to conduct advanced research—to a total of about 2,000.

Among nonacademic categories, we send out American specialists—representatives of a wide variety of fields, including athletic coaches, Supreme Court Justices, Nobel Prize winners in varied fields, professors, and others. All are selected to discuss or demonstrate their particular specialties, in the context of American aims and ideals, with their counterparts and others interested abroad. Some 300 such specialists went abroad for us in 1963.

We also send out performing arts groups—professional and amateur—to demonstrate abroad our cultural achievements and our interest in these arts. Some 646 people visited 427 cities in 90 countries under this program in the same fiscal year. It will be of special interest to you here that almost half the number of performers—nearly 300—were in musical groups from college and university campuses, from Maryland to California. These young, talented amateurs have demonstrated not only a high competence in their art but a great capacity for meeting young people in other countries on their own terms, both musically and as representatives of their generation and their nation.

We also bring in people from other countries. The academic program runs to about 2,000 foreign students and about 2,400 in the categories of teachers, lecturers, research scholars, and educational travel grantees. In general, they come to study, to visit as members of a student group, to teach in or study our educational system, to lecture in a university, to conduct advanced research, or to gain practical professional training.

In addition, we bring in foreign leaders and foreign specialists, about 1,250 in 1963. This is an extremely important category of our exchanges, because these grants enable leaders from other countries to observe our "open society" at firsthand, to base their impressions upon observable fact rather than upon incomplete or distorted information.

Exchanges in an Open Society

Our open society lends itself peculiarly well to exchanges. It gives exchange a maximum opportunity to be effective. This works advantages both ways. Our visitors learn from us, and we learn from our visitors. No society can be sufficient unto itself in the realm of ideas, any more than in the realm of trade. Hence, we continue to be dependent on the importation of ideas, new knowledge, new insights, new approaches from other countries. America has always encouraged free trade in ideas, in scholarship, in literature, in science. Foreign visitors can be welcome carriers of ideas and insights, and good exponents and defenders of them. On their visits here their American hosts and col-

leagues have the opportunity to discuss ideas with them. Through the friendly confrontation of exchange, the ideas that divide can often be cut away, or at least cut down in size and effect; and the ideas that unite can be given greater force and effect.

At the celebration of the 15th anniversary of our exchange agreement with the Netherlands, at The Hague in May, Senator Fulbright said that "probably the most valuable gift we have to offer other nations is the example of our willingness to debate, to dissect, to disagree, to take unpopular positions. This is the essential, the true meaning of our open society and perhaps the greatest validity of the argument for exposing other people to it. . . ." And he added:

Restraint and responsibility among nations, even as among people, must develop from the widest possible exposure to men and ideas. It was these considerations I had in mind when I first sought support from my Congress for exchange programs. They seem even more valid today, and as I look to the future, they are compelling.

Exchange of persons and related activities not only reflect our open society; they also help to sustain it and to encourage a climate of free discussion elsewhere. Exchange is a force that works on the side of open societies—to help to keep them open or to help them become more so.

We have now toured some of the principal parts of our exchange program. If I could merely list the principal categories of people we send out, and those we bring in, as I have, my task in describing the bureau's wide-ranging array of activities would be fairly easy. But there is much more to educational and cultural affairs, and there is no convenient label for the broad bracket of activities I must, at least, mention. Let me refer to a few:

We assist some 100 American-sponsored elementary and secondary schools overseas—institutions to meet the needs of Americans abroad and also to serve as demonstration centers of American educational methods and ideals.

We participate actively in multilateral organizations. Among those are UNESCO, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), and the Organization of American States (OAS). Our work with OAS, of course, places particular emphasis on

programs of the Alliance for Progress.

We have a general responsibility for the development of the Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West—the East-West Center in Honolulu. This effort to provide a scholarly meeting ground for Asians and Americans has had the strong leadership of President Johnson, Congressman Rooney of New York, and others who have seen in the creation of the Center an opportunity to put the values of exchange into concrete and enduring form in the mid-Pacific.

These are only some of the so-called related activities that go along with our basic educational and cultural exchange programs. And I should record clearly one more fact, that CU serves as an *initiating agency*, with a view to seeing that gaps in our total international educational effort are adequately filled. One example is the initiative taken to provide better screening, orientation, and counseling services abroad for prospective foreign students, before they leave their home countries. Later problems of social or academic adjustment can be minimized, if not averted, by more adequate services at the application and admission stages.

Through this whole complex pattern of activity, we make a contribution to encouraging the easy, natural interchange of ideas and of people that forms one of the more promising conditions for peace.

We know there is progress. We know, for example, that people talk more freely across all barriers than they did only a few years ago.

At the time the telegraph cable was put through to India in 1870, John Ruskin expressed doubts whether there had been anything really significant to say on the new copper wire, "either to India or to any other place."

No one would ask today, when the new under-seas telephone cable is put through to Japan in a service inaugurated by President Johnson and Premier Ikeda,⁵ what meaningful and manifold uses there would be for this new facility. International dialog and discussion—even to the point of an international "Town Meeting of the World" via Telstar—has come to be an

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1964, p. 26.

accepted part of the whole pattern of an increasingly close-knit world.

I believe we have more to say, in terms of our idea of the kind of world we want to see; and I believe we are recognizing more and more that we have much to learn from other countries and other peoples. Certainly the interest of American institutions in establishing overseas campuses and centers, and of Americans in many fields of activity in participating in international conferences and seminars, is greater than ever before.

Activities of the Private Sector

The preeminent source of strength for our total international effort in educational and cultural affairs is the private sector. Within it our system of higher education is a major resource base. In both numbers and diversity, this system is unparalleled in the world. More than 1,800 colleges and universities in this country, for example, have foreign students enrolled; the total number is approximately 75,000. Your university here is one with a substantial enrollment of foreign students from many lands.

Like its sister land-grant institutions, Nebraska has many other forms of direct international involvement. Since 1958, as many of you know, the university has held an AID [Agency for International Development] contract, now in excess of \$3 million, for assistance to Ataturk University in Turkey in the development of its programs in agriculture, engineering, business administration, and education. Since the end of last month Nebraska has had a new Peace Corps training project on its campus. This group of volunteers will go to Bolivia after 10 weeks of training. Your campus has also been the site of significant meetings over the last 2 years on the international role colleges and universities should play.

Nebraska furnishes an excellent example, too, of a program in which our bureau has a co-operating and supplementing role. The undergraduate program in Latin American studies in the College of Arts and Sciences includes, as you know, an exchange program with El Colegio de México, in Mexico City. As a part of a two-way exchange, selected Nebraska un-

dergraduates are enabled to pursue their studies for a full academic year at this institution. The second such group left for Mexico late in June. Here is a splendid cooperative arrangement, one in which the broad and diversified program offered at Nebraska is significantly supplemented by residence and study in Mexico. The Department of State, through the bureau I head, has been pleased to assist this program through grants to cover costs of transportation, tuition, and a living allowance. Here is an example very close at hand of the blending or fusing function of which I spoke earlier.

Your Chancellor [Clifford M. Hardin] has been a national leader in international educational planning. The university's sons and daughters have contributed importantly. One is my friend and colleague, William J. Crockett, the very able Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration. I would also mention two brothers, Theodore Sorensen, who has made a distinguished contribution to public understanding of foreign as well as domestic issues through his close association with President Kennedy, and Thomas Sorensen, who has discharged with great skill the difficult and demanding responsibilities of Deputy Director for policy and plans for USIA [United States Information Agency].

The international role of institutions like Nebraska is great, and growing. Projections prepared at the Fund for the Advancement of Education suggest that by 1985 some 80 percent of the country's college and university students will be in publicly supported educational institutions. Today's figure is about 60 percent. If this projection for 1985 proves correct, then the international role of the great State institutions will be steadily enlarging over the next two decades.

My visit to Lincoln and later today to Omaha suggests one other base, besides that of higher education, on which much that we do depends. That is the base provided by community activity in the arts. The encouragement given by American communities to furthering opportunities in music, drama, and other performing arts—as well as in the visual arts—provides a foundation for the projection abroad of American interest and achievement in these fields. This kind of

activity also enables our visitors to see for themselves what the sense of community means to Americans—how they create and sustain their local cultural institutions. You can be proud of what has been created here, with the Sheldon Memorial Art Gallery, which I visited this morning, as a truly outstanding example.

We all have much work still to do, of course, to make our society what it can be. The challenge of the “great society,” of which President Johnson has spoken, is “to enrich and elevate our national life, and to advance the quality of our American civilization.”⁶ Realization of these goals will require the fuller participation of our citizens in their community and national life—their responding to, as he said, “a challenge constantly renewed, beckoning us toward a destiny where the meaning of our lives matches the marvelous products of our labor.”

How Do We Know Exchanges Are Effective?

How do we know that this relatively new activity of educational and cultural exchange has been worth the effort? How do we know exchanges are effective?

Probably the most convincing single document is a report, titled *A Beacon of Hope*, by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.⁷ Early in 1963 this Commission reported to Congress on interviews with foreign grantees in 20 countries and with other informed persons here and abroad. The report deals with the Department of State's programs and program activities. I can do no better than read to you the concluding paragraph of this report:

Looking back at the program's first 14 years as a world-wide activity of the Department of State, we believe that the Congress and the American people can feel pride and deep satisfaction that, although some improvements are yet to be made, the exchange program they conceived has proved so effective to their purposes. As it has developed in the course of these

⁶ For remarks made by President Johnson at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., on May 22, 1964, see White House press release dated May 22.

⁷ A limited number of copies of the report are available upon request from the office of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Room 4513, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

years, it has established itself as a basic ingredient of the foreign relations of the United States. There is no other international activity of our Government that enjoys so much spontaneous public approval, elicits such extensive citizen participation, and yields such impressive evidences of success. In a time when most international activities seem almost unbearably complex, hazardous and obscure in outcome, the success of educational exchange is a beacon of hope.

But we have no airborne magnetometers or Geiger counters to tell us when we have struck a rich vein of success in an exchange effort, or a streak of what may be lean ore, at best. There are no computers, no machinery, for this kind of measurement. We can only depend on our reports from the field and from our grantees, and from the “debriefings,” as we call them, of many who have gone overseas for us and come through Washington to tell us of their experiences.

Such evidence does add up. It comes to us in the form of a Gene Kelly, back from West Africa, where his French-speaking ability added a further asset to his already substantial store of personal qualifications. The appreciative crowds that pressed in on Mr. Kelly in his many scheduled and unscheduled appearances left little doubt that he was, as one post officer put it in his report, “a smash success.”

John Steinbeck left tangible records of his impact in the Soviet Union and in Finland. One is a chair in a student dormitory in Leningrad University with the inscription cut on the back: “Here sat John Steinbeck, November 12, 1963.” The occasion was a several hours' meeting with Soviet students. And in Finland the record shows exacting and exhausting days of interviews, radio and television appearances, meetings with writers and educational groups, autographing sessions, and the like. As the word of “no more names” went out to a group still waiting for autographs, a little lady came up with a well-thumbed copy of *Of Mice and Men*. She asked for an autograph for her nephew, who was ill in bed, she said, and who had asked her to take to Mr. Steinbeck the copy of the book on which the boy had written a school theme.

The autographing session was resumed—for the benefit of the boy, and for the others in line.

Wilma Rudolph, the track star, visited

African countries and attended the African Friendship Games at Dakar. She drew enthusiastic press and post reports for the popularity resulting from her athletic reputation and from the modest personality she displayed to crowds of admirers.

From Omaha, Lorena B. Hahn, formerly United States Representative to the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women, has three times been a representative of the United States, through our bureau, in overseas missions—to the Near East, Africa, and the Far East in 1954, to Europe in 1956, and to the Far East in 1957.

The nearly 300 American college and university students who have gone abroad for us in the last 6 months sang or played in 198 cities in 49 countries. No one who attended the debriefings of these groups—or read their own accounts or the reports written by the posts visited—can doubt the strong, positive impact these young Americans made.

Foreign leaders who have visited this country give us evidence of the value of their visits. Julius Nyerere, now President of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, was a “foreign leader” visitor a couple of years ago. Twelve of the 20 members of Chancellor Erhard’s Cabinet—including Foreign Minister Gerhard Schroeder and Defense Minister Kai-Uwe von Hassel—were grantees in years past. So, too, was a young man named Willy Brandt, now Mayor of Berlin. And there are many more.

A Declaration of Interdependence

There are only a few leading ideas I would like to emphasize and reinforce before I conclude.

Our times have made possible this new educational component of our foreign policy; indeed, they have made it imperative.

It has become possible because for the first time in history the Western World now has both the compassion and the capacity to assist less privileged nations, through education, along the road of social and economic progress.

It has become imperative because for the first time in history survival is no longer a comfort-

able, philosophical issue. It has become an operational one.

So what happens in the minds of men is vital to us all. Men have shaped the future in varied ways. A man by the name of Lincoln, a century ago, saw the gathering storm over slavery and was ready to pour the balm of his great understanding, sympathy, and charity into the wounds of a bitter civil war. A half-century later a man fired a bullet into an Austrian Archduke in a town in the Balkans, the first shot of World War I; and another man, Wilson by name, was pouring into the mainstream of the American democracy the ideas of the “new freedom.” These were ideas for domestic development that influenced the later accomplishments of other men, like Senator George W. Norris, who also left a marked impact on our national life.

The crucial importance of what goes on in the minds of men—for good or ill—is clear beyond question. The opportunities to reach men’s minds—to make information and understanding available to them—are unprecedented today. The effectiveness of exchanges and related activities in doing this job is well demonstrated.

We therefore move ahead in the work of international education in the confident belief that education *can* be decisive over time. It *can* be the ultimate determinant of whether foreign policy is *informed* by knowledge and understanding or *inflamed* by prejudice and passion, by dictatorial or demagogic leaders.

Education can, in fact, be the ultimate deterrent—for our ultimate security truly lies in the minds of men.

Happily, we are committed to the further exploration of this “inner space.” We are committed through acts of Congress, and we are committed through the voluntary participation of the many thousands of organizations and individuals who play some part in the total effort we make through exchanges. As these opportunities expand in an ever more interdependent world, we will need to reach new levels of citizen participation.

In our national commitment to this course I believe we have made over the last two decades a national “Declaration of *Interdependence*”—

a statement of faith in the slow processes of education to serve the ends of mutual understanding. The programs of exchange we conduct have already become, in Secretary Rusk's words, "one of the most powerful, although quiet, elements in our foreign policy."

These are some of the ways in which I think education and foreign policy relate and interact. This is what I think our programs are really all about and what the commitment the University of Nebraska and hundreds of other American colleges and universities have made is all about. The bureau I have the honor to head plays a part in weaving or fusing the public and private sectors more closely together—in helping to create and sustain a kind of common enterprise in which we all have a part and in which, I believe, we can all take pride.

U.S. States Position on Question of Unified EEC Grains Price

Following is the text of a statement released at Washington on July 3 by Christian A. Herter, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations. The statement was broadcast simultaneously in Germany by Deutschlandfunk as part of a recorded interview with Mr. Herter.

1. A unified grains price decision now is not indispensable as far as the United States is concerned. We believe that negotiations on industrial products, agricultural products other than grains, and even on grains, could be carried right up to the concluding stage in Geneva without a unified grains price decision if the EEC [European Economic Community] negotiator were in a position to negotiate on these matters.

2. In the view of the United States, the problem seems to lie therefore not in Geneva but in Brussels. It seems to have become an indispensable element in the internal bargaining situation with the EEC that the unified grains price decision be made now and that in the absence of such a decision the EEC represent-

atives will be unable to enter into negotiations on virtually any matter in Geneva.

3. Unless the capabilities of the EEC to negotiate on industrial products and on agricultural products including grains is restored in one way or another, the timetable and even the final results of the Kennedy Round could be put in serious jeopardy. The preparations for the tabling of exceptions lists (which in the view of the United States must be done simultaneously for industry and agriculture) must be resumed at the latest by the end of the summer holidays if we are to meet the target date of November 16. In view of the already serious delays in the past, such further delays in the progress of the Kennedy Round would seriously endanger the negotiations. That would create a situation where the negotiations might well fail or at best be seriously impaired.

4. As far as the United States is concerned, the question of a unified grains price can in any case not be seen in isolation. While the United States wishes to see the lowest possible grains price in the Community, it is clear that any such price now being considered is so high as to require assurances for the maintenance of grain imports.

New Resources To Be Contributed for Replenishment of IDA Funds

The International Development Association announced on July 7 that formalities looking toward the replenishment of its resources in the amount of \$750 million had been completed. This was accomplished on June 29 with the formal notification to IDA by 12 governments that they would contribute new resources to the organization aggregating more than \$600 million, which was a condition prescribed by IDA's Board of Governors when the replenishment was authorized in September 1963.

The new funds will be available for commitment in new development credits by IDA over a period extending to at least June 30, 1966. Payment is to be made in three equal annual installments, the first not due until November

1965, one year after the final payment on the subscription to IDA's initial resources.

The following list shows the 12 governments which had given formal notification to IDA by June 29, together with the amounts of their contributions; Belgium, which gave notification on July 2, is included in the list:

	(\$ U.S.)
Australia-----	19,800,000
Austria-----	5,040,000
Belgium-----	8,250,000
Denmark-----	7,500,000
France-----	61,872,000
Germany-----	72,600,000
Italy-----	30,000,000
Japan-----	41,250,000
Luxembourg-----	375,000
Norway-----	6,600,000
Sweden-----	15,000,000
United Kingdom-----	96,600,000
United States-----	312,000,000

Four other governments are taking steps toward formal notification that they will contribute the amounts proposed for them. The four are:

	(\$U.S.)
Canada-----	41,700,000
Finland-----	2,298,000
Netherlands-----	16,500,000
South Africa-----	3,990,000

In addition, the Government of Kuwait has decided to participate in the replenishment of IDA resources, with a contribution of \$3.36 million.

Initial subscriptions to IDA, together with three supplementary contributions by Sweden totaling more than \$15 million, have amounted to more than \$790.9 million in freely convertible currency. With its new commitment of \$15 million, Sweden's contributions to IDA will have totaled \$40,225,000, or nearly four times the amount of its initial subscription.

IDA was established in 1960 by member governments of the World Bank. IDA's Articles of Agreement authorize it to make development credits on terms bearing less heavily on the balance of payments of recipient countries than do conventional loans. All of the development credits so far extended by IDA have been repayable in foreign exchange over 50 years, free of interest. To help meet IDA's administrative costs, a service charge of three-fourths of 1 percent per annum is payable on amounts withdrawn and outstanding.

IDA so far has extended credits amounting

to \$778,350,000 for economic development projects in 22 countries. It has lent \$395.85 million for the development of railways, highways, and telecommunications; \$132.8 million for irrigation, land improvement, flood control, and other projects to increase the output of food and other agricultural products; \$85.5 million for the construction of schools and of municipal water and sewerage systems; \$57.7 million for the development of electric power facilities; and \$106.5 million for the development of industry.

Trade With Paraguay and the United Arab Republic

A PROCLAMATION¹

PROCLAMATION OF AGREEMENTS WITH PARAGUAY AND THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC RELATING TO TRADE AGREEMENTS AND OF THE TERMINATION IN PART OF A TRADE AGREEMENT PROCLAMATION RELATING TO PARAGUAY.

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PART I—PURPOSES

The purposes of this proclamation are:

(a) *Paraguay*—To proclaim portions of two agreements with Paraguay, amending the bilateral trade agreement with Paraguay, which contain no new tariff concessions by the United States but under which Paraguay may participate in the Latin American Free Trade Association without violating the bilateral trade agreement.

(b) *Paraguay*—To proclaim the termination of those portions of the trade agreement proclamation relating

¹ No. 3596; 29 Fed. Reg. 9419.

to the bilateral trade agreement with Paraguay which concern the schedules of tariff concessions contained in that agreement.

(c) *United Arab Republic*—To proclaim an agreement for the provisional accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade involving the application of the general provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade but no tariff concessions.

PART II—IDENTIFICATION AND JUSTIFICATION

A. *Paraguay—Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral Agreement*

1. *Identification*—Numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement of April 2, 1962 (TIAS 5000), and unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agreement of June 26, 1963 (TIAS 5390), between the United States and Paraguay, relate to and modify the application of the general provisions of the trade agreement of September 12, 1946, between the two countries (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2689).²

2. *Determination*—I have determined that it is required or appropriate (A) on and after April 2, 1962, that the trade agreement with Paraguay of September 12, 1946, shall be applied as supplemented by numbered paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement of April 2, 1962, and (B) on and after June 26, 1963, that that trade agreement shall be applied as further supplemented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agreement of June 26, 1963.

B. *Paraguay—Partial Termination of Proclamation*

1. *Identification*—The proclamation of March 10, 1947, proclaimed the trade agreement of September 12, 1946, between the United States and Paraguay, as supplemented by an exchange of notes of September 12, 1946, relating to duties and surcharges on certain products in Schedule I of the trade agreement. Unnumbered paragraph 1 of the agreement of June 26, 1963, between the United States and Paraguay, terminated, effective June 30, 1963, Articles VII through XII, the references in Article XVII to Articles XI and XII, and Schedules I and II of that trade agreement of September 12, 1946. Unnumbered paragraph 2 of the same agreement of June 26, 1963, terminated the supplementary exchange of notes of September 12, 1946.

C. *United Arab Republic—Agreement Supplementary to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*

1. *Identification*—The Declaration of November 13, 1962,³ on the Provisional Accession of the United Arab Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade⁴ became effective for the United States on May 3, 1963 (TIAS 5309).

2. *Determination*—I have determined that it is required or appropriate, on and after May 3, 1963, that those provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and agreements supplementary thereto which have heretofore been proclaimed shall be applied as supplemented by the Declaration of November 13, 1962, regarding the United Arab Republic.

PART III—PROCLAIMING PART

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America, including Section 350 (a) (6) of the Tariff Act of 1930, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1351(a) (6)), do hereby proclaim that:

A. *Paraguay—Agreements Supplementary to Bilateral Agreement*

On and after April 2, 1962, the trade agreement between the United States and Paraguay, described in Part II (A) (1) of this proclamation, shall be applied as supplemented by paragraphs 2 and 3 of the agreement of April 2, 1963, and on and after June 26, 1963, that trade agreement shall be applied as further supplemented by unnumbered paragraph 3 of the agreement of June 26, 1963.

B. *Paraguay—Partial Termination of Proclamation*


On and after June 30, 1963, the Proclamation of March 10, 1947, proclaiming the trade agreement between the United States and Paraguay, as supplemented shall be terminated insofar as it relates to those provisions, described in Part II (B) (1) of this proclamation, which were terminated by the provisions of the agreement of June 26, 1963, described in Part II (B) (1).

C. *United Arab Republic—Agreement Supplementary to General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*

On and after May 3, 1963, those provisions of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, as supplemented, described in Part II (C) (1) of this proclamation, shall be applied as supplemented by the Declaration on Provisional Accession of the United Arab Republic, described in Part II (C) (1).

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this sixth day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

² The trade agreement was proclaimed by the proclamation of March 10, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 3) 2688). [Footnote in original.]

³ For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 184.

⁴ That agreement of October 30, 1947, was proclaimed by Proclamation 2761A of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), which proclamation has been supplemented by subsequent proclamations. [Footnote in original.]

Appendix to U.S. Tariff Schedules on Agricultural Imports Corrected

A PROCLAMATION¹

PROCLAMATION CORRECTING PART 3 OF THE APPENDIX TO THE TARIFF SCHEDULES OF THE UNITED STATES WITH RESPECT TO THE IMPORTATION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES

WHEREAS headnote 1 to part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat.), as published at the direction of the President pursuant to section 101(d) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, states that part 3 covers "the provisions proclaimed by the President pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended * * * imposing * * * quantitative limitations on articles imported into the United States * * *"; and

WHEREAS the references to seed rye in headnote 2(d) in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States are obsolete because there are no current import restrictions imposed on seed rye under section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended; and

WHEREAS, by Proclamation No. 3019 of June 8, 1953² (3 CFR, 1949-1953 Comp., p. 189) which was issued pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended (7 U.S.C. 624), the President imposed import quotas on certain dairy products, subject to allocation and license requirements administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, including an annual aggregate quota of 496,000 pounds upon imports of dried buttermilk, which was also applicable to dried whey; and

WHEREAS item 950.01 in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States includes dried buttermilk but does not include dried whey as being subject to the aforementioned annual quota of 496,000 pounds; and

WHEREAS, pursuant to section 102(3) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, the President proclaimed the additional import restrictions set forth in part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (Proclamation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963,³ paragraph numbered 3; 3 CFR, 1963 Supp., p. 73) in the erroneous belief that the quota specified in item 950.01 for dried buttermilk was the effective restriction "proclaimed pursuant to section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act" as provided in section 102(3) of the Tariff Classification Act of 1962; and

WHEREAS the United States Tariff Commission has advised me that in the preparation of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States pursuant to title I of Public Law 768, 83d Congress, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, it inadvertently

overlooked the fact that the aforementioned quota provisions of Proclamation No. 3019 applied to dried whey as well as to dried buttermilk; and

WHEREAS it would be contrary to the intent and purpose of, and the procedures prescribed by, section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to permit these errors to remain uncorrected:


Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me as President, and in conformity with the provisions of section 22 of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, as amended, and the Tariff Classification Act of 1962, do hereby proclaim that—

(a) headnote 2(d) of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 441) is hereby amended by deleting "seed rye or" from the first line thereof and "of 56 pounds each for rye and" from the seventh line thereof; and

(b) the superior heading immediately preceding item 950.01 of part 3 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat. 442) is hereby amended to read as follows: "Dried milk, dried cream, and dried whey provided for in part 4 of schedule 1:"; and the article description for item 950.01 is hereby amended by deleting "item 115.45" and inserting in lieu thereof "items 115.45 and 118.05".

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this seventh day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred [SEAL] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
GEORGE W. BALL,
Acting Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Economic Policies and Practices. Paper No. 5, Unemployment Programs in Sweden. Materials prepared for the Joint Economic Committee. Undated. 51 pp. [Joint Committee print.]

Administration of National Security. The American Ambassador. A study submitted by the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations to the Senate Committee on Government Operations. June 15, 1964. 16 pp. [Committee print.]

¹ No. 3597; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 9421.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1953, p. 919.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 23, 1963, p. 478.

U.S. Outlines Cutoff and Verification Provisions To Halt Production of Fissionable Materials for Nuclear Weapons Use

Following are two statements made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva by William C. Foster, Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and chairman of the U.S. delegation to the Conference.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 18

First, let me welcome, on behalf of my delegation and myself, Ambassador [R. K.] Nehru of India on his return to our Conference. We are very happy to see him here again.

Second, Mr. Chairman, in conformity with the agreed agenda which you have announced today, the United States will talk in general about collateral measures. We feel that the most important collateral measures put before this Conference deal with the nuclear arms race. The United States has already presented a broad range of measures in this area; and we have approached the problem by suggesting measures which would both halt the nuclear arms race and reverse it.¹

As I pointed out in my statement at the 188th meeting [June 9],² our approach to collateral measures is to seek early agreements which would stop the production and the proliferation of more and bigger weapons. In addition, we have developed proposals which would begin

to reduce the number of weapons already produced.

In this area of nuclear armaments we approached the problem in two different ways. First, we dealt with the carriers of such weapons. We proposed a freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. As a means of reducing the numbers of strategic vehicles, the United States has made a proposal for the destruction of B-47 and TU-16 jet bombers. Both the strategic vehicle freeze and the jet bomber destruction could be carried out under verification provisions less burdensome than those which would have to accompany general and complete disarmament.

The second United States approach to the problem of nuclear arms has been to suggest measures which deal with the stockpiles of nuclear explosives themselves. To stop increases in these stockpiles, we have proposed a cutoff of the production of fissionable material for weapon uses. This is a logical companion measure for the strategic nuclear delivery vehicle freeze. One measure freezes the number and characteristics of the carriers; the other freezes the amount of fissionable material available for bombs and warheads which are carried.

We have also made a proposal to reduce the stockpiles of nuclear explosives for use in weapons. To this end the United States has proposed the transfer of significant amounts of fissionable material to nonweapon use.

The nuclear arms race is thus attacked on two fronts. The strategic vehicle freeze and bomber destruction would not only halt the increase but actually begin a decrease in the numbers of delivery vehicles. The cutoff and transfer proposals would not only halt the increase but actually begin a decrease in the size

¹ For texts of statements made by Mr. Foster and by Adrian S. Fisher, Deputy Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, during the session of the Conference which convened Jan. 21, 1964, and recessed Apr. 24, see BULLETIN of Mar. 2, 1964, p. 350; Mar. 9, 1964, p. 376; Apr. 20, 1964, p. 641; and May 11, 1964, p. 756.

² For text, see *ibid.*, June 29, 1964, p. 1004.

of nuclear stocks on both sides.

Today, within this group of measures, I should like to emphasize the cutoff. We believe that it holds promise; and I say that for two reasons. First, it is in this general area that the most recent steps have been taken by both sides. The announcements by the major nuclear powers last April of cutbacks in fissionable material production³ do lend weight to our hope that we may be able to take further significant steps. Secondly, the United States approaches negotiations in this area with a great deal of flexibility. In essence, our proposals cover the full range—from the cutbacks which have recently been announced by the three nuclear participants at this Conference, through further plant-by-plant shutdowns with verification, to a complete cutoff with verification. We are thus prepared to consider and accept a wide range of possible alternatives. For that reason we are hopeful that further results can be achieved.

Basic Elements of U.S. Position

I should now like to review the basic elements of the United States position on a cutoff, some of which have been presented before and some of which have not.

We are prepared to accept a complete, verified cutoff of the production of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons. We are willing to accept this as a measure separate from and prior to agreement on stage I of general disarmament and the establishment of an international disarmament organization as envisaged in the United States draft treaty outline.⁴

We believe that the verification involved for such a measure could be limited in scope.

We believe that, in addition to nuclear powers, nonnuclear powers may wish to accede to a cutoff agreement.

The implementation of a cutoff such as this would have two principal advantages:

First, it would slow the arms race by limiting the quantity of fissionable material avail-

able for use in nuclear weapons of all kinds. Fissionable material which could be made into weapons would still be produced as a by-product in reactors designed for electric power production, propulsion, or other uses. There is no way to avoid this. But this material would be reserved for peaceful uses under adequate safeguards if the cutoff were adopted; and reactors whose only function was to make fissionable material for weapons would be shut down. The cutoff would thus stop production of the vital explosive ingredient for use in nuclear weapons. It would halt the production of fissionable material for use in the full range of nuclear weapons. This range extends from strategic bombs and warheads to tactical battlefield weapons. It extends from strategic anti-ballistic missiles to various types of shorter range air defense rockets.

Second, it would help to inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons. It would put fixed limits on the amounts of nuclear material available for national nuclear weapons programs in many areas of the world. It would reinforce the existing incentives against the transfer to other nations of fissionable material for use in weapons.

In our view a cutoff arrangement should include the following basic undertakings:

First, each party would agree to halt, prohibit, and prevent the production, at facilities under its jurisdiction and control, of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Second, each party would also agree to refrain from rendering assistance to anyone for the purpose of production anywhere of fissionable material for use in nuclear weapons.

Third, each party would agree to accept appropriate inspection.

Fourth, the agreement should contain a withdrawal clause, perhaps one similar to that incorporated in the partial test ban treaty.⁵ Such a clause would serve to guard against occurrences related to the subject matter of the agreement which might affect adversely the security position of the parties.

As I pointed out earlier, verification of a cutoff could be relatively limited in scope. It would deal with three kinds of facilities hav-

³ For an address by President Johnson before the Associated Press at New York City on Apr. 20, 1964, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, May 7, 1962, p. 747.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

ing functions related to the production of fissionable material: (1) those which were declared and completely shut down; (2) those which were declared and continued to produce fissionable material for nonweapon purposes; and (3) those, if any, which were not declared but which might be engaged in clandestine production.

A plant-by-plant shutdown might in the beginning be verified on a plant-by-plant basis. Inspection thus would be even less at the outset than it would be in a complete cutoff.

In August 1962 the United Kingdom delegation submitted an interesting paper on the control of fissionable material production in general and complete disarmament.⁶ Paragraphs 1 through 26 of that paper deal with control of a cutoff in such circumstances. I can assure representatives that the control provisions which we have in mind for the cutoff as a separable, pre-stage-I measure would be less than those envisaged in that paper for general disarmament. This is true because, as a separable measure, the risk of small diversions of fissionable material by one of the nuclear powers is less significant than it would be under general disarmament. As the United Kingdom paper makes clear, large, hidden nuclear production plants would be difficult to construct and conceal, given limited but sufficient inspection rights to deter such activity.

In future statements we shall explore in more detail the verification provisions of such a cutoff.

Transfer of U-235 to Nonweapon Use

In addition to the cutoff the United States has proposed the transfer of significant quantities of weapon-grade U-235 to nonweapon purposes. Such an arrangement could be made only in connection with a cutoff agreement. However, the cutoff agreement itself could be implemented alone.

We have indicated at past meetings that we would consider the transfer of amounts in excess of the originally proposed figure of 50,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235. We have also indicated that if the Soviet Union felt that the transfer of equal amounts would involve in-

equities for it, the United States was prepared to consider transferring some reasonable, larger amount than the Soviet Union. As an example of such an arrangement, we have indicated that we would be willing to transfer 60,000 kilograms to the Soviet Union's 40,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235.

At the 166th meeting [February 13] of this Committee, I pointed out that this proposal was no mere gesture. Some of the figures on its magnitude are worth repeating. The cost of 60,000 kilograms of weapon-grade U-235 is \$720 million. If completely fissioned, it would release about 1,000 megatons of TNT equivalent, or one-third of a ton of TNT equivalent for every man, woman, and child on earth.

The unilateral announcements made in April by the nuclear powers represented here have put us on the path to the cutoff and the eventual reduction of explosive materials available for nuclear weapons. It is our earnest hope that these steps can be followed with agreements for a complete or partial cessation of production of this material and for meaningful transfers of fissionable material to nonweapon purposes.

STATEMENT OF JUNE 25

Last week I described our proposal for a cutoff in the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes and its potential effect on nuclear stockpiles. Today I should like to discuss the verification provisions which we would propose for nuclear powers under a separate cutoff agreement. The appropriate verification procedures for nonnuclear powers need further study, and therefore I will not touch on them today.

At our 188th meeting I set forth our general philosophy in regard to verification. I mentioned the extensive research in this area undertaken by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. That research seeks to devise systems which reconcile the need for adequate verification with the desire to protect the sensitive facilities of inspected parties.

The inspection system we have designed for a cutoff agreement recognizes that certain sensitive facilities may be involved. It represents a concrete expression of our philosophy.

⁶ ENDC/60.

To establish the scope of the inspection system, we started with its purpose. That purpose is to provide a high degree of assurance that no significant increase in existing stockpiles of materials for weapon use could result under the agreement.

We are not asking for inspection for its own sake or in order to spot minor inaccuracies. Our inspection requirements have been guided by our security needs. As I pointed out last Thursday, under a complete cutoff as a separate measure, small diversions of fissionable materials by nuclear powers would be less significant than under general disarmament.

The inspection system we propose is designed with all those thoughts in mind. It seeks only that amount of inspection necessary to guard against significant diversions by the parties.

The system which we propose would subject three types of facilities to inspection: U-235 separation plants, which produce enriched uranium; nuclear reactors, which also produce fissionable material; and chemical-separation plants, which isolate the products of reactor operations. There would be no need to inspect mines or refineries. Nor would there be any requirement to inspect nuclear stockpiles.

Operation of Inspection System

The system would operate in the following manner. First, each nuclear power would declare all U-235 separation plants, chemical-separation plants, and reactors.

Under the cutoff agreement, a nuclear state would probably close many fissionable-material plants rather than maintain them in partial operation. The declarations would, therefore, specify, by individual identification and location, plants to be shut down and plants to continue allowed production.

Such declarations would not reveal information concerning the storage or deployment of nuclear weapons. Nor would there be a statement of the amount of fissionable material presently available to each party for use in weapons. The declarations would include the amount of fissionable materials required for allowed purposes and the production schedules for each facility which would remain in operation. Production requirements would be stated

according to categories of allowed purposes. These would include research, power and propulsion reactors, explosions for peaceful purposes, and transfers to other states or to international organizations for allowed purposes.

Each nuclear power could question the accuracy of another's declaration. If a satisfactory explanation were not received, the questioning power would have the right to withdraw from the agreement.

The next step after the submission of declarations would be the inspections themselves. These would be of three kinds:

First, to check that shutdown plants did not resume operation;

Second, to guard against overfulfillment or diversion of production at the declared operating plants; and

Third, to insure that no undeclared plants were engaged, contrary to the agreement, in clandestine production of fissionable material for use in weapons.

Implementing Inspection Procedures

I should now like to sketch briefly for the Committee how each kind of inspection might be implemented.

Let us begin with the simplest: the observation of a facility which had been shut down completely. This would require an initial inspection to identify the plant and to insure cessation of production. Thereafter only occasional inspections would suffice to confirm the shutdown status. The procedure can be simple, because reopening any significant part of a shutdown production complex is a very difficult and time-consuming process. Irregular inspections, undertaken without too much advance notice, would inhibit resumption of operation.

Procedures for monitoring allowed production at declared facilities are also relatively simple and less intrusive than might at first be expected.

First, to see that U-235 separation plants produced U-235 in declared amounts only, inspectors would require ground access to the perimeter of the process buildings. They would measure the electrical input to the plant. They would check the perimeter uranium input, de-

clared product output, and uranium tails for uranium and U-235 content. They would not enter the actual separation plant. By such a perimeter examination, the inspectors could gage the amount of fissionable material available for allowed uses. By these procedures they would also be able to estimate the production potential accurately enough to guard against diversion of significant quantities. Of course, if the U-235 product were stored for future peaceful use, the U-235 input and output at the storage sites would have to be recorded and the sites monitored.

Second, to inspect nuclear reactors maintained in operation, International Atomic Energy Agency procedures could be used. Under a cutoff agreement, nuclear powers could agree to accept IAEA or similar inspection on a phased basis, starting with reactors of 100 or more thermal megawatts. Since the fissionable product of the reactors would be processed in declared chemical-separation plants, there would be added assurance against its diversion to prohibited uses.

Third, to monitor chemical-separation plants, the inspectors would require complete access to the facilities at all times. This is because the plutonium, the U-233, and the enriched uranium fuel—all possible products of chemical separation—are all also potentially useful in weapons.

Inspectors of a chemical-separation plant would maintain a system of records, check reports on materials and use of the facility, and insure that all material was accounted for. Plutonium, U-233, and enriched uranium would be monitored in storage or used under safeguards consistent with those I have been describing. But a nuclear power could choose a substitute for this particular inspection procedure. It could place under international safeguards an equal amount of the same type of fissionable material as that to be processed in the chemical-separation plant. Of course, the substituted material could not previously have been under international safeguards. By making an independent measurement of the feed to the plant—that is, of all the material to be processed in the plant—the inspectors could determine the quantity of fissionable material to be substituted.

By those three methods, it would be possible to verify that fissionable materials were produced at declared facilities according to agreed allowances.

Finally, we would have to insure that no undeclared facilities were producing fissionable materials. For this purpose, we propose that the parties allow a limited number of inspections of suspected clandestine facilities. Normally such inspection would require internal access to the suspected facility. However, if it were considered particularly sensitive, appropriate external inspection might suffice. The guiding principle would be that a nuclear power could take any reasonable precaution to protect its sensitive facilities as long as the inspectors were satisfied that no prohibited activities were occurring.

The procedures I have described are designed for declared plants, both operating and shut down. They would also cover undeclared plants. The International Atomic Energy Agency might undertake the inspection of the declared plants. We are prepared to explore that possibility with the Agency. For undeclared plants, we propose adversary inspection: We inspect you, and you inspect us.

These procedures would constitute a reliable verification system for the complete cutoff without involving excessive intrusion. There would be no inspection of mines and refineries and no inspection of existing nuclear weapon stockpiles. As much as possible, inspection would take place on the periphery of those plants to be inspected.

We have also proposed a partial cutoff, on a plant-by-plant basis. Verification of such a cutoff would at the outset be even more limited, involving only inspection of shutdown plants.

We have submitted today, as a Conference document, a paper containing the system I have just outlined, with some additional details.⁷ We hope it will be studied by this Committee. We recognize that the technical aspects of the proposed verification system are somewhat complex. For this reason, we neither expect nor desire an immediate reaction, although we do hope to hear the considered views of the members of the Committee in due course.

⁷ ENDC/134.

Existing Law and Measures To Improve the Status of Women in the Western Hemisphere

**U.N. SEMINAR ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN IN FAMILY LAW
BOGOTÁ, COLOMBIA, DECEMBER 3-17, 1963**

by Gladys A. Tillett

One of the durable satisfactions of serving as U.S. Representative on the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women is participation in a United Nations regional seminar. Here standards which have been recommended to the Commission at its annual sessions are discussed in relation to the progress and problems of women in the region. As the head of the U.S. delegation to the United Nations Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law, held at Bogotá, Colombia, December 3-17, 1963, it was my privilege to participate with women leaders from nearly all countries in this hemisphere in a discussion of existing law and practice and of measures to improve the status of women throughout the Americas.

Participation

The success of the Bogotá seminar was assured by the high qualifications of the participants, who came from 25 countries and territories in the Western Hemisphere: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Marti-

nique, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, St. Lucia, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, the United States, and Uruguay. As in all U.N. seminars, the participants were named by their governments as experts in their field and they came uninstructed.

The host country, Colombia, had an impressive delegation, headed by an attorney who had formerly served as Senator and Cabinet Minister; the other Colombian members held high posts in government or national life.

Mexico's participant was a Justice of the Mexican Supreme Court. She had two alternates: one the head of a department in the Mexican Ministry of Government and also Chairman of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women, and the other a well-known practicing attorney in Mexico City.

Five other countries—Argentina, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua—also sent judges, and Brazil, Costa Rica, and Panama sent distinguished professors of law or social service. The participant from Canada has been a member of the Senate of her country for many years.

The participant from the Dominican Republic was one of its ambassadors to the United Nations, and was also President of the Inter-American Commission of Women. Others held high professional positions—in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia and Peru, in the Ministries of Finance of Haiti and Paraguay, in the Ministry of Development and Welfare of Jamaica. The participant from Uruguay was

• *Mrs. Tillett is the U.S. Representative on the Commission on the Status of Women of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. She was head of the U.S. delegation to the U.N. Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law.*

the chief of the Department of Architecture in the Ministry of Public Works. Honduras sent its Vice Minister of Education, and Trinidad and Tobago its Education Officer. St. Lucia sent a former member of its Legislative Council, and Martinique and Surinam sent experts in social rehabilitation.

Serving as alternates on the U.S. delegation were Mrs. Eliska Chanlett, the U.S. delegate on the Inter-American Commission of Women, and Mrs. Alice A. Morrison, Chief of the Division of Legislation and Standards in the Women's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Labor. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico sent Mrs. Cardona de López-Baralt of its Department of Justice.

With one exception, all the countries represented sent women participants. This was in contrast to the situation in an earlier seminar on family law which I attended in Tokyo in 1962,¹ where half the participants were men, including three supreme court justices and a number of high officials in Departments of Justice.

In preparation for both the Tokyo and Bogotá meetings I had traveled widely, in the Far East and in Latin America, on a Department of State specialist grant. During these trips I talked with high officials about seminar plans, conferred with leaders of nongovernmental organizations entitled to send observers, and met many of the distinguished representatives who later attended the seminars.

Altogether, some 20 international women's organizations recognized as consultants by the U.N. Economic and Social Council attended the Bogotá seminar and joined in the discussions. They included such groups as the International Commission of Jurists, the International Federation of Women Lawyers, the World Union of Catholic Women's Organizations, the YWCA, the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, and the Friends World Committee. The International Council of Women sent its international President, Mrs. Craig Schuller, as representative. The International Federation of Business and Professional Women was represented by U.S. Federal Court Judge Sarah T. Hughes of Dallas, Tex., who

¹ Mrs. Tillett attended the Tokyo seminar as U.S. observer.

administered the oath to President Lyndon B. Johnson.

The Government of Colombia provided facilities for the seminar and made the preparatory arrangements. The United Nations provided secretariat services including simultaneous translation.²

As in the Status of Women Commission and all other United Nations bodies, documentation was provided in advance. There were three major papers. One, prepared by the United Nations, dealt with U.N. action thus far; the second, prepared by Miss Gladys Harrison, formerly Assistant General Counsel in the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, dealt with "The Status of Women in Family Law in the United States and Canada"; and the third, prepared by Miss María Lavalle Urbina of Mexico, dealt with the "Status of Women in Latin American Family Law." In addition, participants provided nearly 20 working papers on the laws in their own countries. The United States paper was prepared by my alternate, Mrs. Morrison.

Opening of the Seminar

At the opening session attended by the Foreign Minister of Colombia and many other dignitaries, the participants observed a minute of silence in memory of the late President, John F. Kennedy. Throughout the session there were many expressions of the high regard and affection in which he was held and of appreciation for his imaginative leadership in improving the life of all the people in the hemisphere.

Judge Hughes, in acknowledging these tributes in a later session, said:

Personally and as a citizen of the United States I wish to thank our distinguished President for her tribute in her opening remarks to our beloved President Kennedy, whom I deeply admired for his courage, his wisdom, and his concern for the people of the world and particularly of Latin America.

I realize it is not on the agenda, but I should like to assure the people of Central and South America that President Johnson believes in hemispheric solidarity and in the Alliance for Progress. He will support the alliance in the same way as President Kennedy, realiz-

² For the report, see U.N. doc. ST/TAC/HR/18. Earlier U.N. seminars on the status of women in family law are reported in Nos. 11 and 14 of this series.

ing that the growth of Latin America and its development are necessary, if we in the United States are to progress. He believes in the individual rights of men and women and strongly supports the United Nations and its program of human rights. I have known and been a friend of President Johnson and his wife for many years.

The officers who were elected at the first plenary session served as a steering committee throughout the seminar. Mrs. Esmeralda Arboleda de Uribe of Colombia was elected chairman. The three vice chairmen were Mrs. María Cristina Salmorán de Tamayo of Mexico, Mrs. Gladys A. Tillett of the United States, and Mrs. Julia Guarino Fiechter of Uruguay. Senator Muriel McQ. Fergusson of Canada and Mrs. Winifred Hewitt of Jamaica served as *rapporteurs*.

In addition, discussion leaders were appointed for each of the items on the agenda. Miss Carmen Natalia Martínez Bonilla of the Dominican Republic was the leader on "Age of marriage, consent to marriage and registration of marriages"; Miss Ava María Vargas Dubón of Guatemala on "Effects of marriage on the personal status of women"; Mrs. Alba Alonzo de Quesada of Honduras on "Effects of marriage on the property rights of women"; Miss María Lavalle Urbina of Mexico on "Dissolution of marriage, annulment, separation"; Miss Emma Pilotin of Martinique on "Parental rights and duties"; Mrs. Julia Uriona de Olmos of Bolivia on the "Legal status of unmarried women"; Miss Carmela Aguilar Ayanz of Peru on "Inheritance rights of women"; and Mrs. Emma Cardona de López-Baralt of Puerto Rico on "Social factors affecting the status of women in family law."

Early in the discussion the chairman pointed out that we were not there to enumerate the laws of our respective countries but to examine existing inequities and to see what can be done about them. To further the chairman's objective of encouraging frank discussion, my first intervention made it clear that in the United States women have problems, too.

In the matter of domicile, the agenda subject then under discussion, the basic principle established by law in most U.S. jurisdictions is that the domicile of the wife follows that of the husband. Today, as a result of this ancient rule,

married women living separate from their husbands sometimes may be denied the exercise of their rights of citizenship—voting, running for political office, and jury service—on the basis that they lack the required legal domicile. My statement continued:

I am happy to say that in recent years State laws have begun to recognize a separate domicile for married women. We have made some progress, but today there are only four States which appear to recognize a married woman's separate domicile for all purposes without imposing limitations.

I pointed out also that an increasing number of States allow a married woman to acquire a separate domicile for certain specified purposes, such as voting, taxation, jury service, election to public office, and administration of estates.

The chairman of the seminar expressed appreciation for my statement. She said that, since the representative of the major industrial country in the Western Hemisphere was willing to acknowledge the existence of "problems," she hoped that delegates from other countries would be willing to follow the U.S. example. Throughout the seminar, the frank discussion of legal discriminations and constructive ways of dealing with them was of great benefit to all participants.

Hemispheric Problems

The thread of concern running through the discussion was the need for improvement of family law as a means for affording legal recognition to the human dignity and rights of women.

Many delegates reported that, while progress was being made in the elimination of discriminatory laws and customs, such progress was spotty. This was pointedly brought out early in the session by one participant, who prefaced her opening statement with the rueful comment that women seemed to have responsibilities, rather than rights.

The two subjects on the agenda that gave rise to the most extended discussion were dissolution of marriage and the legal status of unmarried women.

In the discussion of divorce, there was great interest in the measures being taken in the United States to help married couples settle

their differences with the help of family counseling. I pointed out that family counseling is now taught in some major universities and that a number of States have enacted laws that make such counseling obligatory prior to the hearing of a divorce action.

The discussion of divorce brought out wide variation in law and practice; some countries do not allow divorce on any grounds, while others recognize it as a means of dissolving marriage and allow the spouses to remarry. It was recognized that effective legal protections during marriage must be available for the wife as a means of establishing sound family relations and that such protections would also help reduce the emphasis on divorce.

Many participants were in favor of raising the legal minimum age for marriage. It was felt that this would lead to more stable marriages and might also tend to decrease the demand for divorce. It was emphasized that a higher minimum age would allow time for better education and training of the intending spouses. In this connection I stated that the United States is steadily making progress in raising the minimum age of marriage; only four States now permit marriage of girls as young as 14, and in these cases they must have parental consent.

I mentioned that many of our high schools and colleges offer courses in family living and that these are very popular with young people. In response to the interest this statement aroused, I added:

A variety of methods are currently being used to promote the stability of marriage in the United States. One method is the training for family living taught in many of our high schools. In such courses teenage boys and girls are taught that marriage is a partnership to which both partners contribute different but equally important skills. Formal training for family life helps instill attitudes of consideration and cooperation which are so important to a happy marriage.

In addition, marriage counseling has attained the status of a profession in the United States. Several major universities provide courses to permit the award of a doctorate in this field. As an indication of the high standards in this profession, the Menninger Foundation of Topeka, Kansas, requires a graduate or professional degree in one's chosen profession plus 3 years of practical experience as a prerequisite for training in marriage counseling. Representatives of such professions as law, psychology, education, religion,

and social service have completed training in marriage counseling.

In my statement on parental rights and duties I noted that, in the United States, the father has primary responsibility for support of the children both during marriage and after divorce. The seminar discussed at length the problem of support where fathers abandon their families. I also pointed out that provision is made to collect support money from the father, wherever he goes, and to send it to the mother.

Under the agenda item entitled "Legal status of unmarried women," the discussion revolved almost entirely around the rights of the unmarried mother and her child. It was felt that *de facto* unions often reflected lack of educational opportunities, a low level of economic development, and related factors. Numerous other problems were noted.

During a session at which I presided, my alternate, Mrs. Chanlett, made a statement on the Alliance for Progress, pointing out the importance of women making use of its new resources for community development and for the improvement of family life.

Seminar Followup

Participants agreed on the need for legal reforms to eliminate injustices against women and to strengthen the family as an institution.

To follow up a seminar on family law it is important that an objective evaluation be made in each country of the progress of women in that country. Mrs. Eleanor Roosevelt called attention to this need at an informal gathering of members of the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women in New York in the spring of 1962. She pointed out that the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women had set the pattern but that it is the responsibility of each country to make an examination of its own laws and customs to see how these measure up. She noted that the United States was then making a review through the Presidential commission of which she was chairman.

Other types of commissions have been established in various countries. At the Tokyo seminar frequent mention was made of the Pakistan Commission on Family Laws, which promoted numerous legal reforms in that coun-

try. In Singapore the appointment of such a commission led to the enactment of a new code of laws for women, known as the Woman's Charter.

To help carry into effect conclusions reached by a U.N. seminar or by a commission or study group in an individual country, women's voluntary organizations play an indispensable role. Through their study and action programs, they not only educate their own members but usually also reach a wide cross section of the public. Awareness of this fact was implicit in the discussions at the Bogotá seminar and recurred constantly in conclusions reached by the participants. Such women's organizations are firmly established in Latin America and are increasingly important centers of strength and influence. They, and their counterparts in the United States and Canada, offer a ready means for stimulating improvements in the status of women in family law throughout the hemisphere. Their work will be of major importance in putting the conclusions reached at the Bogotá seminar into practical effect.

Conclusion

The Bogotá seminar strengthened my conviction as to the usefulness of U.N. regional seminars in improving the status of women. Especially in situations where women face problems caused not alone by laws but by long-established customs, these seminars provide an invaluable opportunity for frank and free discussion of existing inequities and exchange of information on measures which have proved useful in eliminating them. Seminars serve as a valuable arm to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women by focusing attention of national leaders and of men and women at the grassroots level on the basic principles developed by that Commission.

Each series of U.N. seminars on the status of women deals with a major role of women. In today's world a woman has many roles. The adoption by the General Assembly in 1962 of a resolution suggesting the establishment of a long-term program for the advancement of women,³ with particular emphasis on the de-

veloping countries, reflects the tremendous importance attached by governments of these countries to the potential of women in economic and social progress. More and more countries are recognizing that they need women as well as men for purposes of national development and the raising of living standards. At its 17th annual session in March 1963, the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women voted to initiate a third series of seminars in 1965 on the role of women in economic development, with special emphasis on the developing countries.

Governments and women's voluntary organizations look to the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women for leadership in the establishment of basic principles on all aspects of women's status. The recommendations developed by the Commission at its annual meetings, based on factual information on existing law and practice, provide the guidelines for practical action. Through regional seminars, these recommendations can find application in each of the participating countries and thus open the way for new avenues of service and opportunity for women throughout the world.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Economic and Social Council

Technical Assistance Committee. Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance: The Use of Experts From Developing Countries. E/TAC/140. Rev. 1. April 27, 1964. 6 pp.

Technical Assistance Activities of the United Nations. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3870, May 11, 1964, 179 pp.; Addendum, E/3870/Add. 1, June 10, 1964, 167 pp.

Inquiry Among Governments on Problems Resulting From the Reciprocal Action of Economic Development and Population Changes. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3895. May 18, 1964. 89 pp.

Future of the United Nations Water Resources Development Centre. Note by the Secretary-General. E/3894. May 19, 1964. 2 pp.

Interim Co-ordinating Committee for International Commodity Arrangements. 1964 Review of International Commodity Problems. E/3856. May 29, 1964. 101 pp.

³ U.N. doc. A/RES/1777 (XVII).

United Nations Children's Fund. Children and Youth in Development Planning. Conclusions of a round-table conference held at Bellagio, Italy, April 1-7, 1964. E/ICEF/498. June 2, 1964. 13 pp.

Economic and Social Consequences of Disarmament. Conversion to Peaceful Needs of the Resources Released by Disarmament. Replies of governments. E/3898/Add. 1. June 3, 1964. 31 pp.

Training of National Technical Personnel for Accelerated Industrialization of Developing Countries. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3901, June 3, 1964, 38 pp.; E/3901/Add. 1, June 3, 1964, 158 pp.

Recent Developments Relating to New Sources of Energy. Report of the Secretary-General. E/3903. June 3, 1964. 43 pp.

International Co-Operation in Cartography. International Co-Operation in the Standardization of Geographical Names. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3907. June 3, 1964. 4 pp.

Development of Natural Resources. Report on work being done in the field of nonagricultural resources. E/3904. June 15, 1964. 30 pp.

Measures To Implement the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Progress report by the Secretary-General. E/3916. June 15, 1964. 2 pp.

United Nations Development Decade. Relationships Among Planning Institutes. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3923. June 19, 1964. 9 pp.

United Nations Training and Research Institute. Progress report by the Secretary-General. E/3924. June 19, 1964. 3 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Mexico Conclude Civil Air Transport Negotiations

Press release 316 dated July 6

The United States and Mexico recently concluded conversations designed to reach an agreement on the regulations that might govern aeronautical relations between the two countries after August 15, 1964, the date of expiration of the air transport agreement in force between Mexico and the United States.¹

During the discussions it was agreed on an ad referendum basis that Mexico would receive a route "Mexico City-Detroit" as the route heretofore left unspecified in the present agreement. It was further agreed that the carrier designated by the Mexican Government to fly the

route could apply to the U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board for permission to use the same aircraft for flights beyond Detroit to a city in Canada without traffic rights between Detroit and such Canadian city. The United States would issue the necessary authorization if the point in Canada applied for were Montreal.

The delegations also agreed that the present agreement should be extended to June 30, 1965.

The agreements arrived at in these discussions, if approved by the two Governments, will be formalized through diplomatic channels before the expiration of the existing agreement.

The conversations were held in a spirit of friendship and cordiality. The Mexican delegation was headed by Alberto Acuna Ongay, Civil Aeronautics Administrator of the Department of Communications and Transport, and the U.S. delegation by William E. Knight, Assistant Chief of the Aviation Negotiations Division of the Department of State.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

International air services transit agreement. Done at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 1693. *Accession deposited:* Rwanda, July 6, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratifications deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964; Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (with a reservation and declaration), June 12, 1964.

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic (with reservations), June 9, 1964.

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning acquisition of nationality. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: United Arab Republic, June 9, 1964.

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic relations concerning compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1964. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Ratification deposited: Japan, June 8, 1964.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675 and 5513.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.²

Ratifications deposited: New Zealand, June 12, 1964; Sweden (with a reservation), June 16, 1964.

North Atlantic Treaty—Atomic Energy

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Done at Paris June 18, 1964. Enters into force upon receipt by the United States of notification from all parties to the North Atlantic Treaty that they are willing to be bound by the terms of the agreement. *Signatures:* Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States, June 18, 1964; Italy, June 22, 1964; Denmark, June 25, 1964; Canada, June 30, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. *Ratifications deposited:* Niger, San Marino, July 9, 1964.

Telecommunications

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva 1959) (TIAS 4893) with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963.² *Proclaimed by the President:* July 7, 1964.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force October 21, 1950; for the United States February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respectively.
Notifications received that they consider themselves bound: Niger, April 16, 1964; Rwanda, March 21, 1964.
Adherence deposited: Uganda, May 18, 1964.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending the agreement of March 9, 1959 (TIAS 4192), governing tolls on the Saint Lawrence Seaway. Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 30, 1964. Entered into force July 1, 1964.

² Not in force.

Greece

Protocol modifying and supplementing convention of February 20, 1950 (TIAS 2901), for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion of taxes on estates of deceased persons. Signed at Athens February 12, 1964.²

Ratified by the President: July 7, 1964.

Agreement providing for the refunding of certain indebtedness due from Greece to the United States. Signed at Athens May 28, 1964. Enters into force subject to legislation passed by the United States Congress and signed by the President.

Israel

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5220, 5490, 5557). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 6, 1964. Entered into force July 6, 1964.

United Kingdom

Agreement extending the agreement of June 29 and July 12, 1954, as extended (TIAS 3152, 4290), for a technical assistance program in British Guiana. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington June 22 and 29, 1964. Entered into force June 29, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on July 8 confirmed the following nominations:

Mercer Cook to be Ambassador to the Republic of Senegal. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 327 dated July 16.)

Randolph A. Kidder to be Ambassador to the Kingdom of Cambodia. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated June 16.)

Clinton E. Knox to be Ambassador to the Republic of Dahomey. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated June 9.)

Robert J. Ryan to be Ambassador to the Republic of Niger. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated May 28).

Franklin H. Williams to be the representative of the United States on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 323 dated July 10.)

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No.	Date	Subject
*315	7/6	U.S. participation in international conferences.
316	7/6	U.S.-Mexican civil air transport negotiations.
317	7/7	Netherlands credentials (revised) (rewrite).
318	7/7	Luxembourg credentials (rewrite).
*319	7/8	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Malaysia.
†320	7/9	Philippines credentials (rewrite).
†321	7/9	Argentina credentials (rewrite).
†322	7/9	Brazil credentials (rewrite).
*323	7/10	Williams sworn in as U.S. Representative on U.N. Economic and Social Council (biographic details).
*324	7/10	Kass sworn in as consultant (biographic details).

*Not printed.
†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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August 3, 1964

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Some American Thoughts on Current Issues

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany¹

Hard though it is to reconcile with these lovely surroundings, we have all come here to Tuetzing to work. Our task is quite simply to think and talk about the issues that confront the world today—which when done seriously is work indeed, but of the most stimulating sort. It is work which I am pleased and honored to share with you and your distinguished guests.

Tuetzing, in a remarkably short time, has become closely associated with that type of informal but informed discussion from which we can hope to derive a better understanding of today's problems—and hopefully some progress toward their solution. I have been fortunate in participating in similar conferences over a number of years. This type of gathering has no rival, in my opinion, in prodding us to re-examine long-held notions and to open our minds to new concepts. To me the real value of such meetings of minds is in the exchange of

ideas, in the free flow of conversation as we walk and talk along Tuetzing's lovely garden paths.

I have decided, therefore, to make my remarks quite informal. I hope you will think of them as a kind of conversation. Although I shall inevitably monopolize it for the first half hour or so, it will, I hope, continue with your comments and questions today and in smaller groups tomorrow. My purpose is to comment on four current questions arising out of the relations between my country and Germany, to which I have devoted my attention as American Ambassador.

These four are by no means the only important foreign policy matters affecting Germany with which my Government is at this time concerned, nor is there necessarily any direct relationship among them. I will, moreover, make no attempt to indicate their relative importance nor to deal with them in all their aspects. This I leave to your part of the "conversation." My purpose is, quite simply, to present an American

¹Address made before a summer conference at the Evangelical Academy at Tuetzing, Germany, on July 16.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1310 PUBLICATION 7718 AUGUST 3, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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point of view which my German friends will not consider an intrusion into their exclusive affairs.

The topics I have chosen are the following: (1) our worldwide responsibilities; (2) the future of Europe; (3) Berlin passes; (4) reunification. You will agree, I think, that I have not sought to avoid the controversial.

Our Worldwide Responsibilities

Recently there appeared in a German newspaper a cartoon which depicted a poor little donkey, labeled Germany, which the American Uncle Sam was loading down with a variety of burdens—aid to Viet-Nam, troops for Cyprus, and the like. It appeared from the expression on the donkey's face that he might be wondering "What next?" or "Is there no end?"

Although it is true that there has in recent months been a proliferation of demands on German skills and resources, I believe that the image of Germany portrayed by the little donkey is, in 1964, grossly inaccurate. Germany is now strong, both politically and economically. Perhaps we in the United States have come to realize the implications of this sooner than you, because we have come to know how strength is measured in today's world. As a consequence we know how urgently the strength of Germany is needed.

You have been remarkably successful in rapidly rebuilding, within a democratic framework, a nation which is economically much stronger than Germany has ever been before. It is, therefore, natural that the free nations look increasingly to the Federal Republic to assume a greater role in this or that—ofttimes to Germans seemingly remote—part of the world. The reputation "made in Germany" was not destroyed by Hitler in spite of his best efforts. In Africa, Asia, Latin America, and in Eastern Europe the reputation of your skills, your energy, and your progress is very high. Many wish to take advantage of the experience which has contributed so importantly to your own success.

A specific case in point is the recent appeal of the United States to its allies, in support of the Government of South Viet-Nam, to render appropriate assistance in stemming the tide of

Communist aggression in that country. There are those in Germany who say, "Viet-Nam is far away. Why does it concern us? Why was this call directed to us?" One answer, of course, is that the request went to all of our allies, of which 17, including the Federal Republic of Germany, have already responded favorably. Basically, however, those who pose such questions fail to realize that the Federal Republic of Germany is, according to many indices, the second strongest nation in the free world. If the world struggle against communism is to succeed, this great strength is needed, not just in protecting Germany's own borders but wherever freedom is in jeopardy.

There is wide support in Germany for a forward strategy in the defense of the NATO area. The defense of freedom in today's world requires a truly forward strategy. This entails increasing contributions, in formerly remote areas like Viet-Nam and central Africa, from countries which, like Germany, have only recently acquired the ability to contribute. The contribution need not, in every case, be a military one. Indeed, our Government did not suggest that Germany send military forces to South Viet-Nam.

Freedom is, however, indivisible; what happens in the Mekong Valley can have an important bearing on what happens in Berlin. Aggression anywhere must be made so expensive that those tempted to indulge in it will see the folly of their course. It is when those who have the greatest stake in freedom band together to defend it—wherever and whenever required—that we move toward our common goal.

Sometimes it is urged that Germany's recent past makes it unwise for Germany to assume roles outside its borders. I see no reason why Germany should indefinitely remain the captive of the unfavorable aspects of its history. We in our country recognize that Germany is today a new Germany. Why should not Germans?

Germany, indeed, has many advantages when it comes to dealing with problems affecting the new countries of Africa and Asia. Through the early loss of colonies, Germany has largely escaped involvement in the history of colonialism in the 20th century. This minimizes suspicion of German motives in taking an active interest in these regions. To this advantage

must be added those of German technical and industrial know-how, which enjoys worldwide respect, as do German scientific and cultural attainments.

Nobody particularly enjoys being impertuned, but a man who has become rich soon finds that he has in the process become the target of increased demands. Those who have been contributing feel that he should be willing to help support the community which has made it possible for him to prosper. His standing in the community will depend on his response. This is somewhat the position in which Germany now finds itself.

That is why the United States, which is a strong but heavily laden beast of burden itself, looks increasingly to Germany for help. We have, moreover, found a very welcome response. The Federal Republic is doing much throughout the world, not just because we have asked it to but on its own initiative, in a clear recognition of where German interests and responsibilities lie. One example is the Federal Republic's foreign aid program, which is substantial and is one of the few national programs, apart from our own, which is on a worldwide—not an area-of-interest—basis.

The United States, in the discharge of its own worldwide responsibilities, devotes a substantial percentage of its gross national product to foreign economic and military assistance. It is our hope that the Federal Republic, with its growing resources, will increasingly make a comparable effort. If the developing world looks to Germany for more, it is in reality a flattering tribute to your strength and to your rapidly increasing influence in the world.

The Future of Europe

We have been pleased in recent years to observe a steady development of closer relations between Germany and its neighbors in Western Europe—a development signalized, in the case of France, by the conclusion of the Franco-German treaty in 1963. Through a highly successful series of official visits, Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard in recent months has further extended and strengthened friendly ties with other states of Europe. The Queen of England will visit Germany in the spring of 1965.

It is not, in our view, any contradiction for European states to wish to draw closer together and, at the same time, to maintain or enhance their close relations with the United States. We do not consider it necessary for Germany to have to make a choice. The two go hand in hand. Yet I have often been asked for our views about this matter, and especially about the close relations between France and Germany. Not long ago I replied that if Franco-German *rapprochement* had not already been achieved, I would, as U.S. Ambassador to Germany, be doing my best to promote it as an important goal in the common interest.

Indeed, the establishment of close ties between France and Germany has been a major objective of postwar U.S. foreign policy. It is axiomatic to every student of history that the elimination of Franco-German rivalry is a necessary precondition to the establishment of a sound European and world order. This has been the conviction of Europe's outstanding postwar statesmen—men like Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi, and Robert Schuman. Realization that Franco-German enmity must disappear in turn brought agreement on the need for a unified Europe as the best means of achieving this objective permanently.

The United States strongly supported the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Defense Community, the European Economic Community, and EURATOM. We are convinced that a united Europe can be built on the heritage its nations share. Though there have been setbacks on the road to European political integration, the progress toward European economic integration in the last 10 years has been truly impressive.

That progress has certainly not been achieved despite, or at the expense of, a close Franco-German relationship. The one could not have taken place in the absence of the other. Franco-German cooperation is a reality. The United States welcomes it as long as it does not exclude wider cooperation. The Atlantic community can, I believe, be increasingly strengthened by the friendship and close relationship between these two great countries, each of which has much to offer to the other—and to Europe.

It is true that the signature of the Franco-

German treaty came as a surprise to many Americans, particularly in the light of what had already been accomplished without a formal treaty. However, the preamble appended to the treaty by the German Bundestag at the time of ratification fully answered any questions we might have had, with a clear statement that the treaty would be used to further the common goals of the Western alliance. Fears which had been expressed that the Franco-German treaty might be used as a vehicle for a new power alignment in Western Europe have so far proved groundless. It is in the interest not only of Germany and France but of Europe and the whole Atlantic community that they remain so.

I am persuaded that the United States and the Federal Republic are in accord on the major objectives that we are seeking in Europe: the strengthening of free Europe, the economic and political integration of Europe, and the solidification of the Atlantic partnership. The United States would naturally view with concern the development of an inward-oriented Europe or a fragmented Europe, either of which would be inconsistent with these objectives. I am confident, however, that the goal our Governments have sought so long will prevail.

The Berlin Pass Issue

From the beginning of the talks on the issuance of passes to residents of West Berlin for visits to the Soviet sector over the last Christmas season, there have been conflicting reports on the attitude of the United States. It was then frequently stated in the press that the United States had reservations about the protocol signed with the East Germans. More recently, I have seen reports that we favor pass arrangements and are pressing the Federal authorities to extend such negotiating contacts with the East German regime.

I appreciate the deep emotional interest aroused among most Germans by the pass negotiations. How could it be otherwise when the outcome determines whether families who have been cruelly separated can see one another again, and whether the artificial division between one part of Berlin and the other will be lessened, even if only temporarily and in one direction?

This issue reaches to the very heart of the German people. I think it is worth while, therefore, now that talks are going on in Berlin on a further pass arrangement, to describe briefly the American attitude.

A basic factor is that we consider the present division of Germany and of Berlin completely unjustified and unnecessary—a threat to stability in central Europe. We welcome steps, once decided upon by the authorities in Bonn and Berlin, that can reduce this artificial division and bring Germans on one side of the wall closer to Germans on the other. We welcomed the massive visitation of West Berlin residents to East Berlin arranged over the holidays because of the humanitarian benefits it brought.

We all know, however, that there is more to the pass question than the joy of family reunions. The visitations have involved discussions between representatives of the Berlin Senat and representatives of the East German regime. This circumstance poses complex and sensitive problems, some of which are of direct concern to the United States and others of more concern to the Germans. The United States, France, and Great Britain are responsible for the security of West Berlin. We have, and must retain, ultimate authority in the city in order to meet this responsibility.

It is from this point of view that we must examine any pass arrangement. Would it undermine the rights and responsibilities of the Allies? Would it tend to alter the status of Berlin to that of a "third German state," independent of Allied control and stripped of political and economic ties with the Federal Republic? These would be our concerns.

If the Senat were negotiating independently, without our concurrence, on a matter which could vitally affect Allied interests, Allied authority could be jeopardized. We therefore need to know what is going on at every stage of the negotiations, and we expect that our concurrence will be obtained before positions are taken. The United States gave its concurrence to the pass arrangement at Christmas because we considered that Allied interests were not adversely affected—neither the security of Berlin, nor its status, nor the position of the Allies.

The discussions with the East Germans, and

their signature at the bottom of protocols, do, however, raise other far-reaching problems, including the question of the extent to which the Federal Republic and the Senat should deal with representatives of the Ulbricht regime. This we have felt from the beginning is an area in which German authorities should define the German interest. The United States has not taken sides nor sought to influence the responsible authorities one way or the other. I can assure you that we are not disinterested in this matter, but in its present context and dimensions we shall continue to regard it as primarily a question of concern to the proper German authorities.

Reunification

The announcement last month by the Soviet Government that it had concluded a treaty of friendship and cooperation with the so-called "German Democratic Republic" has again called attention to the Soviet responsibility for the continued enforced division of Germany. This is of course a world problem and not just a tragedy for the German people, since, as Chancellor Erhard and President Johnson stated in their communique of June 13,² there can be no stability in Europe so long as Germany is divided. This statement should be a clear answer to those who accuse the United States of believing that a *détente* (a word so vague that I wish it could be eliminated from our vocabularies) exists or can exist until this cause of tension is removed from central Europe.

The United States has endeavored again and again since 1945 to make its position clear on the issue of German reunification. After the Soviet Union announced its treaty, we joined with the French and British to state our policy in a tripartite declaration.³ We declared that:

... a just and peaceful settlement of outstanding problems in Europe is essential to the establishment of lasting peace and security. Such a settlement requires the application in the whole of Germany of the principle of self-determination. . . . The exercise of self-determination, which should lead to the reunification of Germany in peace and freedom, remains a fundamental objective of the Three Governments.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 992.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 44.

The Three Governments are convinced that such a settlement should be sought as soon as possible.

This is our policy, and although the Soviets have different views, they are fully aware of our own.

After the Berlin crisis of 1961, which occurred shortly after the Kennedy administration came into office, discussions among the Allies and exploratory talks with the Soviets largely engaged the attention of the President, Secretary of State, and other high officials for more than a year. Hours of probing conversations with the Soviets revealed absolutely no basis for serious negotiations.

We have never ceased to be ready to discuss the German question with the Soviet Union when we thought that there was anything to be gained, and we remain ready to do so, in coordination with our German, French, and British allies. American consultations with the Federal Republic in this area have been exceptionally close, and, as you know, they are continuing.

All of us who are concerned with German reunification, however, have a responsibility to ourselves, and a right to ask others, to maintain a strict intellectual honesty about this very vital problem. All of us know the same facts. All of us, Germans as well as Americans, know the same difficulties. It is very easy to say, "Why haven't you done something about reunification?" It is more difficult to say, particularly in the light of the fact that both Americans and Germans have renounced the use of force in achieving reunification, what in fact we should do about it right now. It is important that we continually reaffirm our objective by words and declarations, but we should be aware of the limitations of such words alone in moving the Soviets. Until the opportunity for a real forward movement toward reunification arises, let us not create doubts and conflicts between ourselves by unwarranted accusations of inactivity.

In the meantime, the United States cannot defer efforts to solve other important problems which clearly do not affect the prospects for German reunification. The German question is at this time unfortunately characterized by a face-to-face confrontation in which political positions are fixed. By contrast, affairs in some

other parts of the world are in a greater state of flux, and our policy must deal with that fact. The intrusion of Communist force in Southeast Asia and the infiltration of Africa and Latin America are both active and not merely potential challenges. Meeting them poses demanding tasks for us and the free world. At the same time, the imperatives of the nuclear age require that we make every effort, while there is still time, to halt the piling up of ever more destructive forms of armament. The fact that we make these efforts does not mean that our interest in European security, or German reunification, is in any way diminished.

What is the significance of the new Soviet treaty for the German question? On the face of it the treaty does not portend serious alarms or excursions. It may indeed reflect a more sober Soviet policy on Berlin, essentially deflated of its aggressiveness of the period from 1958 to 1963. We must, of course, remain watchful of actions that may be taken in its aftermath.

The treaty is, however, largely declaratory in nature, and I cannot perceive that it has altered any essential element in the German situation. To suppose it to be a new departure in Soviet policy, designed to perpetuate the *status quo*, is to attribute to the signing of a treaty the kind of binding legal significance it would have only in the free world. The Soviet Union has consistently been committed to the division of Germany. The treaty reaffirms the commitment, but it is nothing new.

We should not be unduly pessimistic about the prospects for German reunification. The present state of affairs will not persist indefinitely. Gloomy predictions that it will persist do not take into account the present course and tempo of the historical process, or the Western capabilities of influencing them. The most striking trends in Europe and within the Communist bloc were scarcely visible 10 years ago. Western Europe is completing the transition into a unified economic complex of great potential prosperity and attractive power to the East. The East European countries are slowly reacquiring a measure of national independence. Increasingly they are turning toward contacts with Western Europe and the United States.

The Soviets doubtless still consider their presence in East Germany important to their security and a lever to use to "solve" the German question on their terms. However, the Zone today would seem to be a wasting asset to the Soviets—an anachronism alongside an Eastern Europe where barriers are coming down. When this becomes more apparent, the continued occupation could lose its essential *raison d'être* to the Soviets.

We of the West should in the future be able to exert increasing influence over developments in Eastern Europe. If we further our contacts there and promote the reentry of its states into peaceful and friendly interchange with us, we will progressively dismantle the mistaken premises on which the division of Germany is based. If we cannot immediately solve the problem, we can at least attempt to change its context. This is what President Johnson meant in his Lexington speech of May 23,⁴ when he stated that wise development of relations with the nations of East Europe would speed reunification. This is a sound proposition, and it is farsighted of your statesmen that they are putting it into practice so vigorously.

U.S.-German Relations

In closing, I would like to refer not just to specific issues in current relations between our two countries but to the very nature of these relations. I feel that this is often a matter of some concern in Germany, as it is in Washington. The complaint is heard here that German foreign policy is merely the tail which is dragged along behind the kite of American foreign policy. You are certainly aware that on the other side of the Atlantic the opposite complaint is sometimes heard. Bonn is said to exercise a veto in critical areas of U.S. foreign policy.

I believe that both of these complaints are wrong; however, they point to the need to define carefully the nature of the partnership between the Federal Republic and the United States. The problem, as it might be phrased, is whether each partner should freely tell the other what he thinks should be done. My an-

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 15, 1964, p. 922.

swer is yes, provided the partnership is founded, as our concept of it is, on the thesis that the United States and Germany are both sovereign nations, bound to consider, but free to reject, the advice of the other.

The United States bears heavy responsibilities in the free world. If we falter, freedom falters. Suppose, for example, that we had not taken the initiative in bringing aid to embattled Viet-Nam and in urging others to support the government there against Communist encroachment. The Federal Republic might be spared approaches from Washington to explain the urgency of the need for help, but who, in the long run, would be the gainer? Not the Federal Republic; certainly not the other free nations—only the Communists. I believe that the German people will increasingly realize this as they continue to assume the share of world responsibilities commensurate to their growing strength.

We, as your partner, welcome steps in this direction. There will be areas in which you yourselves will wish to take the initiative. In such cases we will look to you to advise us what should be done. Neither of us has a veto or a mandate to dictate the other's actions. As partners in a common endeavor of gigantic proportions, and of staggering implications as to the future of the free world, we shall, however, need increasingly to pool our ideas, our resources, and our determinations, in pursuit of our common goals. This, I think, is the true nature of our relationship.

I commend my words to the spirit of understanding of Tuetzing.

Letters of Credence

Argentina

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Argentine Republic, Norberto Miguel Barrenechea, presented his credentials to President Johnson on July 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 321 dated July 9.

Brazil

The newly appointed Ambassador of Brazil, Juracy Montenegro Magalhaes, presented his credentials to President Johnson on July 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 322 dated July 9.

Philippines

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Republic of the Philippines, Oscar Ledesma, presented his credentials to President Johnson on July 9. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 320 dated July 9.

U.S. and U.S.S.R. Hold Talks on Desalting of Sea Water

JOINT MEMORANDUM

White House press release dated July 16

Representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union met in Washington from July 14 to 16, as previously agreed,¹ to explore the possibility of mutually beneficial scientific cooperation in the development of methods for desalting sea water, including the possible use of nuclear energy. The United States delegation was headed by Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. The Soviet delegation was headed by A. I. Churin, Chief Administrator of the State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work.

The representatives of the two countries discussed the problems of desalting brackish water as well as sea water. They reviewed the present activities and plans of the two countries relating to the scientific problems of desalting water, to technological methods for desalting on both small and very large scales, and on the development of reactors suitable for use in large-scale desalting processes.

¹ For a statement by President Johnson, see BULLETIN of July 13, 1964, p. 60.

Certain possible forms of cooperation were identified during the meeting:

1. The conduct, by each country, of scientific research and development work in the field of desalting sea water, including the utilization of atomic energy, in accordance to its own program and at its own expense.

2. The exchange, on a reciprocal basis, of scientific reports, including results obtained from work on pilot and demonstration plants.

3. The arrangement, by mutual agreement, of symposia to discuss specific scientific and technical problems and projects.

4. The arrangement, on a reciprocal basis, of visits by technical experts to appropriate installations and laboratories.

During their current visit here the Soviet delegation will be given the opportunity to visit several installations and laboratories engaged in developing desalting processes, as well as to related atomic energy installations in the U.S.A. The Soviet delegation has likewise invited an American delegation to visit similar installations and laboratories in the Soviet Union.

In the opinion of both delegations, the discussions of these problems were carried on in a business-like manner and were useful for both sides.

As a result of the discussions the delegations will report to their governments on the best means of cooperation in the field of desalting sea water, including utilization of atomic energy.

U.S., U.S.S.R. REPRESENTATIVES

The White House announced on July 16 that the following representatives of the United States and the Soviet Union would attend the meeting on scientific cooperation in the desalting of sea water, which was held at Washington, D.C., July 14-16.

U.S. Representatives

Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology

Kenneth Holum, Assistant Secretary, Department of the Interior

Glenn T. Seaberg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission

James T. Ramey, Member, Atomic Energy Commission

John Calhoun, Assistant Secretary for Research and Development, Department of the Interior

Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, Department of State

C. F. MacGowan, Director, Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior.

U.S.S.R. Representatives

Aleksandr I. Churin, Chief Administrator of State Committee on Coordination of Scientific Work

Vitaliy A. Klyachko, Head of Laboratory, All Union Scientific Research Institute on Water Supply, Canals and Hydroelectric Construction

Aleksandr I. Leypunskiy, Scientific Manager, Physical Power Institute

Nikolay M. Sinev, Deputy Chairman, State Committee on Atomic Energy

Georgiy M. Solovyev, Deputy Chief of Administration of State Committees on Scientific Research Coordination

Mikhail P. Vukalevich, Assistant Director of Moscow Power Institute

Fedor P. Zaostrovskiy, Director, Scientific Research Institute, Chemical Machinery Construction.

U.S. Protests to Soviet Union on Incident Involving U.S. Vessel

*Department Statement*¹

The Chargé of the Embassy of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Georgi M. Kornienko, was called to the Department this afternoon [July 17] to receive an oral protest from Acting Secretary for European Affairs Richard Davis regarding an incident involving the United States merchant vessel SS *Sister Katango* in the Black Sea.

Mr. Kornienko was informed that according to the report of the ship's master, Artur H. Fertig of Wading [River], Long Island, a dispute over stevedoring charges had been referred to the Ministry of the Merchant Marine in Moscow, where it was confirmed that differences would be arbitrated and the ship would be permitted to sail after discharging its cargo of wheat. Local port authorities at Novorossisk, however, refused clearance and the ship sailed July 15 without permission. A Soviet patrol

¹ Read to news correspondents on July 17 by Robert J. McCloskey, Deputy Director, Office of News.

vessel followed the SS *Sister Katingo* outside the harbor, and, when the ship failed to heed an order to return to port, a Soviet naval craft fired three rounds across the bow of the ship. The SS *Sister Katingo* was then boarded, searched, and the captain ordered to pay a fine and sign papers, after which the ship was permitted to continue its voyage to Istanbul.

In making the protest, Mr. Davis noted that, while under international law Soviet authorities may have been within strictly legal rights in the particular circumstances to pursue, board, and search this vessel, the methods employed by the Soviet authorities were excessive and clearly outside the norms of acceptable behavior.

The Soviet authorities were requested to undertake measures to prevent a repetition of this incident.

ANZUS Reviews Areas of Mutual Interest in Asia and Pacific

Following is the text of a communique of the 13th ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, and United States Security Treaty) Council meeting, which was held at Washington July 17-18.

Press release 330 dated July 18

The ANZUS Council held its annual meeting in Washington on July 17 and 18, 1964. The Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime Minister and Minister for External Affairs, represented New Zealand; the Honorable Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, represented Australia; and the Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, represented the United States.

The Council expressed satisfaction that the pattern of regular annual meetings has been restored. It agreed that these meetings not only provide opportunity for full, frank exchanges of views on problems of common interests but serve to emphasize the importance of this defensive alliance of three nations which share a common heritage, common institutions, common values, and common purposes.

The Council noted with grave concern the continuing threat to peace in South and South-

east Asia and the Pacific region posed by the aggressive North Vietnamese and Communist Chinese regimes. It reaffirmed the determination expressed at its 1963 meeting¹ to cooperate with other countries equally determined to preserve their national independence by promoting the peace and security of the area.

The Council gave particular attention to the aggression against South Viet-Nam which the Communist regime in Hanoi organized and is directing, supplying and supporting in flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 1962. It agreed that the defeat of this aggression is necessary not only to the security of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific but as a demonstration that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be allowed to succeed. The Council noted with satisfaction that the members of ANZUS had increased their assistance to the Republic of Viet-Nam since the SEATO Council Meeting in April.² It agreed that they should remain prepared, if necessary, to take further concrete steps within their respective capabilities to assure the defeat of this aggression. It expressed the hope that other nations who prize freedom will join in assisting the valiant people of South Viet-Nam to preserve their freedom. It affirmed its confidence that programs of political and administrative reform, military action, pacification, and economic and social development instituted by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam, together with the continued backing of the Free World, will enable the people of South Viet-Nam to achieve the peace, stability and better life which presently are denied to them by the Communist aggressors.

The Council also devoted special attention to the threat to the security and stability of Laos brought about by Communist violations of the Geneva Agreements of 1962. It expressed its grave concern over the continued presence and intervention in Laos of North Vietnamese forces and over recent Pathet Lao attacks against Government forces. It called for full compliance

¹ For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of June 24, 1963, p. 967.

² For texts of a statement by Secretary Rusk and a final communique, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 690.

with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements, including full support for Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's demand that the Communist forces withdraw from the areas which they recently seized in violation of the Agreements.

The Council reaffirmed its conviction that the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in which all three nations are also members and to which they renewed pledges of support at the recent Manila Council Meeting, continues to make an essential contribution to the peace and stability of the region.

The Council reaffirmed its continuing support for Malaysia. It noted that two of its members are now giving aid, both in forces and in material, to assist Malaysian defense. The Council recognized that in this region, as elsewhere, force must not be employed in violation of the territorial integrity of other nations. It expressed the hope that the independence of Malaysia would be respected and that peaceful relationships with neighboring states would be restored so that all could contribute to the peace, security and advancement of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific.

The Council noted with gratification the substantial economic and social progress of most of the free nations of the Western Pacific, whose continuing advance contrasts sharply with the economic failures of the Communist states. It applauded the increasing cooperation between the more developed and the less developed nations of the Western Pacific in promoting economic and social progress and political stability.

The Council reviewed the efforts being made to move toward a total ban on nuclear testing and toward general disarmament and expressed the resolve of the members of ANZUS to continue working individually and collectively toward these goals. It noted with regret that some governments have not yet signed the nuclear test ban treaty negotiated last year.

Reaffirming the value to the members of the regular, high level exchange of views afforded by the meetings of the ANZUS Council, the Ministers stated their intention to meet again within approximately one year, at a place to be determined.

U.S. Sends Message to Conference of African Leaders at Cairo

Following is the text of a message from President Johnson to President Gamal Abdel Nasser of the United Arab Republic to be conveyed to the Conference of African Heads of State, which convened at Cairo on July 17.

White House press release dated July 17

JULY 17, 1964

I extend, through you, to the representatives of the nations and peoples of Africa gathered in Cairo, the friendly greetings of the Government and people of the United States of America.

As the Heads of State and of Government meet again one year after creating the Organization of African Unity at that historic Addis Ababa gathering, we are impressed with the striking progress which has been made toward African unity in peace and freedom.

Africa through the OAU has shown its capacity to deal through peaceful means with African problems, including such disputes as have arisen among its members. In this way, within the framework of the United Nations Charter, African nations are making a vital contribution to world peace.

As the OAU moves into its second year of activity, it will face new challenges which, I am sure, it will meet in the same spirit it has already demonstrated in the momentous year just past. I and the people of the United States extend to this Organization our best wishes for continued progress toward your high aims.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Satellite Communications—1964. Hearings before a subcommittee of the House Government Operations Committee. Part 1. March 17–May 28, 1964. 657 pp. Foreign Assistance 1964. Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on S. 2659, S. 2660, and

H.R. 11380, bills relating to foreign assistance. March 31–June 23, 1964. 628 pp.

Amendments to the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as Amended, the Atomic Energy Community Act of 1955, as Amended, and the EURATOM Cooperation Act of 1958, as Amended. Reports to accompany H.R. 11832 and S. 2963. H. Rept. 1525 and S. Rept. 1128. June 30, 1964. 13 pp. each.

Presentation of Monument to Mexico. Report to accompany S. 944. H. Rept. 1532. July 1, 1964. 4 pp.

Rio Grande Canalization Project. Report to accompany S. 2370. H. Rept. 1533. July 1, 1964. 6 pp.

Emergency International Flood Control Works, Lower Colorado River. Report to accompany H.R. 7419. H. Rept. 1534. July 1, 1964. 12 pp.

International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos. Report to accompany S. 1627. H. Rept. 1535. July 1, 1964. 9 pp.

The Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 1964. Report to accompany H.R. 10485. H. Rept. 1536. July 1, 1964. 20 pp.

Amending the Foreign Service Buildings Act, 1926, To Authorize Additional Appropriations, and for Other Purposes. Report to accompany H.R. 11754. H. Rept. 1537. July 1, 1964. 3 pp.

Report of the Fourth Conference of the Mexico-United States Interparliamentary Group, by Hon. Robert

N. C. Nix, chairman of Representatives delegation. H. Rept. 1531. July 1, 1964. 26 pp.

Meat Imports—Wild Birds and Wild Animals. Report to accompany H.R. 1839. S. Rept. 1167. July 2, 1964. 11 pp.

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces Treaty. Report of the Senate Committee on Armed Services made by its Subcommittee on the Operation of Article VII of the NATO Status of Forces Agreement, for the period December 1, 1961, through November 30, 1962. S. Rept. 1171. July 8, 1964. 15 pp.

Attendance at Meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association. Report to accompany S. Res. 339. July 8, 1964. 2 pp.

Protecting Heads of Foreign States and Other Designated Officials. Report to accompany S. 1917. S. Rept. 1179. July 9, 1964. 9 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Individual views of Senator Morse on H.R. 11380. S. Rept. 1188, Part 2. July 10, 1964. 25 pp.

The Growing Strength of the Soviet Merchant Fleet. Prepared for the use of the Senate Commerce Committee at the request of Chairman Warren G. Magnuson by the Legislative Reference Service of the Library of Congress. July 10, 1964. 46 pp. [Committee print].

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

In Session as of July 31, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament . . .	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962–
6th Round of GATT Tariff Negotiations	Geneva	May 4, 1964–

Scheduled August Through October 1964

8th FAO Regional Conference for Latin America	Viña del Mar, Chile	Aug. 1–
IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: 6th Session.	London	Aug. 4–
ECAFE/WMO Regional Seminar on Hydrology	Bangkok	Aug. 4–
International Seed Testing Association: Executive Committee Meeting.	Edinburgh	Aug. 10–
17th Annual Edinburgh Film Festival	Edinburgh	Aug. 16–
U.N. Seminar on the Status of Women in Family Law . . .	Lomé, Togo	Aug. 17–
UNESCO International Conference on Youth	Grenoble	Aug. 23–
South Pacific Commission: 2d Regional Education Seminar .	Nouméa, New Caledonia . . .	Aug. 24–
3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.	Geneva	Aug. 31–

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, July 16, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

PAHO Directing Council: 15th Meeting	México, D. F.	Aug. 31-
ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session	Montreal	Sept. 1-
3d FAO Regional Conference for Africa	Tanauarive	Sept. 3-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Costs.	Geneva	Sept. 7-
ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference	Madrid	Sept. 7-
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 10th Session	Washington	Sept. 8-
IMCO Special Assembly	Washington	Sept. 8-
Meeting of the Parties to the Convention for High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.	Ottawa	Sept. 9-
IAEA General Conference: 8th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 15-
U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.	New York	Sept. 15-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 9th Session	London	Sept. 16-
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Session.	Manila	Sept. 17-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session	Geneva.	Sept. 21-
2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Health.	Beirut	Sept. 21-
ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry.	Geneva.	Sept. 21-
IMCO Council: 13th Session	London.	Sept. 22-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session	Rome	Sept. 22-
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session	Auckland.	Sept. 22-
BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee	Geneva.	Sept. 28-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva.	Sept. 28-
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session	Geneva.	Sept. 28-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 52d Meeting.	Copenhagen	Sept. 28-
International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly.	Caracas	Sept. 30-
Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting.	San José	September
Inter-American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Directing Council.	Montevideo.	September
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports	Lima.	September
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Meeting on Statistics Education.	Santiago	September
ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage Techniques.	Paris.	September
UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference	Cairo	September
UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session	Paris.	September
UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Survey Methods.	Toulouse	September
U.N. ECA Industrial Coordination Conference on West Africa	Bamako, Mali.	Oct. 5-
U.N. ECA Subregional Industries Committee: 2d <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting.	Tangier	Oct. 5-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 22d Session.	Geneva	Oct. 5-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcommittee on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain.	London.	Oct. 5-
ILO Technical Meeting Concerning Certain Aspects of Labor-Management Relations Within Undertakings.	Geneva.	Oct. 5-
FAO Council: 43d Session	Rome	Oct. 5-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Welfare Facilities for Industrial Workers.	Geneva.	Oct. 5-
UNESCO Executive Board: 68th Session.	Paris.	Oct. 5-
12th General Conference on Weights and Measures	Paris.	Oct. 6-
5th Inter-American Indian Conference	Quito	Oct. 10-
BIRPI Committee of Experts on International Classification of Industrial Designs.	Geneva.	Oct. 12-
U.N. ECE Governmental Experts on Rational Utilization of Water Resources.	Geneva.	Oct. 12-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 9th Session.	Curitiba, Brazil	Oct. 13-
South Pacific Commission: 26th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 14-
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 11th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 16-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 12th Plenary Assembly.	Geneva.	Oct. 19-
U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners	Bangkok	Oct. 19-
U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 13th Session.	Geneva.	Oct. 19-
7th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Cairo	Oct. 19-
UNESCO General Conference: 13th Session	Paris.	Oct. 20-
4th FAO Regional Conference for Europe	Salzburg	Oct. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 8th Session.	Bangkok	Oct. 27-
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Refugees: 12th Session.	Geneva.	October
1st FAO Regional Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa	Nairobi.	October

United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Adopts Final Act

Representatives of 118 nations took part in a United Nations Conference on Trade and Development which met at Geneva from March 23 to June 16. Under Secretary of State George W. Ball headed the U.S. delegation.¹ Following are the preamble and recommendations contained in the Final Act which was adopted on June 16.²

PREAMBLE

The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development has adopted this Final Act.

SECTION I. BACKGROUND

1. The States participating in the Conference are determined to achieve the high purposes embodied in the United Nations Charter "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom";³ to seek a better and more effective system of international economic co-operation, whereby the division of the world into areas of poverty and plenty may be banished and prosperity achieved by all; and to find ways by which the human and material resources of the world may be harnessed for the abolition of poverty everywhere. In an age when scientific progress has put unprece-

dent abundance within man's reach, it is essential that the flows of world trade should help to eliminate the wide economic disparities among nations. The international community must combine its efforts to ensure that all countries—regardless of size, of wealth, of economic and social system—enjoy the benefits of international trade for their economic development and social progress.

2. Recognizing that universal peace and prosperity are closely linked and that the economic growth of the developing countries will also contribute to the economic growth of the developed countries, realizing the danger of a widening gulf in living standards between peoples, and convinced of the benefits of international co-operation with a view to helping the developing countries to reach a higher standard of life, the States signatories of this Final Act are resolved, in a sense of human solidarity, "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples."³

3. In endorsing the decision to convene the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, the General Assembly of the United Nations was motivated by certain basic considerations. Economic and social progress throughout the world depends in large measure on a steady expansion in international trade. The extensive development of equitable and mutually advantageous international trade creates a good basis for the establishment of neighbourly relations between States, helps to strengthen peace and an atmosphere of mutual confidence and understanding among nations, and promotes higher living standards and more rapid economic progress in all countries of the

¹ For a statement by Mr. Ball before the Conference on Mar. 25 and a message from President Johnson, see BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 634.

² In addition to the portion printed here, the Final Act (U.N. doc. E/CONF.46/L.28) includes: Annex A, showing the results of the voting; Annex B, containing observations of delegations; and Annex C, messages from heads of state and other communications.

³ Preamble to the Charter of the United Nations. [Footnote in original.]

world. Finally, the accelerated economic development of the developing countries depends largely on a substantial increase in their share in international trade.

4. The task of development, which implies a complex of structural changes in the economic and social environment in which men live, is for the benefit of the people as a whole. The developing countries are already engaged in a determined attempt to achieve, by their own efforts, a breakthrough into self-sustaining economic growth which furthers social progress. These efforts must continue and be enlarged. Economic and social progress should go together. If privilege, extremes of wealth and poverty, and social injustice persist, then the goal of development is lost. If the social and cultural dimension of development is ignored, economic advance alone can bring no abiding benefit.

5. The developing countries recognize that they have the primary responsibility to raise the living standards of their peoples; but their national exertions to this end will be greatly impaired if not supplemented and strengthened by constructive international action based on respect for national sovereignty. An essential element of such action is that international policies in the field of trade and development should result in a modified international division of labour which is more rational and equitable and is accompanied by the necessary adjustments in world production and trade. The resultant increase in productivity and purchasing power of the developing countries will contribute to the economic growth of the industrialized countries as well, and thus become a means to world-wide prosperity.

6. The issues before the Conference have been at once challenging and urgent. While there are varying degrees of development, the joint income of the developing countries, with two-thirds of the world's population, is not much more than one-tenth of that of the industrialized countries. Moreover, the dramatic increase in the population of the developing countries multiplies the difficulties they face in assuring to their peoples even the simplest elements of a decent human life. The aim must be to create jointly new trade and new wealth, so as to share a common prosperity, and thereby avoid the

waste and other unfavourable consequences of closed paths to development. The international community is called upon to join in a constructive and universal policy of co-operation for trade and development which will further economic progress throughout the world.

7. The designation of the nineteen-sixties as the United Nations Development Decade was a recognition of deep world-wide concern with the urgent necessity of raising the standard of living of the developing countries and an earnest of the resolve of the United Nations, working together, to accomplish this task. Wide concern has been expressed regarding the inadequacy of the Decade's objective of a minimum rate of growth of aggregate national income of 5 per cent per annum by 1970. To attain even this rate of growth it is essential that measures and action be taken by both the developing and the developed countries, including measures to raise the level and accelerate the rate of growth of earnings of the developing countries from trade, as a means of helping them to overcome their persistent external imbalance.

8. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development was convened in order to provide, by means of international co-operation, appropriate solutions to the problems of world trade in the interest of all peoples and particularly to the urgent trade and development problems of the developing countries. In a period when their need for imports of development goods and for technical knowledge has been increasing, developing countries have been faced with a situation in which their export earnings and capacity to import goods and services have been inadequate. The growth in import requirements has not been matched by a commensurate expansion in export earnings. The resultant trade gap, which gold and foreign exchange reserves have been inadequate to bridge, has had to be filled very largely by capital imports. This in itself cannot provide a complete or permanent solution, and indeed the servicing of external debts and the outgoings on other "invisible" items themselves present severe burdens for developing countries. Moreover, the terms of trade have operated to the disadvantage of the developing countries. In

recent years many developing countries have been faced with declining prices for their exports of primary commodities at a time when prices of their imports of manufactured goods, particularly capital equipment, have increased. This, together with the heavy dependence of individual developing countries on primary commodity exports has reduced their capacity to import. Unless these and other unfavourable trends are changed in the near future, the efforts of the developing countries to develop, diversify and industrialize their economies will be seriously hampered.

9. Deeply sensible of the urgency of the problems with which the Conference has dealt, the States participating in this Conference, taking note of the recommendations of the Conference, are determined to do their utmost to lay the foundations of a better world economic order.

SECTION II. CONSTITUTION AND PROCEEDINGS

10. When, in the third week of December 1961, the General Assembly of the United Nations designated the current decade as "the United Nations Development Decade", it also asked the Secretary-General to consult members on the advisability of convening an international conference on international trade problems. Both resolutions (1707 (XVI) and 1710 (XVI)) sprang from the growing conviction that the economic aims of the Charter would best be furthered by a bold new programme of international economic co-operation; and it was in this conviction that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development had its origin.

11. The Cairo Conference on the Problems of Economic Development held in July 1962 issued a Declaration (which was later welcomed by the United Nations General Assembly in resolution 1820 (XVII)) strongly recommending the early convening of an international conference on trade and development. The idea of such a Conference having gained ground, the General Assembly of the United Nations endorsed, on 8 December 1962 (resolution 1785 (XVII)), the decision taken in August 1962 by the Economic and Social Council (resolution 917 (XXXIV)) whereby the Council resolved to convene this Conference and to establish a

Preparatory Committee to consider its agenda. The Secretary-General was requested to invite all States Members of the United Nations and members of the specialized agencies and of the International Atomic Energy Agency to take part in the Conference. The deliberation of the Preparatory Committee's three sessions⁴ were fruitful: a detailed provisional agenda for the Conference was drawn up, and a report was prepared defining the problems to be examined and suggesting the directions in which possible solutions might be sought. At the Committee's request the secretariats of the United Nations family of organizations prepared many studies of the issues involved. The Secretary-General of the Conference sought the advice of governments and scholars, and prepared his report entitled *Towards a New Trade Policy for Development* [E/CONF.46/3]. Member States, individually and in groups, also submitted useful proposals and suggestions to the Conference.

12. On 18 July 1963, the Economic and Social Council decided that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development should be held in Geneva, beginning on 23 March 1964 and continuing until 15 June 1964, and approved the provisional agenda drawn up by the Preparatory Committee (Economic and Social Council resolution 963 (XXXVI)). By its resolution of 11 November 1963 the General Assembly (resolution 1897 (XVIII)) noted the work of the Preparatory Committee and of the Secretary-General of the Conference, welcomed the Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries,⁵ and invited States to give serious consideration to it. The regional economic com-

⁴ The first session of the Preparatory Committee took place at United Nations Headquarters from 22 January to 5 February 1963; the second was held at the European Office of the United Nations, at Geneva, from 21 May to 29 June 1963; and the third session was at United Nations Headquarters from 3 to 15 February 1964. At its third session, the Committee decided that informal closed meetings should be held prior to the opening of the Conference. These pre-Conference meetings were held in Geneva from 18 to 23 March 1964. [Footnote in original.]

⁵ The Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries was adopted at the same time as, and forms an annex to, the General Assembly resolution in question. [Footnote in original.]

missions and other regional organizations considered questions of trade and development and adopted important resolutions and declarations.⁶ Meanwhile, as the practical arrangements for the Conference went forward, the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council were the principal forum for debates expressing the high hopes vested by the peoples of the United Nations in the Conference as a potential turning point in international co-operation in the field of trade and development.

13. Aware of these high hopes, the representatives of the following one hundred and twenty⁷ States gathered in Geneva from 23 March to 16 June 1964 to take part in the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Ceylon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Leopoldville), Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Dahomey, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Federal Republic of Germany, Finland, France, Gabon, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Haiti, Holy See, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Laos, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Viet-Nam, Romania, Rwanda, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanganyika,⁸ Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United

Arab Republic, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zanzibar.⁸

14. The inaugural address was delivered by the President of Switzerland; the Secretary-General of the United Nations also addressed the Conference; and messages of goodwill and good wishes for success were received from numerous Heads of State. After adopting its agenda and electing its officers—a President, twenty-seven Vice-Presidents, and a Rapporteur—the Conference was addressed by its President and heard, over a period of twelve days, an address by its Secretary-General and a series of policy statements by heads of delegations, most of whom were Cabinet ministers, and by representatives of a number of inter-governmental economic organizations. Five Committees of the whole were established for detailed study of the items of the agenda. The General Committee of the Conference comprised the President, the Vice-Presidents, the Rapporteur, and the Chairmen of the five Committees. The Conference also established a Drafting Committee for the Final Act.

15. With a view to reaching agreement on the issues before the Conference, many informal meetings were held and important consultations conducted among groups of delegations. A notable feature of the Conference was the fact that the delegations of the States signatories of the Joint Declaration of the Developing Countries co-ordinated their work with a view to enhancing general co-operation among all delegations.

SECTION III. FINDINGS

The Conference has been guided by the following findings:

16. World trade has expanded substantially in recent years: the value of world exports has more than doubled since 1950. The principal impulse for this growth has been provided by the overall expansion of the world economy, aided by national and international action as well as enormous scientific and technical prog-

⁶ See the reports relating to the Brasilia meeting convened by the Economic Commission for Latin America (E/CONF.46/60 and 71) and the Alta Gracia Charter approved by the Special Latin American Coordinating Committee of the Organization of American States, (E/CONF.46/100) the resolutions adopted by the Economic Commission for Africa (E/CONF.46/82) and by the Economic and Social Commission of African Unity at Niamey (E/CONF.46/107), the resolution of the Economic Commission for Europe (E/CONF.46/46) and the Teheran resolutions of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (E/CONF.46/87). [Footnote in original.]

⁷ Somalia and Western Samoa were invited, but did not attend the Conference. [Footnote in original.]

⁸ On 27 May 1964, as a result of the formation of the United Republic of Tanganyika and Zanzibar, the delegations of Tanganyika and Zanzibar were reconstituted as a unified delegation. [Footnote in original.]

ress and the social and economic changes in the world.

17. The countries of the world did not share proportionately in this expansion of international trade. While exports of developing countries rose from \$19.2 billion to \$28.9 billion between 1950 and 1962, that is by 50 per cent, the expansion of exports from these countries proceeded at an appreciably lower rate than that of developed countries. As a result, the share of developing countries in world exports declined steadily from nearly one-third in 1950 to only slightly more than one-fifth in 1962. Concurrently, the developed market economies increased their share from three-fifths to two-thirds, and the centrally planned economies from 8 per cent to 13 per cent. One of the reasons for the decline in the rate of expansion of world exports from 8.4 per cent per annum in the early fifties to rather less than 5 per cent in the early sixties is the inability of the developing countries to attain a higher rate of export expansion.

18. The difficulties experienced by developing countries in increasing the sale of their products at remunerative prices in the markets of most of the highly industrialized countries have placed a limit on the extent to which they can purchase capital goods and machinery from the developed countries, which in turn has contributed to a slower rate of expansion of world trade than would have been the case if the developing countries had been enabled to increase their exports at a faster rate. Further, measures having discriminatory or protectionist effects applied by certain developed countries have hampered the development of the trade of developing countries and of world trade in general.

19. The difficulties of developing countries were aggravated by deterioration in their terms of trade during the period 1950-1962. The slower growth in the quantity of exports of the developing countries and the adverse movement of their terms of trade were largely the reflexion of the present commodity composition of their trade, consisting, as it does, predominantly of the exchange of primary product exports for manufactured imports whose relative positions in world markets have undergone significant changes. World trade in manufactures has

been increasing at an annual rate more than twice that of trade in primary products. Factors contributing to the sluggishness of primary product exports include the low response of consumer demand for food to increases in income of consumers in the advanced countries where incomes and food consumption are already high, the widespread use of substitutes and synthetics, and the increasing output of primary products in advanced countries which has been the result both of domestic policies, in many cases reinforced by protective barriers, as well as a general increase in productivity stemming from technological progress. These long-term trends have been accentuated by short-term fluctuations in export earnings caused by economic recessions and other factors.

20. The deterioration in terms of trade and the sluggish expansion of the export quantum of developing countries occurred at a time when their need for imported supplies to speed up the pace of their economic development sharply increased. There is a close link between the rate of economic growth and the available supply of investment goods. The developing countries require a specific increase in the supply of investment goods in order to achieve the Development Decade target. Since their domestic capacity to produce these goods is limited, a substantial amount of such goods has to be imported. Imports have to be financed through export receipts and inflows of capital from abroad. Thus, the resources required for a higher rate of growth would obviously have to be sought in additional export earnings and an increase in the net inflow of long-term public and private funds.

21. The developing countries' surplus of exports over imports in 1950 became a deficit in 1962 of \$2.3 billion, while their net payments for investment income and other invisibles were about \$3.3 billion around 1960. This deficit was covered by the provision of aid and other capital flows. However, the gap between the import requirements of developing countries and their export earnings has been widening. According to United Nations Secretariat estimates, this gap could be of the order of \$20 billion a year in 1970, on the basis of a 5 per cent per annum rate of growth set as the target for

the United Nations Development Decade, assuming no change in the trends of the fifties upon which these estimates were based.

22. In recent years, the developing countries have been turning increasingly to economic and social planning as the most effective means for accelerating their growth. Their plans, policies and institutions are designed to achieve the transformation of their economic and social structures and to provide for maximum saving, investment and output to a pre-determined order of priorities for a targeted rate of growth. However realistic the plans drawn up by the developing countries may be, their realization is hindered by the instability of international markets for primary products and by conditions restricting the access of primary commodities and semi-manufactures and manufactures to the markets of the developed countries. The continued dependence on the export of a single product or a few commodities whose prices have been declining in the past has made the realization of the development plans all the more difficult. The realization of economic and social development plans of the developing countries necessitates an appropriate change in the present structure of international trade in such a way as to afford them the opportunity of earning adequate and stable supplies of foreign exchange.

23. An overwhelming proportion—over two-thirds—of the import and export trade of developing countries is with the developed market economies. Between 1950 and 1962 the total exports of the developed market economies to the developing countries increased by 98 per cent, rising from \$10,650 million to \$21,060 million. This contrasted with the exports of the developing countries to the developed market countries, which increased by 56 per cent, rising from \$13,220 million to \$20,660 million.

24. The reason for the failure of exports of the developing countries to the developed market economies to expand at a faster rate can be attributed to a number of factors. Reference has already been made in the foregoing passages to contributory factors of a general character. Specific policies include price-support programmes, customs duties and internal taxes and fiscal charges imposed on the

consumption of tropical products, export subsidies on commodities of interest to developing countries, and higher levels of tariffs imposed on processed products relative to those applied to such products when exported in their natural form. These factors have contributed to the sluggishness of the demand for the products of developing countries and in the case of some commodities to the accumulation of surpluses which have tended to exercise a depressing effect on world commodity prices. There is need for the elimination of these obstacles by national and international action designed to improve access and expand market opportunities for the exports of primary products, semi-manufactures and manufactures of developing countries in order to increase their export earnings.

25. Owing to its relatively recent origin, trade between developing countries and the centrally planned economies is so far limited to a relatively small number of countries and constitutes a small part of the trade turnover of developing countries as a whole. In 1962, \$1,630 million, or 5.6 per cent of the total exports of the developing countries went to the centrally planned economies, while imports from the latter into the former totalled \$2,150 million and formed 7.3 per cent of total imports. This trade has, however, shown a tendency to increase rapidly in recent years. Thus, in terms of value, the exports of the countries with centrally planned economies to developing countries increased from \$405 million to \$2,150 million, or by 430 per cent, between 1950 and 1962, while exports from the developing countries to the countries with centrally planned economies showed an expansion from \$610 million to \$1,630 million, or by 167 per cent, over the same period.

26. The expansion in trade has been secured mainly through medium and long-term bilateral trade agreements which stipulate the quantity and/or the value of goods to be exchanged. In spite of the rapidity of growth in trade between the two groups of countries, there is still considerable scope for expansion, which can be secured through the removal of certain obstacles which prevent a faster rate of growth and by further positive measures taken by the inter-

ested countries. The major obstacles arise from the fact that trade relations have not yet been established between many developing countries and centrally planned economies, the need, in some cases, due to the bilateral trade system, for individual developing countries to balance their trade with individual centrally planned economies, and the paucity of knowledge among public and private organizations of trade partners in some developing countries about the products and the trade policies and practices of the centrally planned economies.

27. These problems can be solved and trade between countries of the two groups expanded at a more rapid rate through the establishment of normal trade relations between centrally planned economies and a larger number of developing countries; through the granting by countries with centrally planned economies to developing countries, within the framework of the former's foreign trade system, of special advantages conducive to the promotion of such trade; through the adoption by the centrally planned economies, within the framework of their long-term plans, of appropriate measures to secure the diversification and a proportionately increasing growth of their imports of primary, semi-manufactured and manufactured products from developed countries; and through increased utilization by centrally planned economies, in addition to bilateral arrangements, of multilateral trade and payment methods, when these are considered to be of mutual advantage to all partners in the trade. Developing countries for their part should accord the countries with centrally planned economies conditions for trade not inferior to those granted normally to the developed market economy countries.

28. Trade between the centrally planned countries and the developed market economies has grown rapidly in recent years. The full potentiality of this trade, however, has not been realized because of administrative, economic and trade policy obstacles. Efforts to discover means to solve these problems and increase trade to the mutual benefit of all partners concerned and thus achieve levels of trade commensurate with the apparent possibilities, have shown in-

creasing progress in recent years.

29. Continuation of such efforts in whatever available forums, including within the framework of the future institutional arrangements recommended by the Conference, should result in progressively greater levels of trade between countries having different economic and social systems. It is recognized that such a development would be in the interest of world trade as a whole.

30. While trade between developed countries is increasing and while the share of such exchanges in total world trade is also rising, the level of trade between developing countries is very low and its importance in world trade has been decreasing. The expansion of inter and intra-regional trade is important to developing countries insofar as it provides them with wider markets for their products and enables them to further diversify their trade and to save on scarce foreign exchange. Hence, the establishment of closer and broader trade ties between developing countries is necessary.

SECTION IV. REASONS AND CONSIDERATIONS

In drawing up its recommendations, the Conference has been guided by the following essential reasons and considerations:

(31) The development of equitable and mutually advantageous trade can promote higher standards of living, full employment and rapid economic progress in all countries of the world.

(32) The fundamental problems of developing countries are well identified and what is now required is a universal readiness to act and generally to adopt practical measures aimed at increasing exports and export earnings of developing countries and accelerating their economic development.

(33) At the root of the foreign trade difficulties facing the developing countries and other countries highly dependent on a narrow range of primary commodities are the slow rate of growth of demand for their exports of primary commodities, accounting for 90 per cent of their exports, the increasing participation of developed countries in world trade in primary commodities, and the deterioration in the terms

of trade of developing countries from 1950 to 1962.

(34) During the period of structural readjustments of their economies, the developing countries will remain heavily dependent on commodity exports to meet growing import needs involved in the process of industrialization and diversification.

(35) Because of the outstanding importance of commodity trade for economic development, particularly of the developing countries and the special difficulties affecting trade in primary commodities, it is important and urgent that action be taken over a wide front and on dynamic and comprehensive lines so as to conduct a concerted attack on international commodity problems.

(36) There is accordingly a need for a deliberate effort on the part of all industrialized countries to remedy the adverse tendencies in question.

(37) This comprehensive action should include international commodity arrangements as one of the means of stimulating a dynamic and steady growth of the real export earnings of the developing countries so as to provide them with expanding resources for their economic and social development and of securing overall stabilization in primary commodity markets. It is also necessary to accelerate the removal of existing obstacles and to forestall the creation of new obstacles to commodity trade.

(38) Compensatory financing is an appropriate solution to meet the serious residual problems caused by short-term fluctuations in the prices of and earnings from primary commodity exports. For residual long-term problems financial solutions should be sought.

(39) The developing countries should not rely merely on the expansion of traditional exports of primary products and raw materials. Promotion of industries with an export potential in developing countries is essential. Diversification and expansion of exports of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods are among the important means to assist the developing countries to achieve in time a balance in their external accounts.

(40) The establishment and expansion in developing countries of industries with an export

potential call for a whole series of inter-related measures and action on the part of the developing countries within the framework of overall planning, as well as by developed countries and appropriate international organizations.

(41) The role of the public sector in the economic development of developing countries is recognized, as well as the role of private capital, domestic and foreign.

(42) Developing countries face obstacles and difficulties in marketing their manufactures and semi-manufactures in the developed countries. In order to facilitate the industrial exports of developing countries, their products should have freer access particularly to the markets of the developed countries, but also to the markets of other developing countries.

(43) Easier access to markets should be provided not only for existing and traditional exports of manufactures and semi-manufactures, but also for a wider range of products in order to improve the opportunities for the establishment in the developing countries of a wider range of industries more technically evolved and producing industrial goods of higher degrees of complexity.

(44) Substantial imports of manufactures and semi-manufactures may involve some readjustment in the industrial structures of the developed countries.

(45) A lowering of trade barriers would improve the competitive position of the developing countries relative to that of domestic producers in the market of each developed country, but it would not improve their competitive position in that market in relation to exports from other developed countries. Special measures in favour of exports from developing countries would be needed to bring about the required expansion of such exports.

(46) In addition to the expansion of exports of manufactures to developed countries, the expansion of such trade among the developing countries themselves would contribute towards solving the dilemma posed by the economic and technological requirements of modern industry on the one hand and the limited domestic markets of individual countries on the other. Because of the many forms which economic co-operation might have in various cases and the

problems which they might cause, it is considered that a certain flexibility is needed.

(47) The Conference has considered the general targets on which the international community might focus in dealing with the problems of development through trade and international co-operation. A number of principles and criteria aimed at providing constructive guide-lines for policies in the various areas of international financial and technical co-operation have been formulated. The major questions identified are as follows:

(a) The need for higher growth rates for developing countries; measures to be taken by developed and developing countries, including measures to increase foreign exchange availabilities.

(b) Guide-lines for international financial and technical co-operation; terms and conditions of aid, and the relation of trade and aid to maintain the continuity of sound development plans or programmes.

(c) External debt problems.

(d) The need and means for increasing the flow of financial resources to the developing countries.

(e) Compensatory finance; supplementary financial measures.

(f) Aspects of shipping and all other invisible items.

(g) The need for periodic reviews.

(48) There is wide recognition of the importance and gravity of the problem posed by the financing of development, in all its many complex aspects, and this recognition should form the basis for continuing reviews and action in this field.

(49) There is also recognition of the need for greater and more systematic efforts by all parties involved, with a fair division of responsibilities among developed and developing countries, in order to engender the necessary co-operative efforts at the national, regional and international levels.

(50) More specifically, there is wide agreement in some key areas which, though necessarily limited in scope, constituted forward steps. These areas include measures for accelerated growth in developing countries and increase in foreign exchange availabilities; guide-lines for

international financial and technical co-operation, compensatory financing and supplementary financial measures, and for dealing with external debt problems; and some aspects of shipping in relation to the trade of developing countries.

(51) Finally, in some other areas, there is also agreement that specific measures which have been proposed should be given further consideration or should be studied by the appropriate international organizations.

52. In approaching the problem of institutional arrangements, the Conference has taken into account the fact that sustained efforts are necessary to raise the standards of living in all countries and to accelerate the economic growth of developing countries, and that international trade is an important instrument for economic development. The Conference has provided a unique opportunity to make a comprehensive review of the problems of trade and of trade in relation to economic development, particularly those problems affecting the developing countries. It has recognized that adequate and effectively functioning organizational arrangements are essential if the full contribution of international trade to the accelerated growth of the developing countries is to be successfully realized through the formulation and implementation of the necessary policies.

53. To this end, the Conference has examined the operation of existing international institutions and has recognized both their contributions and their limitations in dealing with all the problems of trade and related problems of development. It believes that participating governments should make the most effective use of institutions and arrangements to which they are or may become parties, and is convinced, at the same time, that there should be a further review of both the present and the proposed institutional arrangements, in the light of the experience of their work and activities. The Conference has further taken note of the widespread desire among developing countries for a comprehensive trade organization, and has recognized that further institutional arrangements are necessary in order to continue the work initiated by this Conference and to implement its recommendations and conclusions.

SECOND PART—A CONSOLIDATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE CONFERENCE^{*}

SECTION I. PRINCIPLES

1. The Conference has recommended the following General Principles to govern international trade relations and trade policies conducive to development:

General Principle One

Economic relations between countries, including trade relations, shall be based on respect for the principle of sovereign equality of states, self-determination of peoples, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

General Principle Two

There shall be no discrimination on the basis of differences in socio-economic systems. Adaptation of trading methods shall be consistent with this principle.

General Principle Three

Every country has the sovereign right freely to trade with other countries, and freely to dispose of its natural resources in the interest of the economic development and well-being of its own people.

General Principle Four

Economic development and social progress should be the common concern of the whole international community and should by increasing economic prosperity and well-being help strengthen peaceful relations and co-operation among nations. Accordingly, all countries pledge themselves to pursue internal and external economic policies designed to accelerate economic growth throughout the world, and in particular to help promote in developing countries a rate of growth consistent with the need to bring about substantial and steady increase in average income in order to narrow the gap between the standard of living in developing countries and that in the developed countries.

General Principle Five

National and international economic policies

^{*}The results of the voting on the Principles and Recommendations adopted by the Conference appear in Annex A. Observations and reservations appear in Annex B. [Footnote in original.]

should be directed towards the attainment of an international division of labour in harmony with the needs and interests of developing countries in particular and of the world as a whole. Developed countries should assist the developing countries in their efforts to speed up their economic and social progress, should co-operate in measures taken by developing countries for diversifying their economies and should encourage appropriate adjustments in their own economies to this end.

General Principle Six

International trade is one of the most important factors in economic development. It should be governed by such rules as are consistent with the attainment of economic and social progress and should not be hampered by measures incompatible therewith. All countries should co-operate in creating conditions of international trade conducive in particular to the achievement of a rapid increase in the export earnings of developing countries and in general to the promotion of an expansion and diversification of trade between all countries, whether at similar levels of development, at different levels of development, or having different economic and social systems.

General Principle Seven

The expansion and diversification of international trade depends upon increasing access to markets, and upon remunerative prices for the exports of primary products. Developed countries shall progressively reduce and, in appropriate cases, eliminate barriers and other restrictions that hinder trade and consumption of products of particular interest to developing countries and take positive measures such as will create and increase markets for the exports of developing countries. All countries should co-operate through suitable international arrangements on an orderly basis in implementing measures designed to increase and stabilize commodity export earnings, particularly of developing countries, at equitable and remunerative prices and to maintain a mutually acceptable relationship between the prices of manufactured goods and those of primary products.

General Principle Eight

International trade should be conducted to mutual advantage on the basis of the most favoured nation treatment and should be free from measures detrimental to the trading interests of other countries. However, developed countries should grant concessions to all developing countries and extend to developing countries all concessions they grant to one another and should not in granting these or other concessions, require any concessions in return from developing countries. New preferential concessions, both tariff and non-tariff, should be made to developing countries as a whole and such preferences should not be extended to developed countries. Developing countries need not extend to developed countries preferential treatment in operation amongst them. Special preferences at present enjoyed by certain developing countries in certain developed countries should be regarded as transitional and subject to progressive reduction. They should be eliminated as and when effective international measures guaranteeing at least equivalent advantages to the countries concerned come into operation.

General Principle Nine

Developed countries participating in regional economic groupings should do their utmost to ensure that their economic integration does not cause injury to, or otherwise adversely affect, the expansion of their imports from third countries, and in particular from developing countries, either individually or collectively.

General Principle Ten

Regional economic groupings, integration or other forms of economic co-operation should be promoted among developing countries as a means of expanding their intra-regional and extra-regional trade and encouraging their economic growth and their industrial and agricultural diversification with due regard to the special features of development of the various countries concerned as well as their economic and social systems. It will be necessary to ensure that such co-operation makes an effective contribution to the economic development of these countries, and does not inhibit the eco-

nomic development of other developing countries outside such groupings.

General Principle Eleven

International institutions and developed countries should provide an increasing net flow of international financial, technical and economic assistance to support and reinforce, by supplementing the export earnings of developing countries, the efforts made by them to accelerate their economic growth through diversification, industrialization and increase of productivity on the basis of their national policies, plans and programmes of economic development. Such assistance, should not be subject to any political or military conditions. This assistance whatever its form and from whatever source, including foreign public and private loans and capital, should flow to developing countries on terms fully in keeping with their trade and development needs. International financial and monetary policies should be designed to take full account of the trade and development needs of developing countries.

General Principle Twelve

All countries recognize that a significant portion of resources released in successive stages as a result of the conclusion of an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control should be allocated to the promotion of economic development in developing countries.

General Principle Thirteen

The Conference decided to include, as a separate part of the Principles adopted by the Conference, the Principles relating to transit trade of land-locked countries set forth below.

General Principle Fourteen

Complete decolonization in compliance with the United Nations Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the liquidation of the remnants of colonialism in all its forms is a necessary condition for economic development and the exercise of sovereign rights over natural resources.

General Principle Fifteen

The adoption of international policies and measures for the economic development of the

developing countries shall take into account the individual characteristics and different stages of development of the developing countries, special attention being paid to the less developed among them, as an effective means of ensuring sustained growth with equitable opportunity for each developing country.

2. The Conference has recommended a number of Special Principles to govern international trade relations and trade policies conducive to development (see Annex A.I.1.).

3. The Conference has adopted the following recommendation on Principles relating to transit trade of land-locked countries:

The Conference,

Having regard to the various aspects of the problem of transit trade of land-locked States,

Considering that for the promotion of the economic development of the land-locked States, it is essential to provide facilities to enable them to overcome the effects of their land-locked position on their trade,

Adopts the following principles together with the Interpretative Note:

Principle I

The recognition of the right of each land-locked State of free access to the sea is an essential principle for the expansion of international trade and economic development.

Principle II

In territorial and on internal waters, vessels flying the flag of land-locked countries should have identical rights and enjoy treatment identical to that enjoyed by vessels flying the flag of coastal States other than the territorial State.

Principle III

In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas on equal terms with coastal States, States having no sea coast should have free access to the sea. To this end States situated between the sea and a State having no sea coast shall by common agreement with the latter and in conformity with existing international conventions accord to ships flying the flag of that State treatment equal to that accorded to their own ships or to the ships of any other State as regards access to sea ports and the use of such ports.

Principle IV

In order to promote fully the economic development of the land-locked countries, the said countries should be afforded by all States, on the basis of reciprocity, free and unrestricted transit, in such a manner that they have free access to regional and international trade in all circumstances and for every type of goods.

Goods in transit should not be subject to any customs duty.

Means of transport in transit should not be subject to special taxes or charges higher than those levied for the use of means of transport of the transit country.

Principle V

The State of transit, while maintaining full sovereignty over its territory shall have the right to take all indispensable measures to ensure that the exercise of the right of free and unrestricted transit shall in no way infringe its legitimate interests of any kind.

Principle VI

In order to accelerate the evolution of a universal approach to the solution of the special and particular problems of trade and development of land-locked countries in the different geographical areas, the conclusion of regional and other international agreements in this regard should be encouraged by all States.

Principle VII

The facilities and special rights accorded to land-locked countries in view of their special geographical position are excluded from the operation of the most-favoured-nation clause.

Principle VIII

The principles which govern the right of free access to the sea of the land-locked State shall in no way abrogate existing agreements between two or more contracting parties concerning the problems, nor shall they raise an obstacle as regards the conclusion of such agreements in the future, provided that the latter do not establish a régime which is less favourable than or opposed to the above-mentioned provisions.

Interpretative Note

These Principles are inter-related and each

Principle should be construed in the context of the other Principles.

4. In the light of its adoption of principles governing international trade relations and trade policies conducive to development, the Conference has recognized the necessity of achieving the broadest possible measure of agreement at the earliest possible moment on a set of Principles, and has recommended that the institutional machinery proposed by the Conference should continue efforts to that end (see Annex A.I.3).

SECTION II. INTERNATIONAL COMMODITY PROBLEMS

5. In order to deal with the problems facing the primary commodity trade of developing countries the Conference has recommended that the provisions outlined below should be considered as means of increasing the export earnings of the developing countries by general measures as well as by specific measures related to individual commodities and, that, to this end, practical steps should be taken by governments concerned to implement at the earliest possible date those of the following provisions which are applicable in the light of certain considerations (see Annex A.II.1), as solutions of the urgent problems of developing countries.

(a) Provisions for international commodity arrangements with a basic objective of stimulating a dynamic and steady growth and ensuring reasonable predictability in the real export earnings of the developing countries so as to provide them with expanding resources for their economic and social development, while taking into account the interests of consumers in importing countries, through remunerative, equitable and stable prices for primary commodities, having due regard to their import purchasing power, assured satisfactory access and increased imports and consumption, as well as co-ordination of production and marketing policies (see Annexes A.II.1 and A.II.2):

(b) Provisions for a programme of measures and actions for the removal of obstacles (tariff, non-tariff and other) and discriminatory practices and for expansion of market opportunities for primary commodity exports and for in-

creases in their consumption and imports in developed countries (see Annex A.II.1 and A.II.2).

6. The Conference has given general approval to the establishment of a commission on commodity arrangements and policies within the framework of the continuing institutional machinery which will be established following the UNCTAD. The Conference has also generally formulated terms of reference for the new commission and requested that they be given prompt and favourable consideration by the continuing institutional machinery (see Annex A.II.1).

7. The Conference has also adopted recommendations for active measures to promote market opportunities for primary commodity exports and for increases in consumption and imports in both developed and developing countries. It has expressed the belief that food aid should become an integral and continuing part of international aid under the United Nations and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. It has also recommended special action, both national and international, to deal with cases where natural products exported by developing countries face competition from synthetics and other substitutes. It has also recommended, *inter alia*, the study and preparation of a programme of action for the organization of commodity trade (see Annexes A.II.3, A.II.4, A.II.5, A.II.6, A.II.7 and A.II.8).

8. The Conference has noted the heavy dependence of some developing countries on foreign exchange earnings from the export of minerals and fuels, and has recommended that the developed countries should effectively reduce and/or eliminate barriers and discrimination to the trade and consumption of those products, particularly internal taxation, with a view to increasing the real income of the developing countries from the said exports. It has also recommended action to provide the developing countries producing minerals and fuels with an appreciable increase in the revenues which accrue to them as a result of the export of these natural resources (see Annex A.II.9).

SECTION III. TRADE IN MANUFACTURES AND SEMI-MANUFACTURES

9. The Conference recognizes the urgent need for the diversification and expansion of the export trade of developing countries in manufactures and semi-manufactures as a means of accelerating their economic development and raising their standards of living. It considers that individual and joint action by both developed and developing countries is necessary to enable the latter to obtain increased participation commensurate with the needs of their development in the growth of international trade in manufactured and semi-manufactured products.

10. The Conference has adopted a series of recommendations designed to help in the promotion of industries with an export potential and in the expansion of their export trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures. These recommendations deal with the following questions:

(a) Industrial development (see Annex A.III.1), dealing with the creation of a special-agency for industrial development;

(b) Industrial branch agreements on partial division of labour (see Annex A.III.2);

(c) The establishment and expansion of industries with an export potential (see Annex A.III.3).

11. The Conference has recommended the adoption by governments participating in the Conference of certain guidelines in their foreign trade and assistance policies and programmes providing for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets for manufactured and semi-manufactured products of interest to developing countries, so as to enable these countries to increase and diversify their exports of these products on a stable and lasting basis. These guidelines also include appropriate provision by developing and developed countries for co-operation between governments and private groups to build up export production in developing countries (see Annexes A.III.4, and A.III.6).

12. The Conference has noted both the agreement signified by all developing countries and

a great majority of the developed countries with the principle of assisting the industrial development of developing countries by the extension of preferences in their favour and the opposition to this principle expressed by some developed countries. The Conference has recommended that the Secretary-General of the United Nations establish a Committee of governmental representatives to consider the matter with a view to working out the best method of implementing such preferences on the basis of non-reciprocity from the developing countries as well as to discuss further differences of principle involved (see Annex A.III.5).

13. The Conference has adopted a recommendation based on the readiness of the centrally planned economies to take action with a view to increasing through appropriate measures the import of manufactures and semi-manufactures from the developing countries (see Annex A.III.7).

14. The Conference has adopted a recommendation outlining practical measures for promotion of trade in manufactures and semi-manufactures among developing countries (see Annex A.III.8).

15. The Conference has also adopted a recommendation calling on developed countries to take certain measures, *inter alia*, on import promotion and industrial adjustment (see Annex A.III.6).

SECTION IV. FINANCING FOR AN EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND IMPROVEMENT OF THE INVISIBLE TRADE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

16. On the main issues before the Conference on the financing of development, trade and invisible transactions, a large consensus of agreement was reached, though complete agreement was not always achieved.

17. The Conference recognizes the wide concern expressed regarding the inadequacy of the growth target of 5 per cent per annum set for the United Nations Development Decade. The Conference acknowledges the need for steps to be taken, by both developing and developed countries, to mobilize domestic and international resources for accelerated growth in de-

veloping countries at rates even higher than envisaged for the Development Decade where feasible; and that the economic situations, policies and plans of individual developing countries be examined for this purpose with the consent of the country concerned. The Conference also recognizes in this connexion that the import capacity of developing countries, resulting from the combined total of export proceeds, invisible earnings and capital inflow, and taking into account the evolution of prices, should rise sufficiently, and the measures taken by the developing countries themselves should be adequate, so as to enable those higher rates of growth to be achieved; and that all countries, developed and developing, should undertake, individually and in co-operation, such measures as may be necessary to ensure this. The Conference has also recommended that each economically advanced country should endeavour to supply, in the light of principles set forth in Annex A.IV.1, financial resources to the developing countries of a minimum net amount approaching as nearly as possible to 1 per cent of its national income, having regard, however, to the special position of certain countries which are net importers of capital (see Annex A.IV.2). The Conference has also adopted a recommendation providing, *inter alia*, that the rate of interest of government loans to the developing countries should not normally exceed 3 per cent (see Annex A.IV.3).

18. The Conference has adopted recommendations concerning terms and conditions of financial and technical co-operation provided by industrialized countries through bilateral and multilateral programmes of assistance to developing countries (see Annexes A.IV.1, A.IV.3 and A.IV.4).

19. The Conference has proposed certain measures to deal with the increasing burden of accumulated debt and service payments in developing countries, with the objective of facilitating, whenever warranted and under appropriate conditions, the re-scheduling or consolidation of debts with appropriate periods of grace and amortization, and reasonable rates of interest (see Annexes A.IV.1 and A.IV.5). It has also approved the possibility of deliveries on credit

of industrial equipment reimbursable in goods (see Annex A.IV.6).

20. The Conference has adopted the following recommendations proposing measures and studies concerning an increase in the volume or an improvement in the terms of financing for developing countries:

(a) Recommendations concerning a United Nations Capital Development Fund (see Annex A.IV.7), the gradual transformation of the United Nations Special Fund (see Annex A.IV.8);

(b) The provision of aid for development on a regional basis (see Annexes A.IV.9 and A.IV.10);

(c) The promotion of the flow of public and private capital both to the public and private sectors in developing countries (see Annexes A.IV.11, A.IV.12 and A.IV.13);

(d) Review of the use and terms of credit, export financing and marketing, and credit insurance (see Annexes A.IV.14, A.IV.15 and A.IV.16).

21. The Conference has recognized further that adverse movements in the export proceeds of developing countries can be disruptive of development. The Conference has, therefore, recommended that, as regards payments difficulties caused by temporary export shortfalls, members of the International Monetary Fund should study certain measures with a view to liberalizing the terms of the compensatory credit system operated by the Fund since February 1963 (see Annex A.IV.17). As regards longer-term problems, the Conference has recommended (see Annex A.IV.18):

(a) That the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development be invited to study the feasibility of a scheme that would provide supplementary financial resources to developing countries experiencing shortfalls in export proceeds from reasonable expectations. The relevant economic circumstances for consideration would include the adverse effects of significant increases in import prices.

(b) That the continuing machinery recommended by this Conference be invited to study and organize further discussions of con-

cepts and proposals for compensatory financing put forward by the delegations of developing countries at the Conference, taking into account the effect of shortfalls in export earnings and adverse movements in the terms of trade.

22. The Conference has also recommended a study of the international monetary issues relating to problems of trade and development with special reference to the objectives and decisions of this Conference (see Annex A.IV.19). It has also approved a recommendation on the participation of nationals of developing countries in the process of policy formulation in international financial and monetary agencies (see Annex A.IV.20).

23. The Conference has agreed on a draft text containing a common measure of understanding on shipping questions, and has recommended that appropriate intergovernmental procedures, including any committee that might be deemed necessary, be established to promote understanding and co-operation in the field of shipping, and to study and report on its economic aspects (see Annexes A.IV.21 and A.IV.22).

24. The Conference has also considered and recommended measures on insurance, tourism, technical assistance and transfer of technology, taking into account the need to improve the invisible trade of developing countries (see Annexes A.IV.23, A.IV.24, A.IV.25 and A.IV.26).

SECTION V. INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS

25. The Conference has recommended to the United Nations General Assembly that it adopt at its nineteenth session the following provisions, *inter alia*:

(a) The present United Nations Conference on Trade and Development should be established as an organ of the General Assembly to be convened at intervals of not more than three years and with a membership comprising those states which are members of the United Nations, the specialized agencies, or the I.A.E.A.

(b) The principal functions of the Conference shall be:

(i) To promote international trade, especially with a view to accelerating economic development, particularly trade between countries at different stages of develop-

ment, between developing countries and between countries with different systems of economic and social organization, taking into account the functions performed by existing international organizations;

(ii) To formulate principles and policies on international trade and related problems of economic development;

(iii) To make proposals for putting the said principles and policies into effect and to take such other steps within its competence as may be relevant to this end, having regard to differences in economic systems and stages of development;

(iv) Generally, to review and facilitate the co-ordination of activities of other institutions within the United Nations system in the field of international trade and related problems of economic development and in this regard to co-operate with the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council in respect to the performance of their Charter responsibilities for co-ordination;

(v) To initiate action, where appropriate, in co-operation with the competent organs of the United Nations for the negotiation and adoption of multilateral legal instruments in the field of trade, with due regard to the adequacy of existing organs of negotiation and without duplication of their activities;

(vi) To be available as a centre for harmonizing the trade and related development policies of governments and regional economic groupings in pursuance of Article 1 of the United Nations Charter; and

(vii) To deal with any other matters within the scope of its competence.

(c) A permanent organ of the Conference, to be known as the Trade and Development Board, should be established as part of the United Nations machinery in the economic field, consisting of 55 members elected by the Conference from among its membership, with full regard for both equitable geographical distribution and the desirability of continuing representation for the principal trading states.

(d) For the effective discharge of its functions, the Board should establish such subsidiary

organs as may be necessary, and in particular three committees—on commodities, manufactures, and invisibles and financing related to trade.

(e) Each State represented on the Conference should have one vote. Subject to provisions to be determined by the General Assembly at its nineteenth session after consideration by it of a report and proposals to be made by a Special Committee to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, decisions of the Conference on matters of substance should be taken by a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, and decisions of the Board by simple majority. The task of the Special Committee shall be to prepare proposals for procedures within the continuing machinery designed to establish a process of conciliation to take place before voting and to provide an adequate basis for the adoption of recommendations with regard to proposals of a specific nature for action substantially affecting the economic or financial interests of particular countries.

(f) Arrangements should be made, in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter, for the immediate establishment of an adequate, permanent and full-time secretariat within the United Nations Secretariat for the proper servicing of the Conference, the Board and its subsidiary bodies.

(g) The Conference should review in the light of experience the effectiveness and further evolution of institutional arrangements with a view to recommending such changes and improvements as might be necessary. To this end it should study all relevant subjects including matters relating to the establishment of a comprehensive organization based on the entire membership of the United Nations system of organizations to deal with trade and with trade in relation to development (see Annex A.V.1).

26. The Conference has also recommended action concerning interim institutional arrangements, and the terms of reference of subsidiary organs of the Executive Council (see Annexes A.V.2 and A.V.3).

SECTION VI. SPECIAL PROBLEMS

27. The Conference has requested the Secretary-General of the United Nations to appoint

a committee of 24 members, representing land-locked, transit and other interested states as governmental experts and on the basis of equitable geographical distribution. The said committee is to be convened during 1964 to prepare a new draft convention dealing with transit trade of land-locked countries. The Conference has recommended that the new draft convention be submitted for consideration and adoption by a conference of plenipotentiaries to be convened by the United Nations in the middle of 1965 (see Annex A.VI.1).

28. The Conference has recommended that international organizations set up by the developing countries which are the principal exporters of non-renewable natural products be recognized and encouraged to enable them to defend their interests (see Annex A.VI.2).

29. The Conference has also adopted a recommendation concerning expanded utilization of long-term trade agreements (see Annex A.VI.3).

30. The Conference has recommended non-discrimination in dealing with governmental trading organizations in foreign trade (see Annex A.VI.4).

SECTION VII. PROGRAMME OF WORK

31. In addition to the Programme of Work implied in the recommendations referred to above, the Conference has recommended the following:

(1) A study of the feasibility of rates of growth higher than those which have been experienced by most countries individually during the past decade, and even higher than those envisaged for the United Nations Development Decade, and of measures for developing and developed countries to take to achieve them (see Annex A.IV.2);

(2) An overall economic and social survey of the depressed areas of the developing world and of special measures to make possible immediate action to secure a substantial improvement in the living levels of the populations of these areas (see Annex A.VI.5);

(3) A programme of work for the Commission on Commodity Arrangements and Policies, or any equivalent body that may be established within the continuing machinery, for the devel-

opment of appropriate guiding lines and procedures for commodity arrangements and, in respect of commodities to which certain conditions apply, for commodity negotiations and export studies (see Annex A.II.3);

(4) Further studies in the commodity field regarding promotion and marketing arrangements, and measures to deal with problems of substitution and various types of research aiming at an expansion of market opportunities for exports of primary commodities from developing countries (see Annexes A.II.8 and A.II.5);

(5) Work related to the provision of economic and technical assistance with a view to expanding the export earnings of developing countries from primary commodities, semi-manufactures and finished manufactures (see Annexes A.II.8, A.II.6 and A.II.5, Annexes A.III.4 and A.III.7 and Annex A.IV.25);

(6) A study of methods of payment that would assist in promoting trade among developing countries (see Annex A.II.6 and Annex A.III.7);

(7) The necessary economic and statistical studies of world trade, with special reference to the problems of developing countries (see Annex A.VI.5 and Annex A.II.8);

(8) The transmittal to the continuing United Nations trade machinery which it is proposed to establish, for further consideration and action, a draft recommendation submitted by Czechoslovakia on measures for expansion of trade between countries having different economic and social systems (see Annex A.VI.6);

(9) The transmittal to the continuing trade machinery, for further consideration and action, of draft recommendations on the policies and practices of regional economic groupings among developed countries and on the promotion of regional economic groupings among developing countries, submitted by a number of developing countries (see Annex A.VI.7);

(10) The transmittal to one of the organs to be set up by the Conference for further study of part III of the proposal concerning the use of subsidies for improving the competitive position of manufactures and semi-manufactures of developing countries (see report of the Second Committee, E/CONF.46/132, para. 24);

(11) The elaboration of trade aspects of an economic programme of disarmament (see Annex A.VI.10).

Global Communications Satellite Conference Held at Washington

Press release 328 dated July 17

An International Plenipotentiary Conference on Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System will be held at Washington beginning July 21 with the U.S. Government as host. Delegations from 18 countries, including the United States, are scheduled to participate.

The subject of the conference will be two interrelated proposed agreements. One is inter-governmental and contains the organizational principles as a basis for a global system of satellite communications. The other deals with the commercial, financial, and technical operations and will be entered into by the designated communications entities of each country.

When all issues are agreed upon, the first agreement would be entered into by the U.S. Government as an executive agreement. The Communications Satellite Corporation, under the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, is the designated entity of the United States and would be the signatory of the second agreement. Under the proposed international arrangements the Communications Satellite Corporation will serve as manager of the global system on behalf of all participants in the international joint venture.

There have been a number of conferences and talks with regard to the formation of the global commercial communications satellite system during the past year. The last conferences were held in London in June 1964.

The Washington conference will be held in the international conference suite of the Department of State. The United States has invited delegations from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

All these countries have been participants in previous conferences and talks. However, the proposed agreements will be open for signature to any country which is a member of the International Telecommunication Union. Even if a country does not become a capital contributor or signatory, use of the system will be available to all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis.

The U.S. delegation to the conference will be headed by G. Griffith Johnson, Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and will include Leo D. Welch, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Communications Satellite Corporation, E. William Henry, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, and Richard N. Gardner, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Cameroon, July 13, 1964.

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. Open for signature at United Nations Headquarters, New York, September 28 through November 30, 1962. Entered into force December 27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Belgium, June 29, 1964.

Diplomatic Relations

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 1964.¹

Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.²
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, June 19, 1964.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.²
Ratified by the President: July 13, 1964.
Ratification deposited: United States, July 13, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: Austria, July 17, 1964; Jordan, July 10, 1964; Malaysia, July 16, 1964; Trinidad and Tobago, July 14, 1964.

Trade

Declaration on relations between contracting parties to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the Government of the Polish People's Republic. Done at Tokyo November 9, 1959. Entered into force November 16, 1960. TIAS 4649.

Signature: United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964.

Second procès-verbal extending declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 (TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963.²

Signatures: Australia, April 21, 1964; Finland, May 8, 1964; New Zealand, April 29, 1964; Norway, May 6, 1964; United Arab Republic, May 26, 1964.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of August 7, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5195, 5252, 5304, 5342), with related notes. Effected by exchange of notes at Santiago June 30, 1964. Entered into force June 30, 1964.

Denmark

Agreement concerning visits of the NS *Savannah*. Signed at Copenhagen July 2, 1964. Entered into force July 2, 1964.

Japan

Agreement for Japan's contributions for United States administrative and related expenses during Japanese fiscal year 1964 under the mutual defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954 (TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 9, 1964. Entered into force July 9, 1964.

Consular convention and protocol. Signed at Tokyo March 22, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1964. TIAS 5602.

Proclaimed by the President: July 10, 1964.

Korea

Petroleum agreement of 1964, with agreed minute. Signed at Seoul May 12, 1964.

Enters into force: September 3, 1964.

Sweden

Agreement concerning the visits of the NS *Savannah* to Sweden. Effected by exchange of notes at Stockholm July 6, 1964. Entered into force July 6, 1964.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 7, 1964 (TIAS 5556). Effected

by exchange of notes at Tunis July 7, 1964. Entered into force July 7, 1964.

United Arab Republic

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 8, 1962, as amended (TIAS 5179, 5440, 5579). Effected by exchange of notes at Cairo June 30, 1964. Entered into force June 30, 1964.

U.S. and Canada Exchange Notes on St. Lawrence Seaway Tolls

Press release 304 dated June 30

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The United States Embassy at Ottawa on June 30 exchanged notes with the Canadian Department of External Affairs approving an agreement supplementary to the January 29, 1959, memorandum of agreement respecting the St. Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls.¹ By this exchange the two Governments have agreed to extend the developmental period of the Seaway for 2 years until July 1, 1966. During this period no change in the original tariff of tolls is proposed.

TEXT OF CANADIAN NOTE

No. 101

The Secretary of State for External Affairs presents his compliments to the Ambassador of the United States of America and has the honour to refer to an exchange of notes dated March 9, 1959, which made binding from April 1, 1959, a memorandum of agreement dated January 29, 1959, between the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority and the Saint Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation respecting the Saint Lawrence Seaway tariff of tolls. On May 28, 1964, the Authority and the Corporation signed a memorandum of agreement supplementary to their agreement of January, 1959. The Secretary of State for External Affairs has

¹ For an exchange of notes dated Mar. 9, 1959, and text of the memorandum of agreement, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1959, p. 440.

the honour to inform the Ambassador that the memorandum of supplementary agreement, a copy of which is attached and is incorporated in this note, has been confirmed by the Canadian Government.

Therefore, in accordance with the supplementary agreement, the Secretary of State for External Affairs has the honour to propose that Clause 7 of the agreement of January, 1959, be deleted and the following substituted therefor:

"7. That the Authority and the Corporation, having caused the tariff to be reviewed, shall, not later than July 1, 1966, report to their respective Governments as to the sufficiency of the authorized tolls to meet the statutory requirements, recommending a level of tolls related as realistically as possible to these requirements."

If the United States Government approves, it is suggested that this note and the Ambassador's reply shall constitute an agreement between the two Governments giving effect to the foregoing proposal from July 1, 1964.

PAUL MARTIN

OTTAWA, *June 30, 1964.*

Memorandum of Supplementary Agreement

MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT made this 28th day of May, one thousand nine hundred and sixty-four.

BETWEEN: THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AUTHORITY,
(hereinafter referred to as "the Authority"),

and

THE SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, (hereinafter referred to as "the Corporation").

WHEREAS Clause 7 of the Memorandum of Agreement made on the 29th day of January, 1959, between the Authority and the Corporation respecting The St. Lawrence Seaway Tariff of Tolls provides "that the Authority and the Corporation shall, after five complete seasons of navigation have elapsed, and not later than July 1, 1964, report to their respective Governments as to the sufficiency of the authorized tolls to meet the statutory requirements, and to cause the Tariff to be reviewed accordingly";

AND WHEREAS the Authority and the Corporation, in conducting a joint review of the sufficiency of the tolls, are prepared to agree that:

(a) The report by the Entities will be deferred from July 1, 1964 to July 1, 1966, and the developmental period of the Seaway will thereby be extended by two years and will be deemed to terminate at the end of

the 1966 navigation season. Accordingly no change in tolls will be proposed at the present time.

(b) The joint review will be continued and at the conclusion of this two-year extension, tolls proposals will be related as realistically as possible to the financial requirements of the Seaway Entities.

NOW THEREFORE THIS MEMORANDUM OF SUPPLEMENTARY AGREEMENT WITNESSETH THAT the parties hereto agree to recommend to their respective Governments that Clause 7 of the 1959 Agreement respecting tolls be deleted and the following substituted therefor:

7. THAT the Authority and the Corporation, having caused the Tariff to be reviewed, shall, not later than July 1, 1966, report to their respective Governments as to the sufficiency of the authorized tolls to meet the statutory requirements, recommending a level of tolls related as realistically as possible to these requirements.

THE ST. LAWRENCE SEAWAY AUTHORITY

R. J. RANKIN
President

SAINT LAWRENCE SEAWAY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

J. H. McCANN
Administrator

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

No. 387

The Ambassador of the United States of America [W. Walton Butterworth] presents his compliments to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and has the honor to refer to his note no. 101 of June 30, 1964, proposing that Clause 7 of the Agreement between the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation and the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority dated January 29, 1959, be deleted and replaced with the provision contained in the Agreement of May 28, 1964 between the entities which is quoted in his note.

The terms and conditions set forth in the above-mentioned note and the attached Memorandum of Supplementary Agreement are acceptable to the Government of the United States, which concurs in the proposal that the note of the Secretary of State for External Affairs and this reply shall constitute an agreement between the United States and Canadian Governments giving effect to the joint proposal

of the Corporation and the Authority from July 1, 1964.

W. W. B.

EMBASSY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
OTTAWA, June 30, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, amending the agreement of November 26, 1962. Exchange of notes—Signed at New Delhi April 17, 1964. Entered into force April 17, 1964. TIAS 5562. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-Nam, amending the agreement of January 9, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Saigon April 14, 1964. Entered into force April 14, 1964. TIAS 5563. 3 pp. 5¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 13-19

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 13 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 304 of June 30 and 320, 321, and 322 of July 9.

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*326	7/13	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*327	7/16	Cook sworn in as Ambassador to Senegal (biographic details).
328	7/17	Conference on global communications satellite system.
*329	7/17	Kidder sworn in as Ambassador to Cambodia (biographic details).
330	7/18	ANZUS Council communique.

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THE
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OF
STATE
BULLETIN



Vol. LI, No. 1311



August 10, 1964

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OAS Approves Rio Treaty Measures Against Castro Regime

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as Organ of Consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held at Washington July 21-26 to consider Venezuelan charges of Cuban intervention and aggression. Following is a statement made by Secretary Rusk on July 22 and text of the Final Act, which was signed on July 26.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 333 dated July 22; as-delivered text

Mr. Chairman, fellow ministers: You have complimented us all, Mr. Chairman [Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Brazil], in your willingness to serve as our presiding officer, and your chairmanship gives great satisfaction to every colleague at this table.

Five times in as many years the foreign ministers of the American Republics have met to consider situations affecting the peace of the

hemisphere arising in whole or in part from the interventionist activities of the Castro regime. This is a measure of the frequency with which our regional security system has had to act to thwart Castro's aggressive designs.

In the face of continued Cuban aggression the time has now come to make it abundantly clear to the Castro regime that the American governments in complete solidarity will no longer tolerate its efforts to export revolution through the classic Communist techniques of terror and guerrilla warfare and the infiltration of arms and subversive agents.

Origins of Cuban Aggression

The pattern of Cuban aggression emerged soon after the Castro regime came to power in 1959. You will recall the armed expeditions which set forth from Cuban territory against Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti during the first 6 months of that year. When this direct method of overthrowing governments failed, the Cuban government turned to

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department.

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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the indirect technique of subversion. From the sending of armed landing parties, Castro shifted to training in subversive techniques, transfer of funds for subversive elements, dissemination of systematic and hostile propaganda, and the clandestine shipment of both arms and men. The new pattern emerged in full bloom last year, when Castro made a major effort to disrupt the democratic elections in Venezuela and, beyond that, to destroy the democratic institutions of that country.

Establishment of Communist Beachhead in Cuba

But it took some time to "tool up" this new mechanism for indirect aggression. Meanwhile, the Castro regime embarked upon another type of assault against the traditions and principles of the American community of nations: the establishment of the Communist system in Cuba itself and the facilitation of military intervention by an extracontinental totalitarian power in this hemisphere.

I will not take the time here to go into all the details, but you will recall that by mid-1960 the construction of the apparatus of a Communist state in Cuba was well advanced. Likewise its ties with the Soviet bloc and with Communist China were firmly established. Castro signed the first agreement with the Soviets in February 1960 and with the Red Chinese in July. Cuba established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in May 1960 and with the satellite countries in succeeding months. On July 9, 1960, Premier Khrushchev made his offer to support Cuba with rocket power, and President [Osvaldo] Dorticós replied the following day, hailing, as he put it, "the message of solidarity spoken by the Prime Minister of the Soviet Union." These words were shortly followed by deeds in the form of shipments of large quantities of Soviet arms. On January 2, 1961, Castro paraded these weapons for the world to see, and the flow of arms and the parades continued in the years since.

By August 1960, when the American foreign ministers met in San José for the Seventh Meeting of Consultation, Cuba clearly had become Communist and international communism had opened an important beachhead in the Western Hemisphere.

The Hemisphere's Initial Response

The response of the American governments to this flagrant challenge to hemisphere security fell short—surely we would have to say now—of the nature of the threat. Neither at the Fifth Meeting of Consultation in 1959¹ nor the Seventh Meeting in 1960² did the foreign ministers act in a way to make clear to the Castro regime that the transformation of Cuba into a base of operations for international communism would not be tolerated by the American community.

The task of throwing up the hemisphere's defenses devolved on subsequent consultations beginning with the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers in January 1962 at Punta del Este.³

Transformation of the Hemisphere's Attitude

The change in the hemisphere's attitude toward the danger represented by a Communist Cuba became clearly discernible in the careful study made by the Inter-American Peace Committee in November and December 1961. At the request of the Government of Peru the Committee examined, among other things, the Castro regime's relations with the Sino-Soviet bloc and Cuba's promotion of subversion and revolution in other American Republics. The Committee in its report arrived at these principal conclusions—and let us not forget this documentation of our hemisphere:

1. The identification of the Government of Cuba with the Marxist-Leninist ideology and socialism of the Soviet type, together with the rebuilding of the Cuban political organization on the basis of the one-party system of government that is in accordance with that ideology, presuppose positions that are basically antagonistic to the principle established in the Charter of the Organization . . . that

The solidarity of the American States and the high aims which are sought through it require the political organization of those States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy. . . .

3. The present connections of the Government of Cuba with the Sino-Soviet bloc of countries are evidently incompatible with the principles and standards that govern the regional system . . . [and] will prevent the said Government from fulfilling the obliga-

¹ BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

² *Ibid.*, Sept. 12, 1960, p. 395.

³ *Ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

tions stipulated in the Charter of the Organization and the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

4. As regards the intense subversive activity in which the countries of the Sino-Soviet bloc are engaged in America and the activities of the Cuban Government . . . it is evident that they would constitute acts that, within the system for the "political defense" of the Hemisphere, have been classed as acts of "political aggression" or "aggression of a nonmilitary character."

Based in large part on the findings of the Peace Committee, the American governments took their first, historic stand against communism in Cuba at the Punta del Este conference. Many of you were there. The fundamental decisions made then have been of major importance to us since. They stimulated a new awareness of the dangers inherent in the Communist offensive in America. They gave fresh impetus to efforts to develop internal security capabilities to combat subversion. They helped to fulfill a moral commitment of the Organization of American States to defend its basic purposes and principles against the open challenge of one of its members. And they served to pave the way for the swift, decisive, and equally historic decision taken by the American governments on October 23, 1962, which played such a significant role in forcing the Soviet Union to withdraw its offensive weapons systems from Cuba.⁴

Cuban Intervention in Venezuela

The missile crisis removed whatever doubt remained concerning the Castro regime's status as a pawn of the Soviet bloc. It should have served as a warning to Castro and his followers that the American governments were united and firm in their resolve not to permit Cuba to be used as a base for the expansion of communism on this continent and that their patience was running out. Again he did not heed the warning. Instead, he redoubled his subversive offensive against the hemisphere. And he chose Venezuela as a primary target.

I would recall that in the summer of 1963 a Special Committee of the Council of the OAS, under the distinguished leadership of Ambassador [Juan Bautista] de Lavalle of Peru, completed a detailed study of the Cuban effort to

promote subversion in our countries. And in its report the Committee noted that:

Immediately after the October crisis, spokesmen of the Cuban Government began making a series of speeches openly advocating armed insurrection in Latin America as a means of introducing economic and social changes based on the communist system. Although this does not constitute a position that is entirely different from that hitherto held by the Castro regime, the frequency, intensity, and origin of these provocations are such that they lead the Committee to conclude that the Cuban regime has begun a new phase of promoting and encouraging violent subversion in other countries of the hemisphere.

The Committee also called attention to what it described as "two facts that are intimately related to the policy enunciated by the Cuban leaders." "One of these," the Committee stated, "is the tactic of bringing hundreds of persons to Cuba from all the countries of the hemisphere in order to indoctrinate them and train them in the techniques of subversion. The second is the well-known plan of sabotage, terrorism, and guerrilla action that has been unleashed in certain countries, particularly in Venezuela, and the impetus that the Cuban communist leaders have given to this movement."

In further explanation of its conclusion on Venezuela the Committee added:

There is no doubt that the Castro regime has selected Venezuela as its primary objective. This was indicated by the communist spokesman Blas Roca in his speech on January 24, 1963, commemorating the fifth anniversary of the fall of Pérez Jiménez: "When the people of Venezuela achieve victory, [he said] when they gain full independence from imperialism . . . then all America will be inflamed, all America will advance, all America will be freed once and for all from the ominous yoke of Yankee imperialism. If their struggle is a help to us today, [he said] their victory will be an even greater help. Then we shall no longer be a solitary island in the Caribbean confronting the yankee imperialists, but rather we shall have a base of support on the mainland."

And try they did—until they came up against the resolute will of the leaders and the people of Venezuela. The Cuban effort is detailed in the report of the OAS Investigating Committee, which serves as the basis for our action.

The Committee found these to be the chief manifestations of the Castro regime's intervention in Venezuela:

a. A hostile and systematic campaign of propaganda

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 12, 1962, p. 720.

against the Government of Venezuela, as well as the incitement to and support of the communist subversion that is being carried out in that country;

b. Training, in all kinds of subversive activities, of numerous Venezuelan citizens, who traveled to Cuba for that purpose;

c. Remittance of funds through these travelers and other channels, for the purpose of maintaining and increasing subversive activities, and

d. The provision of arms to guerrilla and terrorist groups operating in Venezuela, as shown by the shipment of arms discovered on November 1, 1963, on the Paraguana Peninsula, and the plan for the capture of the city of Caracas. . . .

The evidence to support these findings is clearly and convincingly set forth in the report. The facts established by the Investigating Committee leave no doubt whatsoever of Cuba's part in this conspiracy against Venezuela.

I know of no greater tribute to democracy in this hemisphere, Mr. Chairman, in modern times—and no greater rebuff to the sinister designs of the Castro regime—than the manner in which the Venezuelan people went to the polls on December 1, 1963.

Based on this experience, it is my firm conviction that we have a solemn responsibility both to the Venezuelan people and to our own peoples not to permit the Castro regime to mount another subversive assault against any American Republic. Our governments acted resolutely against a dictator of the right who plotted to assassinate President [Rómulo] Betancourt in 1960.⁵ They unanimously agreed on sanctions. I now ask: Can we do less against a dictator of the left who tried to assassinate democracy in Venezuela?

Likelihood of Continued Cuban Subversion

By its very nature international communism is aggressive and expansive. We see it at work in all parts of the world, constantly probing and testing for weak spots which it might exploit. In modern dress it marches in the guise of diplomatic relations, trade missions, and cultural exchanges, and peace movements, and youth organizations, and the like. It flies the false ideological banners of "peaceful coexistence" and "wars of national liberation." But no one should be deceived.

⁵ *Ibid.*, Sept. 5, 1960, p. 355.

We in the United States are under no illusion as to the designs of the Communists against us and the free world. We know that the Communist menace is deadly serious, that they seek their goals through varied means, and that deceit is a standard element in their tactics.

We are fully aware—and should be—that Moscow, as well as Peiping and Habana, remains committed to the Communist world revolution. Chairman Khrushchev tells us frankly and bluntly that coexistence cannot extend to the ideological sphere, that between us there will be continued competition and conflict. Castro said on July 26 last year that in Latin America the course to follow is violent revolution waged by fighting revolutionaries, that the correlation of forces in the world had changed in favor of those seeking change through armed struggle, and that when revolutionaries in other Latin American countries know how to fulfill their duty they will have the decided support of the Soviet Union and all the socialist camp, including Cuba.

Last week the Cuban government, following the practice of other Communist governments, announced its slogans for this year's July 26 celebration. It is no accident, and indeed it is highly pertinent to our deliberations, that among the slogans this one appears: "Long live the heroic struggle of the Venezuelan people." In plain language that means: "Long live the struggle against the heroic Venezuelan people."

We should have no illusions about Castro's continuing purpose to export the Cuban revolution. He came to power with the design of converting the Andes into the Sierra Maestra of the Americas. That apparently remains his design. His temperament and ambition, the dynamics of his internal situation, the counsel of those whom he serves and those who serve him—all compel him to promote subversion as a means for breaking out of his insular position.

After years of self-righteous protestations that Cuba exported its revolution by example only, Castro in a recent press interview finally acknowledged that Cuba had been supporting, and will continue to support, subversive groups in other countries. This admission, it is true, adds nothing to what we had already learned through experience. It does serve, however, to

underscore Castro's purpose to give the hemisphere no respite in his relentless campaign to foment subversion whenever and wherever conditions permit.

In this interview Castro also tried to put Cuba's subversive activities on the bargaining counter. I wish to make one point very clear: that as far as the United States is concerned, the encouragement and support of subversion by the Castro regime against other countries of this hemisphere is not a subject for bargaining. It simply must stop. And when it does, the hemisphere will know it without the need for discussions with the Castro regime.

Task of This Meeting

As I stated at the outset, I regard our task as being to determine what measures should now be taken to impress on the Castro regime that the hemisphere will no longer permit its subversive acts against the American Republics. In my opinion there are three types of measures which we can take to drive this point home.

One should represent the American community's reaction to Castro's efforts to destroy democracy in Venezuela. Certainly this intervention should not be allowed to go without imposition of sanctions.

I want to make it very clear that the United States considers that the adoption of sanctions by the foreign ministers would be directed exclusively against the Castro regime and not against any other state or people. I hope this can be made clear in the Final Act of this conference. Rather our concern is that we not fail in our obligations to a sister Republic which has been made the victim of aggression and, indeed, which even today continues to spend its blood and treasure to combat Castro Communist subversion and to defend democracy and freedom. To respond to the call of our sister Republic for collective action is our paramount obligation.

The second type of measure would carry the community's clear warning to the Castro regime that if it persists in acts of subversion in other American Republics the full weight of the regional security system will be applied. This should serve as a deterrent, and I trust the Castro regime will heed such a message.

Awareness that subversion, supported by terror, sabotage, and guerrilla action, as practiced by the international Communist movement, is as dangerous a form of aggression as an armed attack has been very slow in developing in this hemisphere, as well as in other parts of the world. I think it is fair to say that until very recently there has been a lack of sufficient understanding of this point everywhere, and this has led to uncertainty in some quarters as to whether our regional security system possesses an adequate mechanism for dealing with Communist subversion.

In the opinion of my Government there is no doubt that the Rio Treaty⁶ clearly recognizes multiple forms of aggression and provides effective machinery for defending against them. The preamble states that the treaty is intended, among other things, "to provide for effective reciprocal assistance to meet armed attacks against any American State, and in order to deal with threats of aggression against any of them." Article 3 provides for mutual assistance in meeting an armed attack against any signatory; article 6 specifically recognizes the existence of "aggression which is not an armed attack"; and finally, article 9, while defining unprovoked armed attack and invasion by the armed forces of a state as aggression, opens with the very significant wording: "In addition to other acts which the Organ of Consultation may characterize as aggression. . . ." And thus we feel that the Rio Treaty specifically recognizes the existence of various forms of aggression and, most importantly, recognizes the authority of the Council of the Organization of American States, or the Meeting of Foreign Ministers, to characterize them as such. Article 3 of the Rio Treaty spells out procedures for prompt action in the event of armed attack, and article 6 does the same for a wide variety of situations falling short of armed attack.

A third type of measure should urge our own governments and those of other free-world countries to take appropriate steps in the field of trade with Cuba. This is appropriate because the Communist threat to this hemisphere is a threat also to other parts of the free world.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 21, 1947, p. 565.

I should like to mention two matters which, although not directly related to the subject of this meeting, nevertheless have an important bearing on our deliberation.

Message to the Cuban People

The one is that we should remember that the Cuban people, both inside and outside their troubled homeland, will be following our deliberations with greatest interest. They should know that they have not been forgotten and that our desires for a free Cuba remain unchanged. I know of no more eloquent and concise expression of these desires than that which President Kennedy and the Presidents of the Central American Republics and Panama included in the Declaration of San José in March 1963.⁷ As a restatement of my Government's views on this point and in tribute to the memory of the late President, I should simply like to repeat a portion of that declaration to which other colleagues have already generously alluded:

The Presidents declare that they have no doubt that the genuine Cuban revolution will live again, and its betrayers will fall into the shadows of history, and the martyred people of the oppressed isle of the Caribbean will be free from foreign Communist domination, free to choose for themselves the kind of government they wish to have, and free to join their brothers of the Hemisphere in the common undertaking to secure for each individual the liberty, dignity, and well-being which are the objectives of all free societies.

Progress and Freedom

In line with the final thought of that statement, I think we should never lose sight of the fact that our central task in this hemisphere is to promote progress with freedom. This is the vision of the Alliance for Progress. This is the path our governments have set for themselves under the Charter of Punta del Este. As President Johnson said last May in discussing the alliance with the ambassadors of your respective countries:⁸

In devotion to democracy, we are guided by the command of Bolívar that we must fearlessly lay the foundations of South American liberty: to hesitate is destruction.

Our charter charges each American country to seek

⁷ For text, see *ibid.*, Apr. 8, 1963, p. 515.

⁸ *Ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 854.

and to strengthen representative democracy. Without that democracy and without the freedom that it nourishes, material progress is an aimless enterprise, destroying the dignity of the spirit it is really meant to liberate. So we will continue to join with you to encourage democracy until we build a hemisphere of free nations from the Tierra del Fuego to the Arctic Circle.

I close, Mr. Chairman, with one final word, a word I know to be from both the Government and from the people of the United States to our friends throughout the hemisphere, a word on which my fellow countrymen are united, on a nonpartisan basis.

When our Founding Fathers signed our Declaration of Independence, Benjamin Franklin made the famous remark, "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."

Today it is Venezuela which is under attack. Is there any one of us who can say with assurance, "It cannot be my country tomorrow"? So let's say to our brothers in Venezuela, its government and its brave people, "We are with you in full solidarity and will act with you to insure the safety of your democracy."

And let's say to the Castro regime, "Your interference in the affairs of other countries in this hemisphere must stop—must stop and stop now." This is the basis on which the attitude of the United States will rest when we come to the resolutions which will be before us. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

TEXT OF FINAL ACT

FINAL ACT

NINTH MEETING OF CONSULTATION OF MINISTERS OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SERVING AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION IN APPLICATION OF THE INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSISTANCE

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was held at the headquarters of the Organization of American States, the Pan American Union, in Washington, D.C., from July 21 to 26, 1964.

The Council of the Organization of American States convoked the Meeting by a resolution adopted on December 3, 1963, which reads as follows:

WHEREAS:

The Council has taken cognizance of the note of the

Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, by means of which his government requests that, in accordance with Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the Organ of Consultation be immediately convoked to consider measures that must be taken to deal with the acts of intervention and aggression on the part of the Cuban Government affecting the territorial integrity and the sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the operation of its democratic institutions; and

The Ambassador, Representative of Venezuela, has furnished information to substantiate his requests,

The Council of the Organization of American States

RESOLVES:

1. To convoke the Organ of Consultation in accordance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, to meet on the date and at the place to be fixed in due time.

2. To constitute itself and act provisionally as Organ of Consultation, in accordance with Article 12 of the aforementioned treaty.

3. To inform the Security Council of the United Nations of the text of this resolution.

At the meeting held on the same day, December 3, 1963, the Council of the Organization, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, adopted a resolution, whereby a committee was appointed to investigate the acts denounced by Venezuela and to report thereon. The committee, which was composed of representatives of Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, the United States of America, and Uruguay, presented its report at the meeting held on February 24, 1964, by the Council, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation.

With respect to the date and place of the Meeting, the Council of the Organization of American States at its special meeting on June 26, 1964, adopted the following resolution:

WHEREAS:

On December 3, 1963, the Council of the Organization convoked the Organ of Consultation in accordance with the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, stating that it would meet at a place and at a time to be set in due time,

The Council of the Organization of American States

RESOLVES:

1. That the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, shall be held at the headquarters of the Organization of American States.

2. To set July 21, 1964, as the date for the opening of the meeting.

The organization of the Meeting of Consultation and its deliberations were governed by the Regulations of the Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to Serve as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, approved by the Council of the Organization

of American States at the meeting held on July 29, 1960.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 15 of the Regulations of the Meeting, a closed preliminary session was held on the morning of July 21. On that occasion, the matters to be dealt with at the opening session were considered, and the order of precedence of the members of this Meeting of Consultation was established by lot, as follows:

CHILE	His Excellency Mr. Julio Philippi Izquierdo Minister of Foreign Affairs
COLOMBIA	His Excellency Mr. Fernando Gómez Martínez Minister of Foreign Affairs
BOLIVIA	His Excellency Mr. Fernando Iturralde Chinel Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
GUATEMALA	His Excellency Mr. Alberto Herrarte González Minister of Foreign Affairs
VENEZUELA	His Excellency Mr. Ignacio Iribarren Borges Minister of Foreign Affairs
BRAZIL	His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitão da Cunha Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
EL SALVADOR	His Excellency Mr. Héctor Escobar Serrano Minister of Foreign Affairs
URUGUAY	His Excellency Mr. Alejandro Zorrilla de San Martín Minister of Foreign Affairs
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC	His Excellency Mr. José A. Bonilla Atilés Special Delegate
ECUADOR	His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Escudero Minister of Foreign Affairs
COSTA RICA	His Excellency Mr. Daniel Oduber Quirós Minister of Foreign Affairs
PARAGUAY	His Excellency Mr. Raúl Sapena Pastor Minister of Foreign Affairs
HAITI	His Excellency Mr. René Chalmers Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Worship
NICARAGUA	His Excellency Mr. Alfonso Ortega Urbina Minister of Foreign Affairs
PANAMA	His Excellency Mr. Galileo Solís Minister of Foreign Affairs
MEXICO	His Excellency Mr. Vicente Sánchez Gavito Special Delegate
PERU	His Excellency Mr. Fernando Schwalb López-Aldana Minister of Foreign Affairs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA	His Excellency Mr. Dean Rusk Secretary of State
ARGENTINA	His Excellency Mr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship
HONDURAS	His Excellency Mr. Jorge Fidel Durón Minister of Foreign Affairs

His Excellency, Dr. José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States also participated in the Meeting.

Finding it necessary to return to his country, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, by note dated July 23, 1964, addressed to the Secretary General of the Meeting, appointed Mr. Celso Pastor de la Torre, Peruvian Ambassador to the United States of America, as Special Delegate to the Meeting.

Mr. José Rolz-Bennett also attended the Meeting as representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

In accordance with Article 27 of the Regulations, on July 21, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States, Mr. José A. Mora, installed the opening session, at which His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, was elected President of the Meeting. At the same session, His Excellency Mr. Galileo Solís, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama, was elected Vice President of the Meeting. In accordance with the same article, Mr. William Sanders, Secretary of the Council of the Organization of American States, acted as Secretary General of the Meeting. Mr. Santiago Ortiz, Director of the Office of Council and Conference Secretariat Services, acted as Assistant Secretary General.

His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, and His Excellency Mr. Alejandro Zorrilla de San Martín, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Uruguay, addressed the inaugural session held on the same date.

In accordance with the Regulations, the Meeting appointed a Credentials Committee composed of the Foreign Ministers of Peru, Uruguay, and Nicaragua. It also appointed a Style Committee composed of representatives of Colombia, Brazil, Haiti, and the United States of America.

In accordance with the provisions of Article 20 of the Regulations, a General Committee was formed, composed of all the members and charged with considering the topics and submitting their conclusions to a plenary session of the Meeting for approval. His Excellency Mr. Fernando Gómez Martínez, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Colombia, and His Excellency Mr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Argentina, were designated as Chairman and Rapporteur of the General Committee, respectively.

This Final Act was signed at the closing session held on July 26. His Excellency Mr. Gonzalo Escudero, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Ecuador, and His Ex-

cellency Mr. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, President of the Meeting, addressed the same session.

As the result of its deliberations, the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, approved the following resolutions and declarations:

I

APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO THE PRESENT GOVERNMENT OF CUBA^o

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

HAVING SEEN the report of the Investigating Committee designated on December 3, 1963, by the Council of the Organization of American States, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation, and

CONSIDERING :

That the said report establishes among its conclusions that "the Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare," and

That the aforementioned acts, like all acts of intervention and aggression, conflict with the principles and aims of the inter-American system,

RESOLVES :

1. To declare that the acts verified by the Investigating Committee constitute an aggression and an intervention on the part of the Government of Cuba in the internal affairs of Venezuela, which affects all of the member states.

2. To condemn emphatically the present Government of Cuba for its acts of aggression and of intervention against the territorial inviolability, the sovereignty, and the political independence of Venezuela.

3. To apply, in accordance with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the following measures :

a. That the governments of the American states not maintain diplomatic or consular relations with the Government of Cuba ;

b. That the governments of the American states suspend all their trade, whether direct or indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines, and medical equipment that may be sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons; and

c. That the governments of the American states suspend all sea transportation between their countries

^o Adopted by a vote of 15 to 4 (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay). Venezuela was not eligible to vote.

and Cuba, except for such transportation as may be necessary for reasons of a humanitarian nature.

4. To authorize the Council of the Organization of American States, by an affirmative vote of two thirds of its members, to discontinue the measures adopted in the present resolution at such time as the Government of Cuba shall have ceased to constitute a danger to the peace and security of the hemisphere.

5. To warn the Government of Cuba that if it should persist in carrying out acts that possess characteristics of aggression and intervention against one or more of the member states of the Organization, the member states shall preserve their essential rights as sovereign states by the use of self-defense in either individual or collective form, which could go so far as resort to armed force, until such time as the Organ of Consultation takes measures to guarantee the peace and security of the hemisphere.

6. To urge those states not members of the Organization of American States that are animated by the same ideals as the inter-American system to examine the possibility of effectively demonstrating their solidarity in achieving the purposes of this resolution.

7. To instruct the Secretary General of the Organization of American States to transmit to the United Nations Security Council the text of the present resolution, in accordance with the provisions of Article 54 of the United Nations Charter.

II

DECLARATION TO THE PEOPLE OF CUBA¹⁰

WHEREAS:

The preamble to the Charter of the Organization of American States declares that, "the historic mission of America is to offer to man a land of liberty, and a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations"; and that "the true significance of American solidarity and good neighborliness can only mean the consolidation on this continent, within the framework of democratic institutions, of a system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights of man";

The Charter of the Organization declares that the solidarity of the American states and the high purposes toward which it is dedicated demand that the political organization of these states be based on the effective exercise of representative democracy;

The Charter also proclaims "the fundamental rights of the individual" and reaffirms that the "education of peoples should be directed toward justice, freedom, and peace";

The Declaration of Santiago, Chile,¹¹ adopted by the Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign

¹⁰ Adopted by a vote of 16 to 0, with 3 abstentions (Bolivia, Chile, Mexico).

¹¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 7, 1959, p. 342.

Affairs and signed by the present Cuban Government, proclaimed that the faith of peoples of America in the effective exercise of representative democracy is the best vehicle for the promotion of their social and political progress (Resolution XCV of the Tenth Inter-American Conference), while well-planned and intensive development of the economies of the American countries and improvement in the standard of living of their peoples represent the best and firmest foundation on which the practical exercise of democracy and the stabilization of their institutions can be established;

The Ninth International Conference of American States condemned "the methods of every system tending to suppress political and civil rights and liberties, and in particular the action of international communism or any other totalitarian doctrine";

The present Government of Cuba, identifying itself with the principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology, has established a political, economic, and social system alien to the democratic and Christian traditions of the American family of nations and contrary to the principles of juridical organization upon which rest the security and peaceful harmonious relations of the peoples of the hemisphere; and

The exclusion of the present Government of Cuba from participation in the inter-American system, by virtue of the provisions of Resolution VI¹² of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, by no means signifies any intention to deny the Cuban people their rightful place in the community of American peoples;

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

DECLARES:

That the free peoples of the Americas are convinced that the inter-American system offers to the Cuban people unequalled conditions for the realization of their ideals of peace, liberty, and social and economic progress;

That the peoples belonging to the inter-American system are in complete sympathy with the Cuban people in all their sufferings, in the face of the total loss of their liberty both in the spiritual domain and in the social and economic field, the denial of their most elementary human rights, the burden of their persecutions, and the destruction of a legal system that was open to improvement and that offered the possibility of stability; and

That, within this spirit of solidarity, the free peoples of America cannot and must not remain indifferent to or uninterested in the fate of the noble Cuban people, which is oppressed by a dictatorship that renounces the Christian and democratic traditions of the American peoples; and in consequence

¹² For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 281.

EXPRESSES :

1. Its profound concern for the fate of the brother people of Cuba.

2. Its deepest hope that the Cuban people, strengthened by confidence in the solidarity with them of the other American peoples and governments, will be able, by their own endeavor, very soon to liberate themselves from the tyranny of the Communist regime that oppresses them and to establish in that country a government freely elected by the will of the people that will assure respect for fundamental human rights.

3. Its firm conviction that the emphatic condemnation of the policy of the present Cuban Government of aggression and intervention against Venezuela will be taken by the people of Cuba as a renewed stimulus for its hope there will come to prevail in that country a climate of freedom that will offer to man in Cuba a favorable environment for the development of his personality and the realization of his just aspirations.

III

REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COORDINATION ¹³

WHEREAS :

The objectives of liberty and democracy that inspire the inter-American system, threatened as they are by communist subversion, cannot be fully attained if the peoples of the states that compose it lack adequate and sufficient means for bringing about vigorous social progress and better standards of living ;

The persistence of a situation in which the world is divided into areas of poverty and plenty is a serious obstacle to any possibility that may present itself in the American hemisphere for achieving an economically more just society ;

Harmonious and decisive action is indispensable, in both the regional and the international spheres, to combat the causes of economic underdevelopment and social backwardness, since prosperity and world peace based on the freedom of man cannot be achieved unless all the American countries attain equality in the economic and social field ;

In particular, the continued existence of such a state of underdevelopment and poverty among large sectors of mankind, which becomes more acute in spite of the world increase in wealth and the advance of science and technology from which these sectors cannot derive full benefit ; encourages the subversive action of international communism ;

The countries of Latin America expressed their aspirations in the Charter of Alta Gracia and declared their determined intention to work together to build a better world in which there will be a more equitable distribution of income ;

The Conference on Trade and Development, held recently in Geneva,¹⁴ provided a forum for a full discussion of the problems of international economics and established the basis for adequate solutions to problems arising in the fields of raw materials, manufactured products, and international financing ; and

The instruments adopted at the two aforementioned meetings supplement and perfect those signed at the Special Meeting of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council held at Punta del Este in August 1961, and especially, the Charter of Punta del Este,¹⁵

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

DECLARES :

That the aims of unity and peace with liberty and democracy pursued in the struggle against international communism, which threatens the stability of the institutions of the inter-American system and of the countries that compose it, must be achieved by eliminating those obstacles that hinder social progress and economic development, and

RESOLVES :

1. To reaffirm the determined will of their peoples to work, in the regional and international spheres, for the achievement of the objectives expressed in the Charter of Alta Gracia and at the Conference on Trade and Development, which are in line with the aims and purposes of the Alliance for Progress.

2. To request the Inter-American Economic and Social Council to continue the necessary studies in order to find adequate solutions to the problems involved.

IV

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS AMONG THE MEMBER STATES ¹⁶

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

RESOLVES :

To transmit to the Council of the Organization of American States the draft resolution "Diplomatic Relations Among the Member States," presented by the Delegation of Argentina (OEA/Ser. F/IL.9/Doc. No. 30, Rev. 2).

V

VOTE OF RECOGNITION ¹⁷

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

¹³ Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0.

¹⁴ For text of the preamble and the recommendations contained in the Final Act, which was adopted by the Conference on June 16, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.

¹⁵ For background and texts of the Declaration to the Peoples of America and the Charter of Punta del Este, see *ibid.*, Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

¹⁶ Adopted by a vote of 19 to 0.

¹⁷ Adopted by acclamation.

President Praises OAS Action Condemning Cuban Aggression

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated July 30

The inter-American system demonstrated once again this week its effectiveness and vitality by dealing resolutely with Cuban aggression against Venezuela. The speeches at the meeting showed general agreement on a verdict condemning Cuban aggression, and the final resolution made it abundantly clear that the hemisphere will not tolerate aggression by subversion. There was a genuine concern, which we shared, that although Venezuela was the target of Communist aggression today, another country might be the target tomorrow, and that we must stand all for one and one for all. Many able diplomats contributed to this encouraging result, but we Americans can be proud of our own Secretary Rusk and of Secretary Tom Mann [Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs] and Ambassador Bunker [Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Representative on the OAS Council], who backed him up.

RESOLVES:

To congratulate His Excellency Mr. Vasco Leitão da Cunha, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of Brazil, on the wise and intelligent manner in which he guided the deliberations of the Meeting.

VI

VOTE OF THANKS¹⁷

The Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Serving as Organ of Consultation in Application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance,

RESOLVES:

1. To express to His Excellency Mr. José A. Mora, Secretary General of the Organization of American States, its appreciation for all the attentions and courtesies extended to the delegates in connection with this Meeting.

2. To place on record its gratitude to the Secretary General of the Meeting, Mr. William Sanders, and to all who collaborated with him, for the manner in which the advisory and secretariat services of the Meeting were organized and carried out.

3. To offer its appreciation to the hemisphere and world press and other information media for the efficient service they rendered to the Meeting.

STATEMENTS

STATEMENT OF CHILE

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on paragraphs 1 and 2 of the operative part of Resolution

I, because of its doubts regarding the legality of the use of the term "aggression" in describing the acts. It voted negatively on paragraph 3, because it is firmly convinced that the measures agreed to are not appropriate to the particular case that has brought about the application of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance. It also voted against paragraph 5, because it believes that there are discrepancies between the provisions of that paragraph and those of Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations and of Article 3 of the Rio Treaty. With reference to its abstention on paragraph 6, its attitude is consistent with the attitude taken with respect to the measures called for in paragraph 3.

The Delegation of Chile abstained from voting on the Declaration to the People of Cuba since, although agreeing with its basic content, it maintains relations with the Republic of Cuba and since it believes precisely in the principle of nonintervention, it has deemed it preferable not to give positive support to this resolution.

STATEMENT OF MEXICO

The Delegation of Mexico wishes to make it a matter of record in the Final Act, that the Government of Mexico:

1. Is convinced that the measures provided for in the third paragraph of the operative part of Resolution I (which the Delegation of Mexico voted against) lack foundation inasmuch as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance does not envisage, in any part, the application of such measures in situations of the kind and nature dealt with by this Meeting of Consultation.

2. Makes a specific reservation to the fifth paragraph of the operative part of the same resolution since it endeavors to extend, in such a way as to be incompatible with the provisions of Articles 3 and 10 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the right to individual or collective self-defense.

3. Reiterates without reservations its "will to cooperate permanently in the fulfillment of the principles and purposes of a policy of peace," to which "is essentially related" the "obligation of mutual assistance and common defense of the American Republics," in accordance with the provisions of paragraph five of the Preamble of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs sign the present Final Act.

DONE in the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., United States of America, in the four official languages of the Organization, on July twenty-six, nineteen hundred sixty-four. The Secretary General shall deposit the original of the Final Act in the archives of the Pan American Union, which will transmit the authenticated copies thereof to the governments of the American republics.

¹⁷ Adopted by acclamation.

Some Thoughts on the Conduct of Foreign Policy

*Remarks by Secretary Rusk*¹

Gentlemen, I want to welcome you personally to the Department of State this morning and, as a member of the State Department Legion Post, to give you a special welcome on their behalf. Being a member of Boys Nation is a very real distinction, and I want to congratulate you and the Legion for this very stimulating program.

I was delighted to meet David John Long, whom you have elected as your Secretary of State. That is the end of his political career! [Laughter.]

But I want to take a moment or two just to give you some feel of what this foreign policy business is all about, not just my own side. I started with a meeting at 8 o'clock at breakfast with the Secretary of Defense and the head of our Disarmament Agency. We still have an arms race. There is not much prospect that that is going to turn downward, although it is not going up quite as fast as it perhaps might.

I will be meeting all day with the foreign ministers of the Latin American countries.² We are all together here in this hemisphere, while you are in town, to take some additional measures against Castro.

I will be meeting with the Prime Minister of Malaysia, who is visiting us at the moment.³

And there will be a meeting this evening that will run until past bedtime.

So life is busy. And the United States is busy. And the world is pretty turbulent. We

will be going through a rather special season here the next 3 or 4 months while our people are engaging in the grand inquest of the Nation that occurs every 4 years to decide who shall be responsible for our Federal Government for the next 4 years. This makes some difference abroad because, as is sometimes said, when Uncle Sam coughs, the rest of the world begins to sneeze. They are very much interested in what we do here, how we conduct ourselves, and how we move in the world about us.

But the point I want to emphasize to you is that foreign policy is not something which "those people in Washington" carry on with people from other countries in some abstract way unconnected with your own affairs. Foreign policy is about you. This is a point you must really get into your gizzards. It has to do with your home, the military service most of you are going to engage in, your chances for a decent future, and these days, indeed, the existence of the Northern Hemisphere.

We know, here in the Department of State, that foreign policy is about people, and that is the brooding, overriding consideration in everything that we do, whether it's trade, or whether it's trying to get the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots to find some basis of agreement on their little island, or whether it's trying to insist, as we are insisting, that Hanoi and Peiping leave their neighbors alone, or whether it's trying to work out some scientific cooperation with all countries, including Communist countries, on this matter of desalting sea water. This is all about what happens to individual people.

¹ Made before Boys Nation at Washington, D.C., on July 23.

² See p. 174.

³ See p. 190.

Directions of U.S. Policy

The second point I'd like to make is that our policy—that is, the directions of our policy, the objectives of our policy—are really very simple. I would suggest that if I were to ask you fellows to sit down on a pop quiz and write two pages about what you think the American people are trying to accomplish in the world, you would be able to do it very accurately, and most of you would be in agreement.

Let me suggest two ways in which you can remind yourselves as to what our policy—our objectives—are. First reread the first part of the Declaration of Independence. How many of you have done that, say, in the last 6 months? [Large show of hands.] Well, good for Boys Nation! This is really very important.

The American people really do believe that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed. Now, the philosophers can play around with that and find problems in it from a purely intellectual point of view, but the American people believe that that is the heart of political wisdom. And this is a scarlet thread that runs through most of our policy.

For example, this is why the American people instinctively favor the independence of nations on these great colonial issues. We invented that idea. This is why it's easier for us to work intimately with a democracy than with a dictatorship. This is why we are so deeply concerned about what has gone on over the years in Eastern Europe. That is why we are so much concerned when here at home we fail to live up to the commitments of our own consciences and our own political basis.

There isn't a country in the world that doesn't have problems, say, of discrimination, or failure to live up to the highest ideals. But we can't use that as an alibi. Everyone is watching us. They are expecting us to make good on our commitments. We are the only country in the world at the present time that is expected to bat a thousand in this business. And if we fail, those failures just rush around the world at the speed of light and our enemies are joyful and our friends are distressed. So we have the pressure of history upon us to do the best job

we can here in our own society. So this simple notion that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed is an operating principle of policy that you see at work all the time.

Now, another thing that you might want to read, if you haven't recently, is the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter. Those of us who participated in World War II came out of that war with the hope that perhaps mankind had it made finally. We had been scarred by the flames of that war. We were thinking long and deeply with other nations about what kind of world we ought to have. And on a bipartisan basis—almost unanimity in the Senate—we joined with other nations to sit down and write out those simple principles in the preamble and articles 1 and 2. One rogue government stood in the way in 1945—Stalin's Soviet Union. I'm convinced that if Stalin had played ball with the United Nations according to his commitments, this could have transformed the course of history. But he didn't, he didn't.

It reminds us, by the way, that we need strength, and great strength, if we are to make peace. I think it is probably correct to say that the drastic, far-reaching demobilization of the Western World that occurred at the end of World War II was perhaps the most serious mistake our people ever made.

When I was a student in Germany many years ago, I was out on a lake in a canoe, and I went ashore for some lunch, and I pulled the canoe up on the beach and had my lunch. When I got back the canoe was gone. The water police putted around in their motor boats, and after about an hour, they came back trailing the canoe and they said, "We have the thief. He will be punished. Here is your boat. Here is your canoe. But we are fining you five marks for tempting thieves." Because I had left the canoe up there without being locked or tied up or anything of that sort.

So here is the problem for democracies on that matter of strength. I think it's entirely probable that after World War II, through demobilization, we tempted thieves. We exposed Stalin to the pressures of enormous temptations to reach out and grab. And he grabbed. And

we have been rebuilding the strength of the free world ever since.

But look at the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter—an association of independent nations, voluntarily co-operating in their common interest across national frontiers, joining together in mutual defense, settling disputes by peaceful means if possible. I mean those are things that are pretty fundamental to policy on a bipartisan basis in this country.

The Confrontation With Communism

Now, let me say just a word about the kinds of problems we have, and then I will have to run, because I have foreign ministers over there waiting for a meeting.

Very seldom do we, as the United States, have a bitter, painful, strictly bilateral issue with any other government. Most of our quarrels with other governments have to do with what's going to happen to somebody else. We had one of these bilateral issues not long ago with Panama. But these are extremely rare. Our general bilateral relations with most governments in the world tend to be pretty good.

But we do have many problems that arise out of this great confrontation between communism and the free world. This is the underlying crisis of our day. The contest is between the United Nations kind of world order on the one side and a Communist world revolution kind of world order on the other, and so many problems arise out of that confrontation.

You sometimes hear this word *détente*. Be-ware of it. It's a very tricky word. I got trapped myself in it not long ago in a press conference. I said that although there might have been some reduction in tension, it is incorrect to speak of a *détente*. One of the newspapermen present went to a dictionary and looked up *détente*, and it said, "A certain reduction in tension"!

It is true that we do not have in front of us at the moment a blazing crisis with the Soviet Union. But the big, dangerous, explosive problems are still with us. They have not been resolved. Germany, Berlin, Cuba, Southeast

Asia—these big problems are there. We are not in a state of settled peace. So we have got to do all that is required to take care of our vital interests.

Other People's Quarrels

There is a third range of questions, and that is what might be called other people's quarrels. I suppose there are 25 or 30 countries that we have relations with who have some sort of quarrel with their immediate neighbors. And we get drawn into these quarrels, either because we are members of international bodies where they come up, such as the United Nations, or because our own interest requires us to take a hand to try to settle them, or because the parties themselves come to us asking for help, either to settle or at least to ask our support for their own particular point of view.

At any given time, these are the things that occupy the greater part of our agenda. Well, we can't run away from these problems. They are there. The outcome is of interest to us. If there are two nations with whom we hope to be friends, such as Pakistan and India, and they themselves are in a bitter controversy with each other, then this cannot help but complicate our relations with both Pakistan and India. And so this is a problem.

We receive every working day in this Department about 1,300 cables from our posts all over the world. This is official cables. We get telegrams from the public in addition to that! [Laughter.] We send out a thousand cables a day, all of them signed "Rusk," and I see about six of them. [Laughter.]

Building a Decent World Order

Most of that business has to do with the on-going business of building a decent world order. Today we will be attending 15 to 20 international meetings somewhere in the world—as a government. I don't have to count them because that is true on every working day. And these meetings throughout the year cover a great variety of things—everything from the nuclear arms race to epidemiological control, or the allocation of radio frequencies, or basic education in the Amazon Valley, or whatever it might be. This is the great constructive

work in which governments and ordinary men and women all over the world are engaged.

I'd like also to say that here is where our greatest strength lies. You know, of course, that this country has in the military field almost literally unimaginable strength. It is hard to conceive of what the world would be like if that strength were completely employed. So don't worry about strength. There is plenty of strength in the military field.

But there is also a great deal of strength in what I referred to earlier, when I referred first to the Declaration of Independence. These simple, direct, human commitments of the American people are a source of the greatest strength of all in this country because these are commitments that we share with ordinary men and women in practically every other country, including the countries behind the Iron Curtain.

These elementary commitments to a decent standard of living and to some personal dignity and to concern for family and a need for education and things of that sort—those are pretty universal. Those people who wrote our Declaration of Independence felt that those were deeply rooted in human nature and in the relation between man and God. I think they were right, because people have been thinking about these things for more than 2,000 years, and my guess is that something that has been worked on for 2,000 years can kick up some pretty fundamental ideas.

But we never have to argue with people in other parts of the world on what the American people are after. This is the point I want to impress on you. We never spend any time, because these decent commitments of the American people are known and recognized and respected. The complications come in how to get on with them in a complex and ticklish situation and how these general principles apply to a particular situation.

But these commitments are a source of our greatest alliances, because they mean that in times of crisis there is not so much neutralism as you would suppose.

Don't worry about the difference between allies and neutrals in any fundamental sense. We are allied with countries because we want to help preserve the independence of states. Our

chief interest in the so-called unaligned countries is in their genuine safety and genuine independence—so that they can work with us in places like the United Nations.

And what happens in your neighborhood, in your schools, in your own universities—what happens there—is a part of the strength which ties us with these other people. So we can look into the future with a great deal of confidence, even though there is a lot of hard work to be done and still some burdens to bear in this business. We have got a million men in uniform outside the continental United States ashore and afloat, and they have got to have our support, support in a lot of ways, including foreign aid, to see if we can get this job done without committing them to combat, if possible. We have got to have our space program. We have got to have a good lusty defense budget for the foreseeable future.

Now, it's going to mean some taxes, a good many taxes. But I don't think that the American people are going to be too much concerned about packing a load for the purposes to which this country is committed.

Again thank you very much, fellows, for being here.

Second Round of Civil Aviation Talks With Canada Concluded

Press release 338 dated July 24

Canadian and United States delegations concluded on July 23 at Washington a further round of talks concerning the renegotiation of the Air Transport Agreement now in force between the two countries.¹ Substantial progress was made on a number of important questions during the meetings, including application of the recommendations made by Prof. John Kenneth Galbraith in his report to the President last year. Both delegations have now undertaken to report to their Governments on the results achieved and, following further study, to meet again at the earliest practicable date with a view to concluding the negotiations.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of May 25, 1964, p. 844.

President Speaks to American Field Service Students

Following is the text of remarks made by President Johnson on the south lawn of the White House on July 20 when he greeted some 2,800 American Field Service students from 59 countries who were preparing to return home after completing their senior year in high school in the United States.

White House press release dated July 20

I suppose I should introduce myself. I am the father of Lynda and Luci Johnson—and I am known as the man who is the White House dogs' best friend.

It is good to have you with us. Nothing makes a house happier than young people, and this house is a very happy home right now with you on hand.

I know that during the past year each of you has made life much happier, much more rewarding, for the American families with whom you have lived. I hope you will take back to your own lands even half as much enrichment as you are leaving behind in our land.

You have been in the United States during a year history will never forget—and you will always remember. You have seen our system—and our people—tested by a terrible tragedy. But you have also seen that system and this people respond nobly, with great courage and great common sense.

I believe there is an example in this for all the world.

People in other countries sometimes forget what we in America can never forget: that America has been built by sons and daughters of every continent and every country.

Men may try to tell you that peace among nations and neighbors is not possible, that old animosities can never be forgotten, that old suspicions and prejudices can never be overcome, that old rivalries and struggles can never be laid aside. When any tell you that, you tell them of America.

Here in this diverse land of 190 million people—people with the blood of your own ancestors in their veins—we have forgotten and

overcome and laid aside divisions of the past. We live together in 50 States as one people—one people, united and indivisible.

If such unity can be accomplished here, it can be accomplished everywhere. And we believe that you will, in your own times, be leaders for peace and justice around the world.

I don't know what impressions you may have brought here, or what impressions you may be taking away now. But I hope you will convey to your families, friends, and fellow countrymen one fact about America: that almost nobody in America thinks that much in America is as good as it should be or could be—even, sometimes, including its President.

Free expression, self-criticism, constant self-examination are the great strengths of free peoples—and great sources of the energy from which progress comes. You have seen this process at work this year. We have been dealing with problems in our society which have existed 100 years or more. But we are making progress—toward fulfilling the rights of all the people, toward opening greater opportunity, toward building better cities, toward building a more prosperous economy, toward making life better.

America is not an old, contented, complacent land—ready to stand still. America is young, as you are young, with its future before it, as your future is before you.

Your land and this land have much to do together. I am sure you will be leaders in those great works.

On this happy evening I know there is in the hearts of all of us one note of sadness. One week ago today the man who had done so much for 40 years to foster and nurture this program passed away in his sleep—Director General Stephen Galatti. Mr. Galatti was a remarkable American—and a remarkable citizen of the world. Through the fruits of this program, his influence will live on for many generations.

Tonight I would like to announce that I am conferring upon Mr. Stephen Galatti, Sr., a Presidential Citation, which reads as follows:

Trusted Counselor, Friend, and Inspiration for Young People Throughout the World, he selflessly devoted his life to the cause of Peace by laboring tire-

lessly to foster understanding today among the youth who will lead the nations of the world tomorrow.

If Mr. Galatti's son, Stephen, Jr., will come forward, I would like to present this Presidential Citation to him at this time.

Prime Minister of Malaysia Visits Washington

Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman of Malaysia visited the United States July 21 to August 4, 1964. He met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials during his stay at Washington July 22-24. Following are an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and Prime Minister Rahman on July 22, an exchange of toasts at a luncheon at the White House that day, and the text of a joint communique released on July 23.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JULY 22

White House press release dated July 22

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, ladies and gentlemen: It is my great personal pleasure and my privilege on behalf of the people of America to welcome you this morning to the United States.

We remember happily your visit to our country 4 years ago.¹ We are very proud to welcome you back again today, this time as the leader of the new nation of Malaysia.

Our two countries are far removed from one another, but we here in the United States are very much aware of the outstanding leadership that you have offered during these midcentury decades. We have greatly admired the courage by which you led your native land to a decisive victory over Communist terrorism. We have no less admired and applauded the vision with which you have worked to secure the blessings of liberty for all of your people.

In times of trial and in times of hope, you have manifested the highest order of responsibility and foresight toward the best interests of

your people. The impressive mandate of your recent elections is a great tribute from your people to you.

For myself, I welcome this opportunity to add through personal conversation to the understanding already achieved by our personal correspondence. Mr. Prime Minister, we in America share with you and your people the same hopes for the future and the same devotion to peace and the same desire to see the lot of mankind made better throughout the world. I am hopeful and I am confident that our discussions together will be to the profit of the great cause in which both of our countries earnestly labor together.

Prime Minister Rahman

Mr. President, thank you very much, indeed, for your warm and cordial welcome. I have looked forward to this moment for some time, because I am very happy to have the chance at last to meet you personally. It is always a privilege to meet the President of the greatest democracy in the world, particularly when you have heard so much of his work in the cause of freedom and peace. In the past we have had contacts through the normal diplomatic channels, but as you have rightly said, there is a world of difference between the correspondence and the pleasure of having personal conversations.

Remembering with heartfelt pleasure my last visit to the United States, I have always cherished the hope of returning some day; so when your invitation reached me I was very happy indeed to accept. I know that you are rather preoccupied with national affairs at present, but in spite of that you were good enough to ask me to come at this time. It was a considerate move on your part, and I appreciate it most sincerely.

I most heartily endorse the sentiments you have expressed of our mutual hopes of peace and happiness in the world. I come from an area of the world that is beset with all kinds of troubles. To the north there is trouble, to the east there is trouble, and now there is trouble coming from the south of my country. These troubles threaten to encircle the two

¹ BULLETIN of Nov. 21, 1960, p. 783.

countries in Southeast Asia that have so far remained free.

To us small nations, America forever stands out as a pillar of hope, a guarantor of our rights as free nations. Therefore, Mr. President, I believe there should be no embargoes on friendship and good will between men and nations.

I wish to thank both you and the American people and at the same time to convey the very warm good wishes of the nations and people of Malaysia to our American friends.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS, JULY 22

White House press release dated July 22

President Johnson

Mr. Prime Minister, Mr. Secretary, Mr. Ambassador, Governor Harriman, ladies and gentlemen: In this house, none are so welcome as those leaders who have chosen the path of freedom and democracy. Our guest today is such a leader. He guided his native Malaysia to independence. He led his people to a decisive victory over Communist guerrillas.

He took the lead in the formation last year of the nation of Malaysia. In all of this, he has kept faith with democracy.

He has sought for his people food instead of bullets, clothes instead of uniforms, homes instead of barracks.

Malaysia's success shines as an example for many lands.

Mr. Prime Minister, you and your people have our respect and our faith. We are very glad that you are here today. There are many choices for the world today. There is the choice of perpetual war or permanent peace. There is the choice of order or chaos. There is the choice of the rule of law or the rule of the jungle.

The American people have made their choice—for peace, for order, and for the rule of law.

We are proud to support those whose choices are the same. We support our friends with all of the resources of our nation. We of this generation are determined that men shall live

in a world where aggression will not go unpunished, where terror will not go unchallenged, where irresponsibility will not be left to run rampant.

Our course—the course of the United States—has been chosen freely. It will not be lightly changed.

The people of Malaysia have likewise made their choice freely, and it likewise will not be changed.

Your Excellency, we of the United States extend to you our congratulations. We wish for your people a future of peace and progress.

Now I should like to ask all of you to join me in a toast to His Majesty the King of Malaysia, and to the friendship between the Malaysian and American people—long may it endure. To His Majesty.

Prime Minister Rahman

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I wish to thank you, Mr. President, very much indeed for the glowing compliments you have paid to the nation and the people of Malaysia and to me, sir. This is a most pleasant luncheon in my honor.

It is always heartwarming to know that the successes we have achieved during the short years of independence, both in overcoming the Communist terrorism that plagued our country for nearly 12 long years and in being able to build a democratic and, as you say, a prosperous nation, are admired and appreciated, as you say, by other countries of the free world. To win praise from the United States—the redoubtable champion of democracy, the bastion of strength in the free world—is to me praise indeed.

Malaysia may be small—and it is small in size and population—but our people, as you know, are great in heart.

We know, however, that success cannot feed upon itself; otherwise, it dwindles and dies. So success must always be the basic ground for greater efforts, and that is what we are endeavoring to do in Malaysia today despite external difficulties and troubles.

We are well aware that although we have won the struggle against communism in our own

country, the menace still exists and may strike us again.

I think it is true to say that Malaysia has proved two important truths: first, that through unity and cooperation democracy can and does work in Asia; second, that a truly successful democracy, prosperous and progressive, thinking first and always of the welfare and well-being of the people, is the only effective answer to the insidious intrusion of communism.

From our own experience we have learned that it is not practical to be neutral in this struggle. In our view, the state is made for men and not men for the state. That is why we are proud to belong to the free world.

My last visit to the United States coincided with the election campaign. This time I have arrived between national conventions and at a time when you are so preoccupied. I can only thank my stars that Malaysia's elections are not on so vast a scale as yours. Nevertheless, we have just emerged from the elections and are not quite yet recovered from the effects of it. I can well understand, with your huge country and with voters by the millions, what you will have to go through in the next few months. When I was here last I came to know what American presidential elections mean, and all I can say is that I am a happy man that I don't have to stand for the elections.

I wish you all the luck. However, the whole world will be waiting and watching the elections in the United States. I shall say no more for fear of treading on dangerous ground; so I will content myself by wishing every success to the voters.

The great interest the United States has shown in our progress and development in Malaysia is a source of satisfaction to us. I appreciate very deeply the help that you have given us in various ways and in various forms, such as providing technical assistance in the form of experts under the Colombo Plan and for the excellent work being done by dedicated men and women of the Peace Corps. In fact, I would like to see more members of the Peace Corps serving in Malaysia, especially doctors and engineers. Those whom I have had the pleasure of meeting have said to me, and I think they are

sincere, that they are very happy to be in Malaysia—so why not, Mr. President, send more of them?

We were getting on very well indeed with our tremendous plans for development since the struggle against the Communists, and the help we obtained from our friends has proved most valuable to us.

As you said, Malaysia has been a beacon to other lands and a beacon that does shine but, unfortunately, it can also attract insects and pests. Some of these are harmless, but others are very harmful. Unfortunately, the glow from our beacon has attracted quite the wrong kind of attention as well, where both the Communists and now our next-door neighbors, the Indonesians, plainly consider us a tasty morsel to tempt the appetites of the giants. I think they are doing just a little bit more than just that, but I would not like to bore you, sir, in our pleasant company by telling all that was happening.

As far as I am concerned, we have done everything humanly possible to humor them, but nothing can satisfy them until, I am afraid, they have devoured us.

But I know I can trust you to stop them from devouring us and getting the help from our friends in the free world. I hope that the beacon can then continue to shine in order to guide others to safety, security, peace, and happiness.

In the meantime, we must push ahead with development, because this is an essential element in our effort to provide higher standards of life and a richer future for our nation.

So we look to freedom-loving people for understanding and support, and that is why I am so especially glad to hear your warm praise today.

Mr. President, in conclusion, I do most sincerely appreciate both your kindness and your hospitality and all of the nice things you have said about my country.

Your Excellencies, to the President, Mrs. Johnson, I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to join me in a toast to the President of the United States and to the lasting friendship between America and the Malaysian people.

White House press release dated July 23

The President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Malaysia met on July 22 and 23 to discuss matters of mutual interest and recent developments in Southeast Asia.

President Johnson and Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman welcomed this, their first meeting, and the opportunity it presented to become personally acquainted and to review major problems in Southeast Asia. The President and the Prime Minister discussed the Communist threat to and activities in Laos and Vietnam and reaffirmed their support of the cause of freedom in those countries. The President noted with appreciation the contribution Malaysia has made to the common cause in Vietnam by providing equipment, training and advice based on her own experience in combating Communist terrorism. In turn the President made clear that all Southeast Asian countries, including Malaysia, could rely on the firm intent of the United States to resist Communist aggression against Free Asian nations.

The Prime Minister reviewed developments in Malaysia with the President and progress made thus far in furthering the economic and social progress of its people. The Prime Minister also expressed appreciation for the contribution of American Peace Corps Volunteers in this task.

The President informed the Prime Minister of his special interest in Malaysia's impressive achievements in the fields of education, economic growth and rural development. The President noted with admiration the Prime Minister's objective of a happy and prosperous nation upholding the principles of justice, freedom and democracy.

The Prime Minister outlined for the President the origins of the Malaysia concept and the history of its formation, and in this context reviewed the current activities by a neighboring state in violation of the territorial integrity of Malaysia.

The Prime Minister recounted his determined and various efforts to seek an amicable and honourable solution to the problem including the recent tripartite meeting in Tokyo. He also in-

formed the President of the discussions at the recent Commonwealth Prime Ministers Conference in London.

The President re-affirmed the support of the United States for a free and independent Malaysia, and for Malaysia's effort to maintain her security, preserve her sovereignty and continue her development in peace and harmony.

The President agreed to provide military training in the United States for Malaysian personnel, and to consider promptly and sympathetically credit sales, under existing arrangements, of appropriate military equipment for the defense of Malaysia.

The President expressed his strong hope that a peaceful and honorable way out of the current and dangerous situation could be found, and his appreciation for the earnest endeavors of the Prime Minister to this end. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that, while firmness in self-defense is indispensable, it is better to talk than fight.

The President and the Prime Minister found in the common devotion of the United States and Malaysia to the principles of democratic government and individual freedom a bond of understanding which is certain to bring their two countries into a constantly closer relationship, and agreed to maintain close contact on problems of mutual interest.

U.S., U.K. Test Low-Yield Nuclear Device Underground in Nevada

Following is the agreed text of a joint U.S.-U.K. announcement released simultaneously on July 18 at Washington and London.

White House press release dated July 18

The United States and the United Kingdom tested a low-yield British nuclear device underground at the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission's test site in Nevada yesterday (July 17).

The test was requested by the British Government and was conducted under the Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes, which

has been in effect between the two countries since August 4, 1958.¹

Both governments were satisfied that substantial technical and military benefits could be obtained by testing a British nuclear device underground as part of a continuing nuclear research program. The test was carried out within the framework of the limited nuclear test ban treaty of August 1963.

U.S., New Zealand, and Australia Reaffirm Ties of Friendship

Secretary Rusk was host at a dinner at the Department of State on July 17 honoring the participants in the meeting of the ANZUS Council at Washington July 17-18.² Following are the substantive portions of remarks made at the dinner by Secretary Rusk, New Zealand Prime Minister Keith J. Holyoake, and Australian Minister for External Affairs Paul Hasluck.

Secretary Rusk

This nation feels special ties with Australia and New Zealand. So do I, personally. As far as Australia is concerned, I am from Georgia, and I recall that Georgia and Australia were competing with each other for the products of the prisons of Britain at an early stage in our history.

And if I had to name the country which has cost me most personally, it would be New Zealand. Because during the last war when I was a Colonel on the General Staff and had to brief our Chiefs on the progress on the war in Africa, I, as did our Chiefs, became deeply impressed with the performance of the 2d New Zealand Division. I remember General Marshall, morning after morning, would say: "Where's the 2d New Zealand? Has it been committed yet?" And during that period, I took an oath that if I ever ran across a member of the 2d New Zealand Division, I would buy him a drink. And then I proceeded myself to the China-

Burma-India Theater and stopped in Cairo at a time when the entire division was on leave!

This association is so close, so natural, so obvious, that it is almost difficult to explain why ANZUS had to be made formal. I was there in September 1951 when we signed the ANZUS Treaty. And I think all of us felt at that time with Dean Acheson that it simply "puts into words strong ties and purposes already in existence."³ It was almost a part of the nature of things that we and Australia and New Zealand would have this kind of relationship among us.

But it goes beyond that. We have been comrades in arms in two world wars, plus the Korean episode. I remember in that dramatic week of the outbreak of the Korean war, after President Truman had decided that we should have to do something about this North Korean aggression—I remember [New Zealand Ambassador] Carl Berendsen's coming in straightaway like a shot to see me and simply saying, "What do you want from New Zealand?"

Well, this is the kind of thing that is important to a people like the United States, carrying very substantial burdens all over the world. Association with others in these joint enterprises is a matter of the greatest possible importance to us in these various situations. You may be interested in running back with us to 1951, to remember what Carl Berendsen said on that occasion of the signing:³

The treaty . . . rests upon the solid basis of common interests and ideals, upon the regard and the affection of the respective peoples, upon their common desire for peace and upon their common determination to resist aggression. It reflects also the inescapable facts of geography on the one hand and, on the other, the especial perils to which the Pacific may be exposed in the course of this worldwide conflict between liberty and slavery with which the whole of mankind is today oppressed.

And that was said 13 years ago.

And Percy Spender, now the distinguished President of the International Court, then Ambassador, said on that occasion, on behalf of Australia:³

The treaty . . . expresses in formal language the close ties of fellowship, understanding, and comradeship between us. But it does much more than that.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Sept. 24, 1951, p. 495.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of July 28, 1958, p. 161.

² For text of a final communique released on July 18, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.

It marks the first step in the building of the ramparts of freedom in the vast and increasingly important area of the Pacific Ocean. This day we here and now declare to the world that our three peoples share a common destiny. We publicly proclaim our intention and determination that that destiny shall be that we endure as free peoples and that we with other free peoples shall so labour that liberty shall not perish from the earth.

Things don't change a great deal. Who can doubt in 1964 that we share a common destiny? In this struggle between coercion and freedom, our vital common interests are worldwide and our fortunes literally inseparable. But we share, at the present time, a direct concern and special responsibilities, through ANZUS and SEATO and other arrangements, for the security of Southeast Asia. And those challenges will continue to test our mettle. While we shall persist untiringly in our efforts toward peace and to bring about through peaceful means a decision on the part of Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone, the United States will not waver in honoring its commitments under the ANZUS pact or our other international agreements. And we shall continue to help those who struggle and fight to defend their own freedom.

And I want to say to you, Mr. Prime Minister and Mr. Hasluck, that we find in this serious situation both comfort and strength in such allies and friends as Australia and New Zealand. Together, and in cooperation with other peoples who love liberty, we shall, as we anticipated in 1951, continue to strive for a peaceful world and a brighter future for ourselves and for our children.

And so this 13th meeting of the ANZUS Council is a very special and happy occasion for us—an experience in comradeship which is, I think, literally unique among nations, particularly in this vast area of the Pacific Ocean. Thank you very much.

Prime Minister Holyoake

Well, it is marvelous, what you have done in these few, brief years in this wonderful country. I suppose there has never been an example in all the world's history of responsibility and leadership—world responsibility and world leadership—being virtually thrust upon a people. And I say that advisably, not that you

shirked your duty, but because responsibility was thrust upon you in such a short space of time. And certainly, even if some of you might quarrel with that postulation, none of you will quarrel with the statement that I now make: that never in all the history of the world has world leadership been exercised in such responsible fashion as it is being exercised by the United States of America at the present time. There is no question whatever about that. The leadership you have given, the wealth you've poured out, the responsibility you shared, cheerfully, the load that you carry as taxpayers—I'm very conscious of the taxpayer, the man who hands out, so cheerfully, his millions and billions of dollars to help the world.

Looking back, I make bold to say this, that if anybody had prophesied 20 years ago or even 12 or 15 years ago that any nation in the world would have given the leadership, given the help, the succor, militarily, in every other way that this great United States of America has now given—if we would have prophesied that 12 or 15 years ago, we'd have been laughed at—none would have believed it. It's the phenomenon of our times. And because of this, we are proud and grateful to be your friends, to be numbered amongst your friends. We're proud and we're grateful that we should be associated with you. I'm speaking of New Zealand, a country of only 2.6 million people. But we're proud and grateful to be associated with you in the many ways we are—in SEATO, in ANZUS, in many other ways. Of course we have a common heritage, a common goal. We're in ANZUS because we wanted to play our part. And, as you know, the ANZUS Treaty lays it down that, if the United States of America is attacked, we'll come immediately to your aid. And I'm certain that millions of American people sleep more happily in their beds each night, being assured of that fact. Of course, I'm bound to say that perhaps we in New Zealand are more conscious of this and sleep more comfortably in our beds, knowing that the converse applies—if we're attacked at any time, the United States with her tremendous strength would come to our aid. . . .

I say again and may I say finally: there's a tremendous love for and admiration of the

people of the United States of America in our country in New Zealand. We'll always be proud and grateful for your friendship and the opportunity of our associations with you, the opportunity of serving, whether it is in war or whether it is in peace, in any capacity in which it is considered that we're able to serve with you.

Thank you very, very much for the opportunity of being with you tonight.

Mr. Hasluck

I was very moved, and I'm sure that all the Australians present were moved, by the statements made by the Secretary of State. And they certainly found a very clear echo in our minds. The ANZUS Treaty to us is something which means more than the formal document. It is in a sense the little sort of charter that we hang on the wall to show that we are the members of a particular association for which we hope to qualify in our own right and an association which we value very much.

ANZUS, in the sense that in any extremity we are in alliance with the United States of America, means a great deal to the very stark fact of our own survival—a fact of which we are very conscious in our part of the world, living, as we are, a comparatively isolated European community in close proximity to the Asian Continent. Our chances of survival depend very much on our own national integrity and our own national vigor, and equally depend on the strength of the alliances that we can form with like-minded people overseas. So when we think of ANZUS we do think quite starkly of the fact of our own survival.

But it goes a long way beyond that. It's not only that we are members of ANZUS because we think this is going to help us to survive and to live the sort of life that we want to live and build the sort of society that we want to build in our part of the world. We believe that, through our membership in ANZUS, beyond the borders of Australia we can make some contribution to the security of the whole region, we can help to remove fear that hangs like a shadow over a whole region, and by so doing we can make our small contribution toward the peace and security of the world. I'm sure that every Australian is strongly behind his Govern-

ment in its resolution to make what contribution it can to that great cause.

We are not a great country in the numbers of our population, but I believe that, larger than our population, is the way in which we have developed our resources—the industrial, technological, scientific, and other assets which we have built up there. And I believe in the character of our people: that we are fit to be a sturdy ally—and can be valued as such.

Our links with New Zealand are very close and very intimate. There's always a sort of friendly rivalry between us. It's never quite certain whether we are the outlying island of New Zealand or whether New Zealand is the outlying island of Australia. But we joke about each other, and we can joke in this friendly fashion. But I would like every American to realize that down in that corner of the world, side by side, you have these two like-minded English-speaking people dedicated to the same causes as those to which you are dedicated, willing to make their contribution to the same struggles in which you are giving leadership.

And I'd like every American also to realize that, on our part, we are greatly touched and we are moved in the depths of our being by both the realism and the resolution with which the postwar United States of America has accepted the burdens of leadership of the free world. We know it's not an easy task. One of the memories that we have as Australia from the days when Great Britain was giving that sort of leadership is a memory of the loneliness of great powers. No American can hope to be 100 percent popular around the world. No American can expect to receive gratitude around the world.

Britain went through this sort of thing in the last century—the berated power, the power that was always denigrated, the power that was always scoffed at, but the power that kept the peace of the world. And it's part of your burden, not only to do the great things which you are doing in all quarters of the globe but to have the fortitude and the strength of your own principles to endure the misunderstanding and, with patience, to survive the misrepresentation which seems to be always the fate of great

powers. But if ever—and this may sound a little particular—but if ever any American in that sense of loneliness feels that America is misunderstood, that the great effort that America is making on behalf of world peace

is not appreciated, I do hope that they'll think that down there in Australia and in New Zealand there are a few of your comrades who do understand you, who do stick with you. Thank you very much.

American Policy in Africa

by J. Wayne Fredericks

*Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs*¹

For many years Africa played a minor role in the drama of international affairs. In the wake of the past decade's wave of freedom and independence for former colonies, however, the new nations of Africa have graduated to more prominent and more demanding roles on the world stage.

This remarkable development offers an impressive set of challenges, of opportunities, and of problems for Americans who work both in the public and private sectors. Those challenges, opportunities, and problems, in turn, have reshaped United States policy toward the countries and peoples of Africa.

You in Minnesota have been in the vanguard of Americans who recognize the immediacy of Africa's problems. Against that background, let me review for you some of the most important challenges Africa poses for American foreign policy today.

The first important challenge Africa presents to Americans—and vice versa—is the challenge to be understood. Africa's nations, and her nations to be, figure daily in the news. But more often than not, what we read about those developing lands centers on the conflicts and crises, rather than on the continent's growing cooperation and progress. Like so many

others, Americans need to look behind the headlines of revolts, of border clashes, of mutinies and uprisings.

Those are disquieting developments. They do bespeak instability. Some of them are clear threats to the peace in Africa. But they do not represent the complete picture.

The challenge to know Africa better carries with it the responsibility for Americans to view the developments there in perspective. We must have some comprehension of the true causes of unrest threatening certain African nations. This challenge calls for an open mind to view objectively the considerable progress being made against formidable odds. A good hard look will indicate that much of this unrest is caused by the wide discrepancy between the needs and hopes of the people and the shortage of skills and capital required to move ahead rapidly.

Helping Africa Speed Its Development

Africa's new wave of independence has ushered in remarkable advances in many parts of the continent. But the overall situation is still one which creates great expectations among the peoples of the new nations. As you may know, the average annual income on the African Continent is only \$120. Its literacy rate is only 15 percent. One out of five Africans

¹ Address made at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., on July 7.

dies before reaching his teens. Agricultural productivity is low. Malnutrition and disease are widespread. Transportation and communications facilities are inadequate.

On the other hand, Africa has vast and under-exploited resources, such as unparalleled potential for hydroelectric power and agricultural production. Most important, Africa has human determination. The tremendous energies of its peoples have been turned to the economic and social development of their homelands. But the encouraging efforts at self-help found in every African nation are not enough to do the job with the necessary speed. Outside assistance is required. This, then, is a second important challenge—that of helping Africa speed its economic and social development.

U.S. Policy of Cooperation

The third important challenge is closely related to the other two. It consists of the formulation and execution of sound, effective, and mutually advantageous American foreign policy toward the various nations of Africa. As you can imagine, many problems complicate the pursuit of this objective.

U.S. foreign policy in Africa is predicated upon a long-range view of African developments. Economic growth, political stability, and true independence are sought by Africans. These goals, if achieved, protect American interests as well. While we, as a people, do have moral and humanitarian impulses to help less fortunate nations, we also are bound to the African Continent because the maintenance of peace and stability there is directly related to our own security and to peace in the world.

The United States respects the African peoples' desire for freedom, dignity, a more abundant life, and for African unity. We have sought to focus our programs of assistance toward the most effective ways of helping African nations obtain the professional and skilled personnel required to strengthen their economies, improve their public administration, and safeguard their independence. American assistance also is calculated to improve the productivity and general well-being of individual Africans.

Our policy in Africa is one of cooperation,

not domination. We have no desire to replace the mutually beneficial relationships existing between African and European nations in many parts of the African Continent. Europe's assistance to Africa is several times greater than our own. As it is the desire of African nations to continue to seek outside help, we seek to harmonize our aid with that of other free-world nations who play a more principal role in financing African assistance.

For the past 3 years, the United States Government has contributed roughly one-fourth of the \$2 billion in external economic assistance which Africa has received from government sources. This is exclusive of the very important contributions made by U.S. foundations, religious organizations, and other private groups. In fiscal years 1962, 1963, and again this year, our Government provided approximately \$500 million in economic assistance to 34 African countries. Surplus food, under the Food for Peace program, accounted for a sizable portion of the total amount. Other free-world governments provided some \$1,200 million, and the Sino-Soviet bloc extended some \$200 million in credits every year except 1963.

The United States also supports the goal of African unity. The desire for unity—either pan-Africanism or regional cooperation—is dear to the heart of every African leader. They believe that some form of mutual cooperation is necessary and proper to Africa's political, economic, and social development. The United States is glad to see the lively interest Africans are taking in cooperative endeavors. We believe this course can contribute importantly to a stable and strong continent.

A major development in continental African cooperation is the Organization of African Unity. Although the OAU was not formed until the conference of African chiefs of state of May 1963, when most African governments were less than 4 years old, it already has recorded several remarkable accomplishments. The OAU helped end last fall's hostilities between Algeria and Morocco. It has played an important role in bringing about a cease-fire on the Ethiopian-Somali frontier.

The United States respects the desires of

African leaders to keep the cold war out of Africa. We respect their posture of nonalignment in the East-West struggle, which is part of the foreign policy of most African nations. We believe that African countries, as they increase their ability to protect their independence, will remain truly nonaligned and reject the subordination that communism demands.

At the same time, we cannot underestimate the current threat and thrust of Sino-Soviet efforts in Africa. From January 1954 to June 1963, the Sino-Soviet bloc expended, as distinct from obligated, a total of \$1.5 billion in economic aid to less developed countries outside of the bloc itself. Of that amount, approximately 30 percent, or some \$450 million, went to Africa, including the United Arab Republic. I might point out, for comparative purposes, that during that same period only some 6 percent of all U.S. economic aid went to Africa, although today the total has climbed to about 10 percent.

In addition, the Communists in the last few years have established a diplomatic, economic, or cultural presence in many independent African states. Other Communist techniques to undermine Africa's freedom involve student training, cultural exchanges, informational programs, and economic ties.

Yet, in spite of—or perhaps in part because of—international communism's major efforts in Africa, the Communists have to date failed to subvert or capture any African country as a satellite. Open Communist interference in African domestic affairs and overt attempts to sway African nations have helped to arouse African suspicions of Communist goals.

The most important factor in precluding Communist success, however, has been Africa's increasing awareness of the divergence between the aspirations of international communism and the aspirations of the African nations. However, we cannot be—and we are not—complacent about the Communist threat to Africa. It is there; it is real; it is dangerous.

The Problem of the Congo

In Africa, U.S. foreign policy objectives involve coming to grips with problems of considerable dimensions.

One problem of great importance is that of the Congo. Only 4 years ago this vast and potentially rich nation in the heart of Africa came to independence. Shortly thereafter its peace and progress were disrupted by secessionist attempts in three of its provinces—Katanga, Kasai, and Orientale—and the Communist bloc sought to exploit the disorder for its own purposes. This nearly led to an East-West confrontation. Only through United Nations efforts was such a showdown averted.

The initial decision to support a U.N. operation in the Congo was made in 1960 by the Eisenhower administration. This decision was reaffirmed and implemented by the Kennedy administration's Congo policy during 1961, 1962, and 1963, until the Congo was reunited.

United States policy, in my judgment, has been successful. Although the Congo today is far from trouble free, the crisis which began when it achieved its independence on June 30, 1960, is now over. When the Katangese secession movement collapsed in January 1963, an unhappy chapter in the short history of that fledgling nation ended.

During that entire period the United States, despite considerable misunderstanding here in our own country of the issues involved, firmly and steadfastly supported the efforts of the United Nations to carry out its various mandates. The substance of those U.N. mandates was to help the Congo maintain its political independence and territorial integrity and to assist that nation in the restoration and maintenance of law and order. The speed and skill with which the U.N. moved into the Congo situation as a stabilizing force—with no comparable experience to draw upon, I might add—made that operation a major contribution toward the maintenance of world peace and security.

Today, the Congo is an independent nation with its boundaries intact. Maintenance of law and order is still a problem but no longer a massive threat to Congolese internal security. Civil war in the Congo has been averted and big-power confrontation in central Africa avoided. Communist aims, which came perilously close to succeeding in the early days of independence, have been thwarted.

Four years ago almost to the day, United Nations forces entered the Congo in response to an appeal from the Congolese Government. The last units of the United Nations forces left Léopoldville only last week. Hundreds of U.N. personnel continue to work there as teachers and technicians assisting the Congolese people in the great task of nation building. Belgian technical assistance is equally large. The Congolese are striving for the development of their own constitutional processes and are now conducting a referendum on a new constitution. This referendum began on June 25 and is scheduled to be completed by July 10. So far, the vote has been overwhelming in favor of acceptance of the new document, which was developed by a representative commission which sat for 3 months early this year.

Prime Minister [Cyrille] Adoula's Cabinet submitted its resignation at the end of June coincidental with the expiration of the Fundamental Law on the same date. President [Joseph] Kasavubu asked Mr. Adoula and his Cabinet to continue as a caretaker government until a new government is appointed which, under the new constitution, will be charged with governing the country until elections for parliament can be held. These are to take place within 6 to 9 months after the new constitution is approved. Mr. [Moise] Tshombe, who recently returned to the Congo after a year's absence abroad, has been asked by the President to form a Cabinet.

The United States has followed developments in the Congo very closely over the past 4 years and will continue to do so in the future, for the Congo has a key role to play in sub-Saharan Africa. It has gone through many vicissitudes, and its travail is not yet over as its leaders struggle with many problems in the economic, social, educational, and security fields as well as the primary one of creating a true sense of national unity.

No one, of course, can know with certainty what the future holds, but I, for one, am personally optimistic that the efforts of the United Nations and other countries in providing assistance to the Congo are bearing fruit in increasing the resources available to the Congolese leaders to meet and overcome their difficulties.

U.S. Support for Self-Determination

Another difficult and urgent aspect of our African relations has been that of demonstrating to African nations our will to provide at home the type of freedom and democracy we advocate and support in Africa—and elsewhere overseas.

The enactment last week of the 1964 Civil Rights Act offers dramatic evidence of the determination of all branches of the Federal Government, and of Negro as well as other Americans, to eradicate segregation and discrimination. Although the act's effect cannot yet be fully measured, it already has begun to make significant changes in traditional patterns of segregation.

There are racial problems in Africa, too. Although there has been racial or tribal strife in various parts of Africa, the most difficult of the racial and colonial problems lie in the southern end of the continent, where colonialism and *apartheid* are now being confronted by a show of African determination. Ever since the Addis Ababa summit meeting of May 1963, which gave birth to the Organization of African Unity, African nations one after another have intensified their attacks on South Africa's *apartheid* policy, upon Portuguese policy in Africa, and on the policy of the white-minority government of Southern Rhodesia. They will undoubtedly pursue these matters at the OAU meeting to be held at Cairo later this month.

United States policy supports the aspirations for self-determination of the peoples of those parts of Africa still not independent, and we have welcomed the emergence of independent African nations. Now, with Malawi (Nyasaland) achieving independence yesterday [July 6] and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) scheduled for independence in October, the world faces Africa's hard core of resistance to political change.

This hard core is found in Southern Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, Portuguese Guinea, and the Republic of South Africa, which administers neighboring South-West Africa under a League of Nations mandate.

What is our policy toward these areas? Simply stated, the United States supports the aspirations for self-determination and for polit-

ical participation in their governments of the peoples of those parts of Africa.

Malawi, Zambia, and Southern Rhodesia

First, let me turn to an area that was for a dozen years known as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland. Last December 31, the political experiment that brought the three countries of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, and Southern Rhodesia together officially ended. Each is now moving ahead separately.

Yesterday, Nyasaland became a member of the Commonwealth and is now known as Malawi. It is a country small in size, heavily populated, and primarily agricultural in economy. It is stable politically, however, and has come to independence under the leadership of its U.S.-educated Prime Minister, Dr. H. Kamuzu Banda. Malawi faces some difficult tasks in the economic development field, and we are endeavoring to lend a hand through our AID [Agency for International Development] program and through our Peace Corps volunteers. There also are encouraging indications that other friendly countries are going to coordinate their assistance efforts with ours. As Malawi is a former British possession, the United Kingdom understandably is playing the leading role in assistance, but we expect to play a role in helping Malawi strengthen its independence through economic growth.

Northern Rhodesia also is moving toward independence, having just completed an agreement with the British on the final form of its constitution. By mutual consent, independence will come on October 24, at which time the country will become Zambia, a republic within the British Commonwealth.

Hardly any state on the African Continent came to independence under more auspicious circumstances than those under which Zambia will begin its nationhood. It has one of the most viable economies in Africa, thanks to its position as one of the top three copper producers in the world. However, it is seriously short of the trained manpower needed to enable key positions to be filled by Africans. Our principal assistance efforts, therefore, are devoted to meeting requests from the Government to fill this need. We are making major efforts

in the fields of education to assist in the training of personnel who will be needed in the program of Africanization of key positions.

The situation in the third country of the former Federation—Southern Rhodesia—we view with many misgivings. Progress there is blocked by a double stalemate—first, between the United Kingdom and the Southern Rhodesia Government and, second, between the Southern Rhodesia Government and the principal African nationalist leaders. At the present time, nearly 400 of the key African nationalist leaders are being held in one form of detention or another by the Government of Southern Rhodesia—most of them without trial. The situation is tense, and, unless present trends are reversed, it could become even more serious in the near future.

The present regime is believed to be seeking independence at an early date under the existing form of government which, as a practical matter, would assure control of the government and the economy by the small white European minority for a long time to come. In a country of more than 3.5 million Africans and only some 200,000 Europeans, there naturally is much opposition from the African majority and from other nations to this proposal. For example, Southern Rhodesia is to be excluded from the July Commonwealth Prime Ministers conference at London for the first time. There is a strong indication of British Commonwealth opposition to any attempt by the Southern Rhodesian Government to obtain independence under a white minority.

The future of Southern Rhodesia is essentially a question for the British Government. But when the Southern Rhodesian question is discussed in various U.N. bodies, as it frequently is these days, we must and do make clear our desire to see the development of a solution acceptable to both races in the colony.

Angola and Mozambique

The Portuguese territories of Angola and Mozambique, situated on Africa's west and east coasts, represent another difficult southern African problem. Portugal views those territories as "overseas provinces" and feels very

strongly that it should be permitted to govern them without outside interference.

For their part, the Africans look upon the territories as "colonies" and feel very strongly that they should become independent as soon as possible. We in the United States are deeply committed to self-determination for all people. We believe Portugal should recognize publicly that the principle of self-determination is applicable to its territories. Our policy is to encourage both Portugal and the Africans to come to a workable understanding.

Talks between Portugal and several African nations took place last year under U.N. auspices but broke down over an inability to agree on what constituted self-determination. In May, however, the Secretary-General indicated in a report to the Security Council that he was consulting with Portugal and African representatives on the possibility of the talks being resumed.² We would very much like to see an amicable solution result from a continuation of such talks. The alternative to an amicable settlement is a serious one. There already has been fighting between nationalists and Portuguese forces in Angola and Portuguese Guinea. Clearly, we want to see peaceful progress on the question of the Portuguese territories instead of further conflict.

South-West Africa

The most intractable problems in southern Africa are those of South Africa and South Africa's administration of the former German colony of South-West Africa. South Africa's mandate over South-West Africa, which was assigned by the League of Nations after World War I, is currently the subject of a contentious case before the International Court of Justice. Two African countries that were members of the League of Nations—Ethiopia and Liberia—have asked the Court to judge whether South Africa has lived up to its obligations.

A South African Government Commission, the Odendaal Commission, proposed early this year that South-West Africa be divided into a white section and 10 nonwhite "homelands." The Commission also advocated large-scale incorporation of the territory's administrative

structure into the Republic's governmental departments. Spokesmen of the South African Government endorsed the broad principles of the Odendaal Commission's report, but the Government has decided not to implement controversial proposals of the Commission before the judgment of the Court is rendered.

South Africa's Apartheid Policy

Apartheid, a policy of group separation of races in the Republic of South Africa itself, is a tragic philosophy involving both whites and nonwhites whose families sometimes have lived in the area for generations and who together have built one of the highest standards of living in Africa. The conflict between nonwhite aspirations and official policy is already having extensive repercussions elsewhere, especially in newly independent Africa and in the United Nations.

The Republic of South Africa has been in the news quite a bit lately because of further incidents reflecting its determination to maintain its policy of *apartheid*.

In June eight leaders in the resistance to *apartheid*—black, white, and Indian—were sentenced to life imprisonment in the widely publicized Rivonia trial.

In May, Albert Luthuli, President General of the African National Congress and winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, was restricted to part of his local district for a second 5-year period. Nothing he says or writes can be published in South Africa, and he cannot have any visitors from outside his local area without special government permission.

A few days ago, the controversial 90-day detention clause was extended for an indefinite period up to 1 year. Under this clause, police may arrest without charge and hold in solitary confinement any person suspected of having information about certain types of political offenses or about plans to commit them. Persons can be arrested and held for successive 90-day periods. As many as three terms in a row, separated only by moments, have been imposed on the same individual.

The entire body of legislation restricting people's rights, opportunities, and activities has created understandable bitterness and opposi-

² U.N. doc. S/5727.

tion to *apartheid*, particularly among the black Africans, Asians, and Coloreds, who are people of mixed blood. But it also has developed a growing body of white South African opinion that feels *apartheid* is becoming destructive of the very values it purports to preserve. There are many churchmen, teachers, businessmen, editors, journalists, politicians of all parties, and many other troubled white opponents of the present policy of *apartheid*. Large numbers of South African lawyers, doctors, scholars, and others protested against the extension of the 90-day detention clause as an invasion of civil and human rights. Spokesmen of major religions—Catholic, Jewish, Moslem, and Protestant—appealed to the Government to let it lapse.

We can sympathize with the desires of those people who are concerned with the true values of Western civilization and wish to moderate their nation's restrictive policies. In view of our own race relations, we also can understand the very real problems with which South Africa is faced. At the same time, we believe there must be a change of direction—some movement toward finding a solution to South Africa's problems—and we think one of the first steps is to provide an opportunity for meaningful discussion of South Africa's race problem among people of all races and to begin to work out steps providing for political participation in a society based upon government by consent of the governed.

South Africa could have much to offer Africa and the world. But instead it is becoming increasingly isolated. South Africa has the most highly developed economy in Africa. It has a great reservoir of skills, of educated people, of technological know-how. With its substantial industries, great mineral reserves, and other basic components of industrial development, unfettered by its policy of *apartheid*, South Africa would be well endowed to play a leading role in economic and social development in Africa and elsewhere. Instead, the countries of Africa are largely closed to South Africa. That country has been forced out of several international organizations dealing with African scientific, economic, and social welfare problems. Instead of being a leader in this formative period of

African history, South Africa is becoming more and more isolated from the continent of which it is a part.

We believe South Africa's participation in African affairs would be a profoundly favorable development for all of Africa and, indeed, for the world. But we also know it cannot happen as long as *apartheid* continues to be the official policy of South Africa. We are committed to use our best efforts to encourage South Africa to abandon *apartheid*.

In summary, then, over the years the United States has developed a fundamental African policy to encourage Africa's political, economic, and social development and to assist in the growth of peaceful, stable, and independent nations on that continent. We know that peace and security are indivisible, and we want to help establish and maintain societies in Africa that can make their own positive contributions to world peace and progress.

NASA and Western Europe Agree on Scientific Satellite Project

NASA ANNOUNCEMENT

The first joint satellite agreement between the European Space Research Organization (ESRO) and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was announced on July 21 by the two agencies.

The organizations have signed a memorandum of understanding for a project involving two scientific satellites, reflecting further extension of the U.S. program encouraging cooperative space efforts with other countries. These two satellites bring to 13 the number launched or planned under the program.

ESRO, which came into formal existence in March 1964, is the nine-nation West European group formed to conduct scientific space research utilizing the capabilities of its member countries.

Membership includes Belgium, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and

the United Kingdom. Italy is expected to join when the Italian Government has ratified the ESRO convention. Austria has observer status.

ESRO plans include sounding rocket and satellite experimentation and the establishment of several centers and a launching site in its member countries.

Under the NASA-ESRO memorandum of understanding, the first satellite, to be known as ESRO I, is to contain eight experiments to study high-latitude particles (especially in auroral phenomena) and their effects on the polar ionosphere. The second, ESRO II, is to measure solar and cosmic radiation. It also will contain eight experiments.

Both satellites will be launched on NASA Scout rocket boosters into near-polar eccentric orbits. The launchings are tentatively scheduled during 1967 from the Air Force Western Test Range.

Responsibilities for the project will be divided between the two agencies as follows:

—ESRO will provide the experiment instrumentation; design, construct, and test the spacecraft; provide ground checkout and launch support equipment; track and acquire data from the spacecraft within the capability of its projected network; and reduce and analyze all data.

—NASA will train ESRO personnel as is mutually determined, provide the Scout launching vehicles, and conduct the launching operations. NASA will also provide necessary supplemental tracking and data acquisition support.

As with all NASA international cooperative projects, each agency will bear the cost of discharging its responsibilities. The scientific results and findings will be made available to the world scientific community.

The NASA-ESRO agreement brings to 13 the international cooperative satellites provided for under NASA memoranda of understanding. These include three joint U.S.-U.K. satellites, of which two have been successfully launched (Ariel I, April 1962; Ariel II, March 1964); five U.S.-Canadian satellites, the first of which—Alouette I—was launched in September 1962; two satellites to be launched in 1965-67 under the joint U.S.-Italian project San Marco; and FR-1, the cooperative U.S.-French satellite to be launched next year.

TEXT OF AGREEMENT

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE EUROPEAN SPACE RESEARCH ORGANISATION AND THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION

1. The European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the United States National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) affirm a mutual desire to undertake a cooperative program of space research by means of satellites. The objectives are to (a) perform an integrated study of the polar ionosphere with particular emphasis on auroral events and (b) measure solar and cosmic radiation.

2. It is planned to accomplish this cooperative program through the preparation, launching, and use of two satellites which are scheduled tentatively for launching in 1967.

(a) The polar ionosphere satellite, to be known as ESRO I, will contain experiments to perform an integrated study of high latitude particles and their effects on the polar ionosphere, including optical, heating, ionization, and large scale dynamic effects involving currents and magnetic perturbations. It will also include a beacon experiment for measurements of the total electron content between the satellite and ground observers. A near-polar eccentric orbit within the capability of the present Scout launch vehicle is planned for ESRO I.

(b) The solar astronomy and cosmic ray satellite, to be known as ESRO II, will contain experiments to measure solar and cosmic radiation including X-rays, He II line, Lyman Alpha, trapped radiation, solar and Van Allen belt protons, cosmic ray protons, alpha particles, and high energy electrons. A near-polar eccentric orbit within the capability of the present Scout launch vehicle is planned for ESRO II.

3. It is understood that this program is experimental in character and therefore subject to change in accordance with altered technical requirements and opportunities.

4. ESRO will be responsible for the following:

(a) Providing the experiment instrumentation.

(b) Designing, constructing, testing, and delivering to the launch site two flight qualified spacecraft for each mission.

(c) Supplying spacecraft ground checkout and launch support equipment.

(d) Providing such tracking and data acquisition support as may be within the capability of the projected ESRO network.

(e) Reducing and analyzing the data.

(f) Supporting such trainees as may be assigned pursuant to 5(a) below.

5. NASA will be responsible for the following:

(a) Making available project-related training for periods providing mutual benefits within the limits of resources in facilities and personnel.

(b) Reviewing the acceptance tests of satellite

flight units and the results of these tests. Final determination of the suitability of flight units for launching will be by joint ESRO/NASA decision.

(c) Providing the Scout launch vehicles, including heat shields and spacecraft tie-down and separation mechanisms, required for launching the two satellites.

(d) Conducting the launch operations, including tracking to the point where an initial orbit is established.

(e) Supplying necessary additional tracking and data acquisition support, with reimbursement by ESRO of any incremental costs such as those occasioned by special equipment and data tapes.

6. ESRO and NASA will each bear the cost of discharging its respective responsibilities including the costs of travel by personnel and transportation charges on all equipment for which it is responsible.

7. It is intended that this project proceed by mutual agreement between ESRO and NASA. The responsi-

bility for accomplishing this will rest with project managers to be named by ESRO and NASA. Assisted by a Joint Working Group with appropriate membership, the ESRO and NASA project managers will coordinate the agreed functions and responsibilities of each agency with the other.

8. ESRO and NASA will use their best efforts to arrange for free customs clearance of equipment required in the program.

9. ESRO and NASA will exchange all scientific information resulting from this cooperative program and make the results freely available to the world scientific community.

P. AUGET

For the European Space
Research Organisation

HUGH L. DRYDEN

For the National Aero-
nautics and Space Ad-
ministration

July 8, 1964

The New Implications of Industrial Competition

by David E. Bell

*Administrator, Agency for International Development*¹

It is a great pleasure for me to meet with you today at this New England Conference on Modernization for World Competition. The United States foreign assistance program, with which I am associated, is deeply involved in one aspect of the problem you are considering here—this is the expansion and strengthening of the economies of less developed countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. I believe this work has some significant implications for the subject of your conference.

The first point I should like to emphasize is that the fundamental purpose of our economic assistance to less developed countries is to help them achieve economic strength and independence.

¹ Address read for Mr. Bell by Deputy Administrator William S. Gaud before the New England Conference on Modernization for World Competition at Boston, Mass., on June 10.

This fundamental theme of helping other countries to become economically stronger—to get on their own feet so that our aid can come to an end—has guided our foreign aid efforts since the days of the Marshall Plan. There is no need for me to recall here the striking success of the Marshall Plan, under which the countries of Western Europe were restored to economic health in 4 or 5 years and by the early fifties were able to make strong economic progress without any further economic aid from us.

What is not so well known is that a substantial number of other countries have by now followed in the footsteps of Western Europe. They have achieved with our help basic economic momentum, and our aid has been brought to an end or is being brought to an end.

American economic assistance has terminated altogether in some 17 countries, including the Marshall Plan countries plus Japan, Spain,

Yugoslavia, and Lebanon. We have identified 14 more countries in which the transition is now in process from economic aid in the form of soft loans and grants to economic self-support and the end of the need for aid.

A clear-cut example is the Republic of China on Taiwan. Fifteen years ago the economy of Taiwan was almost wholly dependent upon the United States for its economic livelihood. Over these last 15 years, however, a highly successful development program has been carried out. In the field of agriculture, a successful land reform program was executed and improved methods, markets, and supplies such as fertilizers were made available to the Taiwanese farmers. Today the productivity of the farmers of Taiwan is second only to that of Japan. Education and health services have been expanded. Transportation and power facilities have been enlarged. Particularly in the last few years, a lively and thriving industrial sector has been emerging.

For the last several years the gross national product of Taiwan has been rising at more than 5 percent per year. A most significant and most necessary element of the progress of Taiwan has been a rapid expansion of exports, which have been going up 10 or 12 percent per year for the last several years. In the present year, 1964, Taiwan exports are expected for the first time to reach half a billion dollars.

Most important of all, the combination of these various factors has meant that the process of self-sustaining economic growth has become established. There is no doubt that in Taiwan today there has been achieved the necessary minimum of trained and experienced leadership, public and private, the necessary minimum of capital facilities, and the framework of incentives, laws, and attitudes which will result year after year in a predictable rise in the gross national product. United States aid has given Taiwan the initial boost that was needed, and the people of Taiwan can take it from there.

What happened 10 years ago in Western Europe and Japan, what is happening today in Taiwan, Greece, Israel, Mexico, Venezuela, and other countries—this is what we want to see happen throughout the less developed parts of the world. We want through U.S. aid to help give an initial boost which will allow these coun-

tries thereafter to make progress with their own resources, without special assistance, relying on normal access to world trade and world capital markets.

We are making headway in that direction. Quite a few countries—even though they are not yet near the end of the need for foreign aid—are making solid headway. India, Pakistan, Turkey, Nigeria, Colombia, Chile—in all these countries the process of economic development is visible. Agricultural and industrial productivity are rising; education is spreading; governmental and private leaders are learning to handle the many difficult problems that arise when economic and social progress occurs.

Please note that I am describing only the beginnings of the process of economic modernization. When a period of self-sustaining economic growth has begun, and foreign aid has been ended, the average standard of living in a country is still quite low and the major progress in living standards is still to come. Far more economic progress has been made in Western Europe and in Japan since economic aid to those areas ended than took place previously. The same thing will be true in each of the less developed countries as they reach the point of rapid and self-sustained economic progress.

For example, the per capita income in Taiwan today, according to the best estimates, measures about \$150 per year—compared to \$2,500 per year per capita in the United States. Even allowing for the well-known deficiencies of such comparative statistics, the gap between these two figures is enormous. But the point I am stressing at the moment is that the people of Taiwan are now in a position to achieve a steady and rapid rise in their own incomes and living standards, without the need for economic aid. Year by year into the future, we can expect to see per capita income rise in Taiwan as economic growth continues in its benign upward spiral.

Opportunities for Trade and Investment

This brings me to the second main point I would like to make this noon. As our foreign aid programs are successful in promoting economic growth, the countries we are assisting not only become stronger economies; they also become better markets for our exports and better

destinations for our private business investment overseas.

This has been evident in Western Europe, where U.S. exports have more than doubled in the last 10 years. It has been evident in Japan, where U.S. exports have quadrupled since 1950. The very rapid rise of U.S. private investment in Europe and in Japan is well known.

But I call your attention to the fact that similar opportunities are appearing today in some of the less developed countries—and will appear tomorrow in many more. As Taiwan's exports have risen from a quarter-billion dollars 3 years ago to a half-billion dollars today, it has become an increasingly attractive market for exports from the United States and from other countries and an increasingly attractive destination for U.S. investment overseas.

Moreover, now that Taiwan has entered a stage of continuing economic progress, it will become a steadily better market. From the viewpoint of the American businessman, interested in exports or in investment abroad, we have seen only the beginnings of the opportunities that will be offered in Taiwan. Many American businessmen are already making plans to take advantage of these increasing opportunities, and I hope that through meetings such as this one the word will spread ever more widely.

Paving the Way for New Markets

The third point I should like to stress here is that the foreign aid program helps to open up U.S. export opportunities by increasing familiarity with U.S. products and establishing commercial relationships.

A striking example of how the aid program has led to the creation of new export markets is the case of coal. Before World War II, U.S. coal was not normally exported to European markets. During the Marshall Plan, however, large amounts of coal were exported to Europe under foreign aid financing. Aid financing of coal exports has long since been reduced virtually to zero. But the markets have remained. Recently the Coal Exporters Association of the United States submitted a statement to the President's White House Conference on Export Expansion pointing out that 28 million tons

out of the 40 million tons of U.S. coal exported in 1962—approximately \$285 million worth—was an outgrowth of export business established as a result of our foreign aid program.

This is a classic case where U.S. aid financing has paved the way for a new market which thrived after aid was discontinued.

We believe that foreign aid today is opening up many such markets, particularly where the opportunities afforded by aid financing are vigorously followed up by export-minded American businessmen. As most of you know, it is AID policy at present, and has been since 1959, to require that foreign aid appropriations be spent in the United States for U.S. goods and services, with relatively small exceptions. At present, over 80 percent of the funds being committed under the foreign aid program are going directly to U.S. suppliers of goods and services.

As a result of this policy, the volume of aid-financed procurement in the United States has increased dramatically for many commodities. For example, in calendar year 1963, foreign aid financed exports of \$180 million of iron and steel mill products, \$292 million of machinery and equipment, \$84 million of chemical and related products, \$52 million of railway and other transportation equipment.

For some commodities, aid now finances a substantial percentage of the total value of U.S. exports. In calendar 1963, for example, aid financed 46 percent of the total U.S. export of fertilizers; 37 percent of the total exports of railway transportation equipment; and 31 percent of U.S. exports of iron and steel mill products.

Our figures on the geographic distribution of foreign aid procurement indicate that Massachusetts has shared significantly in this business. Incomplete figures show that, since January 1962, AID has financed the procurement of well over \$20 million worth of commodities from Massachusetts producers. Moreover, AID technical services contracts in Massachusetts, in effect as of March 31, 1964, totaled over \$19 million.

I should like to stress very strongly a point which, I take it, should be obvious. The market demand I have just been describing—that is, the market demand financed by foreign aid ap-

propriations—is inherently temporary. None of us want to see foreign aid extended for any country a moment longer than is necessary.

Whether these temporary markets turn into permanent ones depends primarily on the effectiveness with which American businessmen follow up the opportunities thus opened to them. If they ship under the foreign aid program to less developed countries first-class merchandise; if they follow along with stocks of spare parts and supplies; if they establish marketing and service arrangements—in short, if they apply in the less developed countries the same vigorous competitive practices they follow in the United States, then they can look forward to solid and growing markets abroad. If, however, they take the opposite attitude and sit back and wait for the follow-on orders to arrive, I am sure they will be disappointed. There are plenty of energetic salesmen from Germany, France, Britain, Japan, striving to obtain business in the less developed countries. American businessmen can compete with them—but not just by sitting in an office on Route 128.

Accordingly, I urge the businessmen in this audience and throughout the United States who are now enjoying or who would like to take advantage of export markets under the foreign aid program to consider themselves in a temporarily fortunate position. These are opportunities which, if vigorously pursued, can open many doors and generate a great deal of trade in the future.

Balance of Payments

The final point I should like to emphasize this noon relates to the other side of the trade coin. As any businessman knows, the United States can export only to people who can afford to pay for exports. People who want to import from the United States must be in a position to obtain dollars with which to pay for those imports. Trade is a two-way street.

There has been a good deal of concern expressed from time to time that if we help other countries expand their economies this will harm, not help, the United States. The evidence is overwhelming that this fear is unwarranted. Year after year since the end of World War II, the economies of Europe and Japan have grown

steadily stronger. Simultaneously, year after year, U.S. exports to those countries and to other parts of the world have grown—and have stayed well ahead of U.S. imports.

The balance-of-payments problems of the United States have not reflected an adverse balance of trade. Quite the contrary, our favorable balance of trade has remained substantial; it has exceeded \$4 billion in each of the last 4 years. We have had, and continue to have, a difficult balance-of-payments problem, but this reflects the extent of our desires and commitments in the world. We want to finance a large volume of investment abroad, large tourist expenditures, and large military and other government outlays abroad—and our favorable trade balance has not been large enough to cover all those requirements. A number of steps have been taken to meet this situation, and the U.S. balance of payments looks a good deal healthier today than it did 3 or 4 years ago.

The lesson to be derived from this experience, however, is not to turn our backs on the policies of economic expansion around the world which we have been following since the Second World War. Quite the contrary, the record of these last 20 years has demonstrated that the U.S. economy is amply strong and healthy enough to hold its own in a competitive world. U.S. exporters have been steadily increasing their volumes, and U.S. investors have been steadily expanding their interests abroad. American businessmen who apply the ideas being discussed at this conference—the best and most modern ideas about research, about marketing, about modernization—can be confident of their ability to operate successfully in an expanding and growing world economy.

We in the United States have much to gain from a dynamic international economic policy.

In the narrowest terms of economic self-interest, it is to our advantage to open up sources of raw materials we do not ourselves have, to find sources of more economical supplies for items for which we are high-cost producers, and to transfer our workers into industries where productivity is greatest and wages can be highest. It is to our own interest to invest our capital overseas when it can yield competitive returns. In short, our economy is strong enough and competitive enough to reap

in practice the rewards of the expansion of the market and the division of labor which economists have been preaching since the days of Adam Smith.

But there are broader reasons which require us to support an expansionist international economic policy. The bulk of the world's population is living today under conditions of hunger, disease, and poverty which are a shame and a reproach to a world blessed with modern science and technology. It is not simply a matter of sound business for us to help overcome those conditions. It is also a matter of fundamental humanitarian concern—and a matter of our own national security in the broadest sense of that term. For we cannot expect to have the kind of stable and progressive world in which free institutions can survive and flourish unless the people of Asia, Africa, and Latin America can look forward to economic and social progress, earned by their own work in independence and self-respect.

Consequently, the task of modernizing primitive economies can and should be thought of as part of the great effort to extend the free society. And the efforts of American exporters and investors to advance their own competitive interests by providing better values in the market place are an integral part of the process of international development on which our own future depends so heavily.

Major difficulties confront us in seeking to achieve international development. Resources are unevenly distributed. Population growth rates are high. Moscow and Peiping seek to frustrate free and democratic development. But the strong interests of the United States—and of free men everywhere—impel us to stick to the job. I am confident we can succeed.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

Rafael Sancho-Bonet as Deputy Chief of Protocol, effective July 29. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 337 dated July 23.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Consular Relations

Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.¹

Accession deposited: Tunisia, July 8, 1964.

Economic Cooperation

Convention on Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and supplementary protocols. Signed at Paris December 14, 1960. Entered into force September 30, 1961. TIAS 4891.

Accession deposited: Japan, April 28, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.

Ratification deposited: Peru, July 20, 1964.

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as revised, for the protection of industrial property. Dated at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered into force June 1, 1928; for the United States March 6, 1931. 47 Stat. 1789.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Trinidad and Tobago, May 14, 1964.

Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.

Notification of accession: Trinidad and Tobago, July 1, 1964.

BILATERAL

Greece

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964.

Panama

Agreement relating to the establishment of a peace corps program in Panama. Effected by exchange of notes at Panamá October 30, 1963.

Entered into force: July 6, 1964.

Turkey

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 17, 1964. Entered into force July 17, 1964.

¹ Not in force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Status of the World's Nations (Revised). A concise reference guide, second in a series prepared by The Geographer, giving official nomenclature, area, population, and capital city of all independent states. Includes some quasi-independent states and "irregular categories." Geographic Bulletin No. 2 (Revised). Pub. 7573. 22 pp. 25¢.

Foreign Affairs Outline—1965: International Cooperation Year. Article based on an address by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, before the Conference Group of U.S. National Organizations for the United Nations at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7638. International Organization and Conference series 52. 5 pp. 5¢.

Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet describing the history, functions, and goals of the Department. Pub. 7644. Department and Foreign Service series 124. 16 pp. 15¢.

The Making of Foreign Policy—An Interview With Secretary of State Dean Rusk. Transcript, with minor editorial changes, of a television program first broadcast on January 12, 1964, on which Secretary Rusk answered the questions of Professor Eric F. Goldman of Princeton University. Pub. 7658. General Foreign Policy series 190. 33 pp. 20¢.

Third Anniversary of the Alliance for Progress. Text of an address made by President Johnson at the Pan American Union on the occasion of the installation of Carlos Sanz de Santamaría as chairman of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. Pub. 7669. Inter-American series 87. 12 pp. 15¢.

Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1963. Sixteenth annual report to the United Nations on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, July 1, 1962 to June 30, 1963. Pub. 7676. International Organization and Conference series 53. 279 pp. \$1.

America as a Great Power. Pamphlet based on an address made by President Johnson before the Associated Press at New York, N.Y. Pub. 7688. General Foreign Policy series 193. 22 pp. 15¢.

U.S. Policy Toward Cuba. Article by Under Secretary George W. Ball, based on a speech made before the Omicron Delta Kappa Society at Roanoke, Va. Pub. 7690. Inter-American series 88. 22 pp. 15¢.

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 6—United States Policy in Viet-Nam. Article based on an address by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara at the James Forrestal Memorial Awards dinner of the National Security Industrial Association at Washington, D.C. Pub. 7691. Far Eastern series 125. 8 pp. Limited distribution.

Foreign Affairs Outline No. 7—The Alliance for Progress. Article based on an address by Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, before the Washington Institute of Foreign Affairs at Washington, D.C. Pub. 7697. Inter-American series 89. 6 pp. 5¢.

Visas—Abolition of Fees. Agreement with Yugoslavia. Exchange of notes—Dated at Belgrade December 30, 1963, March 27 and April 4, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5564. 3 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of the Congo—Signed at Léopoldville April 28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5565. 14 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5566. 9 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5567. 7 pp. 10¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Yugoslavia—Signed at Belgrade April 28, 1964. Entered into force April 28, 1964. TIAS 5568. 4 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with Bolivia, amending the agreement of February 4, 1963, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at La Paz April 27, 1964. Entered into force April 27, 1964. TIAS 5569. 4 pp. 5¢.

Indus Basin Development Fund. Agreement with Other Governments, supplementing the agreement of September 19, 1960—Signed at Washington March 31, and April 6, 1964. Entered into force April 6, 1964. TIAS 5570. 6 pp. 5¢.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agreements of January 5, 1955; November 3, 1956; December 22, 1958; April 28, 1961; and December 28, 1961, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Belgrade April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5571. 6 pp. 5¢.

Education—Educational Foundation and Financing of Exchange Programs. Agreement with the Republic of China—Signed at Taipei April 23, 1964. Entered into force April 23, 1964. TIAS 5572. 15 pp. 10¢.

Corrections

BULLETIN of June 29, 1964, p. 998: The bottom line in the left-hand column should read, "but defined his policy of the 'good neighbor' as:"

BULLETIN of July 13, 1964, p. 56: The last sentence in the first full paragraph in the right-hand column should read, "But at least it provides a means for the two countries to work out useful arrangements regarding future border difficulties."

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*331	7/20	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*332	7/20	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Malaysia.
333	7/22	Rusk: meeting of OAS foreign ministers.
*334	7/22	Program for visit of President of Malagasy Republic.
†335	7/22	Cleveland: "The Fraternity of the Impatient."
*336	7/23	Knox sworn in as Ambassador to Dahomey (biographic details).
*337	7/23	Sancho-Bonet designated Deputy Chief of Protocol (biographic details).
338	7/24	Second round of air talks with Canada concluded.
†339	7/23	Harriman: Eastern Canadian American Assembly, Quebec.
*340	7/24	Cultural exchange (Turkey).
*341	7/24	Rusk: death of Mrs. Richard I. Phillips.
*342	7/24	Program for visit of President of Malagasy Republic.

* Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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
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THE
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August 17, 1964

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The Pursuit of Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a very genuine personal pleasure for me to join you in celebrating the 50th anniversary of the founding of the American Field Service. From its beginning in 1914 as a volunteer ambulance service with the French armies, through its active service with the Allied armies in the Second World War, and—most of all—during the postwar years in which it initiated and developed a splendid high school student exchange program, the American Field Service has devoted itself to promoting understanding and friendship among the peoples of the world.

When you began your teenage exchange program by bringing 50 students to this country for the school year 1947–48, probably not many people foresaw how rapidly that program would grow. But it is one of the glories of our society that if one plants a good idea, or a sound insti-

tution, thousands of willing hands will come forward to tend and nurture it. To have brought more than 16,000 young people from some 65 countries into schools and homes in more than 2,000 American communities, and to have enabled nearly 10,000 young Americans to study and live with families abroad—these are very substantial accomplishments. These are among what Raymond Fosdick has called “the infinity of threads which bind peace together.”

Many of you here tonight are among this great corps of international ambassadors. Others of you represent the even larger number of persons, here and abroad, whose contributions have been indispensable to the program's success: parents, host families, school and community representatives, and volunteer workers. And beyond all of you stand millions of other people in this country and elsewhere who have been touched by this program, if only by getting acquainted with a student from abroad, in school or in a neighbor's home.

Many of us in the Department of State and our overseas posts have a close working re-

¹ Made at the 50th anniversary dinner of the American Field Service at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 2 (press release 355 dated Aug. 1). For the text of remarks made by President Johnson at the White House on July 20 to a group of American Field Service exchange students, see BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1964, p. 189.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1312 PUBLICATION 7721 AUGUST 17, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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lationship with your organization and have tried to give you as much assistance as possible.

I shall not attempt to add to your chairman's tribute to Stephen Galatti. The American Field Service was fortunate to have as its Director General for nearly 30 years a man of his vision, wisdom, and gentleness. We all regret that he could not have lived to take part in this anniversary celebration, for which he had planned and prepared for more than a year. Surely we can all agree that his most fitting memorial will be the continuation of this great program and our devotion to the ideals he bequeathed to us.

A World of Peace and Brotherhood

Stephen Galatti was working to achieve a world in which all mankind can live together in peace and brotherhood. That kind of world is the abiding dream of the American people and the ultimate goal of their foreign policy.

The primary objective of our foreign policy is, in the familiar but ever-stirring phrase, to "secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity." In earlier days we could do that by keeping ourselves apart from the rest of the world; we felt relatively safe behind our ocean ramparts. But today we can be safe only to the extent that our worldwide environment is safe. Our worldwide environment will be permanently safe only if men succeed in establishing a decent world order, the kind of world order set forth in the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the United Nations Charter: a world of independent nations, each free to choose its own institutions, but cooperating with others, a world in which all international disputes are settled by peaceful means, a world subject to the rule of law.

To arrive at such a decent world order is the the overriding preoccupation of our foreign policy. And if all governments were agreed on that goal, we could rapidly attain it. But, unhappily, there are powerful forces which do not want that kind of world, which seek to dominate and regiment all of mankind.

The great issue of our time is which of these two concepts of a world order will prevail: freedom or coercion. And here let me say again something I have said on several occasions: The

Communist goal, proclaimed in doctrine and supported in action, is world domination. Both of the main branches of the Communist movement have the same goal—even though they may differ over tactics. They have made it clear that by "peaceful coexistence" they mean a continuing attempt to spread their system over the earth by all means short of the great war which would be self-defeating. No one has to convince us the contest between freedom and Communist imperialism is for keeps. For this struggle is our first order of business in the State Department. And it must never cease to be our first order of business until a worldwide victory for peace and for freedom has been secured.

Our purpose must be to win that victory without a great war if possible. We will defend our vital interests, and those of the free world, by whatever means are required. But a military orgy is not a rational path to a decent world order of free men. No sane man could regard the incineration of most of the Northern Hemisphere as a triumph for freedom.

Several Main Lines of U.S. Policy

In moving toward a world in which both peace and freedom are secure, we pursue simultaneously several main lines of policy.

We seek to prevent the Communists from expanding their domains. The primary purpose of our military forces is to make resort to force by our adversaries unprofitable, dangerous, and futile. In the last 3½ years our nuclear deterrent has been greatly amplified and a substantial part of it made relatively invulnerable to attack. Our military power is almost literally unimaginable. So is the devastation which would result in even a few hours of all-out war.

In difficult situations it is easy to say that we should either have a big war or should quit. There have been many clashes since the Second World War that could have mushroomed into a third world war if sobriety had not exercised a restraining influence. It is important that our allies remain assured both that we are loyal and determined in our common commitments and that our military forces are directed and controlled by steady hands.

We must maintain not only a formidable nuclear deterrent but other types of military

force. We have in fact strengthened substantially our conventional forces and given them more mobility. In addition, we have improved our capacity to help our allies in dealing with aggression by guerrilla warfare and the infiltration of arms and military men across national frontiers.

We are very gratified by the decisions taken by the foreign ministers of the American Republics at their meeting which ended a week ago today.² They voted to sever diplomatic relations with Castro's Cuba—as most of them already had done. They decided to break trade relations between the American Republics and Cuba, except for foodstuffs and medicine and medical equipment. And they decided to interrupt sea transportation between the American Republics and Cuba.

These decisions were the response of the American Republics to Castro's efforts to destroy democracy in Venezuela. They made it clear, we think, that Castro has no future in this hemisphere or in Cuba. We believe that the Cuban people welcome these measures against a regime which has betrayed them and prevents them from enjoying their close traditional ties with the other peoples of this hemisphere.

In Southeast Asia we have taken further steps to assist the Government and people of South Viet-Nam to repel the Communist aggressors. The defeat of this aggression is essential to the security of Southeast Asia and as a demonstration that Communist expansion by guerrilla warfare, infiltration of weapons, and military men cannot succeed.

Next door, in Laos, we support the government of Prince Souvanna Phouma and are insisting upon full compliance with the Geneva accords of 1962,³ which have been flouted by Hanoi and Peiping. The essence of those accords is very simple: Let everyone leave the Laotians alone and let them work out their own future for themselves—independent, neutral, and secure.

We also support the cause of freedom by helping the developing countries to move ahead

economically and to overcome the social and political problems which feed discontent. And we do what we can to help settle disputes within the free world.

Search for Means To Reduce Tensions

Meanwhile, we search for means of reducing the danger that hostility between the two worlds may lead to a general war. The Soviet leadership appears to recognize a common interest with us in preventing a mutually destructive thermonuclear exchange. We have managed to reach a few limited agreements with Moscow. And we should like to reach more—although little progress in controlling arms is possible without reliable inspection and verification.

We are not justified in relaxing our efforts in the slightest. But we shall continue to search earnestly for further useful agreements. As President Johnson has said: "Our guard is up, but our hand is out."⁴

There is another important element in our policy toward our divided world. It is to give the ordinary people of the world a chance to assert their concern for peace. This is why we are encouraged by signs of growing interest in more national autonomy and more personal freedom among Communist countries, by movement away from seclusion and toward more normal contacts between their peoples and the peoples of the free world.

Economic problems are evident throughout the Communist world. Failures in food production are endemic and obviously are not quickly curable under collective systems of agriculture. Industrial growth has slowed down. The gap in living standards between their system and the more advanced countries of the free world is growing wider. But their peoples aspire to a better life and are asking for performance on the promises made to them for so long. This rising consumer demand is requiring careful decisions about the allocation of limited resources. Naturally, we would rather see them put more resources into improving the living standards of their peoples than into the promotion of their world revolution.

The Communist world is also torn by a great

² For a statement by Secretary Rusk and text of the Final Act, see *ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

³ See p. 218.

⁴ BULLETIN of Apr. 20, 1964, p. 607.

dispute between Moscow and Peiping and by strong national impulses among their smaller members. Most of the Eastern European nations are increasing their trade and other contacts with the West.

These are not dramatic changes, but they are movements toward a little more national—and personal—freedom of action and expression.

We think it would be very shortsighted not to recognize these trends and do what little we can to encourage them. We do not think it is in the interest of the United States or the cause of freedom to insist that all people who bear the Communist label are alike or that there is no possibility of evolution within that world.

There is another interest, shared around the world despite the deepest differences, which deserves our attention. It arises from the confrontation between frail man and a hostile universe. This is a struggle in which all men are potential allies. It is the struggle against disease, natural catastrophe, the assault of nature upon our food and other requirements. It lays the basis for cooperation in medicine, meteorology, the basic sciences, the peaceful exploration of outer space, the desalinization of sea water. These are enterprises which hold out large practical benefits for all mankind as well as the hope that slowly and steadily the common interests of the race can take control over the tendency of man to destroy himself.

Thus our policy toward the Communist states has several facets: to halt aggression, to reduce the danger of a great war, to encourage evolution toward more open societies, and to find elements of common interest based upon the human condition.

Building Free-World Strength

At the same time, we are building the strength of the free world. We are expanding and improving our partnerships with other economically advanced nations of the free world—with Western Europe, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and others.

We are helping less developed countries to move ahead economically and socially toward human dignity and political stability. There are more than 80 of these countries, and they contain nearly half the world's population.

The economically advanced countries are too strong and healthy and prosperous for the Communists to seize by force or subversion. Therefore they are addressing themselves to the less developed countries. They have emulated our foreign aid programs with substantial resources. And the leading Communist slogan is "Yanks, go home." By that they mean not only our military forces but our foreign aid programs.

Foreign aid remains, as it has been throughout the postwar period, an indispensable instrument of our foreign policy. We would wish to help these countries even if there were no such thing as a cold war. But the Communist threat makes our aid imperative if freedom is to survive and ripen in vast areas of the world. And surely it is better to save freedom by helping new nations to get on their feet than to wait until it can be saved only by committing American youths to combat.

Another of our constant objectives is the strengthening and improvement of international institutions—some regional, some specialized, and, most important of all, the United Nations. Early this year, I suggested some ways for improving the procedures of the United Nations General Assembly and making it a more responsible body.⁵ The United Nations commands our continuing support. As President Johnson said to the General Assembly last December:⁶ ". . . more than ever we support the United Nations as the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind."

"Unpartisan" Nature of U.S. Policies

These basic policies I have been talking about are in no sense partisan. They have been developed and supported over the postwar years by leaders of both parties—by four successive Presidents, by the major presidential candidates in four successive elections, by leaders of both parties in Congress, and by the American people. They have been national policies—bipartisan or, as the late Senator Vandenberg, one of their chief architects, preferred to put it, "unpartisan."

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 112.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

The United States Senate ratified the United Nations Charter by a vote of 89 to 2. NATO, the Rio Pact, ANZUS, SEATO, and our other alliances were ratified by overwhelming bipartisan votes. Aid to Greece and Turkey, the Marshall Plan, our foreign aid programs over the years, have been voted by bipartisan majorities. The test ban treaty was approved by the Senate by a vote of 80 to 19.

Over the years these national policies have produced good results. The winds of freedom are blowing strong. The simple ideas and ideals to which we are committed are shared by men and women around the globe—the ideas and ideals of freedom, of human rights, of government with the consent of the governed, of the sort of world projected in the United Nations Charter. We have more allies in this struggle than we sometimes think. As the Prime Minister of Malaysia [Tunku Abdul Rahman] said the other evening in Washington:⁷

It may be fashionable for some people or leaders of some countries to find fault with America, but this is the price of greatness which America has to pay. You should realize that deep, really deep down, in their hearts . . . most Asian nations, except the Communist, have the highest regard, the highest respect and admiration, for your country.

A few nights earlier the Minister for External Affairs of Australia [Paul Hasluck] said:⁸

. . . I'd like every American . . . to realize that . . . we are greatly touched and we are moved in the depths of our being by both the realism and the resolution with which the postwar United States of America has accepted the burdens of leadership of the free world. We know it's not an easy task. . . . No American can hope to be 100 percent popular around the world. No American can expect to receive gratitude around the world.

Britain went through this sort of thing in the last century—the berated power, the power that was always denigrated, the power that was always scoffed at, but the power that kept the peace of the world. And it's part of your burden, not only to do the great things which you are doing in all quarters of the globe but to have the fortitude and the strength of your own prin-

⁷ In remarks made on July 22 at a dinner given by Secretary Rusk in the Prime Minister's honor. For an exchange of greetings and toasts and a joint communique with President Johnson, see *ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 190.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 196.

ciples to endure the misunderstanding and, with patience, to survive the misrepresentation which seems to be always the fate of great powers.

Not all our friends are so outspoken. But, as the Prime Minister of Malaysia indicated, down in their hearts most people in the world understand, respect, and share what America stands for. They know and trust the decent commitments and intentions of the American people. Most of them want the kind of world we want—not because we want it but because they want it too.

U.S. Supports Preconditions for Conference on Laos

Following is the text of a U.S. statement handed by Secretary Rusk on July 30 to Soviet Chargé d'Affaires G. M. Kornienko, together with a Soviet statement handed to Under Secretary Ball on July 26 by Mr. Kornienko.

U.S. STATEMENT OF JULY 30

Press release 349 dated July 31

The Government of the United States shares the concern of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics over the deteriorating situation in Laos, as expressed in the Soviet statement handed to the United States Government on July 26.

As the Soviet Government is aware, the United States Government placed great store in the understandings regarding Laos reached by President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev at Vienna in June 1961¹ and the Geneva Agreements on Laos which followed.² The United States Government believed that peace could be restored to Laos if foreign interference were ended there and the people of that country were left alone to work out their own destinies on the basis of a policy of neutrality. The Geneva Agreements provided a sound basis for such a policy and placed responsibility upon the International Control Commission and the Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference to see to it that the parties lived up to their obligations.

¹ BULLETIN of June 26, 1961, p. 999.

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

From the very beginning, however, the Pathet Lao and North Viet-Nam, backed by the Chinese Communists, refused to comply with their obligations. North Vietnamese military forces were not withdrawn from Laos under ICC supervision. North Viet-Nam continued to use and, indeed, increased their use of Laotian territory to infiltrate military personnel and supplies into South Viet-Nam. The Pathet Lao, with North Vietnamese support, have repeatedly violated the cease-fire, most recently in their unprovoked attacks against and seizure of neutralist positions on the Plain of Jars, which were the subject of a report to the Co-Chairmen by the International Control Commission dated June 20. The Pathet Lao has refused to cooperate with the International Control Commission and with the Government of National Union.

These repeated violations of the Geneva Agreements have occurred in the face of the special responsibility which Article 8 of the Protocol to the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos places on the Co-Chairmen to exercise supervision over the observance of the Agreements. At the same time, the International Control Commission has been unable effectively to deal with these violations largely because of the refusal of the Pathet Lao to allow the Commission to exercise free access to areas under Pathet Lao control and also the failure of its Polish member to participate in the Commission's activities in a positive manner.

The Soviet Government's statement makes certain allegations regarding United States activities in Laos which are contrary to fact. The United States withdrew all 666 of its military advisory personnel from Laos under ICC supervision in accordance with Articles 2 and 3 of the Geneva Protocol. In the face of the aggressive attacks launched by the Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese in May on the Plain of Jars in flagrant violation of the Geneva Agreements, the United States responded to Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's request for assistance by initiating reconnaissance flights. These flights were undertaken to obtain information not otherwise available as to the intentions and dispositions of the attacking forces in view of the forced withdrawal of the International Control Commission from the Plain of Jars and the imminent threat which the attacks

posed to the whole of Laos including the Government of National Union and the entire Geneva settlement.

Not only did the United States not support the military coup attempted in April, but it took immediate and effective steps to support the Government of National Union under Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma. The United States Ambassador in Vientiane worked in close harmony with the Soviet Ambassador at that time; and the attitude and actions of the United States Government with respect to the attempted coup are well known to the Soviet Government.

The United States continues to exert every effort to resolve the Laotian problem by peaceful means in accordance with the 1962 Agreements. In this connection, the United States Government participated in consultations at Vientiane called for by Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma under paragraph 4 of the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.³ The United States regrets that the Soviet Government did not join in those consultations. In addition, as the Soviet Government will recall, the United States has given its support to the proposal of the Polish Government for diplomatic talks among the Lao parties, the Co-Chairmen and members of the International Control Commission. The United States Government has been disturbed to note the rejection of these proposals by the Pathet Lao, the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists. The United States continues to believe that a preliminary conference of the general type suggested by the Polish Government offers the best hope of dealing with the current problems on the diplomatic level.

The United States Government notes that, in its statement, the Soviet Government proposes the convening of an international conference on Laos in August. As the Soviet Government is undoubtedly aware, Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma, in a communique of May 24, 1964, addressed himself to a similar proposal. In his statement, the Prime Minister expressed a willingness to attend such a conference if, first, a cease-fire were effected in Laos under International Control Commission supervision

³ For text of a joint communique released at Vientiane on June 29, 1964, see *ibid.*, July 20, 1964, p. 88.

and the Pathet Lao withdrew from those areas which it illegally occupied by virtue of its May attacks. The United States Government believes the position of the Prime Minister is justified and fully supports this position.

In sum, the United States Government remains of the view that the 1962 Geneva Agreements provide a sound basis for resolution of the Laotian question. What is needed above all is compliance with those Agreements by those who have thus far ignored their commitments. Nevertheless, the United States is prepared to attend a conference such as that proposed by the Soviet Government if Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma's preconditions are met and it is thus demonstrated that there is some reason to believe that such a conference may serve a useful purpose.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 30, 1964.

SOVIET STATEMENT OF JULY 26

Unofficial translation

In connection with the continued deterioration of the situation in Laos the Soviet Government, as one of the parties to the Geneva accords on Laos, feels obligated to call the attention of all the states which are parties to the above-mentioned accords to the following.

Lately it has become increasingly obvious that certain states have embarked on a course of flagrant intervention in the internal affairs of Laos and violation of the Geneva accords, which, as is well known, obligate the states which are signatories thereto to respect the independence and neutrality of Laos.

Contrary to the Geneva accords the United States has left its military personnel and various military and semimilitary organizations and services in Laos, continuing to give unilateral military aid to the reactionary forces of the country. With the support of the United States these forces carried out a military coup in Vientiane last April, which brought about an extreme aggravation of the domestic political conditions in the country and paralyzed the operation of the coalition government, the establishment of which was in itself an advance on the road to realization of those principles which are laid down in the Geneva accords. As a result there arose the threat of a complete breakdown of the accords signed at Geneva.

In flagrant violation of the sovereignty of Laos, United States aircraft are conducting reconnaissance flights above the territory of the country and are exposing to bombing and bombardment the areas controlled by the Pathet Lao. The numerous representations made by the Soviet Government, as co-chairman

of the Geneva Conference on Laos, to the Government of the U.S.A., with an appeal to discontinue interference in the internal affairs of Laos and violations of the Geneva accords, have not achieved their purpose. In spite of the repeated representations of the co-chairmen, resumption of negotiations between the three political forces of Laos for a peaceful settlement in the country in accordance with the Geneva accords has still not been implemented.

The Soviet Government was the first to support the proposal of Norodom Sihanouk, Chief of State of Cambodia, for convening a new international conference of 14 states concerning Laos. Considering the tense situation in Laos, the Soviet Government proposed that such a conference be held at Geneva in June 1964. However, the proposal for calling a conference at that time has not met with the support of the U.S.A. and certain other states.

Under various unfounded pretexts the proposal of the Polish People's Republic for conducting consultations with the participation of the three political forces for the purpose of planning a new international conference on Laos has also been rejected.

The Soviet Government can no longer reconcile itself to such a situation when the Geneva accords on Laos are thwarted, when certain states, which have signed the accords, evade the discussion of the dangerous situation in Laos which has been created and which threatens the peace and security not only of that country but of the entire area of Southeast Asia as well. Such a position is also dictated by the fact that in the situation thus created the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference have been placed in a false position, preventing them from fulfilling the functions imposed upon them.

The Soviet Government therefore addresses a proposal to the governments of all countries which signed the Geneva accords on Laos to convene in August of this year an international conference of 14 states on Laos to discuss urgent measures which would insure a peaceful settlement in Laos in accordance with the Geneva accords of 1962, strict and unswerving fulfillment of these accords by all the states concerned. Such a conference could be held in Geneva or in another city acceptable to all the participants of the conference. This new proposal has been dictated by the sincere desire to contribute to the implementation of the Geneva accords.

For its part, the Soviet Union is prepared, just as before, to contribute to the efforts directed toward expediting the convening of the said international conference. A negative attitude toward this proposal on the part of other states will place the Soviet Government in a position where it will be compelled to consider in general the question of the possibility of fulfillment by the Soviet Union of the functions of co-chairman, since under the conditions of gross and systematic violation of the Geneva accords by certain states, the role of co-chairmen loses all useful significance and becomes fictitious.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of July 31

Press release 350 dated July 31

Secretary Rusk: I would like to note that our friends of the Oxford-Cambridge tennis team are my guests here this afternoon. We welcome them and hope that they will enjoy their visit to this country.

I am pleased to hear that the Senate today gave strong bipartisan approval to legislation which permits us to fulfill our obligations under the International Coffee Agreement.¹

The passage of this legislation is important, both to the American consumer and to coffee-producing countries in Latin America as well as in other places.

The good health of the coffee industry is a key factor in the economic and social progress of 30 countries in Latin America, Africa, and the Far East. In Latin America alone it accounts for more than 50 percent of the exports of 6 Latin American nations.

Great hardship has been suffered by coffee consumers and producers alike because of the wide fluctuations in coffee prices in recent years. In 1954, for example, the price rose above 90 cents. The present price is around 47 cents, which is approximately average over the last 10 years.

The Coffee Agreement will not raise coffee prices. A recent rise was due to a major crop failure of the Brazilian production. But while it will not raise prices, it should narrow the price swings. It should bring stability to Latin American economies and protect the American consumer against skyrocketing prices.

Thanks to the positive action by the Senate and similar favorable action earlier by the House of Representatives, the United States

will soon be able to cooperate fully to make the International Coffee Agreement a success.

Your questions, gentlemen.

Consistency in Main Lines of U.S. Policy

Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Goldwater's statements, rightly or wrongly, have been widely interpreted abroad, particularly in the press abroad, as indicating there would be considerable change in U.S. foreign policy were he elected. This press comment presumably reflects to some extent official feelings abroad. I am wondering if you could tell us whether this hampers or inhibits the conduct of U.S. foreign policy in the next few months, particularly on projects of a long-range nature.

A. Well, we have not yet entered the most active part of the campaign and public discussion, so the details of policy are yet to be clarified.

I have no doubt that our friends abroad will be watching our discussions here and in the course of our election with the greatest of interest, because what happens here is of considerable importance in many, many countries in other parts of the world. But this is a decision which we are making here at home ourselves, as Americans. This is our decision. And this is not something that our friends abroad can make for us.

I don't anticipate in these next several months any significant change in our foreign policy. The main foreign policies of the United States are those that are adopted and approved by the people of the country and their leaders, in the broadest sense on a bipartisan basis. I think that if we were to bend those policies in any significant way the American people would bend them back in the course of our discussion.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 6, 1962, p. 234; Oct. 29, 1962, p. 667; Jan. 27, 1964, p. 143; and Mar. 23, 1964, p. 459.

I suppose that there may be certain questions quite apart from the character of the debate in our own country, the nature of the discussion, of a long-range sort which could be affected by the fact that we are in an election period. But at the moment I could not give examples of such matters.

Our job is to get on with the national business. And there has been a remarkable consistency in the main lines of policy since 1945. And my own personal responsibility is to get on with that job during this 2 or 3 months' period ahead of us.

Q. Mr. Secretary, but isn't the point of the questions that have been raised the fact that, while there has been in the past, ever since World War II, a basic bipartisan trend of United States foreign policy, in this case the opposition candidate is committed to basic changes in that policy?

A. Well, I think that is something which may emerge in the course of the public discussion in the months ahead. But nevertheless, I think the main lines of American policy are well known and have very strong support throughout the country and on a bipartisan basis. And I would not expect major deviations from those well-established policies.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of the Republican critics have suggested that as a government we would be more successful in diplomatic negotiations with the Soviet Union if we adopted a tougher stance. For example, it has been suggested that, if we used our diplomatic relations with Russia as a threat, we might extract concessions or advantages for the United States. What do you think of this approach?

A. Well, where our vital interests and the vital interests of our allies are concerned, the United States is just as tough and just as stubborn as is necessary to protect our vital interests. And that has been, I think, eminently demonstrated time after time.

I think we ought to bear in mind that when the other side considers that their vital interests are at stake, they are going to be stubborn, too. And I think it would be unrealistic to suppose that they will roll over and play dead on the basis of anything that we say and do that might affect their vital interests.

Now, the problem arises where there are conflicts of interest. These have to be approached with care and persistence in an attempt to resolve the conflict or to work out some basis on which these two parts of the world can live together. This is why, after the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty last year, we have attempted to find other points where some advance, small or large, could be made. These efforts have not been marked with great success. But nevertheless the effort has to be made.

But we ourselves would not yield to pressures against our vital interests or threats against our vital interests. We have to be cautious about supposing that others would do the same.

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, the South Vietnamese today are accusing the Red Chinese of having directed a strike involving North Vietnamese regulars against a hamlet in the Mekong Delta. What is this Government's information about that involvement?

A. I haven't seen any information to that effect in any of the reports that have come to me. I do see the daily operation reports. I have seen the ticker to which you refer. But I have had nothing at all from Saigon in that matter.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in this connection would you care to give us an assessment of General [Nguyen] Khanh's first 6 months in office in regard to the progress or otherwise of the war in South Viet-Nam?

A. I think that in his first 6 months he took over a very difficult situation with imagination, with vigor. He was a very capable field commander, when he himself was a corps commander, and he has injected new energy into the military effort against the Viet Cong.

He has had to reorganize his government, both in Saigon and in the provinces in some detail. That has taken some time. In any such transfer of responsibilities—there has been perhaps some confusion, but that is being worked out. I think he understands the broad-scale nature of the problem. It is a problem that cannot be dealt with purely by military means. It requires very energetic effort in the political, economic, and social fields.

We, I think, on the whole have been encouraged by the progress that has been made thus far in getting on with the job.

There are still great difficulties in dealing with this kind of mean and frustrating sort of guerrilla warfare. But I think he has made very considerable progress in the short time that he has been in charge of the situation in Saigon.

Q. Mr. Secretary, why has there not been this past week a full and public explanation of the new buildup that is planned of our forces in Viet-Nam? We have made public statements in the past either that we would go in or that we hoped troops would come out. Why the peculiar handling of this particular announcement, and could you now tell us what it is really all about.

A. Well, this is primarily a matter for the Department of Defense. But it was felt that the announcement of increased American effort and assistance out there should properly be made by the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam.

I don't myself believe that there is much magic in these theoretical numbers about strength tables. We do say regularly how many troops we have there and what they are doing.

We will be reinforcing certain aspects of that in the advisory field, in the transportation and communications field.

But I would think it perfectly normal that the announcement of the additional assistance could well come from the Vietnamese Government. They are the ones carrying the primary responsibility.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been a spate of reports about the differences of view between General Khanh and Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor as to the conduct of the war. Could you clarify that situation for us?

A. Well, I have seen comments from time to time from Saigon that indicate there might be some differences. But let's remember that these started a few days ago on the occasion of the celebration of what they call their Day of Shame, commemoration of the division of Viet-Nam in 1954. It's a period when the Vietnamese think about their country as a whole, their relatives on both sides of the frontier. I think it is understandable that their thoughts

would be concerned about the national feeling of the Vietnamese people as a whole—and further, that the frustrations of the effort against the guerrillas have stimulated some of the talk to which you refer.

But again, I am in touch with the conversations we have with the Vietnamese Government. I do not find differences of view in our official relationships or official communications on the conduct of the effort there, or on the objectives or the policies to be followed.

Moscow-Peiping Differences

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you give us your assessment of the situation developing between the Soviet Union and Communist China over the holding of a summit conference and what effect this may have on policies in Southeast Asia which in turn affect us, particularly in Laos?

A. It is always hazardous for us over here to try to draw final conclusions about such a matter as the Moscow-Peiping dialogs. I have said very frequently that I felt this was a very serious dispute and have indicated the elements which would seem to me to be parts of that dispute—the leadership of the Communist world, state relationships, certain problems of ideology, certain problems of tactics—about how best to get on with the world revolution. The differences seem to be, if anything, widening and deepening at the present time. But we cannot, I think, draw any final conclusion that these differences have led to a serious and complete and final break between these two Communist capitals.

I think perhaps the most immediate effect upon us in Southeast Asia is that it creates some difficulty in carrying out the Geneva accords of 1962 on Laos.

You will have noted the Soviet note on that subject. I believe you have in your hands our reply to that note.² Perhaps behind this is the feeling on the part of the Soviet Union that its own position in Southeast Asia is not what it was at the time of the signing of the agreements and it is not so easy for it to give full effect to its commitments. But nevertheless we must

² See p. 218.

hold all of the signatories to those agreements to the carrying out of their full responsibilities, and we believe that it would be possible, if the signatories put their minds to it—it would be possible to work out the problem of Laos on the basis of the agreements of 1962. We are not giving up that effort by any means; we shall continue to pursue it. But I think that would be one of the more immediate, shall we say, by-products of that debate between Moscow and Peiping.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you return to an earlier question about the buildup in South Viet-Nam?

A. All right.

Q. It seems to me there has been about a 30-percent increase in the American participation there, American strength. Did you intend to minimize that additional contribution with your earlier answer?

A. Well, those indications of buildup have to do with a buildup over a period of time, and, as the buildup occurs, the figures are available—the approximate strengths from time to time are readily available; there is no secret about that. All that I was expressing was a certain reservation about a highly theoretical figure in terms of tables of organization, for example, rather than actual strengths based upon actual movements and presence in the area. And I would myself think of this in terms of actual strengths and troop movements, personnel movements, rather than theoretical figures about tables of organization.

OAS Action on Cuba

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the United States plan to follow up the finding of the OAS [Organization of American States] that subversion is a form of aggression under the Rio Treaty? Do you intend to carry that into other forums applied in other parts of the world?

A. Well, this particular form of aggression which Cuba launched against Venezuela included the shipping in of arms, associated with a well-developed and highly sophisticated plan for the actual physical overthrow of the Government of that country. We decided in our

foreign ministers meeting that it should be recorded that that type of aggression is one of the aggressions covered by the Rio Pact.³ This is not an attempt to reach any final or complete definition of aggression. But whatever that definition might turn out to be some day, this was to be included. Now, we shall follow up, certainly, to the extent of informing our friends abroad about this action by the governments of the hemisphere and, within the terms of the resolution, ask them to examine the possibility of demonstrating their solidarity with the hemisphere in these matters.

Such aggressions have been regularly considered in the United Nations since 1945. This is not a new invention in the field of aggression. There have been several cases where this type of action has been called to the attention of the Security Council, and in other parts of the world.

Here, we in the hemisphere in the first instance, as contemplated in the U.N. Charter itself, we have dealt with it on the basis of a regional organization.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has been fairly silent on the return of [Moise] Tshombe to the Congo. Do you now have any misgivings about the welcoming back of the old Katanga mercenaries?

A. Well, I had not supposed we had been silent on that subject. We are supporting the Government of the Congo at the present time. Remember, when we had our problems with Mr. Tshombe earlier, this was not personal to him but rather an objection to the secession of the Katanga. This was a part of our support of United Nations efforts to maintain the unity of the Congo, and at that time he was leading an effort at secession.

Now he is occupying a key post in the Central Government of the Congo. His purpose is to keep that country unified. We are supporting him in that effort. So that this does not represent a different attitude on the part of the United States. It represents a change in circumstances in the Congo itself; and we wish him well in his efforts to maintain the unity and

³For a statement by Secretary Rusk and text of the Final Act, see BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

to establish the security and the good order of the Congo, in order that it can get on with the economic and social job which is waiting for it, through which it can become one of the most prosperous countries in Africa, because it has very formidable resources and could be a country of very great importance in Africa.

U.S. Warnings to Chinese Communists

Q. Mr. Secretary, a couple of months ago several U.S. officials issued very strong verbal warnings to the Chinese Communists to ease off in Southeast Asia or run the risk of war. I wonder, sir, if you could tell us now whether you are in a position on the basis of Chinese action and statements as to how they are reading these warnings?

A. I can't tell you in detail. I think this is something that is being tested now in connection with Laos and is being tested in the weeks and months ahead with respect to South Vietnam. But I think those warnings have been clear. I think they have registered in Peiping. I would hope very much that Peiping is thinking about them very seriously, because one thing is quite clear and that is that the United States commitment to the security of Southeast Asia is complete and we are going to see that situation through.

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. In your testimony on the Hill this week, and that of Mr. Mann [Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs], you both emphasized the situation of Brazil as opening new opportunities for development of activity there. Could you give us your viewpoint as to how well they are doing in getting the country ready for additional economic and social development?

A. We have been encouraged by the progress that the Government of Brazil has made in the short time in which it has held office. Brazil is a very large country with some very large problems. There is a lot to be done, and there are some hard decisions to be made. But I must say that I am encouraged to believe that these steps, the necessary steps, will be taken and

that there will be a great deal of international interest in and support for the efforts which Brazil is making to get its economic house in order and play the role which is there for it to play in the hemisphere and world affairs.

Q. Do you see any reason for or any indication for a change in the Soviet position toward the status of Berlin in the fact that they may accept finally the well-established links between West Berlin and the Federal Republic?

A. I don't want to appear to cut you off with a very short answer, but quite literally the answer is no, I have not noticed any changes.

Soviet Compliance With Test Ban Treaty

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. The President yesterday noted the first anniversary of the signing of the nuclear test ban treaty.⁴ At the time it was under debate in the Senate, serious questions were being raised by critics of the treaty as to whether in fact it would be complied with by the Soviet Union. Has there, sir, in fact during the past year been any serious question of possibly surreptitious Soviet testing?

A. No. We have, as we indicated to the Congress, to the Senate, at the time of the test ban treaty, we have very important means for assuring ourselves that violations do not occur. I do not believe that violations have occurred. I think that if there were significant violations we would have known, and certainly, if there were violations, we would have made an issue of it, made the information public. No. We are satisfied that violations have not occurred.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were you at all surprised to be advised by the President yesterday that you and other Cabinet members would not be considered as possible vice presidential candidates? [Laughter.]

A. Well, I think, as far as I am concerned, we have set a record in the smallest and shortest boom in history: one sentence in a local newspaper last Friday, knocked down by me on Sunday,⁵ confirmed by the President on Thurs-

⁴ See p. 228.

⁵ See p. 231.

day. I think that that is quite a political campaign. [Laughter.] No. I was not surprised. Not at all.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. As a matter of fact, it makes it very much simpler in my present position for everyone to understand that I have no interest in any other office and that all I want to do is to do this one as well as I can while I am in it.

Hanoi and Peiping

Q. Sir, I just wondered if I could follow up an earlier question. When you said that how the Chinese are reading our warnings will be tested in Laos and South Viet-Nam, I wonder, sir, specifically are you saying that the Chinese Communists are principally responsible for the subversion and aggression in Laos and South Viet-Nam and that it is for them to cease and desist?

A. Well, as far as the operational side is concerned, the primary responsibility rests with Hanoi. They are the ones who have military personnel in Laos. They are the people who are infiltrating trained cadres into South Viet-Nam. So that from an operational point of view, Hanoi is the immediate problem.

But Peiping has been giving support, encouragement, to Hanoi in this effort. I must say that I believe that Peiping has a certain influence in Hanoi and that if Peiping were to exert itself, to urge upon Hanoi full compliance with the 1962 accords, my guess is that the situation would change very dramatically. So that I think we have to hold Peiping responsible for not giving the support, that it is committed to, to the agreements of 1954 and 1962.

From the point of view of operations, we have indicated earlier that certain Chinese-made arms have appeared in South Viet-Nam in relatively small quantities. I am not aware of Chinese personnel involved in Southeast Asia in any significant way, although once in a while you get a rumor to that effect. But I have no doubt at all that if Peiping threw its weight behind the 1962 accords in Laos, those accords would be fulfilled, so that we have to hold Peiping responsible for its signature of those accords.

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the French Government made any official approach to the United States to get it to change the so-called strategy of flexible response in the defense of Europe?

A. Not that I am aware of. There has been some discussion of this matter in NATO, and indeed NATO has adopted guidelines which go a long way toward establishing the conditions under which a nuclear response from NATO would be called for. This is, I think, to some extent a theoretical discussion, because I think everyone knows that, if NATO is attacked, NATO will use whatever means are necessary to meet that attack. And although there is some question about what kind of flexibility one uses in the event of some small or accidental kind of engagement, nevertheless any major attack on NATO would lead to, I am quite sure, the use of maximum power.

Senate Action on Meat Exports

Q. Mr. Secretary.

A. Yes.

Q. Sir, Senator [Ralph W.] Yarborough takes the attitude that the State Department should not be criticizing the Senate for its action on meat exports, and he also said he thought there was some built-in prejudice over here in the State Department against the cattle industry. I wonder if you would comment on that.

A. Yes, I'd be glad to. [Laughter.] We have strongly urged the Congress not to pass the legislation which the Senate did pass the other day, imposing the very severe limitations on beef imports, because in the first place the object of the bill has already been achieved by action—voluntary action—on the part of beef exporters to the United States to reduce their exports, and by strenuous efforts to increase our beef sales abroad.

You see, our beef imports are for manufacturing purposes; that is, for hamburgers, for example. Beef prices in this country have to do with fed beef, where there is a very large overproduction here in our own country. The drop in beef prices has not been related to the type of beef, or because of the type of beef which is being imported. Nevertheless, we have

tried to meet the situation by bringing about *de facto* the situation that would be envisaged under the legislation.

Now, the legislation itself raises very serious problems for us internationally, because if some of our trading partners abroad should demand compensations for intrusions into their trading rights that are represented by this legislation, this would be, could be, quite serious with respect to other sectors of our economy.

And I must say it does not appear to us to be a very good time to raise this kind of issue through legislation, when we are facing Kennedy Round negotiations in GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade], where we are trying to maintain, sustain, and improve an important agricultural market in Western Europe, and if Western Europe were to apply to us the same principles that are written into this beef legislation, we would have the greatest difficulty in sustaining over a billion dollars' worth of agricultural market in Western Europe.

So we feel that on practical grounds it misses the point, and on grounds of general trade policy it creates some very severe obstacles to the promotion of American trade.

I regret that anyone thinks that we shouldn't speak our piece on it. We have to, because we are responsible for sustaining the trading interests of all segments of our economy with the rest of the world. And I would be negligent in my duty if I did not speak out on a matter of this sort.

Q. Mr. Secretary—

A. Yes.

Q. Back to Viet-Nam. How do we feel specifically about the question of the South Vietnamese going into the north?

A. Oh, I think that this comes under the heading of trying to predict the future and the circumstances that might develop in the future. I wouldn't want to be precise on that subject. We can't sit here now and write a forward scenario indefinitely into the future. The other side is writing that scenario too.

Our commitment to the security of Southeast Asia, as I have said, is complete and firm. We are going to do what is necessary to maintain the security of those free countries of South-

east Asia in cooperation with both them and other countries.

And so your question, I think, throws me into the future in a way that I just can't get into.

Aid to South Viet-Nam From Other Nations

Q. Mr. Secretary, in following along with that same issue, how do you feel about foreign nations sending rather larger groups to the support of South Viet-Nam than has yet been the case? I am thinking particularly of the small medical units from Korea, the Philippines, and elsewhere. What about larger military units?

A. Well, we, of course, very much support the recent action taken by the Government of Viet-Nam in sending a message to some 32 countries asking for additional support. This will cover a very wide range of needs. We could use more men. We could use more economic resources, more technical assistance, more equipment. And it would be important politically, psychologically, in the international field for these other nations to make it quite clear that they are a part of this effort to maintain the security of South Viet-Nam. So that we do believe there will be a steady increase in the effort being made by other countries to help out in this situation.

Q. When you speak of needing more men, are you speaking of civilians or military people?

A. Well, we were pleased to see that the Australians, for example, have increased their group in South Viet-Nam. You may have noted on television here 3 weeks ago a program which showed the Australian military advisers in the field with South Vietnamese troops, working alongside of our own people there.

This is the kind of help that is of considerable importance from a political, psychological, and indeed from a military point of view. This all helps.

Q. Thank you.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can I belabor one point?

A. Yes.

Q. Because I think the Secretary has left an impression that he may not want to leave on

this question of the troops in South Viet-Nam.

A. Yes?

Q. *This administration made quite a deal of its announcement at one time that by '65 troops could come out, projecting far into the future. Then it stressed very heavily the withdrawal of 1,000 MP's. Then it even announced the return of some MP's.*

Last fall, shortly after President Johnson took over, he made a great point of saying, "There is rotation, but we are not increasing, we are not decreasing."

Suddenly you confront us, sir, with this major increase in American investment of men, without any public explanation of why this is necessary at this juncture. Is that the impression you wanted to leave us with, sir?

A. Not at all. Are you under any doubt about why it's necessary?

Q. *Well, all I know is that the Government has been officially silent.*

A. I mean, if we need more helicopters, we need more helicopters. If we need more communications, it is important to have them there. If we need more people in connection with advisers and training, we need them there.

In other words, we are increasing our effort in the hope that we can move the situation along more rapidly than it otherwise would move without that additional help.

Now, the numbers, as I say, will grow within certain limits over a period of some time, but those numbers are not—there is nothing mysterious or strange about those.

The figures of Americans present in South Viet-Nam will be made available right along as we go. There will be several thousands, as indicated, or more personnel sent to South Viet-Nam in the months ahead. But I didn't want to leave the impression that there is some sort of theoretical figure.

What is required will be sent there, and if they are not required they will be brought home. And what that figure will be from month to month, I can't tell you now. We will have to wait and pick up those figures on a month-to-month basis.

Q. *Thank you, Mr. Secretary.*

President Hails First Anniversary of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

A year ago this week the nuclear test ban treaty was signed and agreed on.² Today, a year later, more than 100 nations have joined the three original signing countries. We have also seen a U.N. resolution banning weapons of mass destruction in outer space,³ and steps to cut back production of fissionable materials.⁴

A year without atmospheric testing has left our air cleaner. This is a benefit to every American family—and to every family everywhere—since all radiation, however small, involves some possibility of biological risk to us or to our descendants.

At the same time we have taken every precaution to insure the security of the United States. To this end, we have put into full effect the program of safeguards originally approved by President Kennedy on the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.⁵ I can report that the Chiefs have reviewed the present program and agree that satisfactory progress is being made under it. Indeed the safeguards program leaves us much safer against surprises than we were in the period of moratorium begun in 1959.

Even if this treaty should end tomorrow, the United States would be safer and stronger than before.

We owe the test ban treaty, and this year of progress, to the determined and dedicated leadership of a great President and the Senate of the United States. This leadership toward peace had no partisan tinge. Four-fifths of the Democrats and three-fourths of the Republicans in the Senate voted for this treaty. It is therefore right that Americans, without regard to party, should give thanks in this anniversary week for what the President and the Senate achieved last year.

¹ Read by the President at his press conference on July 30 (White House press release).

² For background and text of the treaty, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 235.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

⁴ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

⁵ For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 496, and May 11, 1964, p. 744.

This thankfulness can be traced to the deep desire that all of us have for a world in which terror does not govern our waking lives. We should think of a world in which we need not fear the milk which our children drink, in which we do not need engage in agonizing speculation on the future generations and whether they will be deformed or scarred.

We can live in strength without adding to the hazards of life on this planet. We need not relax our guard in order to avoid unnecessary risks. This is the legacy of the nuclear test ban treaty, and it is a legacy of hope.

President of Malagasy Republic Visits Washington

President Philibert Tsiranana of the Malagasy Republic and Mrs. Tsiranana made an official visit to the United States July 26 to August 5, 1964. Their itinerary included visits at Philadelphia, Washington, New York, Minneapolis-St. Paul, San Francisco, and Honolulu. President Tsiranana met with President Johnson and other U.S. officials during his stay at Washington July 27-29. Following is an exchange of greetings between President Johnson and President Tsiranana on July 27, together with the text of a joint communique released on July 28.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS, JULY 27

White House press release dated July 27

President Johnson

Mr. President, your country and my country are both young, but friendship between our peoples is old.

Even before we gained our independence, Americans were engaged in peaceful commerce with your people. We are proud to welcome you here today in friendship and independence.

Independence is the great trust of the century. Never before have so many men had in their own hands the privilege and the responsibility of determining their own destiny.

We of the United States rejoice in this. We rejoice especially, Mr. President, when nations

such as yours and leaders such as you emphasize the responsibility of independence as well as the privilege of independence.

In our 188 years of independence, we have learned that liberty is not license; freedom is not a favor; security is not to be had without sacrifice.

In your nation's 4 years of regained independence, you have impressed these same lessons upon those that you lead. Your statesmanship speaks eloquently as an example of the new leaders of the new nations on both continents between which your country is an ancient bridge. In Africa and Asia, the wealth of independence, freedom, and peace runs strong. We welcome and we applaud the courage of men on every continent who stand against the efforts of any to turn that tide or stem its flow.

Mr. President, the United States does not seek to dominate any friend and does not seek to destroy any foe. But where men stand up for their own freedom, we will stand with them. Where men strive to make life better for their children, we will strive with them. Where men are ready to seek sincerely after peace, we welcome them to join with us genuinely in its pursuit.

In the 1860's our two countries solemnly declared that peace and friendship should exist between them forever. In these 1960's, 100 years later, it gives me great pleasure to reaffirm that declaration.

It is my pleasure to welcome you here this morning, to welcome you as the leader of free and independent friends of these free and independent people of the United States for whom I speak.

President Tsiranana

Translation from the French

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, I am most grateful to you for welcoming us, my wife, the members of my party, and myself, in this very high and lofty place of the American history.

I am most grateful to you also for giving me the occasion to get better acquainted with your huge country. Up to now, I had only visited New York City and Washington.

Owing to the very close relations which have already existed between our two peoples and

owing to the present international situation, it behooves me to meet with you at this point and to have meetings and talks with the high officials of your Government.

These considerations were not the only ones which caused me to decide to accept your friendly invitation. The feelings of Madagascar toward the United States as well as my own personal feelings led us very naturally to strengthen the already important action of our respective embassies in the field of friendship.

Lately, the Government of the United States has been of great service to Madagascar and has effectively contributed to our development policy. But the Government of the United States has done even more in preparing and in enacting the bill on civil rights, and I was most happy to be able to congratulate personally Secretary G. Mennen Williams on the very day of the enactment of this historic bill after sending a telegram of personal congratulations to you, Mr. President.

The administration which was led first by the much beloved President Kennedy and which was led then by Your Excellency, Mr. President, has displayed itself as a human and courageous administration. The nation which you are leading is favored among all nations, and it has the greatest of destinies promised to it.

The Malagasy people will never forget the unity displayed in this noble endeavor by the representatives of the American people and by its leaders.

On behalf of the Parliament and of the people of Madagascar, and on behalf of our Government, I salute you, Mr. President and Mrs. Johnson, and I bring you the assurances that the great Malagasy Island counts firmly the United States of America among its greatest friends. Long live the United States and long live Madagascar.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE, JULY 28

White House press release dated July 28

The President of the Malagasy Republic, Philibert Tsiranana, and the President of the United States, Lyndon B. Johnson, have held very cordial discussions on matters of interest to both countries.

President Tsiranana described the economic matters of concern in his country and the efforts of his Government to promote the advancement of the Malagasy people. He expressed appreciation for the understanding and friendly cooperation of the United States in assisting the economic development of Madagascar, and received assurances that the United States Government will contribute to the realization of the Malagasy 5-year plan.

President Johnson recalled the longstanding friendly relations that have existed between Americans and Malagasy and expressed his conviction that this visit would serve to further cement these ties.

President Tsiranana praised the efforts of the late President Kennedy carried on by President Johnson in the quest for better understanding between the peoples of the world and recognition of the integral rights of man and of his dignity.

The two Presidents reviewed the situation existing in the world today and stressed the necessity of maintaining peace and security in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations. They considered the difficulties confronting the developing nations of the world and discussed ways in which the industrial nations might assist in overcoming these problems.

The two Presidents discussed foreign private investments and the measures taken by the Malagasy Government to encourage them, and they spoke of ways in which trade between the United States and Madagascar can be expanded.

The two Presidents have stated they are quite satisfied with the relations existing between their two countries. They pledged themselves to continue cooperation and friendship.

President Moves To Advance Program on Desalting of Water

White House press release dated July 25, for release July 26

The White House announced on July 26 that President Johnson has requested the Department of the Interior to collaborate with the Atomic Energy Commission, in consultation with the Office of Science and Technology, to develop a plan for "an aggressive and imaginative program" to advance progress in large-

scale desalting of sea water.

The President, in making his request, noted that the Federal saline water conversion program has concentrated thus far on research, and development efforts have been limited. Substantial progress has been made, the President said, but much remains to be done and the greatest necessity is to advance the technology of large-scale desalting plants.

The President requested that the Interior Department submit a report to the Budget Bureau by September 11.

The President also announced that a three-man team from the Department of the Interior and the Atomic Energy Commission is leaving for Israel to begin joint discussions with Israeli representatives in Tel Aviv on July 27 on the desalting of sea water. This team is the outgrowth of a 2-day meeting held in Washington on June 2 between President Johnson and Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol.¹ A group will investigate the technical and economic feasibility of building a combined nuclear power and sea-water desalting plant in Israel.

The U.S. representatives will be Milton Chase and Stewart Mulford of the Interior Department and Irving Spiwak, a nuclear reactor expert from the Atomic Energy Commission laboratory at Oak Ridge, Tenn.

The President also announced that a 1-week-long international symposium on desalting of water will be held in Washington beginning October 3, 1965. The symposium will be sponsored by the Department of the Interior and the Department of State with the cooperation of the Agency for International Development and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

In his request to the Interior Department, the President said that every means should be explored to increase the momentum of desalting progress by exploiting the now best developed technology (evaporators), using conventional or nuclear fuels or both, and by pursuing other alternatives. He said the plan should provide for the full use of existing research and development facilities.

The President pointed out that a recent study

made under the auspices of the Office of Science and Technology indicates that a combination of large-scale nuclear power plants and large-scale desalting plants could produce power and water at competitive costs by about 1975 in many water-short coastal areas. He said the plan should propose the best strategy and time schedule for relating the development of large-scale nuclear power technology to the development of large-scale desalting technology.

The President also requested that full recognition should be given to the importance of sharing the benefits of American desalting technology with other nations.

Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Issues and Answers"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on the American Broadcasting Company's radio and television program "Issues and Answers" on July 26.

The Announcer: Secretary of State Dean Rusk, here are the issues:

Is the Johnson administration following a "no win" policy?

Should we bomb Communist supply routes in North Viet-Nam?

Will new inter-American sanctions bring down Castro?

For the answers to the issues, live from Washington, D.C., the Secretary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk, who has just come from the final session of the inter-American foreign ministers meeting.

To interview Secretary Rusk, ABC White House correspondent Bob Clark and ABC State Department correspondent John Scali.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, welcome.

Secretary Rusk: Thank you.

Mr. Scali: You have just come, as we have said, from the final session of the inter-American foreign ministers meeting. What is your assessment as to the importance of the economic and diplomatic sanctions in bringing down Castro?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this meeting of the foreign ministers which concluded just

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 958, and June 29, 1964, p. 1001.

a few moments ago was one of the most important ever held in this hemisphere.¹ It started, as you know, from Venezuela's complaint against Cuba for shipment of arms and for violent conspiracy against the democracy of Cuba last November.

Now the foreign ministers looked at this with great sobriety and decided that they must impose mandatory action against Castro under the Rio Treaty. They determined not to maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba. Now this is of some importance because you will recall that Castro's sister, upon her arrival in Mexico, said that these Cuban embassies in the hemisphere are centers of subversion. We know this to be the truth, and we know that this applies not just to the host country but to all neighboring countries, and therefore all of us have an interest in this situation.

We had some very eloquent testimony from the Dominican representative, pointing out that when the inter-American Republics decided to break relations with the Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic, this was welcomed by the people of the Dominican Republic, that they looked upon this as a source of strength in their effort to regain their freedom.

Now we believe that the Cuban people, who are a proud people and who do have close traditional ties with the rest of the hemisphere, will, I think, welcome this action as demonstrating that the regime which has now fastened itself upon them is not compatible with the hemisphere and must be resisted.

The foreign ministers also decided to break trade relations between the American Republics and Cuba, except for foodstuffs and medicine and medical equipment. All of us have a real stake in the public health of the Cuban people, both on humanitarian grounds and because public health in this hemisphere is indivisible. We have felt it important to leave that exception. We also decided to interrupt sea transportation between the hemisphere and Cuba, as an additional measure, to make it quite clear that Castro has no future in Cuba or in this hemisphere.

Now I'd like to say that I think the ministers felt some regret that these steps were necessary. We had hoped very much that Castro would have drawn the necessary conclusions from the actions taken at Punta del Este in January 1962,² when the Cuban government was denied participation in the hemisphere, and would have ceased these steps of intervention. We thought that after the missile crisis of 1962 he would have drawn the necessary conclusions. But the ministers were, with the very large majority, determined to send a signal to Castro that now this activity must stop, and it must stop now. And I think this was done with great vigor and with great clarity, and it is quite clear now that the hemisphere has a very, very high degree of unanimity in meeting this threat.

There were one or two or three special cases where it was not possible for the governments to vote yes on the final resolution, but I think the reasons for that were well understood by the foreign ministers. We expect now a consolidated hemisphere in resistance to these subversive activities from Cuba.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, do you think that the steps agreed upon will satisfy Republican critics who are saying that the Johnson administration just isn't doing enough to wipe out Castro as a threat?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't want to predict satisfaction. I would say these steps had nothing to do with the internal political situation in the United States. Venezuela brought the charge. The issue was not whether our friends in the hemisphere agreed with the United States. The question was "What is your attitude toward these attacks against Venezuela?" and I think there was a feeling of agreement with the suggestion that I made when I quoted Benjamin Franklin saying "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately." I think there was a feeling that no one could know who would be next unless the hemisphere with solidarity moves now to make it clear to Castro that this sort of thing must stop.

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

Bipartisanship in U.S. Foreign Policy

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, in the last 2 weeks, Republicans, led by Senator Goldwater, have roundly criticized administration foreign policy in Laos, in Cuba, and in South Viet-Nam. Have you read the Republican platform, and how would you reply to the criticisms made of the administration foreign policy?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I am not going to enter into a specific debate on every point in the Republican platform. Of course I read it, because I must. The attitude of a great political party on foreign policy issues is a matter of concern to any Secretary of State. Indeed, during the past 3½ years I have occasionally gone back to review the Democratic and Republican platforms of 1960 because our main lines of foreign policy in this country need to be those that are broadly supported by all of the people of the country.

I was interested in certain differences of emphasis between the Republican platform of 1964 and their platform of 1960. I think this is perhaps understandable, because in 1960 the Republicans had had 8 years of responsibility for the executive branch of the government and were directly involved in dealing with a very complex world situation, carrying the full responsibility for the United States. For example, in 1960 they made considerable point of the fact that the main lines of American foreign policy have been bipartisan in character. Now this goes back to great decisions made by the American people at the end of World War II, when we were framing the United Nations Charter with our friends abroad—when we were, during the period of cooperation between President Truman and Senator [Arthur H.] Vandenberg, creating the Marshall Plan and NATO and these other great postwar policies. And during the period when President Eisenhower and Senator Lyndon Johnson were working together on these national policies, bipartisanship was important. And, indeed, I think if you will look at the congressional situation throughout this postwar period, the great steps in foreign policy, whether it is foreign aid, or whether the Trade Expansion Act, or whatever it is, were based upon strong

support from both sides of the aisle. I think there was a little contrast in emphasis between the two platforms for support for the United Nations. I think in 1960 the platform was much more forthcoming in support of the United Nations.

I felt in 1960 the Republican platform emphasized the importance and necessity of foreign aid somewhat more positively. I think that is because those people who were then engaged in this struggle for freedom right around the world could see the great importance of a foreign aid effort. I was not quite sure about the present platform as to whether the doubts or the hesitations meant that they would expect to reduce that program very substantially. If so, this would cause me some concern. But I am not entering into details of that platform. That will come out in the course of the discussion between now and November, but I think there were some differences of emphasis between 1960 and 1964 that were of some interest to me.

Mr. Clark: The main theme of Senator Goldwater's criticism of foreign policy is that it's a "no win" policy. As he puts it, "a policy unmarked by purpose, pride, or the prospect of victory." How would you answer this?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I would not agree with this. What we are trying to accomplish in this world—the American people are trying to accomplish and most people in most other countries—is a victory for freedom, for the independence of states and the freedom of peoples. In the last 4 years there have been 12 new countries entering the world scene. There have not been since January 1961 any new accessions to the Communist bloc.

Now in some parts of the world, for example among the smaller countries of Eastern Europe, you feel at the present time very considerable stirrings of the ideas of freedom among those peoples, national independence as well as personal freedom. This is something that Mr. Dulles used to talk about in 1953 and 1954. He felt this would occur within the Communist world. It is beginning to occur. These are not dramatic changes, they are not decisive and final changes, but these are movements toward free-

dom—ordinary men and women trying to find a little more elbow room, a little more freedom of action, a little more freedom of expression, a chance to restore their historical ties with the centers of Western civilization in Western Europe.

Now we know that this struggle for freedom is constant, it is implacable, and it is necessary to win it, but you do not win it by a vast military orgy which would bring into jeopardy the existence of the Northern Hemisphere.

Mr. Scali: Then, Mr. Secretary, your position is that, regardless of what critics may say, the administration is following a policy of victory?

Secretary Rusk: It is a victory of freedom for ourselves and for peoples all over the world, a victory for a decent world order under conditions of law.

Now, this country has almost unimaginable military strength in the most literal sense. Well, our great strength—our greatest strength—is the decent commitments of the American people on a bipartisan basis that we have known since 1945—commitments about what kind of world we want to live in, what kind of society we want—these decent hopes for peace and freedom and well-being for mankind.

Now, these strike a very important, responsive chord among ordinary people all over the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain. And I have no doubt that the influence of this country in the world scene is moving with the course of history and that freedom is the story of the future as well as the present.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, you said a moment ago that the war for freedom around the world can't be won by a vast military orgy. Are you suggesting that Senator Goldwater in the White House might conduct a vast military orgy?

Secretary Rusk: No, I am not commenting on Senator Goldwater. I think that he will be clarifying his attitude on particular problems during the course of the campaign.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, Senator Goldwater has given another interview to a German publication, this time to the magazine *Review*. In it he is quoted as saying he favors a policy up to the brink of war. He is quoted as saying,

"The only person who is respected is the one who clearly says, when necessary, that he is determined to go to the extremes." Then he goes on to say generally he favors the foreign policy of the Eisenhower-Dulles period. Do you agree with these views?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in the first place one cannot look to the future with certainty because the other side, the Communist world, is helping to write this scenario. No one can say with absolute certainty what is likely to happen. But I think it is important for us to keep in mind that our first obligation is to protect our vital interests by peaceful means if possible so that, if we ever come to a holocaust, we will have done everything that is reasonable and humanly possible to make that unnecessary.

Now, World War I military casualties were about 40 millions alone. World War II casualties ran in the neighborhood of 60 millions. These are a fraction of the casualties that would be present in a third world war. We've got to learn the lessons of World Wars I and II before world war III. We won't have a chance to draw any lessons from that war. As Mr. Khrushchev put it, the survivors would envy the dead. Now, the problem here is to make it very clear that the vital interests of the free world will be defended with whatever is necessary. But the problem also is to defend these by peaceful means if possible.

Now, since World War II there have been at least 20 disputes in some part of the world that could easily have grown, and grown rapidly, into a general war. The easiest thing in the world to think of is to expand a war. I mean, if you just turn your back on one of these situations for 5 minutes, you can have a world war. But the human race needs something else if we can find it because we literally are in a situation where there is so much destructive power available in the hands of frail men that the existence of the Northern Hemisphere is at stake.

Therefore we've got to act with prudence and sobriety and judgment, certain patience and persistence, to see if we cannot save the human race.

Now, again, who can predict the future, because the other side has something to say about this? But I think it has been clear since the end of the war that the American people are

determined to defend the interests of freedom, they are determined to try to build a peace, and if we fail it will be because of the compulsive determination of the Communist world to try to take this world over. This is the underlying crisis of our day that we must keep in mind. Most of the world is committed to the kind of world written into the United Nations Charter: independent countries cooperating voluntarily with each other, settling their disputes by peaceful means.

The Communist world is determined to try to bring about a world of the Communist revolution. Now, there is no difference among most of the Communists on that point. Mr. Khrushchev says there is no ideological coexistence. His purposes are the same. He and Peiping are arguing about who should lead this movement. They are arguing about problems of technique and style and method and that kind of thing. There is no question about the end result they anticipate.

But it is very important for us to try to work these problems out, with the kind of sobriety that permits the human race to survive. Now, I think there is a certain sobriety in some of the Communist capitals. I think the experiences of the missile crisis of 1962 had a sobering effect, and that is all to the good. I think the peoples of some of those Communist countries are beginning to build up what might be called the beginning of a public opinion of the consumer. That is a feeling that the ordinary, daily needs of the people are becoming important and these should be attended to. To the extent that they turn their attention to the unfinished business of their own peoples, this is a step toward peace.

Now, our problem at the present time is that Peiping is pursuing this world revolution dogma with a militancy that is threatening the peace, and our immediate problem is to bring Hanoi and Peiping to the necessary decision to leave their neighbors alone before it is too late.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, Senator Goldwater's thesis is that we are not defending freedom vigorously enough, that if we don't make it clear to the Soviets and Chinese Communists that we are willing to go to war unless they back off, unless they stop encouraging aggression in Viet-Nam and other places, inevitably we are

going to lose this piecemeal. How do you answer that?

U.S. Efforts in Southeast Asia

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't know in detail what Senator Goldwater's views are, and so I am not commenting on that, but let's take Southeast Asia for a moment. In 1954 Viet-Nam was divided. The free world did not succeed in finding another answer to that situation. Communists became consolidated in North Viet-Nam. Now that, in turn, created pressures and threats against other neighbors of Viet-Nam. One doesn't have to rely upon some theory called the "domino theory" to explain this phenomenon. One can see the proclaimed doctrine of communism itself. They have an appetite which grows upon feeding, and it was predictable that, when Viet-Nam was divided in 1954, Laos, South Viet-Nam, other countries in that area, would come under attack.

Now the problem is this. There are what—a billion and a half people in Asia, about half of them in the Communist world, with about half of them in the free world. We cannot solve the problems of Asia by substituting Americans for Asians in that vast mass of people. What we can do is to help the Asians who are determined to be free to be able to be free, and that is what President Eisenhower decided in 1954 with regard to South Viet-Nam, and we have been pursuing that policy.

Now in 1959 North Viet-Nam made a decision to try to press in upon South Viet-Nam. In 1960 they proclaimed it publicly, and so this is an announced attempt to undermine a neighbor.

When President Kennedy became President, we felt that it was necessary to put a good deal more effort in there because the threat seemed to be greater than was being recognized, and so we had to put a lot of effort into there. At present, we are trying to put the South Vietnamese in a position to win their struggle against about 30,000 hard-core Viet Cong, perhaps another 60,000 sort of part-time help or casual help. Because it is a country of 14 million people, and we have no evidence that these 14 million people are looking to North Viet-Nam for any answers. The problem is to give them the necessary security so that they can

cooperate with their government, they can do what they want to do without fear of having their throats cut at night. And so we are going to be giving all the help that is necessary to insure that these free countries of Southeast Asia remain free. Now, one can't predict the future, again because Hanoi and Peiping are in this business and they've got some decisions to make. We hope they make the right decisions, but we can't predict the future here.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, much of the foreign press especially in Europe have jumped all over Senator Goldwater since his nomination. Have any foreign governments indicated concern or alarm to the State Department over what might happen if Senator Goldwater becomes our new President?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, no. No government has approached us on that matter. Indeed it would be highly improper for them to do so. I think we can expect that the foreign press and foreign discussion will follow our presidential election here very closely, with great interest, because, as someone has put it, every time Uncle Sam coughs the rest of the world begins to sneeze. But this is a decision that we will be making ourselves, here at home, among the American people. And I would hope that some of our foreign friends would not get too much concerned with it.

Mr. Clark: Do you think the foreign press is overdoing it at the moment in sounding the alarm over Senator Goldwater?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think you gentlemen in our press media here would not permit me to comment on your activities in this regard. I think I won't criticize the foreign press. They are bound to be very much interested in everything that happens here because what happens here is of great concern to them. So I am not going to counsel them as to how they should report their news.

Insuring the Independence of South Viet-Nam

Mr. Scali: Mr. Rusk, Senator Goldwater says we are already at war in South Viet-Nam and that President Johnson refuses to say whether our goal there is victory. Do you agree?

Secretary Rusk: Not at all. It is true that the Vietnamese Government and the Viet-

namese people are engaged in a very bitter, sometimes frustrating, and always mean struggle against guerrillas who are trying to destroy the fabric of the civil government of South Viet-Nam. And this is a very large undertaking. Certainly for the almost 200 men that we have lost since 1961 out there—for them this was a world war, for them and their families. And we think about it all the time. We have felt that there is no quick and ready answer, however, in multiplying those casualties by the tens of thousands or perhaps even by the millions. And you can multiply them either way. If you withdraw, and Southeast Asia falls to communism, I think we know from the history of aggression that we only postpone an even vaster conflict with a deathly toll on the entire human race.

On the other hand, you can move to expand the war quickly, and that again multiplies the cost to everybody concerned, in Asia, ourselves and everyone else.

Now, we want very much to bring Hanoi and Peiping to the necessary decision to leave their neighbors alone, without the general war, if we can do so, and we have tried that in a number of ways. For example, in the case of Laos we did get agreement that everybody would leave Laos alone and let these people work out their own future and everybody would get out.

Well, the North Vietnamese did not comply with this, and so we are having now to push in on that situation again, to bring them into compliance. They left their own people behind instead of pulling them out. And they use Laos for infiltration routes into South Viet-Nam, contrary to the agreements. But I think we have to stay with this and take the measures that are necessary to insure the security and the freedom and the independence of South Viet-Nam, as well as those other free countries in Southeast Asia. This we are determined to do, and President Johnson has made that clear many times.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, your name is mentioned today in today's Washington Post as a possible Democratic candidate for Vice President. Would you like the job, or would you accept it if it were offered?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it is almost presump-

tuous for me to comment on a question in which there is so little interest, but many, many years ago I made a decision that I would never run for any elective office anywhere, any time, at any level. I have great respect for those who do run for elective office. But I have served half of my adult life in public service in one way or another. This is not my cup of tea.

Mr. Seali: Mr. Secretary, do you intend to participate in the political campaign, however?

Secretary Rusk: Not in the usual partisan sense. I think it is well for the Secretary of State to—and this has been the desire of most Presidents—for the Secretary of State to talk

about policy. You see, during these next several months the Nation's got to get on with its business. We are going to be dealing with the rest of the world, and it is very important that people in Moscow or in London or Paris or wherever know that this country is in business, and we can't continue the necessary job in our relations with the rest of the world if the Secretary of State is caught up in a sharp partisan controversy here at home.

Mr. Clark: Mr. Secretary, I am sorry, our time is up. Thank you very much for being our guest on "Issues and Answers."

Secretary Rusk: Thank you.

The United States, Canada, and Leadership in International Cooperation

*by Under Secretary Harriman*¹

My participation in this meeting tonight recalls a previous occasion when I spoke here in Canada. That was the Liberal Summer Conference at Port Hope in 1933. Its purpose was "a discussion of present-day problems by liberal minded men and women of all parties." I was among the Americans asked to explain certain aspects of President Roosevelt's New Deal.

It was a troubled but exciting year, as you will remember. Most of the world was deep in depression. And most countries were desperately trying to protect their own industries, their farmers and labor against dumping from abroad. Tariff barriers had been increased and import quotas imposed. These policies had deepened the worldwide depression. I suggested that these economic isolationist policies should be reversed and that there should be close cooperation between Canada and the United

States. I concluded by pointing out that this should not be as difficult for our countries as in other parts of the world and proposed that "a leadership in international cooperation should come from us."

In the intervening years I have not changed this view that we have a special responsibility to show the way in international cooperation. And I am glad to say that I have had the privilege of participating with Canadian representatives in a number of cooperative efforts that have been productive for both our countries and have promoted broader international understanding.

With Canada we showed the way to other countries in lowering tariffs by negotiating the first reciprocal tariff agreement with any country in 1935. As you know, our trade has vastly expanded from \$390 million in 1933 to \$8,211 million last year.

Canada's participation in the Marshall Plan contributed significantly to the phenomenal success of that great cooperative program to revive

¹ Address made before the Eastern Canadian American Assembly at Mont Gabriel, Quebec, Canada, on July 25 (press release 339 dated July 23). Mr. Harriman also made some extemporaneous remarks.

Western Europe's war-shattered economies. Now Canada and the United States are full members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. In the Development Assistance Committee we are working together with Western European countries and Japan to provide assistance to less developed countries. Incidentally, I have noted that Canada has budgeted about \$180 million in the current fiscal year for bilateral and multilateral economic assistance. This is an encouraging increase over the previous year in this most important activity.

You are all familiar with our joint efforts in the field of defense. Canada was a leader in the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and has played a key role in NATO since its inception in 1949. For more than 20 years our top military officials have consulted regularly in the Joint Board on Defense. Under arrangements worked out in 1957 we have been working closely together in cooperative programs for the air defense of North America. The Canadian-U.S. Regional Planning Group is a subgroup of the NATO Military Committee. In these and many other ways we have worked closely to strengthen our defenses and those of the Atlantic community.

In many dangerous and difficult situations Canada has been filling an important special role. She has played a major role in international undertakings to maintain the peace. Canada has contributed to practically all of the major peacekeeping exercises in recent times. She has helped staff United Nations commissions in Kashmir, Palestine, Lebanon, and Yemen. Her military units are included in the U.N. Emergency Force in the Gaza Strip. In the International Control Commissions for Laos and Viet-Nam, Canadian members have played a key role. Most recently Canada contributed to the United Nations force to maintain peace in Cyprus. And Prime Minister Lester Pearson won the Nobel Prize for his invention of the peacemaking machinery that helped settle the Suez problem. This is an enviable record of which Canadians can well be proud and for which the rest of us are deeply grateful.

Respect for Each Other's Views

Quite naturally, the United States and Canada are not always in full agreement on the analysis of problems or on ways to deal with them. Canada has its own interests, its own policies, and its own view of the world. But even when we disagree on one thing or another, we attempt to do so with full respect for the other's views and for the sincerity of the other's intentions. We must always keep it that way. In the most fundamental matters, on the things that count most, on the broad outlines of the kind of world we want for ourselves and our children and our grandchildren, there can be no doubt that Canada and the United States are in solid agreement.

It is in this spirit of common interest that I feel it might be useful for me to set forth some of the issues we face in the world and the manner in which the United States is attempting to respond to them. In some of these I believe we are in full agreement; in others there may be some differences in emphasis and in the actions we take in response. It is not my purpose to point out the differences between us, nor is it my purpose to try to convert Canadians to our position.

Nature of Communist Threat

The great issue of our time centers on the aggressive effort of the Communists to force their way of life and their ideology on free nations. They would have us believe that this is a conflict between two economic systems—capitalism on one hand and communism on the other. We must not permit Mr. Khrushchev and his colleagues to get away with this misrepresentation. The issue, in fact, is far deeper.

While I was serving as Ambassador to Moscow during World War II, I reported that our postwar objectives and those of the Kremlin were irreconcilable. Nothing that has occurred since then has changed that estimate. We seek a world in which people can choose their own way of life and shape their own destiny in independence and freedom. The Communists are determined to undermine freedom and to impose on every people the chains of Com-

munist dictatorship.

Communist aggression against independent nations is just as vigorous as ever. In fact, in some areas the pressures have grown markedly. We should recognize, too, that the methods of operation and the areas of particular concentration have changed in recent years.

Countering Communism in the Hemisphere

The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a major turning point in our times, and I am confident it will be so recorded in history. The stationing of nuclear missiles in Cuba was a Soviet effort to reduce their imbalance in nuclear capability and to advance Moscow's program of nuclear blackmail in the Americas. It failed dramatically. President Kennedy made it crystal clear that we had the power to eliminate this threat to our security, and the will to use that power if necessary. At the same time, with great statesmanship, he left the door ajar for a Soviet retreat. Mr. Khrushchev took that door quickly. And since then he has dropped his game of nuclear-missile rattling.

Secretary of State Rusk stated at a news conference recently² that "for about 3 years we have said that the two fundamental nonnegotiable points between us and the present regime in Cuba are the military connection with Moscow established in this hemisphere and, secondly, the interference by Castro and his regime in the affairs of other governments, other countries in this hemisphere, as exemplified in the recent Venezuelan case."

The Soviet military base was dealt with in the showdown with Khrushchev. We are dealing with the second problem in cooperation with Latin American governments through the Organization of American States. The Venezuelan experience has exposed beyond question Castro's program of training terrorists from other Latin American countries and of supplying weapons and other support. Castro's organization has been active in a number of other Latin American countries. The meeting of the OAS Council in Washington this week³ has been an im-

portant step in the direction of meeting this danger.

Taking Steps To Reduce Tension

Since the confrontation in Cuba, Khrushchev has backed away from nuclear threats. If anything is clear it is that he does not want again to risk the danger of nuclear war. He and his colleagues who have worked to build up the Soviet Union do not want to see destroyed overnight all they have spent a lifetime to develop.

This, in fact, has become a major point of dispute between Moscow and Peiping. Khrushchev says he intends to communize the world through the example of Soviet success without nuclear war, whereas he charges that Mao Tse-tung's policies are so reckless that they will bring the world to nuclear disaster.

In view of Moscow's present attitude it may be possible in time to work out agreements that will further reduce the danger of nuclear war. The limited ban on nuclear testing was a first step in this direction. Further steps have been taken, and more may be possible. We are determined to explore each avenue while at the same time maintaining our ability to destroy any aggressor.

The present Soviet economic stringency may encourage additional steps in arms limitations. As weapons have become increasingly sophisticated and expensive, the cost of the arms race has risen and is a growing burden on the Soviet economy.

It is noteworthy that, as soon as President Johnson informed Mr. Khrushchev that we were going to reduce production of fissionable material, the Soviet leader announced he would take parallel measures.⁴

Helping the Developing Nations

The deepening conflict between Moscow and Peiping has significance in the long run in shattering the monolithic structure of the Communist international movement. But in the immediate future it will, I believe, add to the dangers from Communist pressures. For the conflict between the two big Communist powers

² BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 439.

³ *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

has stimulated both of them to increase their activities, particularly in the less developed areas of the world. Peiping is trying to wrest the leadership of the Communist international movement away from Moscow. Each is trying to prove that its methods promise the quickest and surest road to Communist takeover. Each is trying to expand its influence, not only in Communist parties around the world but with non-Communist parties and peoples as well.

We can expect both the Chinese and Russian Communists to use every available technique in their effort to enlarge their influence—economic and military assistance, propaganda, subversion, and, where it seems to have possibility of success, so-called “wars of liberation.” Wherever political or economic weakness exists, there will be heavier pressure from Communist activity on independent nations.

The signs of this heavier pressure are evident. With encouragement and support from Peiping, the Communist regime in North Viet-Nam is directing, supplying, and reinforcing the large-scale programs of subversion directed against the independent governments in South Viet-Nam and Laos. The visits of high-level Chinese delegations to Africa and new promises of assistance underline Peiping’s heightened interest in that continent, where a score of new nations are struggling to make progress. Red China’s propaganda activities and the training of Cuban guerrilla terrorists point to new subversive efforts in Latin America.

The Soviets are not standing still in face of this increased challenge from Peiping to win adherents on every continent. They have given material and moral support to the Castro regime and its elaborate program of subversion in Latin America. Moscow has made new offers of large loans to countries like India, Algeria, and Indonesia. During his recent visit to Cairo, Khrushchev promised new backing to the Arab world.

This, then, is no time for us to relax. Rather it is a time to exert all of our energies to help those under pressure from this two-pronged campaign by the Communists. We must assist them to remain masters of their own destinies and to achieve their goals of a better life in freedom. This will mean greater not less efforts in political and informational activities,

in military aid, in technical assistance, and in economic development. Each free country has a role to play in this enterprise, some more and some less, depending on their own resources and potential. The important thing is for each to do as much as it can and in its own fashion.

Bridging the Gap Between East and West

The conflict between Moscow and Peiping’s is not the only development that has shattered the Communist monolith. It is clear that Moscow’s once tight hold over Eastern Europe is slowly but irrevocably loosening. The strong nationalist feelings of the people of those countries have produced demands for greater freedom from Moscow’s domination. Khrushchev himself has told visitors to the Kremlin a year ago that when children grow up they can no longer be spanked.

We must remember, of course, that the Soviets still dominate Eastern Europe militarily. And in those countries Communist governments still rule, with restrictions on freedom that we abhor. But the Western countries should continue to encourage contacts which offer the only alternative to Eastern Europe’s total dependence on Moscow.

Earlier this year President Johnson urged that we “develop with our allies new means of bridging the gap between the East and the West, facing dangers boldly wherever danger exists, but being equally bold in our search for new agreements which can enlarge the hopes of all while violating the interests of none.”⁵ In another talk he summarized our view by saying: “In other words, our guard is up but our hand is out.”⁶

U.S.-Canadian Agreement on Major Problems

In the main I think that we Americans and Canadians are in agreement on the major problems facing our world. Where we have differences, we should continue to thrash them out openly and frankly, attempting to understand each other’s viewpoints. We have too much in common to permit differences over less important matters to interfere with our sharing of common responsibilities and our working to-

⁵ *Ibid.*, Jan. 27, 1964, p. 110.

⁶ *Ibid.*, May 11, 1964, p. 726.

gether for the kind of future we both desire.

As Paul Martin, your Secretary of State for External Affairs, said at the American Assembly only a few months ago:

"The maintenance of good relations between

Canada and the United States will depend in the long run less on administrative devices than on the ease with which our respective governments can discuss, and agree, and when necessary agree to disagree."

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.N. Economic and Social Council Meets at Geneva

The 37th session of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations convened at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 13. Following is a statement made before the Council on July 23 by Harlan Cleveland, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, together with a statement on the reports of the regional economic commissions made on July 14 by Franklin H. Williams, U.S. Representative on the Economic and Social Council.

STATEMENT BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY CLEVELAND

Press release 335 dated July 22

It is all too easy in these days of upheaval and transformation to assert that we face historic decisions—or stand at a fork on history's highway. In the longer perspective it usually is difficult to point a finger at a single decision and say that this one was truly historic; the forks in the road are not so plain in retrospect as they sometimes seem at the moment.

Yet it does seem that now, this very year, we face a quite unprecedented test—a test of the ability of mankind to establish and operate as much international machinery as we obviously need to survive on this planet—and to pursue the tasks that lie beyond mere survival.

Ranking in importance with arms control, peacekeeping, and human rights is that rich and colorful variety of problems and prospects which we sum up in a bureaucratic-sounding phrase: economic and social development. So let us try—because we do it too seldom—to grasp some sense of direction in the totality of affairs which concern the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations.

It seems clear to me, Mr. President, that over the years we have made great progress toward seeing development whole. By this I mean two things.

First, we have come to think of what we call economic and social development less as an isolated abstraction and more in relation to its function and purpose. We see that a peaceful world requires a fair degree of political order, that political order requires an acceptable rate of economic development, that the purpose of economic development is not statistical but social progress, and that social progress is meaningful only in terms of "better standards of life in larger freedom" *for the individual*.

The *second* thing I mean by saying that we have made progress in seeing things whole is that we now have a firmer conception of economic and social growth as a complex process—and not the automatic product of some selected stimulus.

As our discussions have proceeded over the years—as technical conferences have opened and closed, as international aid programs have gone into action and come to grips with realities in the field—we have heard less and less of doctrinaire claims that the key to development everywhere is to be found in anyone's pet theory or favorite dogma.

One by one the advocates of one-shot solutions have come forward and posed their propositions:

—Make the money available, and everything else will take care of itself.

—Draw up a comprehensive long-term plan with goals and priorities, and the society will perform according to plan.

—Teach everyone to read and write, and forward motion will follow naturally.

—Cut down the rate of population growth, and you will assure economic progress.

—Invest your resources in heavy industry; turn over the job to science and technology, or go all out for institution building.

These and other "solutions" have been pressed upon us from time to time. But the hope for a sudden blinding flash of clarity, the illusion of a single solution, a simple answer, or a secret formula has faded in the clash of ideas and the commerce of shared experience that has informed our thinking.

Mr. President, I do not wish to be misunderstood. Capital, planning, education, population policy, industry, science and technology, institution building—these and many other factors are essential to economic growth and thus to social progress. Advocacy—even strident advocacy—of one or another of the factors has served sometimes to bring to it the attention it deserved, to bring it into better focus and better balance with the other major factors in economic and social development. The whole point here is that *all* of these factors are more or less important at various stages of development, at various times and places, that they are intimately and intricately interrelated, that most societies have to work on most of them together most of the time, and that the best formula for somebody else's country is most unlikely to be the best formula for your country—or mine. The goal of development is free-

dom—which is to say a workable diversity, not an overworked dogma.

We still perceive the process of economic and social growth but dimly; but at least we see it as a process, and we are learning to see it whole.

Four Measures To Improve U.N. System

Even while we have all been trying to decide just what the task of development is in general, we have been busy getting on with the job in particular. Twenty years after those fateful conferences in Hot Springs, Bretton Woods, and Dumbarton Oaks, we have built in the U.N. family a group of international agencies which now spends more than a billion dollars a year and touches nearly every phase of development in every developing country. The U.N. family of organizations is now the world's largest source of assistance to developing countries, with the sole exception of the aid programs administered by my own Government.

The success of these U.N. programs—the fact that both contributing countries and recipient countries continue to support them—is the hard evidence that we are on the right track. The U.N. has in fact, as some of us 20 years ago hoped it would, created the political environment within which those who give and those who take, those who lend and those who borrow, those who advise and those who use or reject the advice, can come together in dignity and equality to promote that social progress and those better standards of life in larger freedom which are the promise of the charter.

One of the main reasons this international effort has worked so well is that it has engaged the enthusiasms of specialists in every field for the unique contribution their speciality can make to the developing countries. But there is a cost in turning loose the experts in each field to communicate their wonderful enthusiasms to the political and administrative leaders of each developing country. The cost is proliferation of effort, a good deal of competition between technicians for the limited resources and talent that are available to each developing country—and competition, indeed, for the attention of the very few people who are typically able and willing to make major decisions about development.

This is why we think the time is now past due for four kinds of change in the arrangements by which we do our work together.

First, we strongly support the Secretary-General's proposal¹ to consolidate the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund into a single U.N. Development Program which, while maintaining the distinctive character of the two funds, would provide for a single governing council of governments, a single consultative board of international executives, and a unified management. With this merger, we can begin to think of the whole technical assistance and preinvestment activity of the U.N. family as one system. This view is evidently supported by a large number of countries, developed and developing. We trust that the Secretary-General's proposal will be approved at this meeting of the Economic and Social Council.

Second, we are glad to see that the secretariat has made some real progress in appointing well-qualified persons to the important jobs as resident representatives of the United Nations in the developing countries. It is of enormous importance, in our judgment, that the resident representatives be in a position to help the developing countries make sure that contributions to development from elements of the U.N. family are constructively related to each other and to the priority goals of each developing country. The most important and useful kinds of coordination simply cannot be done by having big meetings in Geneva or New York; they must be carried out in the capital city of each developing country in close proximity to the political authorities who are responsible for decisions about the destiny of their own people.

If we do not keep strengthening the resident representatives as the United Nations' total contribution to development expands, we will be placing on the developing countries themselves the whole burden of coordinating a dozen U.N. agencies and relating their work to a growing number of bilateral aid programs. A few of the more advanced developing countries are able to take on this unimaginably complex task. But most of them are not able to do so;

¹ U.N. docs. E/3850 and E/3851.

a prime symptom of underdevelopment is precisely the absence of enough leaders with the training and experience for the administration of large-scale complex systems.

Third, we think that within the U.N. system there is now apparent a serious deficiency of executive capability in two fields: industrial development and housing. Both of these fields reach deeply into other specialties: Industrial development involves manpower training, scientific research, supply of agricultural raw materials, arrangements for marketing and international trade, and not merely the engineering know-how to build and manage factories. Similarly, the almost universal housing shortage is closely related to the work of population experts, child welfare experts, regional and urban planners, and industrial and agricultural developers.

In our judgment it would be a serious mistake to try to separate these subjects—industrial development and housing—from the rest of the development process by establishing cumbersome and unnecessary independent agencies. Rather, we believe that to strengthen the Center for Industrial Development and to establish a Center for Housing, Building, and Planning, as operational arms of the U.N. Secretariat and closely associated with the new U.N. Development Program (which is the logical source of preinvestment funds for international projects in industrial development and housing), would provide the strong executive capacity which is now needed in these two important fields.

A *fourth* improvement required in the U.N.'s capacity "to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom" is the need to institutionalize the U.N.'s concern with international trade in relation to development. The U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) has recommended a big conference on this subject at least once every 3 years, a 55-member Trade and Development Board meeting twice a year, and a Secretary General and staff serving the new institutions within the U.N. Secretariat.²

² For text of the preamble and recommendations of the Final Act adopted by the Conference, see *BULLETIN* of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.

The aim of this machinery is to provide a forum for a deep and continuing analysis of obstacles to the expansion of trade of the developing countries—obstacles that may lie in the policies of industrialized countries or in the practices of the developing countries themselves. This will require a new and important dialog—mainly between developed and developing countries—about their respective national policies, such as trade and investment policies, which may affect the rate and character of development. We are glad to see this machinery invented and think it is wise to build it, as the U.N. trade conference proposed to build it, as an integral part of the U.N.

Role of ECOSOC

What is the role of this Council in this evolving system of international development institutions:

- a secretariat which combines a heavy burden of research and planning with ever-growing operational functions;

- the U.N. Development Program with its resident representatives in each developing country;

- a dozen specialized agencies, each with its own projects and programs in nearly every developing country, and each with its expanding role as field agent for the U.N. Development Program in its own area of responsibility;

- the World Bank complex—the International Development Association, the International Finance Corporation, and the Bank itself—a major and still expanding source of capital for development, which is now also beginning to use the specialized agencies as finders and executive agents in such fields as education and agriculture;

- the prospective UNCTAD machinery;

- the regional economic commissions of the Council, which are giving increasing emphasis to operations along with their valuable research work;

- the functional commissions and special committees, tackling such knotty and mysterious questions as social development, industrial and urban planning, population research, the control of traffic in narcotics, and the codification of international statistics; and

- the human rights activities of the U.N., which can be even more important now that most societies have achieved their national freedom and need now to go on to consider threats to the freedom and dignity of individual men and women.

Faced with this constellation of galaxies, which like our physical universe seems to be expanding all the time, the function of the Economic and Social Council is clear and compelling. It is to hold this vast operating mechanism together, to keep its many parts from clashing, to make sure that each organization in the U.N.'s complex system knows what the other parts of the system are doing. ECOSOC is charged by the charter to be the body which concerns itself with the whole system; as the system moves increasingly into operations, ECOSOC quite naturally becomes a clearinghouse of coordination and reporting for operational as well as research programs.

While we are at it, let us discard the static idea of ECOSOC as the peak of some hierarchical pyramid and think of it dynamically as the hub of a wheel moving up the development road. In a strong, well-made wheel, the hub is not in competition with the spokes, which in this analogy are the functional conferences and commissions, or with the outer edge of the wheel, which is the field operations in each developing country of the World Bank, the U.N. Development Program, and the specialized agencies. Every element of the system—the rim, the spokes, and the hub—had better be strong and tightly bolted to every other element of the system. For the road to development is full of rocks and potholes, and the goals of the Development Decade are not yet in sight around the slippery curves ahead.

The same idea was set forth clearly and forcefully by the Secretary-General when he reminded the Council that “it exercises the functions of a governing body as regards the economic and social functions of the UN itself as well as those of coordinator of the activities of the UN family.” In cooperation with the Administrative Committee on Coordination, the Council has achieved substantial progress in this respect. But as the work of the U.N. and its related agencies increases in scope and com-

plexity, it is equally evident that the time has come to take a hard look at the way the Council has discharged its functions; to undertake a critical review of its procedures, its coordination machinery; to judge its effectiveness and to enhance that effectiveness. We agree with the Secretary-General's proposal for such a review, and we will cheerfully help all we can as the Coordination Committee embarks upon this difficult but crucial task.

U.N. Conference on Trade and Development

Mr. President, the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development is so fresh in our minds that it may be useful to reflect for a moment on its outcome—and its future.

The nations already in an advanced stage of industrialization do, of course, account for most of world trade. It is a simple fact of economic life that the more highly industrialized nations have a greater capacity to buy and to sell and therefore to develop a high level of mutually beneficial trade among themselves.

It is also a plain fact of history that the dominant natural impulse to stimulate trade where it already was profitable has had an effect on the production pattern of all trading countries. This has quite understandably influenced many developing countries to concentrate their production in relatively few export products. This may have tended to discourage structural changes in these economies—more diversification of their production—which in the long run often would be to their advantage. We not only wish for an increase in the foreign trade of developing countries but would particularly hope that in its expansion sound ways and means can be found to stimulate a wider range of their exports in the interest of more effectively balanced economic development.

There are many reasons why we would welcome a healthy rise in trade between the industrialized and the developing countries.

First, we are committed morally and politically—and as a matter of plain common sense—to contribute our full share in the global war against poverty in working partnership with those prepared to do as much themselves.

Second, we have committed vast resources, during nearly two decades of sustained support,

for economic and social development around the world. This burden will be upon us, in one form or another, for as long as the problem of poverty exists on a major scale in this world. We carry it with good will as a necessary contribution to international peace. I trust we will continue to do so.

Third, in addition to aid, trade is one of the important factors in the process of growth. The sooner a developing country can earn its own way in a competitive world, the better it is for everybody.

Under the circumstances, then, if my Government were to follow any other course than one designed to reduce the barriers to the trade of the developing countries and to promote the diversification of their economies, we would be guilty of the idiocy of giving with one hand and taking away with the other. This is why my Government looks forward to the establishment of practical U.N. machinery in the field of international trade.

Let us now examine what this "machinery" is supposed to produce as an end product. We like the Secretary-General's definition, in his address to this Council on July 16th. He called on all of us then to think of the United Nations as "an instrument for reconciling differences of opinions and not only as a framework in which they can manifest themselves."

"Differences of opinions" about what? The rub is here. For when you consider trade in relation to development, you are talking about matters which cut deep into the domestic politics of every country on earth.

In the developing countries the obstacles to development and to the growth of national trade are certainly in essence "internal" affairs. Land reform is often the key to agricultural development; tax systems and budget controls are keys to development. The government's policies about investment, the government's attitudes toward private enterprise, the government's willingness to build development institutions and put them in charge of well-trained technicians rather than political favorites—all these are essentially "domestic" decisions.

In a curiously similar way obstacles to more imports and better export markets for the developing countries, which appear to them as

"external" matters, are regarded as "internal" affairs in the industrialized countries. In several important elections in our history the tariff issue was the main bone of contention between our two political parties. Aid policy is also a sensitive "internal" problem in every developed country.

The UNCTAD machinery will presumably be designed to promote a dialog between the developing and the industrialized countries. But the content of that dialog is not, for the most part, *international actions*—it is, rather, each country's *national policies*. The effectiveness of the new machinery will be measured by whether the dialog it organizes does, in fact, result in our modifying each other's national policies.

If we tell you that you must get on with tax reform in your own country because we think you should, you are likely to resent the suggestion and not do anything about the revenue system. Only if we can persuade you that tax reform is in the interest of your own economic growth will we have any effect on your national policy.

In just the same way, if you tell us that our tariffs are too high, we are not likely to make any change just because you think we should. Only if you can persuade us that change will serve the national interest of our country—which *is* served, of course, by expanding world trade and development of the less developed areas of the world—is your argument likely to have any effect on our national policies.

Nor will it help if large majorities pass resolutions recommending changes in the commercial policies of nations not part of the majority. The problem here was perceptively stated at the UNCTAD conference by the delegate from a developing country: "It is an obvious fact," he said, "that on the basis of simple majority, the developing nations can outvote the developed nations at any time. Yet, what will it avail this Conference to reach decisions by simple majority if the defeated minority includes the very countries from whom concessions are expected?"

There is, I believe, a real danger that the coinage of the United Nations will be debased by premature votes on one-sided propositions. A better approach would be a dialog in which

we settle down to the task—it will be a hard, slow, and tedious task—of achieving a reasonable consensus about just what we all need to do to raise the levels of trade of the developing countries as a contribution to their economic growth and their social progress. We will not do this by voting but by striking bargains in which *both* the developing and the developed countries agree to try to change their own national policies for mutual benefit.

Debates in which the industrialized countries attribute the lack of economic growth to internal obstacles in the developing countries, and the developing countries in turn attribute their troubles to commercial restrictions in the industrialized countries, will be worse than useless. But something useful can and will happen in the new machinery if, so to speak, we all leave the rostrum and move together to the workbench—that is, if we jointly address ourselves to the problem rather than merely addressing ourselves to each other.

"The Fraternity of the Impatient"

I want to be very clear about this. I would not dream of objecting—and my Government certainly is not objecting—to vigorous debate and discussion between the world's South and the world's North. It is indeed a turn in the history of international economic relations, as the Secretary-General said last week, that the "South" can now be identified as a large group of more than 75 votes, when it chooses to assert itself. The developing nations themselves, in their recent joint declaration, have cited "the unity of the 75"—I understand it is now 78—as the outstanding feature of the U.N. trade conference and an event of historic importance. We welcome this closer association of nations which, despite diversity in many things, share common interests in their efforts toward self-sustaining economic growth. That they should concert together toward common ends is entirely fit and proper.

That same joint declaration of the 75 expresses great impatience. For our part, we not only honor and applaud their impatience—we share it. Welcome to the "fraternity of the impatient," we say. We too wish to move faster in the development effort. We too wish to close

the "trade gap." We too wish the developing nations to reach a level of self-sustaining growth just as soon as possible.

For two decades past, my own country has been insistently and impatiently pushing economic and social development, in the face of those enormous obstacles of tradition and apathy which are the universal symptom of underdevelopment. We were the first to formulate the theory and develop the practice of international economic aid; we have been pioneers in the field of technical assistance and 40-percent contributors to the technical assistance and preinvestment programs of the U.N. Directly and through the World Bank, we have provided more than \$40 billions of public dollars for capital investment to bear witness to our impatience with the sluggish pace of economic growth and social progress in the developing countries.

So let us join in applying our impatience to the problem of development, rather than to each other. International cooperation for development will not work if it is conceived as a battleground and set up as an adversary proceeding, a game of "I win, you lose" between haves and have-nots.

The engineers who deal with complex physical systems have coined a phrase we might find a use for in the U.N. system. When one of the vital parts gives an input to the total machine more powerful than the machine's feedback system can correct, the machine goes into a state they call "runaway to maximum." It results, of course, in the total breakdown of the machine.

If the corrective feedback processes already built into the U.N. system do not operate effectively, there is real danger of a "runaway to maximum" that would disrupt the intimate cooperation on which economic growth and social progress depend.

It would be bad for the developing countries, and bad for international cooperation, if the peoples and parliaments of the developed nations came to believe that recommendations on trade and development matters bearing the U.N. trademark had been produced by an automatic majority of the 75. It would be far better if people in both developed and developing coun-

tries came to believe that the U.N. stands for procedures that force both groups to study their common problems in depth and open their minds to the processes of mutual persuasion.

A special committee to be appointed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations will soon meet to study such procedures. Its work will be a first test of our ability to conduct a constructive dialog on matters which sharply divided the delegates to the Geneva conference. The successful outcome of this first dialog is an obvious prerequisite to the formation of workable arrangements under the United Nations for discussing trade in relation to development.

Nor need we wait for the outcome of these discussions before moving forward toward the objective highlighted by the developing countries at UNCTAD. We are all familiar with the current efforts in the General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade to advance negotiations for substantial reductions in tariffs and other barriers to trade as part of what has come to be known as the Kennedy Round of negotiations.³ We are prepared to give special emphasis to reduction of barriers to trade in products of particular interest to the developing countries.

Hope for Success of Common War on Poverty

Mr. President, we live in a world where international cooperation has become a simple necessity. As President Johnson has recently said,⁴

Those who live in the emerging community of nations will ignore the problems of their neighbors at the risk of their own prosperity.

We live in a world in which governments of all complexions are being forced to turn more and more of their attention to meeting at least the material needs of their people;

—in which a practical world community is emerging—and turning to the task of economic and social development;

—in which scientific and technical cooperation among the nations goes forward at a staggering pace, with bright prospects for all of us;

—in which the peaceful exploration of outer space promises untold benefits and opportunities for all mankind;

³ For background, see *ibid.*, June 1, 1964, p. 878.

⁴ *Ibid.*, June 29, 1964, p. 990.

—in which the oppressed are finding a new voice to demand the human rights which are promised to them in our charter.

From this general trend we can draw rising hopes for the fate of the world, for the future of nations, for the freedom of all peoples, and for the dignity of the human person. We can dare to hope that a world too long torn by dissension—and paralyzed by sterile confrontation—may be entering a period of healing and fruitful cooperation.

But these hopes must be cautiously conditioned: They depend upon the dominance in world affairs of a will to cooperate, to work together, and to approach our tasks with a reasonable capacity to take account of each other's problems and viewpoints.

Our late President, John F. Kennedy, was firmly dedicated to the proposition that a practical system of international cooperation is itself the most effective answer to those who would rather denounce than do something about poverty. It was this spirit that prompted him to propose to the U.N. General Assembly on September 25, 1961, that the decade of the 1960's be designated as the U.N. Decade of Development⁵ so that, as he put it,

. . . development can become a cooperative and not a competitive enterprise, to enable all nations, however diverse in their systems and beliefs, to become in fact as well as in law both free and equal nations.

The ideas President Kennedy advanced on that historic day are very much alive. President Johnson has already shown in many deeds that he has committed the U.S. Government fully to fight against poverty, illiteracy, and disease in the United States and elsewhere in the world. If we avoid an adversary confrontation by working together in the U.N., we can be certain of the ultimate success of our common war on poverty.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR WILLIAMS

At the outset let me say that I have entered my new assignment as permanent United States Representative to this Economic and Social Council with great enthusiasm and some awe for, Mr. President, as we all know, ECOSOC

bears the principal responsibility for redeeming the pledge of "the peoples of the United Nations" to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person" and to "promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom."

It would be an insensitive man indeed who would not enthuse at the privilege of officially participating in the fulfillment of such a pledge. In a personal capacity, I look forward to the comradeship and understanding of my distinguished colleagues around the table as together we come to grips with the variety of challenging and exciting concerns before us.

Mr. President, before commenting specifically on the reports of the regional economic commissions, I thought you might be interested in some initial reactions of a newcomer, of one who, for the first time, has examined an agenda of the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. It seemed conceivable to me that innocence—if not virtuous in this context—might have some usefulness.

First, I was struck with how new, how unique, this institution is, even in a short historical perspective. I am aware that international cooperation did not burst upon the world for the first time in San Francisco 19 years ago. I know that the United Nations is not the very first nor the oldest existing international organization. And, of course, I am aware that many of my distinguished colleagues have devoted years of their lives to endeavors in the field of ECOSOC's competence and concern.

But, coming fresh to this body, I cannot help but be struck by the thought that our labors are indeed something new under the sun, that in the history of social organization this Council is truly a pioneer, and that the agenda which lies before us is a kind of map—a map charting the current frontiers of human endeavor in the field of economic and social development and in the search for human freedom.

My first reaction to this agenda, then, was a sense of exhilaration and excitement—of entering upon a great and, for me, a new adventure. I would hope that as we work our way through the mundane details, the routine

⁵ *Ibid.*, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 619.

specifics with respect to budgets and administration and so on, we shall, each one of us, be sustained by that sense of adventure—a sense which surely is justified by the very nature of this enterprise.

My second impression was one of astonishment—of awe, almost of dismay—at the complexity, diversity, and breadth of the subjects before us. World trade, world food, world population, human rights, industrialization, manpower, training, natural resources, patents, cartography, housing, and road signs—I do not have to go through each item; you are all more familiar with them than I.

Work of the Regional Economic Commissions

As I listened yesterday to the valuable and interesting reports of the distinguished executive secretaries of the regional economic commissions, these preliminary impressions of mine were confirmed. The variety and significance of the tasks undertaken by these bodies and their supporting secretariats is indeed breathtaking, particularly in a year when the needs of UNCTAD required that so much of the secretariat resources be diverted to preparation for that conference.

But of even greater significance is the difference, sometimes in kind and sometimes in degree, in the programs of the commissions as revealed by these reports. These differences, of course, reflect the differing needs and desires of countries in the various regions of the world.

It is this capacity to respond to different needs which explains the importance which the member countries of our organization attach to the commissions. We must be united, but at the same time we must recognize the diversities among us—diversities arising from our several histories, from our various natural resource patterns, from our differing stages of social and economic development.

Since my country occupies roughly half a continent, much of our political and economic history has centered around the reconciliation of the often conflicting claims of unity and diversity. It is out of our own national experience, therefore, that our firm support for regional organization within a strong central

United Nations arises. As I enter upon my duties, I wish to reaffirm my Government's devotion to so organizing ourselves as to give adequate recognition both to the need for strong central direction and sufficient decentralization to insure that the economic and social work of the United Nations continues responsive to the varying needs of the different regions.

In all this, our approach must remain pragmatic; we cannot afford to be doctrinaire. All experience demonstrates that at times the predominant need will be for greater centralization and at other times a greater measure of decentralization will prove desirable.

In general, my Government is satisfied with the direction in which the work of the several commissions is proceeding. Accordingly, we will join in the resolutions proposed by the commissions, noting their reports and endorsing their proposed work programs. We shall also support the special resolution proposed by the Economic Commission for Europe relating to reinsurance.

Now, Mr. President, with your permission, I should like to make a few remarks on the respective reports.

Economic Commission for Europe

My delegation was pleased to hear the distinguished Executive Secretary of ECE, Mr. [Vladimir] Velebit, state the primary task of ECE to be the internal problems of Europe. European countries have much to offer the developing world, both by way of technical assistance and financial support. But these technical and financial contributions should continue to be made through the bilateral programs of the countries concerned, as well as through such international institutions as EPTA [Expanded Program of Technical Assistance], the Special Fund, the World Bank group—established for these purposes. The fact that the member states of ECE are in a position to help in the development of the developing countries, in my country's view, does not make ECE an appropriate vehicle for extending that help.

It is also true that member states of the Commission account for the preponderant part

of international trade in products of interest to the developing world. The trade relations between member countries of ECE and the developing world should nevertheless continue to be the concern of international organizations established in that field rather than of the ECE.

Exchange of experience between the secretariat of the ECE and those of the other commissions will, however, continue to prove useful and should, therefore, be maintained.

This, of course, leaves a wide field of action for ECE. The study of income policies, mentioned by the Executive Secretary, should prove valuable not only to member countries but to the world in general. From time to time we all face the problem of maintaining a satisfactory rate of economic growth in an environment of price stability. We have much to gain from the experience of the most advanced countries of the world in their attempts to achieve this goal.

My delegation has been pleased that the Economic Commission for Europe has continued the *Ad Hoc* Group To Study Problems of East-West Trade. The first session of that group did some valuable work in this field. As the opportunities for trade between Western countries and those with centrally planned economies increase, it is important to all of us that we understand better the institutional conditions under which such trade can take place.

The economic and statistical reports of the secretariat continue to be of high quality. The economic survey for Europe particularly has achieved a high standard of reliability and objectivity, despite the difficulty of working with a large variety of information available in diverse forms and of compiling, summarizing, and analyzing this information in a systematic and unified manner.

We also wish to commend the ECE for taking steps to concentrate its work programs and reduce the frequency of its meetings. It is important that we continuously reexamine ongoing activities with a view to making whatever economies may be possible for, as UNCTAD indicates, the need for international action tends to grow faster than the financial resources necessary to support such activities.

It is with this in mind that my delegation hopes that the work program of this Commission can be carried out within the budgetary resources planned for 1964-65.

Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East

While the statement of U Nyun, the distinguished Executive Secretary of ECAFE, covered a wide range of activities, I was especially impressed by the degree to which increasing attention is being given to certain selected fields of activities.

I refer in particular to the concentration of effort on the population problem, a problem which is certainly basic to the economic and social development of the Far East. In this area, where the pressure of population on the land resources is a matter of prime concern, useful work in the demographic field is under way. My Government felt that particularly worthy of note in this connection was the Asian Population Conference and the resolution⁶ on Population Growth and Economic and Social Development which was adopted at the Tehran meeting of the Commission.

Especially praiseworthy, I believe, is the attempt of countries within ECAFE to develop methods of cooperation which are in keeping with the trends and needs of Asia and are not carbon copies of economic institutions developed under different conditions.

Mr. President, it is indeed appropriate in an area having such vast needs for arable land and for power that the regional commission should give attention to the harnessing of water as the report has indicated.

ECAFE has cooperated with the specialized agencies concerned in sending out teams of experts to assist in the implementation of their programs, particularly those recommended in U.N. resolutions, such as, for example, that relating to the universal literacy campaign. The U.N. resident representatives in the countries concerned can be very helpful in this regard. Accordingly, Mr. President, we would like to recommend that such teams be instructed to discuss their recommendations with the U.N.

⁶ U.N. doc. E/CN.11/660.

resident representative as well as with the other U.N. and bilateral experts who may be working on the same problem in the country.

Economic Commission for Latin America

Before addressing myself specifically to the report of ECLA, I should like to congratulate its distinguished Executive Secretary, Dr. José Antonio Mayobre, who assumed his office since this body last met. My Government knows Dr. Mayobre well, for he served with distinction as the Venezuelan Ambassador to my country and performed valiant service as the first U.N. Commissioner for Industrial Development. He has our best wishes and full support in his present capacity.

In listening to his oral exposition yesterday, I was struck by the degree to which he shares the eloquence of his distinguished predecessor, Dr. Raúl Prebisch, whom I have recently come to know. He will prove a valiant pleader for the concerns of ECLA.

The continued strengthening of the ECLA secretariat, both by the opening of a new regional office in Bogotá, Colombia, and by the assignment to the Commission of 15 regional advisers, has been noted with pleasure by my Government.

We are also pleased to note that Trinidad and Tobago has joined the Commission since the last meeting of ECOSOC, and we are confident that this association will mean much both for the Commission and for the Government of this relatively young country.

One point made by Dr. Mayobre seems worthy of special mention. In the first part of his statement he called attention to the fact that important institutional developments have occurred in Latin America over the last 5 years but that nevertheless many problems still persist. This is a telling example of the fact that the mere proliferation of international and regional institutions does not in itself create the environment conducive to economic and social development. In addition there must be a wise use of domestic resources and of resources obtained from abroad as well as international co-operation looking toward the creation of a trade and economic environment in which de-

velopment can flourish.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that encouraging institutional developments *are* taking place in Latin America. I refer in particular to the fact that the Latin American Institute for Economic and Social Planning has enjoyed another successful year of operation and that the Central American Economic Integration Program has entered into its operational phase, supported by the Mexico City office of ECLA.

Economic Commission for Africa

Finally, I should like to say a few words about the youngest commission, the Economic Commission for Africa, which is continuing to make remarkable progress under the distinguished leadership of its Executive Secretary, Robert Gardiner. Mr. President, it is apparent that Mr. Gardiner has brought to this important and delicate position the essential qualities of personal character, wisdom, and foresight, as well as an appreciation of the tremendous problems of economic development in Africa. But, most important of all, he has a determination to solve them.

I was particularly heartened to hear him say that the Commission is now entering a new phase of its activities—that, beginning with this year, it can devote increasing attention to action-oriented research rather than basic research.

Since we last met, the ECA secretariat has made considerable progress in solving its staffing and regional office problems. The establishment of the Conference of African Planners, which Mr. Gardiner mentioned, was indeed a significant and wise step.

The speed with which the African Institute for Economic Development and Planning was established is particularly noteworthy, as is the African initiative in obtaining special interim financing from EPTA funds pending formal approval of special fund financing. The United States has been pleased to support the Institute by supplying a small working library, as well as a United States expert to help plan the curriculum. Our offer to meet part of the cost of a series of special summer courses remains open against the possibility that the Insti-

tute may be in a position to conduct such courses.

Mr. Gardiner also referred to progress made toward the establishment of the African Development Bank. The intention to start operations with rather small resources subscribed by member countries rather than to wait assistance from the more advanced countries is another striking example of bold African initiative. My Government has offered technical assistance to help establish and operate the bank and is currently negotiating with the Commission in the establishment of a training program for staff members of the bank. Once the bank is in operation, we are prepared to consider participation in loans for specific regional projects.

Mr. President, in conclusion let me state the obvious. The work of the four regional commissions over this past year confirms our judgment of their great importance in fulfilling the responsibilities of this Council. We are all deeply indebted to the four executive secretaries for their wise and dedicated leadership.

This reference to these four leaders provides me an opportunity to say one more word. Over the past years I have traveled widely throughout the countries of the less developed world—through countries which until a few years ago were simply a dream in the minds of millions but yet not a living reality. Wherever I have gone in recent years I have been struck by the high quality and dedication to service of the people of these growing nations. As these men and women struggle to build a new and better world for themselves and for all of us, let me state unequivocally that my Government and the American people more than wish them well. We rejoice in their new-found freedom, we share in their dreams, and we stand side by side with them—as partners—in the struggle for a fuller life in a world of greater freedom and equality.

Current U.N. Documents

Security Council

Letters from the representative of Israel and the Chargé d'Affaires a.i. of the Syrian Arab Republic regarding recent border clashes between the forces of the two countries: S/5801, July 7, 1964, 7 pp.; S/5805, July 8, 1964, 1 p.

Letters from the Chargé d'Affaires of Cambodia regarding overflights by aircraft of Republic of Vietnam: S/5804, July 8, 1964, 1 p.; S/5810, July 10, 1964, 1 p.; S/5814, July 13, 1964, 1 p.

Letters from the representatives of Cyprus and Turkey on the Cyprus dispute: S/5802, July 8, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5806, July 8, 1964, 1 p.; S/5807, July 8, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5812, July 13, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5813, July 13, 1964, 5 pp.; S/5815, July 14, 1964, 1 p.; S/5818, July 14, 1964, 3 pp.; S/5820, July 15, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5821, July 17, 1964, 2 pp.; S/5823, July 21, 1964, 1 p.; S/5824, July 21, 1964, 1 p.; S/5825, July 21, 1964, 2 pp.

Letter from the representative of Sweden regarding continuation of Swedish contingent to form part of UNFICYP through September 26. S/5819. July 15, 1964. 1 p.

Cable from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Haiti regarding intervention in Haitian domestic affairs by Dominican Republic, S/5808, July 9, 1964, 2 pp.; reply from representative of Dominican Republic, S/5809, July 9, 1964, 2 pp.

Letter from representative of Soviet Union transmitting "Memorandum of the Government of the USSR regarding certain measures to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security." S/5811. July 10, 1964. 6 pp.

General Assembly

Legal Problems Relating to the Utilization and Use of International Rivers. Report of the Secretary-General. Volume 1, paras. 1-423. A/5409. April 15, 1963. 223 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:

Information furnished by the representatives of the United States and the U.S.S.R. concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond: A/AC.105/INF.69, June 23, 1964, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.70, June 23, 1964, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.71, July 8, 1964, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.72, July 10, 1964, 1 p.; A/AC.105/INF.73, July 22, 1964, 2 pp.

Report of the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee on the Work of Its Third Session. Annex IV. Information on Facilities for Education and Training in Basic Subjects Related to the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. A/AC.105/20/Add.1. July 3, 1964. 40 pp.

Letter regarding Gibraltar from the representative of Spain to the chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A/AC.109/91. July 7, 1964. 1 p.

Architectural and engineering survey of the Headquarters building. Sixth report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions to the General Assembly at its nineteenth session. A/5714. July 20, 1964. 14 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Commission on the Status of Women. Dissolution of Marriage, Annulment of Marriage and Judicial Separation. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/415/Add. 1. June 4, 1964. 70 pp.

International and Regional Symposia on Industrial Development. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3921. June 18, 1964. 32 pp.

Report of the Commission on Human Rights. E/3925. June 19, 1964. 10 pp.

Multiplicity of Resolutions. Report by the Secretary-General. E/3880. June 25, 1964. 3 pp.

Commission on Human Rights. Study of discrimination in respect of the right of everyone to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. E/CN.4/875. June 29, 1964. 3 pp.
Annual Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. E/3935. July 7, 1964. 71 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Cultural Relations

Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Concluded at London November 16, 1945. Entered into force for the United States November 4, 1946. TIAS 1580.
Signature and acceptance: Kenya, April 7, 1964.

Narcotics

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs and protocol of signature. Concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.
Accession deposited: Tanganyika and Zanzibar, July 3, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹
Ratifications deposited: Denmark, July 27, 1964; France, July 21, 1964.

Nuclear Test Ban

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water. Done at Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force October 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratifications deposited: Dominican Republic, July 22, 1964; Korea (with a declaration), July 24, 1964.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Initialed at Washington July 24, 1964. Will be opened for signature at Washington for 6 months from August 19, 1964, to governments of states listed in the annex to the special agreement, *infra*, and, subject to approval of their quotas, to all states which are members of the International Telecommunication Union. Enters into force when signed without reservation as to approval by two or more governments, or approval after reservation, and such governments or their corresponding signatories have signed the special agreement.
Initialed ad referendum by representatives of the following governments: Australia, Belgium, Can-

ada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Switzerland, United Kingdom, United States, and Vatican City State.

Special agreement to establish interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Initialed at Washington July 24, 1964. Will be opened for signature at Washington August 19, 1964. Enters into force for each signatory on day of signature, provided the agreement, *supra*, has entered into force for or been provisionally applied by its government.

Initialed ad referendum by representatives of the following governments: Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Switzerland, and Vatican City State.

Initialed ad referendum by representatives of the entities designated by the following governments: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and United States.

BILATERAL

Italy

Compromise of arbitration in accordance with article 12 of the air transport agreement of February 6, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1902, 2081, 4558). Signed at Rome June 30, 1964. Entered into force June 30, 1964.

Japan

Protocol supplementing convention for avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income of April 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901). Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1960.¹
Ratification advised by the Senate: July 29, 1964.

Protocol modifying and supplementing convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901). Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: July 29, 1964.

Luxembourg

Convention with respect to taxes on income and property. Signed at Washington December 18, 1962.¹
Ratification advised by the Senate: July 29, 1964.

Netherlands

Protocol modifying and supplementing extension to the Netherlands Antilles of convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to income and certain other taxes of April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1855, 3366, 3367). Signed at The Hague October 23, 1963.¹
Ratification advised by the Senate: July 29, 1964.

Spain

Agreement on the use of Spanish ports and territorial waters by the NS *Savannah*. Effected by exchange of notes at Madrid July 16, 1964. Entered into force July 16, 1964.

Sweden

Convention supplementing convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in income and other taxes of March 23, 1939 (54 Stat. 1759). Signed at Stockholm October 22, 1963.¹
Ratification advised by the Senate: July 29, 1964.

¹ Not in force.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on July 29 confirmed the following nominations:

Lucius D. Battle to be Ambassador to the United Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 10.)

Winthrop G. Brown to be Ambassador to the Republic of Korea. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 348 dated July 31.)

Cecil B. Lyon to be Ambassador to Ceylon. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 23.)

Tyler Thompson to be Ambassador to Finland. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 358 dated August 6.)

Margaret Joy Tibbetts to be Ambassador to Norway. (For biographic details, see White House press release dated July 9.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Kenya. Exchange of notes—Signed at Nairobi March 19 and April 20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964. TIAS 5573. 4 pp. 5¢.

Defense—Improvements in the Continental Air Defense System. Agreement with Canada, amending the agreement of September 27, 1961. Exchange of

notes—Signed at Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6, 1964. TIAS 5574. 2 pp. 5¢.

Ionospheric Research by Satellites. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Ottawa May 6, 1964. Entered into force May 6, 1964. TIAS 5575. 5 pp. 5¢.

Maritime Matters—Use of Norwegian Ports and Territorial Waters by the N.S. *Savannah*. Agreement with Norway—Signed at Oslo March 1, 1963. Entered into force May 8, 1964. TIAS 5576. 5 pp. 5¢.

Austrian Property, Rights and Interests. Agreement with Austria—Signed at Washington January 30, 1959. Entered into force May 19, 1964. TIAS 5577. 32 pp. 15¢.

Law of the Sea—Convention on the Continental Shelf. Agreement with Other Governments—Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578. 56 pp. 20¢.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: July 27–August 2

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to July 27 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 335 of July 22 and 339 of July 23.

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†343	7/28	Cotton textile agreement with Greece.
†344	7/28	Cotton textile agreement with Turkey.
*345	7/27	U.S. participation in international conferences.
†346	7/28	Agreements on global commercial communications satellite system.
*347	7/29	Cultural exchange.
*348	7/31	Brown sworn in as Ambassador to Korea (biographic details).
349	7/31	U.S. reply to Soviet statement of July 26.
350	7/31	Rusk: news conference of July 31.
†351	7/31	Rusk: Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization.
†352	8/1	Rusk: letter to Manlio Brosio, NATO Secretary General.
355	8/1	Rusk: "The Pursuit of Peace."

*Not printed.

†Filed for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Foreign Relations of the United States 1943, Volume II, Europe

The Department of State recently released *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1943, Volume II, Europe*.

This volume contains documentation on the wartime relations of the United States with most of the friendly or neutral governments of Western Europe. Of special importance and interest are the compilations relating to the overthrow of the Fascist regime in Italy and the emergence of Italy as a cobelligerent; the efforts of the United States to assure the maintenance of Spain's neutrality; American concern over the disunity among Yugoslav resistance forces; attempts to reduce and divert the volume of trade between the Axis Powers and the European neutrals; and the political problems attendant upon the successful military operations in North Africa.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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Vol. LI, No. 1313



August 24, 1964

UNITED STATES TAKES MEASURES TO REPEL ATTACK AGAINST U.S. FORCES
IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

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United States Takes Measures To Repel Attack Against U.S. Forces in Southeast Asia

On August 2, and again on August 4, U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam were attacked by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats. The U.S. vessels took appropriate retaliatory action and, following the second attack, air units of the 7th Fleet fired on gunboats and on certain supporting facilities on the North Vietnamese shore. On August 7 the Congress, at the request of the President, passed a joint resolution approving and supporting "the determination of the President . . . to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression." Following are the texts of documents relating to the incident.

U.S. PROTEST TO NORTH VIET-NAM, AUGUST 3¹

The United States Government takes an extremely serious view of the unprovoked attack made by Communist North Vietnamese torpedo boats on an American naval vessel, the U.S.S. *Maddox*, operating on the high seas, in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2. United States ships

have traditionally operated freely on the high seas, in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law to vessels of all nations. They will continue to do so and will take whatever measures are appropriate for their defense. The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 4 by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1313 PUBLICATION 7726 AUGUST 24, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

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Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

**STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON,
AUGUST 3²**

I have instructed the Navy:

1. to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin off the coast of North Viet-Nam,
2. to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol,
3. to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers, and
4. to issue orders to the commanders of the combat aircraft and the two destroyers [U.S.S. *Maddox* and U.S.S. *C. Turner Joy*],
 - (a) to attack any force which attacks them in international waters, and
 - (b) to attack with the objective not only of driving off the force but of destroying it.

**ADDRESS TO THE NATION BY PRESIDENT
JOHNSON, AUGUST 4¹**

My fellow Americans: As President and Commander in Chief, it is my duty to the American people to report that renewed hostile actions against United States ships on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

The initial attack on the destroyer *Maddox*, on August 2, was repeated today by a number of hostile vessels attacking two U.S. destroyers with torpedoes. The destroyers and supporting aircraft acted at once on the orders I gave after the initial act of aggression. We believe at least two of the attacking boats were sunk. There were no U.S. losses.

The performance of commanders and crews in this engagement is in the highest tradition of the United States Navy. But repeated acts of violence against the Armed Forces of the United States must be met not only with alert defense but with positive reply. That reply is being given as I speak to you tonight. Air action is now in execution against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Viet-Nam which have been used in these hostile operations.

² Read by the President to news correspondents (White House press release).

³ Delivered from the White House by radio and television (White House press release; as-delivered text).

In the larger sense this new act of aggression, aimed directly at our own forces, again brings home to all of us in the United States the importance of the struggle for peace and security in Southeast Asia. Aggression by terror against the peaceful villagers of South Viet-Nam has now been joined by open aggression on the high seas against the United States of America.

The determination of all Americans to carry out our full commitment to the people and to the Government of South Viet-Nam will be redoubled by this outrage. Yet our response, for the present, will be limited and fitting. We Americans know, although others appear to forget, the risks of spreading conflict. We still seek no wider war.

I have instructed the Secretary of State to make this position totally clear to friends and to adversaries and, indeed, to all. I have instructed Ambassador Stevenson to raise this matter immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.⁴ Finally, I have today met with the leaders of both parties in the Congress of the United States, and I have informed them that I shall immediately request the Congress to pass a resolution making it clear that our Government is united in its determination to take all necessary measures in support of freedom and in defense of peace in Southeast Asia.

I have been given encouraging assurance by these leaders of both parties that such a resolution will be promptly introduced, freely and expeditiously debated, and passed with overwhelming support. And just a few minutes ago I was able to reach Senator Goldwater, and I am glad to say that he has expressed his support of the statement that I am making to you tonight.

It is a solemn responsibility to have to order even limited military action by forces whose overall strength is as vast and as awesome as those of the United States of America, but it is my considered conviction, shared throughout your Government, that firmness in the right is indispensable today for peace. That firmness will always be measured. Its mission is peace.

⁴ See p. 272.

**ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT,
SYRACUSE UNIVERSITY, AUGUST 5⁶**

Dr. Newhouse, Chancellor Tolley, Governor and Mrs. Rockefeller, Members of the Congress, distinguished guests, members of the faculty, ladies and gentlemen:

I know that you share with me the great admiration and pride that the generosity of Dr. Newhouse has made possible for this area of our nation and for this great institution. We all are in his debt, and in the years and generations and centuries to come we will see the products of this great adventure.

On this occasion it is fitting, I think, that we are meeting here to dedicate this new center to better understanding among all men. For that is my purpose in speaking to you.

Last night I spoke to the people of the Nation. This morning I speak to the people of all nations—so that they may understand without mistake our purpose in the action that we have been required to take.

On August 2d the United States destroyer *Maddox* was attacked on the high seas in the Gulf of Tonkin by hostile vessels of the Government of North Viet-Nam.

On August 4th that attack was repeated in those same waters against two United States destroyers.

The attacks were deliberate.

The attacks were unprovoked.

The attacks have been answered.

Throughout last night, and within the last 12 hours, air units of the United States 7th Fleet have sought out the hostile vessels and certain of their supporting facilities. Appropriate armed action has been taken against them. The United States is now asking that this be brought immediately and urgently before the Security Council of the United Nations.

We welcome—and we invite—the scrutiny of all men who seek peace, for peace is the only purpose of the course that America pursues.

The Gulf of Tonkin may be distant, but none

⁶ Made at the dedication of the Samuel I. Newhouse Communications Center at Syracuse University, Syracuse, N.Y. (White House press release; as-delivered text).

can be detached about what has happened there.

Aggression—deliberate, willful, and systematic aggression—has unmasked its face to the entire world. The world remembers—the world must never forget—that aggression unchallenged is aggression unleashed.

We of the United States have not forgotten. That is why we have answered this aggression with action.

America's course is not precipitate.

America's course is not without long provocation.

For 10 years, three American Presidents—President Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and your present President—and the American people have been actively concerned with threats to the peace and security of the peoples of Southeast Asia from the Communist government of North Viet-Nam.

President Eisenhower sought—and President Kennedy sought—the same objectives that I still seek:

—That the governments of Southeast Asia honor the international agreements which apply in the area;

—That those governments leave each other alone;

—That they resolve their differences peacefully;

—That they devote their talents to bettering the lives of their peoples by working against poverty and disease and ignorance.

In 1954 we made our position clear toward Viet-Nam.

In July of that year we stated we would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the 1954 agreements “with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.”⁶

In September of that year the United States signed the Manila Pact,⁷ on which our partici-

⁶ For text of a statement made by Under Secretary Walter B. Smith at the concluding Indochina plenary session at Geneva on July 21, 1954, see BULLETIN of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162; for text of the Agreement on the Cessation of Hostilities in Viet-Nam, signed at Geneva July 20, 1954, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

⁷ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

pation in SEATO is based. That pact recognized that aggression by means of armed attack on South Viet-Nam would endanger the peace and the safety of the nations signing that solemn agreement.

In 1962 we made our position clear toward Laos. We signed the Declaration on the Neutrality of Laos.⁸ That accord provided for the withdrawal of all foreign forces and respect for the neutrality and independence of that little country.

The agreements of 1954 and 1962 were also signed by the government of North Viet-Nam.

In 1954 that government pledged that it would respect the territory under the military control of the other party and engage in no hostile act against the other party.

In 1962 that government pledged that it would "not introduce into the Kingdom of Laos foreign troops or military personnel."

That government also pledged that it would "not use the territory of the Kingdom of Laos for interference in the internal affairs of other countries."

That government of North Viet-Nam is now willfully and systematically violating those agreements of both 1954 and 1962.

To the south, it is engaged in aggression against the Republic of Viet-Nam.

To the west, it is engaged in aggression against the Kingdom of Laos.

To the east, it has now struck out on the high seas in an act of aggression against the United States of America.

There can be and there must be no doubt about the policy and no doubt about the purpose.

So there can be no doubt about the responsibilities of men and the responsibilities of nations that are devoted to peace.

Peace cannot be assured merely by assuring the safety of the United States destroyer *Maddox* or the safety of other vessels of other flags.

Peace requires that the existing agreements in the area be honored.

Peace requires that we and all our friends stand firm against the present aggressions of the government of North Viet-Nam.

The government of North Viet-Nam is today

flouting the will of the world for peace. The world is challenged to make its will against war known and to make it known clearly and to make it felt and to make it felt decisively.

So, to our friends of the Atlantic alliance, let me say this this morning. The challenge that we face in Southeast Asia today is the same challenge that we have faced with courage and that we have met with strength in Greece and Turkey, in Berlin and Korea, in Lebanon and in Cuba, and to any who may be tempted to support or to widen the present aggression I say this: There is no threat to any peaceful power from the United States of America. But there can be no peace by aggression and no immunity from reply. That is what is meant by the actions that we took yesterday.

Finally, my fellow Americans, I would like to say to ally and to adversary alike: Let no friend needlessly fear—and no foe vainly hope—that this is a nation divided in this election year. Our free elections—our full and free debate—are America's strength, not America's weakness.

There are no parties and there is no partisanship when our peace or the peace of the world is imperiled by aggressors in any part of the world.

We are one nation, united and indivisible. And united and indivisible we shall remain.

PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE TO CONGRESS, AUGUST 5⁹

To the Congress of the United States:

Last night I announced to the American people that the North Vietnamese regime had conducted further deliberate attacks against U.S. naval vessels operating in international waters, and that I had therefore directed air action against gunboats and supporting facilities used in these hostile operations. This air action has now been carried out with substantial damage to the boats and facilities. Two U.S. aircraft were lost in the action.

After consultation with the leaders of both parties in the Congress, I further announced a

⁹Transmitted on Aug. 5 (White House press release); also available as H. Doc. 333, 88th Cong., 2d sess.

⁸ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

decision to ask the Congress for a resolution expressing the unity and determination of the United States in supporting freedom and in protecting peace in southeast Asia.

These latest actions of the North Vietnamese regime have given a new and grave turn to the already serious situation in southeast Asia. Our commitments in that area are well known to the Congress. They were first made in 1954 by President Eisenhower. They were further defined in the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty approved by the Senate in February 1955.

This treaty with its accompanying protocol obligates the United States and other members to act in accordance with their constitutional processes to meet Communist aggression against any of the parties or protocol states.

Our policy in southeast Asia has been consistent and unchanged since 1954. I summarized it on June 2 in four simple propositions:¹⁰

1. *America keeps her word.* Here as elsewhere, we must and shall honor our commitments.

2. *The issue is the future of southeast Asia as a whole.* A threat to any nation in that region is a threat to all, and a threat to us.

3. *Our purpose is peace.* We have no military, political, or territorial ambitions in the area.

4. *This is not just a jungle war, but a struggle for freedom on every front of human activity.* Our military and economic assistance to South Vietnam and Laos in particular has the purpose of helping these countries to repel aggression and strengthen their independence.

The threat to the free nations of southeast Asia has long been clear. The North Vietnamese regime has constantly sought to take over South Vietnam and Laos. This Communist regime has violated the Geneva accords for Vietnam. It has systematically conducted a campaign of subversion, which includes the direction, training, and supply of personnel and arms for the conduct of guerrilla warfare in South Vietnamese territory. In Laos, the North Vietnamese regime has maintained military forces, used Laotian territory for infiltra-

tion into South Vietnam, and most recently carried out combat operations—all in direct violation of the Geneva agreements of 1962.

In recent months, the actions of the North Vietnamese regime have become steadily more threatening. In May, following new acts of Communist aggression in Laos, the United States undertook reconnaissance flights over Laotian territory, at the request of the Government of Laos. These flights had the essential mission of determining the situation in territory where Communist forces were preventing inspection by the International Control Commission. When the Communists attacked these aircraft, I responded by furnishing escort fighters with instructions to fire when fired upon. Thus, these latest North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels are not the first direct attack on armed forces of the United States.

As President of the United States I have concluded that I should now ask the Congress, on its part, to join in affirming the national determination that all such attacks will be met, and that the United States will continue in its basic policy of assisting the free nations of the area to defend their freedom.

As I have repeatedly made clear, the United States intends no rashness, and seeks no wider war. We must make it clear to all that the United States is united in its determination to bring about the end of Communist subversion and aggression in the area. We seek the full and effective restoration of the international agreements signed in Geneva in 1954, with respect to South Vietnam, and again in Geneva in 1962, with respect to Laos.

I recommend a resolution expressing the support of the Congress for all necessary action to protect our Armed Forces and to assist nations covered by the SEATO Treaty. At the same time, I assure the Congress that we shall continue readily to explore any avenues of political solution that will effectively guarantee the removal of Communist subversion and the preservation of the independence of the nations of the area.

The resolution could well be based upon similar resolutions enacted by the Congress in the past—to meet the threat to Formosa in

¹⁰ BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 953.

1955,¹¹ to meet the threat to the Middle East in 1957,¹² and to meet the threat in Cuba in 1962.¹³ It could state in the simplest terms the resolve and support of the Congress for action to deal appropriately with attacks against our Armed Forces and to defend freedom and preserve peace in southeast Asia in accordance with the obligations of the United States under the Southeast Asia Treaty. I urge the Congress to enact such a resolution promptly and thus to give convincing evidence to the aggressive Communist nations, and to the world as a whole, that our policy in southeast Asia will be carried forward—and that the peace and security of the area will be preserved.

The events of this week would in any event have made the passage of a congressional resolution essential. But there is an additional reason for doing so at a time when we are entering on 3 months of political campaigning. Hostile nations must understand that in such a period the United States will continue to protect its national interests, and that in these matters there is no division among us.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE, *August 5, 1964.*

STATEMENTS BY SECRETARY RUSK AND SECRETARY McNAMARA, AUGUST 6¹⁴

Secretary Rusk

I appear before you in support of the joint congressional resolution on southeast Asia now before your committees. If the committees are agreeable, I shall proceed by explaining the purpose of the resolution. Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNamara will then describe to you the recent attacks on our naval vessels and the U.S. response thereto. I would then propose to conclude by going over the text of the resolution itself and discussing its meaning and scope.

¹¹ H.J. Res. 159, 84th Cong., 1st sess.; for text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 7, 1955, p. 213.

¹² H.J. Res. 117, as amended, 85th Cong., 1st sess.; for text see *ibid.*, Mar. 25, 1957, p. 481.

¹³ S.J. Res. 230, 87th Cong., 2d sess.; for text, see *ibid.*, Oct. 22, 1962, p. 597.

¹⁴ Made before a joint session of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.

The immediate occasion for this resolution is, of course, the North Vietnamese attacks on our naval vessels, operating in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, on August 2 and August 4.

However, it is obvious that these attacks were not an isolated event but are related directly to the aggressive posture of North Vietnam and to the policy that the United States has been pursuing in assisting the free nations of southeast Asia, and particularly South Vietnam and Laos, to defend themselves against Communist aggression and thus to preserve the peace of the area.

When Indochina was divided and the independent states of South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia were created under the conditions of the Geneva accords of 1954, it was at once clear that in the face of the North Vietnamese threat South Vietnam and Laos could not maintain their independence without outside assistance. The Government of South Vietnam turned to the United States for such assistance, and President Eisenhower in October 1954 made the decision that it should be furnished, stating that our purpose was to "assist the Government of Viet-Nam in developing and maintaining a strong, viable state, capable of resisting attempted subversion or aggression through military means."¹⁵

In the fall of 1954, Secretary Dulles negotiated, and the Senate in early 1955 consented to, the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, sometimes known as the Manila Pact. This treaty provided for the collective defense of the parties to this treaty—Thailand, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It provided further that the protection of the treaty should extend, under an annexed protocol, to the territory of South Vietnam and to Laos and Cambodia.

I do not need to review for you the subsequent history of North Vietnamese efforts to subvert and conquer South Vietnam and to do the same in Laos. Having found that South Vietnam

¹⁵ For a statement made by President Johnson on June 2, in which he read a letter of Oct. 1, 1954, from President Eisenhower to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, see BULLETIN of June 22, 1964, p. 953.

would not collapse of itself but was on the contrary making remarkable progress, Hanoi in 1959 initiated a systematic campaign of terror and subversion in South Vietnam, directed and supplied with key personnel and equipment from the north. By 1961, the situation had reached a critical point and the United States greatly increased its advisory and supporting assistance to the Government of South Vietnam.

Despite this assistance, the task of countering the extensive Viet Cong effort remains a long and arduous one, and, as you know, we have moved within the last 2 weeks to further increase our support while recognizing always that the struggle in South Vietnam must essentially be the responsibility of the South Vietnamese themselves.

In Laos, the agreements reached at Geneva in 1962 have been consistently violated by Hanoi, and in May of this year the situation took on a more critical character when a Communist military offensive drove neutralist forces from the area of the Plain of Jars they had held in 1962. Our response to these events, the provision of additional T-28's to the Government of Laos and the carrying out of reconnaissance flights, with the incidents resulting therefrom, are well known to you.

The present attacks, then, are no isolated event. They are part and parcel of a continuing Communist drive to conquer South Vietnam, control or conquer Laos, and thus weaken and eventually dominate and conquer other free nations of southeast Asia. One does not need to spell out a "domino theory"; it is enough to recognize the true nature of the Communist doctrine of world revolution and the militant support that Hanoi and Peiping are giving to that doctrine in southeast Asia.

U.S. Policy and Objectives

Although the United States did not itself sign the Geneva accords of 1954, Under Secretary Walter Bedell Smith made a formal statement that the United States:

... would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening international peace and security.

We have repeatedly made clear that the independence and security provided for South Viet-

nam under those accords was a satisfactory status for South Vietnam. All that is needed, as I have myself often said, is for Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors alone.

The same is true with respect to the 1962 accords for Laos. These provided a reasonable arrangement for the status of Laos, and what is needed, again, is simply that the Communist side should honor the commitments it undertook.

Above all, there can be no doubt of United States objectives for these nations and for the area as a whole. Here, as elsewhere, we believe that nations are entitled to remain free and to develop as they see fit. The United States has no military, territorial, or political ambitions for itself in southeast Asia. We seek only the restoration of peace and the removal of Communist subversion and aggression.

Essentially, the outcome of this conflict, and the course of events in the area as a whole, is up to the Communist side. It has the option of accepting the freedom and independence of neighboring nations, or of continuing its aggressive tactics. For our part, as President Johnson stated on June 23:¹⁶

The United States intends no rashness and seeks no wider war. But the United States is determined to use its strength to help those who are defending themselves against terror and aggression. We are a people of peace—but not of weakness or timidity.

Purpose of the Resolution

This, then, is the background of the resolution before you. We have never doubted the support of the American people for the policies that have been followed through three administrations over a period of a decade. But in the face of the heightened aggression on the Communist side, exemplified by these latest North Vietnamese attacks, it has seemed clearly wise to seek in the most emphatic form a declaration of congressional support both for the defense of our Armed Forces against similar attacks and for the carrying forward of whatever steps may become necessary to assist the free nations covered by the Southeast Asia Treaty.

We cannot tell what steps may in the future be required to meet Communist aggression in

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 46.

southeast Asia. The unity and determination of the American people, through their Congress, should be declared in terms so firm that they cannot possibly be mistaken by other nations. The world has learned over 50 years of history that aggression is invited if there is doubt about the response. Let us leave today's aggressors in no doubt whatever.

I now turn to Secretary McNamara, who will describe the recent attacks and our response.

Secretary McNamara

During the past few days, deliberate and unprovoked military attacks by the North Vietnamese have given rise to the need for us to appear here today. I should like to review the attacks with you briefly and to describe the responses we made to those attacks.

The first incident occurred on August 2. It concerned the U.S.S. *Maddox*, one of our destroyers engaged in a routine patrol in international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin off the North Vietnam coast. At about noon, when the *Maddox* was about 30 miles from the coast, she reported that three torpedo boats were on a southerly course heading toward the ship at a range of over 10 miles.

Two hours later, at approximately 2:40 p.m., the *Maddox* was approached by a high-speed—45 to 50 knot—craft. She reported that the apparent intention of this craft was to conduct a torpedo attack and that she intended to open fire in self-defense if necessary. She was attacked by the three PT craft at 3:08 p.m. She opened fire with her 5-inch battery after three warning shots failed to slow down the attackers. The PT's continued their closing maneuvers, and two of the PT's closed to 5,000 yards, each firing one torpedo. The *Maddox* changed course in an evasive move, and the two torpedoes passed on the starboard side at a distance of 100 to 200 yards.

The U.S.S. *Ticonderoga*, which was operating in waters to the southeast and which had been alerted to the impending attack, advised she was sending four already airborne F-8E (Crusader) fighters with rockets and 20-millimeter ammunition to provide air cover for the *Maddox*. At about 3:21 p.m., the third hostile PT

moved up to the beam of the *Maddox* and received a direct hit by a 5-inch round; at the same time it dropped a torpedo into the water which was not seen to run. Machinegun fire from the PT's was directed at the *Maddox*. However, there was no injury to personnel and no damage. The *Maddox* continued in a southerly direction to join with a sister destroyer, the *C. Turner Joy*, as *Ticonderoga* aircraft commenced attacking the PT's. Zuni rocket runs and 20-millimeter strafing attacks were directed against two of the PT's, and they were damaged. The third PT remained dead in the water after the direct hit by the *Maddox*. At 3:29 p.m., the engagement terminated and the aircraft escorted the *Maddox* southward on its patrol course.

On Monday, August 3, the President made public instructions that he had issued the day before regarding future patrols and engagements with enemy craft. He instructed the Navy, first, to continue the patrols in the Gulf of Tonkin; second, to double the force by adding an additional destroyer to the one already on patrol; third, to provide a combat air patrol over the destroyers; and fourth, to issue instructions to the combat aircraft and to the destroyers (a) to attack any force which attacked them in international waters and (b) to attack with the objective of not only driving off the force but of destroying it.

At the same time as these instructions were being broadcast throughout the world, the State Department, acting pursuant to the President's further instructions, took steps to deliver a note of protest to the North Vietnam regime. The note was also widely publicized. It concluded with the words,

The United States Government expects that the authorities of the regime in North Viet-Nam will be under no misapprehension as to the grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces.

Our hopes that the firm, defensive action taken in response to the first attack and the protest to Hanoi would end the matter were short-lived.

After the first attack on Sunday, the *Maddox* joined with its sister destroyer, the U.S.S. *Turner Joy*, in the Gulf of Tonkin and resumed

its patrol in international waters, as directed by the President.

Monday, August 3, was uneventful.

The patrol was also uneventful during most of the daylight hours of Tuesday, August 4. In the early evening of August 4, however, the *Maddox* reported radar contact with unidentified surface vessels who were paralleling its track and the track of the *Turner Joy*. It was 7:40 p.m. when the *Maddox* reported that, from actions being taken by those unidentified vessels, an attack by them appeared imminent. At this time the *Maddox* was heading southeast near the center of the Gulf of Tonkin in international waters approximately 65 miles from the nearest land.

The *Maddox* at 8:36 p.m. established new radar contact with two unidentified surface vessels and three unidentified aircraft. At this time, U.S. fighter aircraft were launched from the *Ticonderoga* to rendezvous with the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy* to provide protection against possible attack from the unidentified vessels and aircraft, in accordance with the President's previously issued directives. Shortly thereafter, the *Maddox* reported that the unidentified aircraft had disappeared from its radar screen and that the surface vessels were remaining at a distance. The aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* arrived and commenced defensive patrol over the *Maddox* and the *Turner Joy*.

At 9:30 p.m., additional unidentified vessels were observed on the *Maddox* radar, and these vessels began to close rapidly on the destroyer patrol at speeds in excess of 40 knots. The attacking craft continued to close rapidly from the west and south, and the *Maddox* reported that their intentions were evaluated as hostile. The destroyers reported at 9:52 p.m. that they were under continuous torpedo attack and were engaged in defensive counterfire.

Within the next hour, the destroyers relayed messages stating that they had avoided a number of torpedoes, that they had been under repeated attack, and that they had sunk two of the attacking craft. By midnight, local time, the destroyers reported that, even though many torpedoes had been fired at them, they had suffered no hits or casualties and that the defensive aircraft from the *Ticonderoga* were

illuminating the area and attacking the enemy surface craft. Shortly thereafter, they reported that at least two enemy craft had been sunk although low ceilings continued to hamper the aircraft operations. The *Turner Joy* reported that during the engagement, in addition to the torpedo attack, she was fired upon by automatic weapons while being illuminated by searchlights.

Finally, after more than 2 hours under attack, the destroyers reported at 1:30 a.m. that the attacking craft had apparently broken off the engagement.

The deliberate and unprovoked nature of the attacks at locations that were indisputably in international waters compelled the President and his principal advisers to conclude that a prompt and firm military response was required. Accordingly, the President decided that air action, in reply to the unprovoked attacks, should be taken against gunboats and certain supporting facilities in North Vietnam which had been used in the hostile operations. On Tuesday evening, after consulting with congressional leadership, he so informed the American people.

The United States military response was carefully planned and effectively carried out. The U.S. air strikes began approximately at noon Wednesday local time against North Vietnamese PT and gunboats, their bases and support facilities. These reprisal attacks, carried out by naval aircraft of the United States 7th Fleet from the carriers *Ticonderoga* and *Constellation*, were limited in scale—their primary targets being the weapons against which our patrolling destroyers had been forced to defend themselves twice in the prior 72 hours.

Specifically, our naval air forces launched 64 attack sorties against 4 North Vietnamese patrol boat bases and their boats and against a major supporting oil storage depot. Strike reports indicate that all targets were severely hit, in particular the petroleum installation, where 10 percent of North Vietnam's petroleum storage capacity was 90 percent destroyed. Smoke was observed rising to 14,000 feet. Some 25 North Vietnamese patrol boats were destroyed or damaged.

Our losses were two aircraft destroyed and two damaged. One of the pilots is believed to

have crashed with his plane between two PT craft he had under attack. Another pilot reported that he was ejecting from his downed aircraft. His whereabouts is at present listed as unknown.

In view of the unprovoked and deliberate attacks in international waters on our naval vessels and bearing in mind that the best way to deter escalation is to be prepared for it, the President and his principal advisers concluded that additional precautionary measures were required in southeast Asia. Certain military deployments to the area are therefore now underway. These include:

- a. Transfer of an attack carrier group from the Pacific coast to the western Pacific;
- b. Movement of interceptor and fighter bomber aircraft into South Vietnam;
- c. Movement of fighter bomber aircraft into Thailand;
- d. Transfer of interceptor and fighter bomber squadrons from the United States to advance bases in the Pacific;
- e. Movement of an antisubmarine force into the South China Sea;
- f. The alerting and readying for movement of selected Army and Marine Forces.

In the meantime, U.S. destroyers, with protective air cover as needed, continue their patrol in the international waters of the Gulf of Tonkin.

The moves we have taken to reinforce our forces in the Pacific are in my judgment sufficient for the time being. Other reinforcing steps can be taken very rapidly if the situation requires.

This concludes my descriptions of the two deliberate and unprovoked North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. naval vessels on the high seas; of the United States reprisal against the offending boats, their bases and related facilities; and of the precautionary deployment and alerting steps we have taken to guard against any eventuality.

Secretary Rusk

I now turn to the specifics of the resolution before you.

The preamble, I believe, speaks for itself. It

spells out in the simplest and shortest terms possible the fact of North Vietnamese attacks, their relation to the overall campaign of aggression by North Vietnam, and the purposes and objectives of the United States in southeast Asia.

As to the operative sections of the resolution, section 1 declares the approval and support of the Congress for actions, in response to armed attack on United States forces, which the President has the authority and obligation to take in his capacity as Commander in Chief.

Turning next to section 2 of the draft resolution, let me make clear at the outset what the resolution does not embrace. It does not cover action to assist any nation not a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization or a protocol state. It does not cover any action in support of a nation unless such nation requests it. It does not cover any action to resist aggression that is not Communist in origin. The Southeast Asia Treaty includes a United States understanding that it is directed solely against "communist aggression."

The language, "to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force," is similar to the authority embraced in the Formosa resolution of 1955, the Middle East resolution of 1957, and the Cuba resolution of 1962. Copies of each of these have been made available to you for comparative purposes. The Formosa resolution authorized the President "to employ the Armed Forces of the United States." The Middle East resolution stated that the United States was "prepared to use armed forces." The nearest parallel to the language of the present resolution is in the first clause of the Cuba resolution, that the United States is "determined . . . to prevent by whatever means may be necessary, including the use of arms" Cuban subversive activities extending to any part of the hemisphere.

I shall not take your time this morning to review the constitutional aspects of resolutions of this character. I believe it to be the generally accepted constitutional view that the President has the constitutional authority to take at least limited armed action in defense of American national interests; in at least 85 instances, Presidents of the United States have

in fact taken such action. As I have said before, we cannot now be sure what actions may be required. The Formosa resolution of 1955 was followed by the use of United States warships to escort supply convoys to the offshore islands in 1958; the Middle East resolution was followed by President Eisenhower's sending of troops to Lebanon in 1958; the Cuba resolution was followed by the well-known events of October 1962. I do not suggest that any of these actions may serve as a parallel for what may be required in southeast Asia. There can be no doubt, however, that these previous resolutions form a solid legal precedent for the action now proposed. Such action is required to make the purposes of the United States clear and to protect our national interests.

TEXT OF JOINT RESOLUTION, AUGUST 7

JOINT RESOLUTION ¹⁷

To promote the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and

Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them in the collective defense of their freedom; and

Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political ambitions in that area, but desires only that these peoples should be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Congress approves and supports the determination of the President, as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to prevent further aggression.

SEC. 2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security in southeast Asia.

¹⁷ H.J. Res. 1145, adopted on Aug. 7 unanimously by the House of Representatives and by the Senate by a vote of 88 to 2.

Consonant with the Constitution of the United States and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.

SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent resolution of the Congress.

Secretary Rusk Discusses Asian Situation on NBC Program

Following is the transcript of an interview of Secretary Rusk by NBC correspondent Elie Abel, broadcast over nationwide television on August 5.

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, are we going to get through this situation without touching off a bigger war?

Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Abel, one can't be a reliable prophet when the other side helps to write the scenario. But I do want to insist upon one point, that the purpose of the United States in Southeast Asia for these past 10 years or more has been a part of a general policy of the United States since World War II, that is, to organize a decent world community in which nations will leave their neighbors alone and in which nations can have a chance to live at peace with each other and cooperate on a basis of their common interests.

Now, in Southeast Asia we have been saying over and over again, in conferences such as the Geneva conference of 1962 and elsewhere, that there is only one problem with peace in Southeast Asia and that is these pressures from the north, that if the north would leave their neighbors to the south alone, these peoples of that area could have their peace and could have a chance to work out their own lives in their own way. That is the problem, and to come to the decision to leave their neighbors alone is a necessary decision which Hanoi and anyone supporting Hanoi must reach.

Q. Why was it necessary, Mr. Secretary, for us to strike as swiftly and abruptly as we did without taking time even to notify our allies?

A. Well, in the first place, we had some ships in the Gulf of Tonkin who were under attack, and they were dodging torpedoes.¹ Here is a vast expanse of international waters in which we have a perfect right to be. We had to strike immediately because we didn't expect to ask those ships to run a continuing gauntlet of torpedoes on their way back to the Gulf of Tonkin when their mission was completed, nor were we prepared to have them denied international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin.

Further than that, if under these attacks there had not been an immediate and appropriate response, then Hanoi and those who might be standing behind Hanoi in this might well have come to a very formidable mistaken judgment about what is possible in the Southeast Asian situation.

Q. You mean their view that we are a paper tiger might have been confirmed?

A. That's correct. They could have made a basic miscalculation about what the commitment of the United States means in a situation of this sort.

Q. Mr. Secretary, were our destroyers operating in support of South Vietnamese units in these same waters? Could this have been the cause of the North Vietnamese decision to attack our destroyers?

A. Well, I saw a story to that effect from Hanoi, but Hanoi knows just as well as we do that our destroyers were not involved in any mission other than that that was publicly announced. They knew that they were well at sea, they knew that they were on normal patrol operations, they knew that they were not doing any firing at anybody. So that there is no misunderstanding on the part of Hanoi on this point.

Q. What explanation, then, can you come up with for this unprovoked attack?

A. Well, I haven't been able, quite frankly, to come to a fully satisfactory explanation. There

is a great gulf of understanding between that world and our world, ideological in character. They see what we think of as the real world in wholly different terms. Their very processes of logic are different. So that it's very difficult to enter into each other's minds across that great ideological gulf.

I can't come to a rational explanation of it. Perhaps they will offer one some day. But thus far we have to take it as we see it. And the essential fact was that our vessels were being attacked on the high seas by these boats and we had to do something about it.

Q. Do you see any danger, sir, that by this forceful action we may force the Communists, divided up to now, to pull themselves together?

A. I just can't say as to that. We do feel that in connection with Laos and the Laotian agreements of 1962 the Soviet Union and Poland have given better support to those agreements than have Peiping and Hanoi, although the general public line of all of the Communist countries on Viet-Nam has been pretty much the same. But how this will be affected by the unity or disunity of the Communist world, I just wouldn't be prepared to say.

Q. Do you have the feeling, sir, that the Communists—that is, the Soviet Communists—are trying to reduce their commitments in that part of the world, that they may have lost influence and leverage?

A. Well, as you recall, there was a note the other day² which indicated that, unless there was an immediate meeting of the 14-nation conference on Laos, the Soviets would reconsider their responsibility as co-chairman. That indicated that they might be considering withdrawing from some of their responsibility in that situation.

We impressed upon them the fact that they have a very strong commitment to that settlement. They have an obligation under those 1962 accords to serve as co-chairman and do their best to give full effect to those accords, and so we would expect and hope that they would not take that action.

But, again, when you talk about the internal

¹ For background, see p. 258.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1964, p. 218.

relationships within the Communist world, I think we on the outside have to be a little cautious about leaping to very far-reaching conclusions. We know that the dispute between Moscow and Peiping has been deep and bitter. But, on the other hand, this is all a part of the Communist world, and these two great systems always have the capability of changing directions on relatively short notice. So, again, I think prediction on this would be hazardous.

Q. Have you today or yesterday been in contact with the Soviet Union—that is, not you personally, but the United States Government?

A. I think as far as the last 2 days are concerned, our contact with them is in the Security Council of the United Nations.³ But we have been in contact with them repeatedly—I emphasize repeatedly—over the last months and years on the Southeast Asia situation and especially in connection with their responsibility as co-chairman of the Geneva Conference on Laos.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been some speculation that putting this issue into the U.N. may, after it has calmed down, lead to increased pressure for a 14-nation conference on Southeast Asia, the kind of conference we have been opposing. Do you see that danger?

A. Well, we haven't been opposing conferences in principle here. What we are trying to do is to make some headway on the real issues.

In the case of Cambodia we would like to see the United Nations establish some observers along the Cambodian-South Vietnamese frontier and get that border problem settled down.⁴ We think that would help both sides.

In the case of Laos, we have been trying to get some indication from the other side, through Prince Souvanna Phouma's preconditions—some indication that a conference could produce a constructive result. If you hold a conference of 14 nations and it simply breaks up after bitter debate and violent disagreement, that has not contributed anything to the situation. So we would like to see the processes of diplomacy work constructively in ways that

could produce some result that would be mutually beneficial.

Q. Mr. Secretary, how does this confrontation today differ from the Cuban missiles crisis of 1962?

A. Oh, I think this is a serious crisis that we are in. But the Cuban missile crisis was a direct involvement among the nuclear powers and had very, very far-reaching immediate dangers in it. The present situation arose out of the firing upon American destroyers by North Vietnamese torpedo boats. I think that the two situations are rather different in character.

Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. This is Elie Abel in the James Monroe Room at the State Department, Washington, D.C.

U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. Mark Signing of Nuclear Test Ban Treaty

Joint Statement

Press release 356 dated August 5

One year ago today the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water was signed by the representatives of the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R.¹ This treaty moved our planet toward a further strengthening of peace. It helps restrict the arms race. It gives all men and women confidence that they and their children will be breathing purer air and living in a healthier, a less contaminated world. The states taking part in the disarmament negotiations at Geneva made their contribution to this cause. The positive role played by the Secretary-General of the U.N., U Thant, in the conclusion of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the three elements is worthy of note. Since the signing of the treaty, most of the world's states—more than 100—have joined the three original signatories. Since then, also, additional—if limited—steps have been taken

³ See p. 272.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907; June 15, 1964, p. 937; and June 29, 1964, p. 1002.

¹ For a statement made by President Johnson on July 30, see BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1964, p. 228; for background and text of the treaty, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234.

to reduce nuclear hazards to mankind. Such are the resolution of the General Assembly of October 17, 1963, on banning of weapons of mass destruction in outer space and the steps taken by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the U.S.S.R. in the early months of this year to cut back production of plutonium and enriched uranium.

These have been significant and valuable steps, but only first steps. Serious problems and differences remain to be dealt with in order to achieve a downturn in the arms race, effective disarmament and secure peace. With a sincere concern for the true interests of all nations and through a constructive effort to achieve agreement consistent with those interests, we can seek to move along the road to understanding and to peace.

In marking the first anniversary of the signing of the treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, we declare our intention to do everything possible for the solution through negotiations of unresolved international problems in order to strengthen general peace, the benefits of which would be enjoyed by all states, big and small, and by all people.

U.S. Reaffirms Support of OAS Decisions on Cuba

Following is a Department statement read to news correspondents on August 4 by Department spokesman Robert J. McCloskey in response to a query concerning Mexico's announcement that it will continue relations with Cuba.

We consider that the Rio Treaty was correctly applied by the foreign ministers at their recent meeting.¹ The acts of the Cuban government were clearly designed to overthrow the freely elected government of Venezuela by subversion, force, and violence. These acts were declared by the foreign ministers to be acts of aggression within the meaning of article 6 of

¹ For text of a final act signed July 26 at the conclusion of the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of the OAS foreign ministers, held at Washington to consider Venezuelan charges of Cuban intervention and aggression, see BULLETIN of Aug. 10, 1964, p. 179.

the Rio Treaty. The juridical issues were fully discussed during the meeting and were resolved in the way which the treaty itself specifically provides for, namely, by a two-thirds majority vote, which by the terms of the treaty is binding on all members. We therefore see no need for review of the foreign ministers' decisions by any other international organization. The United States has faith in the efficacy of the inter-American system and is confident that in the future, as in the past, whatever differences may exist will be resolved in a manner consistent with the traditions of inter-American cooperation and solidarity.

Warsaw Uprising Day

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS August 1, 1964, marks the twentieth anniversary of the historic uprising of Polish patriots to liberate their capital, the City of Warsaw from the Nazi occupation; and

WHEREAS the bravery of the Polish people demonstrated their determination to achieve liberty and independence; and

WHEREAS the American people regard the action of the Polish patriots in the Warsaw uprising as a great manifestation of bravery and devotion to home and country; and


WHEREAS this historic effort should serve to inspire people everywhere to rededicate themselves to the cause of freedom and justice:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate August 1, 1964, as Warsaw Uprising Day.

I invite the people of the United States to observe this day with appropriate ceremonies and activities, and I urge them to mark this event as an exceptional demonstration of man's courage and devotion in the long and continuing struggle for human freedom.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this thirty-first day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3603; 29 Fed. Reg. 11255.

Security Council Hears U.S. Charge of North Vietnamese Attacks

*Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council*¹

I have asked for this urgent meeting to bring to the attention of the Security Council acts of deliberate aggression by the Hanoi regime against naval units of the United States.

Naval vessels of my Government, on routine operations in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, have been subjected to deliberate and repeated armed attacks. We therefore have found it necessary to take defensive measures.

The major facts about these incidents were announced last night by the President of the United States² and communicated to other governments at the same time I was instructed to request this meeting. I shall recount these facts for you, Mr. President, in chronological order so that all the members may have all the information available to my Government.

At 8:08 a.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 2, 1964, the United States destroyer *Maddox* was on routine patrol in international waters in the Gulf of Tonkin, proceeding in a southeasterly direction away from the coast about 30 miles at sea from the mainland of North Viet-Nam. The *Maddox* was approached by three high-speed North Vietnamese torpedo boats in attack formation. When it was evident that these torpedo boats intended to take offensive action, the *Maddox*, in accordance with naval practice, fired three warning shots across the bows of the approaching vessels. At approximately the same time, the aircraft carrier *Ticonderoga*, which was also in international waters and had been alerted to the impending attack, sent out four aircraft to provide cover for the *Maddox*, the pilots being under orders

not to fire unless they or the *Maddox* were fired upon first.

Two of the attacking craft fired torpedoes, which the *Maddox* evaded by changing course. All three attacking vessels directed machinegun fire at the *Maddox*. One of the attacking vessels approached for close attack and was struck by fire from the *Maddox*. After the attack was broken off, the *Maddox* continued on a southerly course in international waters.

Now, Mr. President, clearly this was a deliberate armed attack against a naval unit of the United States Government on patrol in the high seas—almost 30 miles off the mainland. Nevertheless, my Government did its utmost to minimize the explosive potential of this flagrant attack in the hopes that this might be an isolated or uncalculated action. There was local defensive fire. The United States was not drawn into hasty response.

On August 3 the United States took steps to convey to the Hanoi regime a note³ calling attention to this aggression, stating that United States ships would continue to operate freely on the high seas in accordance with the rights guaranteed by international law, and warning the authorities in Hanoi of the "grave consequences which would inevitably result from any further unprovoked offensive military action against United States forces." This notification was in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva accords.

Our hopes that this was an isolated incident did not last long. At 2:35 p.m. Greenwich meridian time, August 4, when it was nighttime in the Gulf of Tonkin, the destroyers *Maddox* and *C. Turner Joy* were again subjected to an armed attack by an undetermined number of motor torpedo boats of the North Vietnamese navy. This time the American vessels were 65 miles from shore, twice as far out on the high seas as on the occasion of the previous attack.

¹ Made in the U.N. Security Council on Aug. 5 (U.S./U.N. press release 4424).

² See p. 259.

³ For text, see p. 258.

This time numerous torpedoes were fired. That attack lasted for over 2 hours.

There no longer could be any shadow of doubt that this was a planned, deliberate military aggression against vessels lawfully present in international waters. One could only conclude that this was the work of authorities dedicated to the use of force to achieve their objectives, regardless of the consequences.

My Government therefore determined to take positive but limited and relevant measures to secure its naval units against further aggression. Last night aerial strikes were thus carried out against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities. This action was limited in scale, its only targets being the weapons and facilities against which we had been forced to defend ourselves. Our fervent hope is that the point has now been made that acts of armed aggression are not to be tolerated in the Gulf of Tonkin any more than they are to be tolerated anywhere else.

I want to emphasize that the action we have taken is a limited and measured response, fitted precisely to the attack that produced it, and that the deployments of additional U.S. forces to Southeast Asia are designed solely to deter further aggression. This is a single action designed to make unmistakably clear that the United States cannot be diverted by military attack from its obligations to help its friends establish and protect their independence. Our naval units are continuing their routine patrolling on the high seas with orders to protect themselves with all appropriate means against any further aggression. As President Johnson said last night, "We still seek no wider war."

Mr. President, let me repeat that the United States vessels were in international waters when they were attacked.

Let me repeat that freedom of the seas is guaranteed under long-accepted international law applying to all nations alike.

Let me repeat that these vessels took no beligerent actions of any kind until they were subjected to armed attack.

And let me say once more that the action they took in self-defense is the right of all nations and is fully within the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.

The acts of aggression by the North Vietnamese in the Gulf of Tonkin make no sense whatsoever standing alone. They defy rational explanation except as part of a larger pattern with a larger purpose. As isolated events, the kidnaping of village officials in the Republic of South Viet-Nam makes no sense either. Neither does the burning of a schoolhouse—or the sabotage of an irrigation project—or the murder of a medical worker—or the random bomb thrown into a crowd of innocent people sitting in a cafe.

All these wanton acts of violence and destruction fit into the larger pattern of what has been going on in Southeast Asia for the past decade and a half. So does the arming of terrorist gangs in South Viet-Nam by the regimes in Hanoi and Peiping. So does the infiltration of armed personnel to make war against the legitimate government of that nation. So does the fighting in Laos—and all the acts of subversion—and all the propaganda—and the sabotage of the international machinery established to keep the peace by the Geneva agreements—and the deliberate, systematic, and flagrant violations of those agreements by two regimes which signed them and which by all tenets of decency, law, and civilized practice are bound by their provisions.

The attempt to sink United States destroyers in international waters is much more spectacular than the attempt to murder the mayor of a village in his bed at night. But they are both part of the pattern, and the pattern is designed to subjugate the people of Southeast Asia to an empire ruled by means of force of arms, of rule by terror, of expansion by violence.

Mr. President, it is only in this larger view that we can discuss intelligently the matter that we have brought to this Council.

In his statement last night, President Johnson concluded by emphasizing that the mission of the United States is peace. Under the explicit instructions of President Johnson, I want to repeat that assurance in the Security Council this afternoon: Our mission is peace.

We hoped that the peace settlement in 1954 would lead to peace in Viet-Nam. We hoped that that settlement, and the supplementary Geneva accords of 1962, would lead to peace in Laos. Communist governments have tried ag-

gression before—and have failed. Each time the lesson has had to be learned anew.

We are dealing here with a regime that has not yet learned the lesson that aggression does not pay, cannot be sustained, and will always be thrown back by people who believe, as we do, that people want freedom and independence, not subjection and the role of satellite in a modern empire.

In Southeast Asia we want nothing more, and nothing less, than the assured and guaranteed independence of the peoples of the area. We are in Southeast Asia to help our friends preserve their own opportunity to be free of imported terror, alien assassination, managed by the North Viet-Nam Communists based in Hanoi and backed by the Chinese Communists from Peiping.

Two months ago, when we were discussing in this Council the problems created on the Cambodia-South Viet-Nam frontier by the Communist Viet Cong, I defined our peace aims in Southeast Asia.⁴ I repeat them today:

There is a very easy way to restore order in Southeast Asia. There is a very simple, safe way to bring about the end of United States military aid to the Republic of Viet-Nam.

Let all foreign troops withdraw from Laos. Let all states in that area make and abide by the simple decision to leave their neighbors alone. Stop the secret subversion of other people's independence. Stop the clandestine and illegal transit of national frontiers. Stop the export of revolution and the doctrine of violence. Stop the violations of the political agreements reached at Geneva for the future of Southeast Asia.

The people of Laos want to be left alone.

The people of Viet-Nam want to be left alone.

The people of Cambodia want to be left alone.

When their neighbors decide to leave them alone—as they must—there will be no fighting in Southeast Asia and no need for American advisers to leave their homes to help these people resist aggression. Any time that decision can be put in enforceable terms, my Government will be only too happy to put down the burden that we have been sharing with those determined to preserve their independence. Until such assurances are forthcoming, we shall stand for the independence of free peoples in Southeast Asia as we have elsewhere.

That is what I said to this Council in May.

⁴ BULLETIN of June 8, 1964, p. 907.

That is what I repeat to this Council in August.

When the political settlements freely negotiated at the conference tables in Geneva are enforced, the independence of Southeast Asia will be guaranteed. When the peace agreements reached long ago are made effective, peace will return to Southeast Asia and military power can be withdrawn.

U.S. Replies to Cambodian Charge on Chemical Operations

Following is the text of a letter transmitted on August 3 to Ambassador Sivert A. Nielsen, President of the U.N. Security Council, from Ambassador Charles W. Yost, Deputy U.S. Representative.

U.S./U.N. press release 4423

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: In the absence of Ambassador Stevenson, I have the honor to refer to a cable to the President of the United Nations Security Council dated July 28, 1964 from the Cambodian Foreign Minister (S/5839) which accuses the United States Government and the Government of Vietnam of responsibility for spreading poisonous chemicals by aircraft on the Cambodian province of Ratanakiri, reportedly resulting in the loss of life.

A careful investigation has been conducted, and it has been determined that no Republic of Vietnam nor American aircraft have conducted chemical operations of any character whatever either adjacent to the Cambodian territory indicated, much less over Cambodian territory, on any of the dates or at any time in the period cited by the Royal Government of Cambodia.

Furthermore, the sole chemical operations conducted within South Vietnam by the Government of Vietnam employ weed-killing chemicals of types used throughout the world, and extensively within the United States itself. These are spread in liquid form, leave no powder residue, and are harmless to human beings.

The United States Government, for its part, would welcome an impartial investigation of the Cambodian charge. The United States Government regrets that the Royal Cambodian

Government has chosen to make these unfounded charges at a time when the Security Council is seeking practical solutions to problems created for Cambodia and the Republic of Vietnam by the presence of Communist Viet Cong military forces in the border area.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

CHARLES W. YOST

New NATO Secretary General Assured of U.S. Support

Following are texts of letters from President Johnson and Secretary Rusk to Manlio Brosio, who became the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization on August 1.

LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated August 1

AUGUST 1, 1964

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: I extend my warm congratulations on the occasion of your assumption of duties as Secretary General of NATO. I have long admired the dedication and wisdom of your predecessors and am confident that with your appointment, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is assured of continued wise and imaginative leadership.

Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed some 15 years ago, NATO not only has proved to be a defensive military Alliance sufficiently strong to deter aggression but it has also provided a most effective forum for political discussion and consultation between the member governments. Indeed it has encouraged all of us to think in terms of mutual assistance and interdependence. And I assure you that in your efforts to strengthen the Alliance you will always be able to depend upon the fullest support and cooperation by the United States.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

LETTER FROM SECRETARY RUSK

Press release 352 dated August 1

AUGUST 1, 1964

DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: As you assume your new duties at the helm of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, I would like to extend to you my warmest congratulations and best wishes. In carrying out your task, I can assure you that you can count on the unswerving support of the United States.

You come to your position after a distinguished career in the political life and diplomatic service of your country. I am greatly pleased that we can count on your many personal and professional qualities in the important office you have now assumed.

I am looking forward to renewing our acquaintance and hope that you will find it possible to visit Washington very soon.

With best regards,

DEAN RUSK

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Letter dated July 13 from the permanent representative of South Africa addressed to the Secretary-General regarding Security Council Resolution S/5761 of June 9, 1964, and transmitting "the full text of (a) the judgement given by Judge-President de Wet in the Supreme Court of South Africa (Transvaal Provincial Division) in the matter of the State against Nelson Mandela and others, and (b) the Judge's remarks in passing sentence." S/5817. July 14, 1964. 76 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Dissemination of Information on the United Nations and the International Trusteeship System in Trust Territories. Report of the Secretary-General. T/1623. May 14, 1964. 8 pp.

Offers by Member States of Study and Training Facilities for Inhabitants of Trust Territories. T/1622. May 15, 1964. 6 pp.

Report of the United Nations Visiting Mission to the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 1964. T/1620. May 18, 1964. 205 pp.

Department Urges Congress To Revise Immigration Laws

Statement by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a distinct privilege for me to appear before you today to discuss the administration's proposals in S. 1932 for a revision of our basic immigration laws.

I shall limit my comments this morning to those objectives of the administration proposals which bear on foreign policy and in which my Department, therefore, is deeply interested. I understand that the Attorney General and the Secretary of Labor will discuss internal or national aspects of the proposals. My colleague, Mr. Abba P. Schwartz, Administrator of the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, is available at the committee's convenience to discuss the refugee and other aspects of the administration's proposal which I may not cover this morning.

There are three areas which are of particular concern to us. The first is the way in which the present law prescribes the selection of immigrants who are subject to quota restrictions. The second is the differential treatment to which we subject persons of Asian ancestry under our immigration laws; and third is the quota status accorded to immigrants of newly independent former colonial areas in the Western Hemisphere.

I should like to address myself first to the formula by which we select quota immigrants. When Congress in 1924 devised this method, usually referred to as the national-origins system, its primary objective was to maintain the ethnic balance among the American population as it existed in 1920.

¹ Made before the Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary on July 31 (press release 351); for a statement made by Secretary Rusk on July 2 before a subcommittee of the House Committee on the Judiciary, see BULLETIN of July 20, 1964, p. 98.

This system preserves preferences based on race and place of birth in the admission of quota immigrants to the United States. This results in discrimination in our hospitality to different nationalities in a world situation which is quite different from that which existed at the time the national-origins system was originally adopted.

Since the end of World War II, the United States has been placed in a critical role of leadership in a troubled and changing world. We are concerned to see that our immigration laws reflect our real character and objectives.

Reaction to National-Origins Principle

What other peoples think about us plays an important role in the achievement of our foreign policies. We in the United States have learned to judge our fellow Americans on the basis of their ability, industry, intelligence, integrity, and all the other factors which truly determine a man's value to society. We do not reflect this judgment of our fellow citizens when we hold to immigration laws which classify men according to national and geographical origin. It is not difficult, therefore, to understand the reaction to this policy of a man from a geographical area, or of a national origin, which is not favored by our present quota laws. Irrespective of whether the man desires to come to the United States or not, he gets the impression that our standards of judgment are not based on the merits of the individual—as we proclaim—but rather on an assumption which can be interpreted as bias and prejudice.

This basic rule embodying the national-origins system was not intended to be the exclusive principle governing American immigration policy. From the very beginning Congress gave equal weight to our good-neighbor policy when it exempted from quota restrictions natives of our sister Republics in the Western Hemisphere. Similarly, the Congress recognized the importance of uniting separated families by permit-

ting wives and children of United States citizens to join their husbands and fathers outside of any quota restrictions. As the years progressed, the Congress has permitted more and more classes of immigrants to come to the United States irrespective of their national origin. In passing the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, the Refugee Relief Act in 1953, and the "Fair Share" Refugee-Escapee Act in 1960, the Congress has made major contributions to the solution of the refugee problem. The main objective of these acts was to permit refugees to come to the United States expeditiously, without subjecting them to delays as a result of quota restrictions. During the last 7 years the Congress, in five bills, has taken additional steps to ease existing quota restrictions by admitting as nonquota immigrants those quota immigrants who had been waiting for visas for a considerable period of time. As a result of this liberalizing policy of the Congress only 34 percent of the 2,599,349 immigrants who came to the United States from 1953 through 1962 were quota immigrants.

The action we urge upon you, Mr. Chairman, is, therefore, not to make a drastic departure from a long-established immigration policy but rather to reconcile our immigration policy as it has developed in recent years with the letter of the general law. The image held by many here and abroad of our immigration policy is one of discrimination which selects prospective immigrants based strictly on their national origin. This is understandable, since 70 percent of the total authorized annual immigration of approximately 156,000 is allocated to three countries, Great Britain, Ireland, and Germany, and only 30 percent is available for over 100 other countries and areas. A careful examination of our actual immigration policy over the last 10 years reveals that this is not an accurate picture.

The fact that we are a country of many races and national origins, that those who built this country and developed it made decisions about opening our doors to the rest of the world, that anything which makes it appear that we ourselves are discriminating in principle against particular national origins, suggests that we think less well of our citizens of those national

origins than of other citizens and that we are somehow fearful or timid about receiving other such citizens from certain parts of the world.

The national-origins principle, rather than the facts of our actual immigration, is picked up by people unfriendly to the United States and made an issue in their countries. This causes political disturbances in the good relations which we would hope to establish.

I therefore urge the committee to reflect in the letter of the law the policy adopted by the Congress during the last decade and to eliminate, with the safeguards proposed by the administration bill, the national-origins system which has created an unwholesome atmosphere in our foreign relations.

The Administration's Proposal

The administration's proposal eliminates the national-origins system on a gradual basis by reducing all quotas by 20 percent each year for 5 years. The present total authorized annual quota admissions of approximately 156,000 would be maintained, except initially all minimum quotas and subquotas would be increased from 100 to 200. These minimum quotas would have the 20-percent reduction each year applied to them.

A quota reserve pool is established by section 2 of the bill before the committee, under which all numbers would be allocated by the fifth year. In each of the 5 years constituting the period of transition, the pool would consist of (1) the numbers released from national-origin quotas each year, under the 20-percent progressive reduction plan and (2) numbers assigned to the old quotas but unused the previous year because insufficient demand for them existed in the assigned quota area.

Experience has shown that we have approximately 50,000 visa numbers annually which are unused and are not available for reallocation to other quota areas. These unused numbers are chiefly from the United Kingdom and Irish quotas.

In the fifth year all quota allocations would be made from the quota reserve pool, which would then become a worldwide quota. So that no one country could enjoy a disproportionate amount of numbers from the pool based on

registrations of relatively long standing, the bill provides that no one of the highly over-subscribed quota areas would receive more than 10 percent of the total authorized quota numbers.

A strict "first-come, first-served basis" of allocating visa quotas would create some problems in certain countries of Northern and Western Europe, which under the national-origins system enjoyed a situation where quota numbers were readily available to visa applicants. To apply the new principle rigidly would result, after a few years, in eliminating immigration from these countries almost entirely. Such a result would be undesirable, not only because it frustrates the aim of the bill that immigration from all countries should continue but also because many of the countries so affected are among our closest allies. At a time when our national security rests in large part on a continual strengthening of our ties with these countries, it would be anomalous indeed to restrict opportunities for their nationals here. Therefore the bill allows the President to reserve a portion of the pool for allocation to qualified immigrants who could obtain visas under the present system but not under the terms of the bill before the committee, and whose admission would further the national security interests in maintaining close ties with their countries. The bill before you proposes that 50 percent of the pool be available for this purpose. However, since the introduction of the bill, we have determined, in consultation with the Attorney General, that 30 percent of the pool would suffice to meet our objective. This is indicated in a projection of estimated admissions for the first 5 years under the bill and in the computation of the estimated percentage of the reserve which will be utilized annually during the first 5 years. I am pleased to offer these charts² for the record.

Immigration Policy Toward Asians

The second issue to which I would like to address myself is our immigration policy toward Asian persons. We urge the Congress to bring to a final conclusion a development which began

more than 20 years ago; we do not ask for a drastic departure from existing policy. As you well know, Mr. Chairman, the Congress eliminated the Chinese Exclusion Laws in 1943 at the request of President Roosevelt. At that time it established a quota which permitted Chinese persons to immigrate to this country. Progressively liberal amendments have followed this well-considered beginning of a revision of our exclusion policy as far as Asian persons are concerned. Race as a bar to naturalization and thereby to immigration was eliminated with the passage of the Immigration and Nationality Act in 1952. That act placed Asian spouses and children of American citizens on equal footing with all other immigrants of non-Asian ancestry by giving them the privilege of nonquota status. The establishment of an upper limit of 2,000 for the so-called minimum quotas in the Asian area, and the rule that the quota of an Asian person born outside Asia be governed by ancestry, remained the only discriminatory provisions in the 1952 act as far as Asian persons are concerned. The 2,000 limit on the number of Asian immigrants from any nonquota area was removed by Congress in 1961. Therefore, only one discriminatory provision remains in the law as far as Asian persons are concerned. This provision requires that an Asian person be charged to an Asian quota even if he was born outside Asia, whether in a quota or nonquota area.

For all practical purposes, Congress has already significantly tempered this provision during the last 10 years by passing the special legislation to which I referred earlier. This observation is best documented by the volume and composition of immigration from the major countries in the Far East. 119,677 immigrants came to the United States from China, Japan, and the Philippines from 1953 to 1963. More than 90 percent of these immigrants, 109,654, were nonquota immigrants. Those who read our immigration laws and see that China has access to 205 quota numbers annually, while Japan has a quota of 185 and the Philippines a quota of 100, are unaware of the actual number of immigrants from these countries. Against the background of the volume of Asian immigration into the United States between 1953

² Not printed here.

and 1963, any increase in the volume of immigration resulting from the proposed amendments would be limited. We deprive ourselves of a powerful weapon in our fight against misinformation if we do not reconcile here too the letter of the law with the facts of immigration and thus erase the unfavorable impression which unjustifiably has become attached to our immigration policy toward Asian persons.

It is of great importance to us from a foreign policy point of view that this last vestige of discrimination against Asian persons be eliminated from our immigration laws. This action would bring to a logical conclusion the progressive policy the Congress has followed since 1943.

Jamaica and Trinidad

Two aspects of our present immigration laws are a source of misunderstanding and friction in the hemisphere.

A major problem arises from the fact that the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 exempts from quota limitations only those persons born in Western Hemisphere countries that were independent at the time the law was enacted. This means that Jamaica and Trinidad—which achieved their independence after the date of the act—are each subjected to restrictions of 100 quota visas annually, while their hemisphere neighbors are not. An additional irritant for these two countries is the fact that the language of the present law would grant nonquota status automatically to dependencies on the mainland if they become independent.

The governments and people of Jamaica and Trinidad have made strong representations asking to be placed on an equal footing with the other American states.

It has long been the policy of the Congress to recognize the unique status of our independent hemisphere neighbors by according them nonquota immigration status. Jamaica and Trinidad are among the friendliest of these neighbors. I urge the committee to remove the accidental discrimination against them by granting nonquota status. The administration's proposal would also accord nonquota status to any dependencies that achieve inde-

pendence in the future, making it clear to all concerned that there are no second-class countries in the hemisphere family.

The differential treatment accorded Jamaica and Trinidad in the matter of nonquota status is compounded by the so-called Asia-Pacific Triangle provisions of existing law, which require that persons of Asian ancestry be charged to the quota of their ethnic origin rather than their place of birth. This provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act affects most countries in the hemisphere, since in many of them some segment of the population is of Asian ethnic origin.

The question has special importance for Jamaica and Trinidad (roughly 40 percent of the Trinidad population is of Asian ancestry), since the law not only discriminates against these two countries on the basis of nationality by withholding nonquota status, but, in addition, establishes differential treatment for large segments of their populations on the basis of Asian ancestry—even though the persons affected are often generations removed from Asia. Nonquota status for Jamaica and Trinidad would have no significance for these persons unless the Asia-Pacific Triangle provisions of the law are repealed. I respectfully urge that such action be taken to remove this last vestige of discrimination—the final step required to place all immigrants from our sister American states on an equal footing.

I realize you may be concerned about the effect of granting nonquota status to these countries on the flow of immigration to the United States. No doubt this flow will increase slightly as a result of this action, since the United States has always had an attraction for those seeking economic opportunity and political freedom. I do not believe, however, that this increase will be dramatic or injurious to our national interest. We do not ask that the qualitative requirements be lifted or modified for these immigrants. They, as all others, will have to satisfy the public-charge provisions of the law. They will have to pass the health, educational, and security tests prescribed by existing law. Furthermore, the Secretary of Labor always has the authority to close the door to immigrants whose admission would adversely

affect the working conditions of American labor or who would take positions for which American labor is available.

Economic Aspects of Proposed Legislation

Without going into details of the economic aspects of the administration's proposal, on which Secretary [of Labor W. Willard] Wirtz will expand when he testifies before this committee, I would like to make a few general observations.

When Congress developed the national-origins system in 1924, it appears that it may have been fearful that our country would be swamped with vast numbers of untrained and impoverished people. Present-day immigration is very different in volume and makeup from the older migration on which most of our thinking is still based; and its significance for this country is considerably different. Immigration now comes in limited volume and includes a relatively high proportion of older people, females, and persons of high skill and training.

The significance of immigration for the United States now depends less on the number than on the quality of the immigrants.

The explanation for the high professional and technical quality of present immigration lies in part in the nonquota and preference provisions of our immigration laws that favor the admission of highly qualified migrants. But still more it depends on world conditions of postwar economic and social dislocations, discriminations, and insecurities in various parts of the world that have disturbed social and occupational strata not normally disposed to emigrate and have attracted them to the greater political freedom and economic opportunity offered in the United States. Under present circumstances the United States has a rare opportunity to draw migrants of high intelligence and ability from abroad; and immigration, if well administered, can be one of our greatest national resources, a source of manpower and brain power in a divided world.

Mr. Chairman, I urge you and members of this committee to give most careful consideration to the President's proposals embodied in S. 1932. The adoption of these proposals

would substantially assist in the conduct of our foreign relations because their impact is much wider than just on our immigration situation. History has made of this country a people drawn from many races, religions, and national origins.

The central issue of our time is between freedom and coercion—between free societies and a world of free nations, on the one hand, and a world in which the human race is regimented under Communist rule. As the great leader of the cause of freedom, we are expected to exemplify all that freedom means. We have proclaimed, again and again, from the Declaration of Independence until the present day, that freedom is the right of all men. The rest of the world watches us closely to see whether or not we live up to the great principles we have proclaimed and promoted. Our blemishes delight our enemies and dismay our friends. In recent legislation, the Congress has reaffirmed our basic commitment to ourselves: that all our citizens are equally entitled to their rights as citizens and human beings.

I believe that the amendments to our immigration laws proposed by the administration would materially strengthen our position in the world struggle in which we are engaged. And if we remain alert and energetic and resolute and true to the ideas and ideals which gave birth to our nation and which have now seized the minds of men everywhere, including millions behind the Iron and Bamboo Curtains, I have no doubt as to how the contest between freedom and coercion will be resolved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Report of National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a special report on U.S. participation in the resources of the Fund for Special Operations of the Inter-American Development Bank. H. Doc. 316. July 2, 1964. 54 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1964. Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on H.R. 11380, together with individual views. S. Rept. 1188, Part 1. July 10, 1964. 44 pp.

International Conference Concludes Agreements Establishing Interim Arrangements for Global Communications Satellite System

An International Conference To Establish Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System was held at Washington, D.C., July 21-24.¹ Following is the text of a communique issued at the close of the conference on July 24, together with the texts of two interrelated agreements initialed at the conference.

COMMUNIQUE

The international conference on Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System has successfully concluded the negotiation of two inter-related agreements for establishment of the system.

Representatives of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Vatican City State initialed the agreements ad referendum to their governments or designated authority.

The first agreement is intergovernmental in character and contains the organizational principles established for the international system. This agreement creates an international Interim Communications Satellite Committee with over-all responsibility for the space segment of the system.

The other agreement, which deals with the commercial, financial, and technical operations of the system, will be entered into by the govern-

ments or the designated communications entities of each country.

The Communications Satellite Corporation, the designated entity of the United States, will serve as manager of the global system on behalf of all participants in the international joint venture.

The agreements will be open for signature on August 19, 1964, for six months, without discrimination, to any country which is a member of the International Telecommunication Union.

The meeting began on July 21. It was the culmination of a number of conferences and talks during the past year with regard to the formation of the global commercial communications satellite system.

G. Griffith Johnson, United States Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, was elected and served as Chairman of the Conference. Ambassador Egidio Ortona, Director General for Economic Affairs of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Chairman of the European Conference on Satellite Communications, was elected and served as Vice Chairman.

To permit the simultaneous distribution of texts in the countries of the various participants, the full agreements will be made available on Tuesday July 28 at 6:00 p.m. EST.

TEXTS OF AGREEMENTS

Following are the texts of two interrelated agreements establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system, which were released by the De-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 167.

AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS FOR A GLOBAL COMMERCIAL COMMUNICATIONS SATELLITE SYSTEM

The Governments signatory to this Agreement,

Recalling the principle set forth in Resolution No. 1721 (XVI)² of the General Assembly of the United Nations that communications by means of satellites should be available to the nations of the world as soon as practicable on a global and non-discriminatory basis;

Desiring to establish a single global commercial communications satellite system as part of an improved global communications network which will provide expanded telecommunications services to all areas of the world and which will contribute to world peace and understanding;

Determined, to this end, to provide, through the most advanced technology available, for the benefit of all nations of the world, the most efficient and economical service possible consistent with the best and most equitable use of the radio spectrum;

Believing that satellite communications should be organized in such a way as to permit all States to have access to the global system and those States so wishing to invest in the system with consequent participation in the design, development, construction (including the provision of equipment), establishment, maintenance, operation and ownership of the system;

Believing that it is desirable to conclude interim arrangements providing for the establishment of a single global commercial communications satellite system at the earliest practicable date, pending the working out of definitive arrangements for the organization of such a system;

Agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

(a) The Parties to this Agreement shall co-operate to provide, in accordance with the principles set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement, for the design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance and operation of the space segment of the global commercial communications satellite system, to include

- (i) an experimental and operational phase in which it is proposed to use one or more satellites to be placed in synchronous orbit in 1965;
- (ii) succeeding phases employing satellites, of types to be determined, with the objective of achieving basic global coverage in the latter part of 1967; and
- (iii) such improvements and extensions thereof as the Committee established by Article IV of this Agreement may decide subject to the provisions of Article VI of this Agreement.

(b) In this Agreement,

- (i) the term "space segment" comprises the communications satellites and the tracking, control, command and related facilities and equipment required to support the operation of the communications satellites;
- (ii) the terms "design" and "development" include research.

ARTICLE II

(a) Each Party either shall sign or shall designate a communications entity, public or private, to sign the Special Agreement which is to be concluded further to this Agreement and which is to be opened for signature at the same time as this Agreement. Relations between any such designated entity and the Party which has designated it shall be governed by the applicable domestic law.

(b) The Parties to this Agreement contemplate that administrations and communications carriers will, subject to the requirements of their applicable domestic law, negotiate and enter directly into such traffic agreements as may be appropriate with respect to their use of channels of communication provided by the system to be established under this Agreement, services to be furnished to the public, facilities, divisions of revenues and related business arrangements.

ARTICLE III

The space segment shall be owned in undivided shares by the signatories to the Special Agreement in proportion to their respective contributions to the costs of the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment.

ARTICLE IV

(a) An Interim Communications Satellite Committee, hereinafter referred to as "the Committee", is hereby established to give effect to the co-operation provided for by Article I of this Agreement. The Committee shall have responsibility for the design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance and operation of the space segment of the system and, in particular, shall exercise the functions and have the powers set forth in this Agreement and in the Special Agreement.

(b) The Committee shall be composed as follows: one representative from each of the signatories to the Special Agreement whose quota is not less than 1.5%, and one representative from any two or more signatories to the Special Agreement whose combined quotas total not less than 1.5% and which have agreed to be so represented.

(c) In the performance of its financial functions under this Agreement and under the Special Agreement the Committee shall be assisted by an advisory sub-committee on finance. This sub-committee shall be established by the Committee as soon as the Committee becomes operative.

(d) The Committee may establish such other advisory sub-committees as it thinks fit.

(e) No signatory or group of signatories to the Special Agreement shall be deprived of representation

² For text, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

on the Committee because of any reduction pursuant to Article XII(c) of this Agreement.

(f) In this Agreement, the term "quota", in relation to a signatory to the Special Agreement, means the percentage set forth opposite its name in the Annex to the Special Agreement as modified pursuant to this Agreement and the Special Agreement.

ARTICLE V

(a) Each signatory to the Special Agreement, or group of signatories to the Special Agreement, represented on the Committee shall have a number of votes equal to its quota, or to their combined quotas, as the case may be.

(b) A quorum for any meeting of the Committee shall consist of representatives having, in total, a number of votes exceeding the vote of the representative with the largest vote by not less than 8.5.

(c) The Committee shall endeavor to act unanimously; however, if it fails to reach agreement it shall take decisions by a majority of the votes cast, except that, with respect to the following matters, and subject to paragraphs (d) and (e) of this Article, any decision must have the concurrence of representatives whose total votes exceed the vote of the representative with the largest vote by not less than 12.5:

- (i) choice of type or types of space segment to be established;
- (ii) establishment of general standards for approval of earth stations for access to the space segment;
- (iii) approval of budgets by major categories;
- (iv) adjustment of accounts pursuant to Article 4 (c) of the Special Agreement;
- (v) establishment of the rate of charge per unit of satellite utilization pursuant to Article 9(a) of the Special Agreement;
- (vi) decisions on additional contributions pursuant to Article VI(b) of this Agreement;
- (vii) approval of the placing of contracts pursuant to Article 10(c) of the Special Agreement;
- (viii) approval of matters relating to satellite launchings pursuant to Article 10(d) of the Special Agreement;
- (ix) approval of quotas pursuant to Article XII(a) (ii) of this Agreement;
- (x) determination of financial conditions of accession pursuant to Article XII(b) of this Agreement;
- (xi) decisions relating to withdrawal pursuant to Article XI (a) and (b) of this Agreement and Article 4(d) of the Special Agreement;
- (xii) recommendation of amendments pursuant to Article 15 of the Special Agreement;
- (xiii) adoption of the rules of procedure of the Committee and the advisory sub-committees;
- (xiv) approval of appropriate compensation to the Corporation for its performance of services as manager pursuant to Articles 5(c) and 9(b) of the Special Agreement.

(d) If the Committee, upon the expiration of sixty days following the date when such matter has been proposed for decision, shall not have taken a decision pursuant to paragraph (c)(i) of this Article on the type of space segment to be established to achieve the objective stated in paragraph (a)(ii) of Article I of this Agreement, a decision on such matter may thereafter be taken by the concurring votes of representatives whose total votes exceed the vote of the representative with the largest vote by not less than 8.5.

(e) If the Committee, upon the expiration of sixty days following the date when such matter has been proposed for decision, shall not have approved

- (i) any particular budget category pursuant to paragraph (c)(iii) of this Article
- (ii) the placing of any particular contract pursuant to paragraph (c)(vii) of this Article or
- (iii) any particular matter relating to satellite launchings, pursuant to paragraph (c)(viii) of this Article

relating to achievement of the objectives stated in paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of Article I of this Agreement, a decision on such matter may thereafter be taken by the concurring votes of representatives whose total votes exceed the vote of the representative with the largest vote by not less than 8.5.

ARTICLE VI

(a) The contributions of the signatories to the Special Agreement towards the costs of the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment during the interim arrangements shall be based upon an estimate of U.S. \$200,000,000 for such costs. Each signatory to the Special Agreement shall pay its quota of such costs in accordance with the provisions of the Special Agreement.

(b) The Committee shall determine whether contributions are required during the interim arrangements in excess of the U.S. \$200,000,000 estimate and, if so, in what amounts. If the additional contributions required during the interim arrangements would result in total contributions exceeding U.S. \$300,000,000, a special conference of the signatories to the Special Agreement shall be convened to consider the matter and recommend appropriate action before decisions are taken by the Committee. The conference shall determine its own procedure.

(c) Each signatory to the Special Agreement may assume the obligation to pay all or part of its quota of any such additional contributions, but no signatory to the Special Agreement shall be required to do so. To the extent that such obligation is not assumed by any signatory to the Special Agreement, it may be assumed by the remaining signatories to the Special Agreement in the proportion that their respective quotas bear to each other or as they may otherwise agree. However, if a signatory to the Special Agreement, which is a member of a group of signatories formed in order to appoint jointly a representative on

the Committee pursuant to Article IV (b) of this Agreement, does not assume the obligation to pay such additional contributions, the remaining signatories of that group may assume that obligation in whole or in part to the extent that these remaining signatories may agree. The quotas of the signatories to the Special Agreement shall be adjusted accordingly.

ARTICLE VII

In order to ensure the most effective utilization of the space segment in accordance with the principles set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement, no earth station shall be permitted to utilize the space segment unless it has been approved by the Committee pursuant to Article 7 of the Special Agreement.

ARTICLE VIII

The Communications Satellite Corporation, incorporated under the laws of the District of Columbia (herein referred to as the Corporation) shall, pursuant to general policies of the Committee and in accordance with specific determinations which may be made by the Committee, act as the manager in the design, development, construction, establishment, operation and maintenance of the space segment.

ARTICLE IX

(a) Having regard to the program outlined in Article I of this Agreement, within one year after the initial global system becomes operational and in any case not later than 1st January 1969, the Committee shall render a report to each Party to this Agreement containing the Committee's recommendations concerning the definitive arrangements for an international global system which shall supersede the interim arrangements established by this Agreement. This report, which shall be fully representative of all shades of opinion, shall consider, among other things, whether the interim arrangements should be continued on a permanent basis or whether a permanent international organization with a General Conference and an international administrative and technical staff should be established.

(b) Regardless of the form of the definitive arrangements,

- (i) their aims shall be consonant with the principles set forth in the Preamble to this Agreement;
- (ii) they shall, like this Agreement, be open to all States members of the International Telecommunication Union or their designated entities;
- (iii) they shall safeguard the investment made by signatories to the Special Agreement; and
- (iv) they shall be such that all parties to the definitive arrangements may have an opportunity of contributing to the determination of general policy.

(c) The report of the Committee shall be considered at an international conference, at which duly designated communications entities may also participate,

to be convened by the Government of the United States of America for that purpose within three months following submission of the report. The Parties to this Agreement shall seek to ensure that the definitive arrangements will be established at the earliest practicable date, with a view to their entry into force by 1st January 1970.

ARTICLE X

In considering contracts and in exercising its other responsibilities, the Committee and the Corporation as manager shall be guided by the need to design, develop and procure the best equipment and services at the best price for the most efficient conduct and operation of the space segment. When proposals or tenders are determined to be comparable in terms of quality, c.i.f. price and timely performance, the Committee and the Corporation as manager shall also seek to ensure that contracts are so distributed that equipment is designed, developed and procured in the States whose Governments are Parties to this Agreement in approximate proportion to the respective quotas of their corresponding signatories to the Special Agreement; provided that such design, development and procurement are not contrary to the joint interests of the Parties to this Agreement and the signatories to the Special Agreement. The Committee and the Corporation as manager shall also seek to ensure that the foregoing principles are applied with respect to major sub-contracts to the extent that this can be accomplished without impairing the responsibility of the prime contractor for the performance of work under the contract.

ARTICLE XI

(a) Any Party may withdraw from this Agreement, and this Agreement shall cease to be in force for that Party three months after that Party shall have notified the Government of the United States of America of its intention to withdraw and the latter shall inform the other Parties accordingly. In the event of such withdrawal, the corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement shall pay all sums already due under the Special Agreement, together with a sum which shall be agreed between that signatory and the Committee in respect of costs which will result in the future from contracts concluded prior to notification of withdrawal. If agreement has not been reached within three months after notification of withdrawal, the Committee shall make a final determination of the sums which shall be paid by that signatory.

(b) Not less than three months after the rights of a signatory to the Special Agreement have been suspended pursuant to Article 4(d) of the Special Agreement, and if that signatory has not meanwhile paid all sums due, the Committee, having taken into account any statement by that signatory or the corresponding Party, may decide that the Party in question is deemed to have withdrawn from this Agreement; this Agreement shall thereupon cease to be in force for that Party.

(c) Withdrawal by a Party from this Agreement

shall automatically effect withdrawal from the Special Agreement by the corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement, but the obligation to make payments under paragraph (a) of this Article or under Article 4(d) of the Special Agreement shall not be affected by such withdrawal.

(d) Upon any withdrawal under paragraph (a) or (b) of this Article, the Committee, to the extent required to account for the quota of the withdrawing signatory to the Special Agreement, shall increase the quotas of the remaining signatories to the Special Agreement in proportion to their respective quotas or as they may otherwise agree. However, if the signatory to the Special Agreement corresponding to the withdrawing Party was at the time of withdrawal a member of a group of signatories formed in order to appoint jointly a representative on the Committee pursuant to Article IV(b) of this Agreement, the quota of the signatory in question shall be distributed by increasing the quotas of the remaining signatories of that group to the extent that those remaining signatories may agree.

(e) Withdrawal by any Party may also take place if, at the request of the Party concerned, the Committee approves the transfer of the rights and obligations of that Party and the corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement under this Agreement and the Special Agreement to another Party and its corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement. Such transferee or transferees need not have been Parties to the Agreement or signatories to the Special Agreement prior to the time of such transfer.

ARTICLE XII

(a) This Agreement shall be open at Washington for six months from 19th August 1964 for signature:

- (i) by the Government of any State which is listed by name in the Annex to the Special Agreement when it is first opened for signature, and
- (ii) by the Government of any other State which is a member of the International Telecommunication Union, subject to approval by the Committee of the quota of that Government or its designated communications entity, public or private. On such approval and entry into force or provisional application, the name of that State and the name of its corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement, and its quota are deemed to be inserted in the Annex to the Special Agreement.

(b) The Government of any State which is a member of the International Telecommunication Union may accede to this Agreement after it is closed for signature upon such financial conditions as the Committee shall determine. On such accession, the name of that State and the name of its corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement, and its quota are deemed to be inserted in the Annex to the Special Agreement.

(c) The quotas of the signatories to the Special

Agreement shall be reduced pro rata as necessary to accommodate additional signatories to the Special Agreement, provided that the combined original quotas of all signatories to the Special Agreement other than the signatories listed in the Annex to the Special Agreement when this Agreement is first opened for signature shall not exceed 17%.

(d) This Agreement shall enter into force on the date upon which it has been signed without reservation as to approval, or has been approved after such reservation, by two or more Governments. Subsequently it shall enter into force in respect of each signatory Government on signature or, if it signs subject to a reservation as to approval, on approval by it.

(e) Any Government which signs this Agreement subject to a reservation as to approval may, so long as this Agreement is open for signature, declare that it applies this Agreement provisionally and shall thereupon be considered a Party to this Agreement. Such provisional application shall terminate

- (i) upon approval of this Agreement by that Government, or
- (ii) upon withdrawal by that Government in accordance with Article XI of this Agreement.

(f) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Article, this Agreement shall not enter into force for any Government nor be applied provisionally by any Government until that Government or its corresponding signatory shall have signed the Special Agreement.

(g) If at the expiration of a period of nine months from the date when it is first opened for signature this Agreement has not entered into force for or has not been provisionally applied by the Government of a State which has signed it in accordance with paragraph (a)(i) of this Article, the signature shall be considered of no effect and the name of that State and of its corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement, and its quota shall be deemed to be deleted from the Annex to the Special Agreement; the quotas of the signatories to the Special Agreement shall accordingly be increased pro rata. If this Agreement has not entered into force for or has not been provisionally applied by the Government of a State which has signed it in accordance with paragraph (a)(ii) of this Article within a period of nine months from the date when it is first opened for signature, the signature shall be considered of no effect.

(h) The corresponding signatory to the Special Agreement of any Government which has signed this Agreement subject to a reservation as to approval, and which has not provisionally applied it, may appoint an observer to the Committee in the same manner as that signatory could have been represented in accordance with Article IV(b) of this Agreement if that Government had approved this Agreement. Any such observer, who shall have the right to speak but not to vote, may attend the Committee only during a period of nine months from the date when this Agreement is first opened for signature.

(i) No reservation may be made to this Agreement except as provided in this Article.

ARTICLE XIII

(a) Notifications of approval or of provisional application and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government of the United States of America.

(b) The Government of the United States of America shall notify all signatory and acceding States of signatures, reservations of approval, deposits of notifications of approval or of provisional application, deposits of instruments of accession and notifications of withdrawals from this Agreement.

ARTICLE XIV

Upon entry into force of this Agreement, the Government of the United States of America shall register it with the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

ARTICLE XV

This Agreement shall remain in effect until the entry into force of the definitive arrangements referred to in Article IX of this Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned duly authorized thereto have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Washington this nineteenth day of August, 1964, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit a certified copy to each signatory or acceding Government and to the Government of each State which is a member of the International Telecommunication Union.

SPECIAL AGREEMENT

Whereas certain Governments have become Parties to an Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System; and

Whereas those Governments have undertaken therein to sign or to designate a communications entity to sign this Special Agreement;

The signatories to this Special Agreement hereby agree as follows:

ARTICLE 1

In this Special Agreement:

(a) "The Agreement" means the Agreement Establishing Interim Arrangements for a Global Commercial Communications Satellite System opened for signature on August 19, 1964, at Washington;

(b) "The Committee" means the Interim Communications Satellite Committee established by Article IV of the Agreement;

(c) "The Corporation" means the Communications Satellite Corporation incorporated under the laws of

the District of Columbia pursuant to the Communications Satellite Act of 1962 of the United States of America;

(d) "Design" and "development" include research;

(e) "Quota", in relation to a signatory, means the percentage set forth opposite its name in the Annex to this Special Agreement as modified pursuant to the Agreement and this Special Agreement;

(f) "Signatory" means a Government or a communications entity which has signed this Special Agreement and in respect of which it is in force;

(g) "The space segment" means the space segment defined in Article I (b) (i) of the Agreement.

ARTICLE 2

Each signatory undertakes to fulfill the obligations placed upon it by the Agreement and thereby obtains the rights provided therein.

ARTICLE 3

Each signatory undertakes to contribute a percentage of the costs of the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment equal to its quota.

ARTICLE 4

(a) During a period of nine months from the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature, each signatory shall, within four weeks from the date of entry into force of this Special Agreement for that signatory, make a payment on account to the Corporation, in United States dollars, or in currency freely convertible into United States dollars, of a percentage equal to its quota of the expenditure which the Corporation has incurred for the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment prior to the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature, and, according to estimates established by the Corporation at that date, is to incur for those purposes within six months after that date, together with its proportionate share of any additional contribution required pursuant to paragraph (b) of this Article, and appropriate interest on all such amounts. Each signatory shall pay the remainder of its contribution pursuant to Article 3 of this Special Agreement in accordance with paragraph (b) of this Article.

(b) The Corporation shall submit to the Committee estimates of the time phasing of payments required pursuant to Article 3 of this Special Agreement. The Committee shall call on the signatories to make their respective proportionate payments in order to enable obligations to be met as they become due. Payments shall be made to the Corporation by each signatory in United States dollars, or in currency freely convertible into United States dollars, and in such amounts that, accounting on a cumulative basis, the sums paid by the signatories are in proportion to their respective quotas. Where a signatory other than the Corporation incurs obligations pursuant to authorization by the

Committee, the Committee shall cause payments to be made to that signatory.

(c) Accounts for expenditure referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this Article shall be subject to review by the Committee and shall be subject to such adjustment as the Committee may decide.

(d) Each signatory shall pay the amount due from it under paragraph (b) of this Article on the date designated by the Committee. Interest at the rate of six per cent per annum shall be added to any amount unpaid after that date. If the signatory has not made a payment within three months of its becoming due, the rights of the signatory under the Agreement and this Special Agreement shall be suspended. If, after such suspension, the Committee decides, pursuant to Article XI(b) of the Agreement, that the defaulting signatory is deemed to have withdrawn from this Special Agreement, the Committee shall then make a binding determination of the sums already due together with a sum to be paid in respect of the costs which will result in the future from contracts concluded while that signatory was a party. Such withdrawal shall not, however, affect the obligation of the signatory concerned to pay sums due under this Special Agreement, whether falling due before it ceased to be a party or payable in accordance with the aforesaid determination of the Committee.

ARTICLE 5

The following shall be included as part of the costs of the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment to be shared by the signatories in proportion to their respective quotas:

(a) The direct and indirect costs for the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment incurred by the Corporation prior to the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature;

(b) All direct and indirect costs for the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment incurred by the Corporation or pursuant to authorization by the Committee by any other signatory on behalf of the signatories to this Special Agreement subsequent to the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature;

(c) All direct and indirect costs incurred by the Corporation which are allocable to its performance of services as manager in the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment and appropriate compensation to the Corporation, as may be agreed between the Corporation and the Committee, for such services.

ARTICLE 6

The following shall not form part of the costs to be shared by the signatories:

(a) Taxes on the net income of any of the signatories;

(h) Design and development expenditure on launchers and launching facilities except expenditure in-

curred for the adaptation of launchers and launching facilities in connection with the design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment;

(c) The costs of the representatives of the signatories on the Committee and on its advisory subcommittees and the staffs of those representatives except insofar as the Committee may otherwise determine.

ARTICLE 7

(a) In considering whether an earth station should be permitted to utilize the space segment, the Committee shall take into account the technical characteristics of the station, the technical limitations on multiple access to satellites due to the existing state of the art, the effect of geographical distribution of earth stations on the efficiency of the services to be provided by the system, the recommended standards of the International Telegraph and Telephone Consultative Committee and the International Radio Consultative Committee of the International Telecommunication Union, and such general standards as the Committee may establish. Failure by the Committee to establish general standards shall not of itself preclude the Committee from considering or acting upon any application for approval of an earth station to utilize the space segment.

(b) Any application for approval of an earth station to utilize the space segment shall be submitted to the Committee by the signatory to this Special Agreement in whose area the earth station is or will be located, or, with respect to other areas, by a duly authorized communications entity. Each such application shall be submitted either individually or jointly on behalf of all signatories and duly authorized communications entities intending to utilize the space segment by means of the earth station which is the subject of the application.

(c) Any application for approval of an earth station located in the territory of a State whose Government is party to the Agreement which is to be owned or operated by an organization or organizations other than the corresponding signatory shall be made by that signatory.

ARTICLE 8

(a) Each applicant for approval of an earth station pursuant to Article 7 of this Special Agreement shall be responsible for making equitable and non-discriminatory arrangements for the use of the earth station by all signatories or duly authorized communication entities intended to be served by the earth station individually or jointly with other earth stations.

(b) To the extent feasible the Committee shall allot to the respective signatory or duly authorized communications entity, for use by each earth station which has been approved pursuant to Article 7 of this Special Agreement, an amount of satellite utilization appropriate to satisfy the total communications capability requested on behalf of all signatories and duly authorized communications entities to be served by such earth station.

(c) In making allotments of satellite utilization the Committee shall give due consideration to the quotas of the signatories to be served by each earth station.

ARTICLE 9

(a) The Committee shall specify the unit of satellite utilization and from time to time shall establish the rate of charge per unit at a level which, as a general rule, shall be sufficient, on the basis of the estimated total use of the space segment, to cover amortization of the capital cost of the space segment, an adequate compensation for use of capital, and the estimated operating, maintenance and administration costs of the space segment.

(b) In establishing the unit rate of charge pursuant to paragraph (a) of this Article, the Committee shall include in the estimated operating, maintenance and administration costs of the space segment the estimated direct and indirect costs of the Corporation which are allocable to its performance of services as manager in the operation and maintenance of the space segment and appropriate compensation to the Corporation, as may be agreed between the Corporation and the Committee, for such services.

(c) The Committee shall arrange for the payment of charges for allotments of satellite utilization to be made quarterly to the Corporation. The charges shall be computed in United States dollars and paid in United States dollars or in currency freely convertible into United States dollars.

(d) The components of the unit rate of charge representing amortization and compensation for the use of capital shall be credited to the signatories in proportion to their respective quotas. In the interests of avoiding unnecessary transfers of funds between signatories, and of keeping to a minimum the funds held by the Corporation on behalf of the signatories, the Committee shall make suitable arrangements for funds representing these components to be retained by signatories where appropriate or, if collected, to be distributed among the signatories in such a way that the credits established for signatories are discharged.

(e) The other components of the unit rate of charge shall be applied to meet all operating, maintenance, and administration costs, and to establish such reserves as the Committee may determine to be necessary. After providing for such costs and reserves, any balance remaining shall be distributed by the Corporation, in United States dollars, or in currency freely convertible into United States dollars, among the signatories in proportion to their respective quotas; but if insufficient funds remain to meet the operating, maintenance and administration costs, the signatories shall pay to the Corporation, in proportion to their respective quotas, such amounts as may be determined by the Committee to be required to meet the deficiency.

(f) The Committee shall institute appropriate sanctions in cases where payments pursuant to this Article shall have been in default for three months or longer.

ARTICLE 10

(a) All contracts placed by the Corporation or by any other signatory pursuant to authorization by the Committee relating to design, development and procurement of equipment for the space segment shall, except as otherwise provided by the Committee, be based on responses to appropriate requests for quotations or invitations to tender from among persons and organizations qualified to perform the work under the proposed contract whose names are furnished to the Committee by the signatories.

(b) For contracts which exceed U.S. \$125,000 the issue by the Corporation of requests for quotations or invitations to tender shall be in accordance with such conditions as the Committee may determine. The Corporation shall keep the Committee fully informed of decisions taken relating to such contracts.

(c) The Corporation shall consult the Committee before issuing requests for proposals and invitations to tender for contracts for design, development and procurement of equipment for the space segment which are expected to exceed U.S. \$500,000. If, as a result of its evaluation of responses to such requests or invitations, the Corporation desires that a contract be placed which exceeds U.S. \$500,000, it shall submit its evaluation and recommendations to the Committee. The approval of the Committee shall be required before each such contract is placed either by the Corporation as manager or by any other signatory pursuant to authorization by the Committee.

(d) The Committee shall approve the program for the launching of satellites and for associated services, the launch source and the contracting arrangements.

(e) Except as otherwise directed by the Committee, and subject to paragraphs (c) and (d) of this Article, all contractors shall be selected by the Corporation and all contracts shall be in the name of and be executed and administered by the Corporation as manager.

(f) Except as otherwise determined by the Committee, all contracts and sub-contracts placed for design, development and procurement of equipment for the space segment shall contain appropriate provisions to the effect that all inventions, technical data and information arising directly from any work performed under such contracts (except inventions, technical data and information pertaining to launchers and launchings) shall be disclosed to the Committee and may be used only in the design, development, manufacture and use of equipment and components for the space segment established under the present interim arrangements or under any definitive arrangements which may succeed these interim arrangements, without payment of royalties, by each signatory or any person in the jurisdiction of a signatory or the Government which has designated that signatory.

(g) Except as it may otherwise determine, the Committee shall endeavor to have included in all contracts placed for design and development appropriate provi-

sions which will ensure that inventions, technical data and information owned by the contractor and its sub-contractors which are directly incorporated in work performed under such contracts, may be used on fair and reasonable terms by each signatory or any person in the jurisdiction of a signatory or the Government which has designated that signatory, provided that such use is necessary, and to the extent that it is necessary to use such inventions, technical data and information for the exercise of the right to use under paragraph (f) of this Article.

(h) The provisions of this Article shall not be held to apply to contracts for design, development, construction and establishment of the space segment to which the Corporation is a party on the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature. Subject to the provisions of Article 4(c) of this Agreement, all such contracts shall be recognized by the Committee as continuing obligations for budgetary purposes.

ARTICLE 11

Each signatory shall keep such books, records, vouchers and accounts of all costs for which it is authorized to be reimbursed under this Special Agreement with respect to the design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance and operation of the space segment as may be appropriate and shall at all reasonable times make them available for inspection by members of the Committee.

ARTICLE 12

In addition to functions stated elsewhere in this Special Agreement, the Corporation, as manager pursuant to Article VIII of the Agreement, shall:

(a) prepare and submit to the Committee the annual programs and budgets;

(b) recommend to the Committee the type or types of space segment to be established;

(c) plan, conduct, arrange for and co-operate in studies, design work and development for improvement of the space segment;

(d) operate and maintain the space segment;

(e) furnish to the Committee such information as may be required by any representative on the Committee to enable him to discharge his responsibilities as a representative;

(f) arrange for technicians, selected by the Committee with the concurrence of the Corporation from among persons nominated by signatories, to participate in the assessment of designs and of specifications for equipment for the space segment;

(g) use its best efforts to arrange for inventions, technical data and information arising directly from any jointly financed work performed under contracts placed before the date on which the Agreement is opened for signature to be disclosed to each signatory and to be made available for use free of charge in the design, development, manufacture and use of equipment and components for the space segment by each signatory or any person in the jurisdiction of

the signatory or the Government which has designated that signatory.

ARTICLE 13

Neither the Corporation as signatory or manager, nor any other signatory as such, shall be liable to any other signatory for loss or damage sustained by reason of a failure or breakdown of a satellite at or after launching or a failure or breakdown of any other portion of the space segment.

ARTICLE 14

Arrangements shall be made whereby all legal disputes arising in connection with this Special Agreement or in connection with the rights and obligations of signatories can, if not otherwise settled, be submitted to the decision of an impartial tribunal, to be established in accordance with such arrangements, which would decide such questions in accordance with general principles of law. To this end, a group of legal experts appointed by the signatories and by the prospective signatories listed in the Annex to this Agreement when it is first opened for signature shall recommend a draft of a Supplementary Agreement containing such arrangements; the signatories shall, after considering that draft, conclude a Supplementary Agreement for such arrangements within a period of three months from the date when the Agreement is first opened for signature. The Supplementary Agreement shall be binding on all those who subsequently become signatories to this Special Agreement.

ARTICLE 15

Any proposed amendment to this Special Agreement shall first be submitted to the Committee. If recommended by the Committee for adoption, it shall enter into force for all signatories when notifications of approval have been deposited with the Government of the United States of America by two-thirds of the signatories, provided that no amendment may impose upon any signatory any additional financial obligation without its consent.

ARTICLE 16

This Special Agreement shall enter into force for each signatory on the day of signature, provided that the Agreement shall have entered into force for or shall have been provisionally applied by the Government which is or has designated the signatory in question; it shall continue in force for as long as the Agreement continues in force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned duly authorized thereto have signed this Special Agreement.

DONE at Washington this nineteenth day of August, 1964, in the English and French languages, both texts being equally authoritative, in a single original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States of America, which shall transmit a certified copy to each signatory or acceding Government and to the Government of each State which is

a member of the International Telecommunication Union.

ANNEX

LIST OF PROSPECTIVE SIGNATORIES TO THE SPECIAL AGREEMENT

Country	Name of Signatory	Quota
Australia	Overseas Telecommunications Commission (Australia)	2. 75
Austria	Bundesministerium für Verkehr und Elektrizitätswirtschaft, Generaldirektion für die Post- und Telegraphenverwaltung	0. 2
Belgium	Régie des Télégraphes et Téléphones	1. 1
Canada	Canadian Overseas Telecommunication Corporation	3. 75
Denmark	Generaldirektoratet for Post og Telegrafvesenet	0. 4
France	Government of the French Republic	6. 1
Germany	Deutsche Bundespost	6. 1
Ireland	An Roinn Poist Agus Telegrafo	0. 35
Italy	to be designated	2. 2
Japan	Kokusai Denshin Denwa Company Ltd.	2. 0
Netherlands	Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands	1. 0
Norway	Telegrafstyret	0. 4
Portugal	Administração Geral dos Correios, Telegrafos e Telefones	0. 4
Spain	Government of the State of Spain	1. 1
Sweden	Kungl. Telestyrelsen	0. 7
Switzerland	Direction Générale des PTT	2. 0
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	Her Britannic Majesty's Postmaster General	8. 4
United States of America	Communications Satellite Corporation	61. 0
Vatican City	Government of the Vatican City State	0. 05

period extending from September 1, 1964, to August 31, 1967. The agreement was effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes at Washington on July 17, 1964.

Designed to promote the orderly development and growth of cotton textile exports from Greece to the United States, the agreement results from bilateral talks held in Athens between Greek representatives and U.S. representatives from the Departments of Commerce and State. These talks led to an understanding regarding the future pattern of cotton textile trade between Greece and the United States.

The principal features of the agreement are:

1. All 64 categories of cotton textiles are covered, with import ceilings as follows:

a. Yarn (categories 1-4)	1,000,000 pounds
Category 1—475,000	
Category 2—150,000	
Category 3—315,000	
Category 4—75,000	
b. Fabrics and made-up goods (categories 5-38, 64)	1,000,000 square yards equivalent, not exceeding 200,000 square yards equivalent in any one category
c. Apparel (categories 39-63)	200,000 square yards equivalent

2. For the second and third 12-month periods (beginning September 1, 1965, and September 1, 1966, respectively) each ceiling will be increased by 5 percent over the levels of the period immediately preceding.

3. The Greek Government agreed to use its best efforts to space evenly its annual exports in the four yarn categories.

4. The U.S. Government agreed, for the term of the agreement, not to request restraint of cotton textile exports from Greece to the United States under the procedures of articles 3 and 6(c) of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962.¹

5. The two Governments agreed to exchange statistical data necessary for the effective implementation of the agreement and to consult on any question arising in the implementation of the agreement.

The arrangements agreed upon by the two

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.

Cotton Textile Agreements Concluded With Greece and Turkey

AGREEMENT WITH GREECE

Press release 343 dated July 28

Department Announcement

The Governments of the United States and Greece announced on July 28 the conclusion of a bilateral agreement covering trade in cotton textiles between the two countries for a 3-year

Governments were the result of bilateral consultations on prospective levels of trade in cotton textiles between the two countries in accordance with the recommendations of the GATT Cotton Textiles Committee for such consultations between importing and exporting countries at its meeting in December 1963.²

Text of U.S. Note

JULY 17, 1964.

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to recent discussions between representatives of the Government of the United States of America and the Government of Greece concerning trade in cotton textiles between Greece and the United States.

As a result of these discussions I have the honor to propose the following agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles between Greece and the United States:

1. The Government of Greece shall limit annual exports to the United States in all categories of cotton textiles for the twelve-month period beginning September 1, 1964, in accordance with the following:

- (a) Yarn (categories 1-4) 1 million pounds.
- (b) Fabrics and made-up goods (categories 5-38, 64) 1 million square yards equivalent.
- (c) Apparel (categories 39-63) 200,000 square yards equivalent.

2. Within the ceiling for yarn the following subceilings shall apply:

Category 1	475,000 pounds
Category 2	150,000 pounds
Category 3	315,000 pounds
Category 4	75,000 pounds

3. Within the ceiling for fabrics and made-up goods, exports in any one category shall not exceed 200,000 square yards equivalent in any agreement year except by mutual agreement of the two governments.

4. The limitation on exports established by paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of this agreement shall be raised by 5 percent for the twelve-month period beginning September 1, 1965 and on a cumulative basis by 5 percent for the subsequent twelve-month period.

5. The Government of Greece shall space exports in the yarn categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 as evenly as practicable within an agreement year except that exports in this group of categories may be permitted to reach 75 percent of the annual level during the first six months of the first agreement year.

6. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available statistical data requested by the other government. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the factors for conversion

into square yards equivalent set forth in the Annex thereto shall apply.

7. For the duration of this agreement, the Government of the United States shall not invoke the procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to request restraint on the export of cotton textiles from Greece to the United States.

8. The Governments agree to consult on any questions arising in the implementation of this agreement.

9. The agreement shall continue in force through August 31, 1967. As used herein, the term "agreement year" means a twelve-month period from September 1 through August 31. Either government may propose revisions in the terms of the agreement, or may terminate the agreement at any time, giving notice at least 30 days prior to that proposed revision or termination.

For the Secretary of State:
G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

His Excellency
ALEXANDER A. MATSAS,
Ambassador of Greece.

ANNEX

LIST OF COTTON TEXTILE CATEGORIES AND CONVERSION FACTORS FOR FABRICS AND MADE UP GOODS

Category Number	Description	Unit	Conversion Factor
<i>Yarn</i>			
1	Yarn, carded, singles	lb.	4.6
2	Yarn, carded, plied	lb.	4.6
3	Yarn, combed, singles	lb.	4.6
4	Yarn, combed, plied	lb.	4.6
<i>Fabrics</i>			
5	Ginghams, carded yarn	sq yds	1.0
6	Ginghams, combed yarn	sq yds	1.0
7	Velveteens	sq yds	1.0
8	Corduroy	sq yds	1.0
9	Sheeting, carded yarn	sq yds	1.0
10	Sheeting, combed yarn	sq yds	1.0
11	Lawns, carded yarn	sq yds	1.0
12	Lawns, combed yarn	sq yds	1.0
13	Voiles, carded yarn	sq yds	1.0
14	Voiles, combed yarn	sq yds	1.0
15	Poplin and broadcloth, carded yarn.	sq yds	1.0
16	Poplin and broadcloth, combed yarn.	sq yds	1.0
17	Typewriter ribbon cloth	sq yds	1.0
18	Print cloth, shirting type, 80 x 80 type, carded yarn.	sq yds	1.0
19	Print cloth, shirting type, other than 80 x 80 type, carded yarn.	sq yds	1.0
20	Shirting, carded yarn	sq yds	1.0
21	Shirting, combed yarn	sq yds	1.0
22	Twill and sateen, carded yarn.	sq yds	1.0
23	Twill and sateen, combed yarn.	sq yds	1.0
24	Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn.	sq yds	1.0
25	Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn.	sq yds	1.0

²For a statement made before the Cotton Textiles Committee on Dec. 3, 1963, by U.S. Representative Stanley Nehmer, see *ibid.*, Jan. 20, 1964, p. 96.

26	Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn	sq yds	1. 0
27	Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yarn.	sq yds	1. 0
<i>Made Up Goods</i>			
28	Pillowcases, plain, carded yarn.	numbers	1. 084
29	Pillowcases, plain, combed yarn.	numbers	1. 084
30	Dish towels	numbers	. 348
31	Towels, other than dish towels.	numbers	. 348
32	Handkerchiefs	dozen	1. 66
33	Table damasks and manufactures.	pounds	3. 17
34	Sheets, carded yarn	numbers	6. 2
35	Sheets, combed yarn	numbers	6. 2
36	Bedspreads, including quilts.	numbers	6. 9
37	Braided and woven elastics.	pounds	4. 6
38	Fishing nets	pounds	4. 6
<i>Apparel¹</i>			
39	Gloves and mittens	doz. prs.	3. 527
40	Hose and half hose	doz. prs.	4. 6
41	T-shirts, all white, knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	7. 234
42	T-shirts, other, knit	doz.	7. 234
43	Shirts, knit, other than T-shirts and sweat-shirts.	doz.	7. 234
44	Sweaters and cardigans	doz.	36. 8
45	Shirts, dress, not knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	22. 186
46	Shirts, sport, not knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	24. 457
47	Shirts, work, not knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	22. 186
48	Raincoats, $\frac{3}{4}$ length or longer, not knit.	doz.	50. 0
49	Other coats, not knit	doz.	32. 5
50	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	17. 797
51	Trousers, slacks and shorts (outer), not knit, women's, girls' and infants'.	doz.	17. 797
52	Blouses, not knit	doz.	14. 53
53	Dresses (including uniforms), not knit.	doz.	45. 3
54	Playsuits, washsuits, sunsuits, creepers, rompers, etc., not knit, n.e.s.	doz.	25. 0
55	Dressing gowns, including bathrobes, beach robes, housecoats and dusters, not knit.	doz.	51. 0
56	Undershirts, knit, men's and boys'.	doz.	9. 2
57	Briefs and undershorts, men's and boys'.	doz.	11. 25
58	Drawers, shorts and briefs, knit, n.e.s.	doz.	5. 0
59	All other underwear, not knit.	doz.	16. 0
60	Pajamas and other nightwear.	doz.	51. 96
61	Brassieres and other body-supporting garments.	doz.	4. 75
62	Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s.	lb.	4. 6
63	Wearing apparel, not knit, n.e.s.	lb.	² 4. 6
64	All other cotton textiles	lb.	4. 6

AGREEMENT WITH TURKEY

Press release 344 dated July 28

Department Announcement

The Governments of the United States and the Republic of Turkey announced on July 28 the conclusion of a bilateral agreement covering trade in cotton textiles between the two countries for a 3-year period extending from July 1, 1964, to June 30, 1967. The agreement was effected by an exchange of diplomatic notes at Washington on July 17, 1964.

Designed to promote the orderly development and growth of cotton textile exports from Turkey to the United States, the agreement results from bilateral talks held in Washington between Turkish representatives and United States representatives from the Departments of Commerce, Labor, and State. These talks led to an understanding regarding the future pattern of cotton textile trade between Turkey and the United States.

The principal features of the agreement are:

1. All 64 categories of cotton textiles are covered, with import ceilings as follows:

- Category 9 (carded sheeting) 1,000,000 square yards
- All other nonapparel categories (categories 1-8, 10-38, and 64) 1,450,000 square yards equivalent, not exceeding 350,000 square yards equivalent in any one category
- Apparel categories (categories 39-63) 300,000 square yards equivalent

2. For the second and third 12-month periods, each ceiling will be increased by 5 percent over the levels of the period immediately preceding.

3. The Turkish Government agreed to use its best efforts to space evenly its annual exports in category 9.

4. The U.S. Government agreed, for the term of the agreement, not to request restraint of cotton textile exports from Turkey to the United States under the procedures of articles 3 and 6(c) of the Long-Term Arrangement Re-

¹ Each component of apparel items imported in sets shall be recorded separately under its appropriate category. [Footnote in original.]

² For purposes of converting dozens into pounds under the United States cotton textile classification systems, the factor to be used is 1.74. [Footnote in original.]

garding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962.

5. The two Governments agreed to exchange statistical data necessary for the effective implementation of the agreement and to consult on any question arising in the implementation of the agreement.

In the course of the bilateral consultations, the United States also agreed to authorize the one-time entry for consumption of 1,100,000 square yards of category 9 goods on hand prior to the imposition of the previous article 3 restraint, which is superseded by the agreement.

The arrangements agreed upon by the two Governments were the result of bilateral consultations on prospective levels of trade in cotton textiles between the two countries in accordance with the recommendations of the GATT Cotton Textiles Committee for such consultations between importing and exporting countries at its meeting in December 1963.

Text of First U.S. Note

JULY 17, 1964

SIR: I refer to recent discussions in Washington between representatives of the Government of the Republic of Turkey and the Government of the United States of America concerning exports of cotton textiles from the Republic of Turkey to the United States.

As a result of these discussions, I propose the following agreement relating to trade in cotton textiles between the Republic of Turkey and the United States:

1. The Government of the Republic of Turkey shall limit the amounts of its exports of cotton textiles to the United States for the twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1964, as follows:

- | | |
|---|--|
| a. Category 9 (carded sheeting) | 1,000,000 square yards |
| b. All other non-apparel categories (Categories 1-8, 10-38, and 64) | 1,450,000 square yards equivalent, not exceeding 350,000 square yards equivalent in any one category |
| c. Apparel categories (Categories 39-63) | The equivalent of 300,000 square yards |

2. The limitations on exports established in paragraph 1 shall be increased by five percent for the twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1965. For each subsequent twelve-month period these limitations shall be increased by a further five per cent over the levels of the immediately preceding twelve-month period.

3. The Government of the Republic of Turkey shall use its best efforts to space evenly its annual exports in Category 9.

4. During the term of this agreement, the United States Government shall not invoke the procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term Arrangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to limit importation of cotton textiles from the Republic of Turkey into the United States.

5. Each Government agrees to supply promptly any available data requested by the other Government. In particular, the Governments agree to exchange monthly data on exports and imports of cotton textiles from the Republic of Turkey to the United States. In the implementation of this agreement, the system of categories and the factors for conversion into square yard equivalents set forth in the annex to this agreement shall apply.

6. The two Governments undertake to consult on any question arising in the implementation of this agreement. In particular, the Government of the United States agrees to undertake, at the request of the Government of the Republic of Turkey, a joint re-examination of the ceilings set forth in paragraph 1 of this agreement in the light of developments in the Turkish cotton textile industry, the performance record of the Republic of Turkey in meeting ceilings established by this agreement, and the condition of the United States cotton textile market.

7. This agreement shall continue in force through June 30, 1967; provided that either Government may propose revision in the terms of the agreement no later than 90 days prior to the beginning of a new twelve-month period; and provided further that either Government may terminate the agreement effective at the beginning of a twelve-month period by written notice to the other Government to be given at least 90 days prior to the beginning of such new twelve-month period.

If these proposals are acceptable to the Government of the Republic of Turkey, this note and your note of acceptance on behalf of the Government of the Republic of Turkey shall constitute an agreement between our governments, effective July 1, 1964.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Mr. İBRAHİM UNAL,
Chief of the Turkish Delegation
for Textile Negotiations,
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey.

ANNEX

[The annex to the agreement with Turkey is identical with the annex to the agreement with Greece. For text, see p. 291.]

Text of Second U.S. Note

JULY 17, 1964

SIR: I refer to the agreement concluded today between our Governments on trade in cotton textiles,

hereafter called the agreement, and to confirm the following arrangement.

In addition to the cotton textiles that may be imported into the United States from the Republic of Turkey under the agreement, the Government of the United States shall authorize the one-time entry for consumption of up to 1,100,000 square yards of Category 9 goods which were ready for shipment from Turkey on August 22, 1963 when United States imports of this category were placed under control. These goods should not be counted against the limitations set forth in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the agreement. The Government of the Republic of Turkey shall provide the Government of the United States with documentation to identify those goods.

I shall appreciate your confirmation of the above arrangement.

Accept, Sir, the assurance of my high consideration.

For the Secretary of State:

G. GRIFFITH JOHNSON

Mr. IBRAHIM UNAL,
Chief of the Turkish Delegation
for Textile Negotiations,
Embassy of the Republic of Turkey.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

North Atlantic Treaty—Atomic Energy

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.¹

Signatures: Norway, July 24, 1964; Portugal, July 9, 1964.

Notification received that it is willing to be bound by terms of the agreement: Denmark, July 29, 1964.

BILATERAL

Belgium

Supplementary convention to the extradition convention of October 26, 1901 (32 Stat. 1894), and the supplementary convention of June 20, 1935 (49 Stat. 3276). Signed at Brussels November 14, 1963.¹

Ratification advised by the Senate: August 6, 1964.

Greece

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of October 30, 1963 (TIAS 5462). Ef-

¹ Not in force.

ected by exchange of notes at Athens July 14 and 16, 1964. Entered into force July 16, 1964.

Guinea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed at Conakry June 13, 1964. Entered into force June 13, 1964.

Ireland

Agreement concerning legal liability in respect of loss or damage in Ireland arising from the operation of the NS *Savannah*. Effected by exchange of notes at Dublin June 18, 1964. Entered into force June 18, 1964.

Italy

Agreement relating to the safeguarding of classified information, with annex of general security procedures. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 4, 1964. Entered into force August 4, 1964.

Mali

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Effected by exchange of notes at Bamako June 4 and 9, 1964. Entered into force June 9, 1964.

Nigeria

Agreement amending and extending the agreement of October 19, 1960 (TIAS 4605), for the establishment and operation of a space-vehicle tracking and communications station within the Federation of Nigeria. Effected by exchange of notes at Lagos April 28 and May 21, 1964. Entered into force May 21, 1964.

United Kingdom

Agreement relating to visits by the NS *Savannah* to ports in United Kingdom territory. Effected by exchange of notes at London June 19, 1964. Entered into force June 19, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of January 9, 1964, as amended (TIAS 5514, 5563). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon July 24, 1964. Entered into force July 24, 1964.

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The Senate on August 6 confirmed the nomination of Harry C. McPherson, Jr., to be an Assistant Secretary of State.

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Releases issued prior to August 3 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 343, 344, and 346 of July 28; 351 of July 31; and 352 of August 1.

No.	Date	Subject
*353	8/4	Program for visit of U Thant.
*354	8/3	U.S. participation in international conferences.
356	8/5	U.S., U.K., U.S.S.R. joint statement on anniversary of test ban treaty.
†357	8/5	Air talks with Japan.
*358	8/6	Thompson sworn in as Ambassador to Finland (biographic details).
†359	8/6	Rostow: "The Alliance for Progress: August 1964" (revised).
*360	8/7	Miss Tibbetts sworn in as Ambassador to Norway (biographic details).
*361	8/7	Cultural exchange (Middle East, Europe).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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THE
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BULLETIN



Vol. LI, No. 1314



August 31, 1964

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America's Efforts Toward World Order

*Address by President Johnson*¹

Mr. President, Ambassador Stevenson, members of the American Bar Association:

Today I speak to you in the midst of a troubled week in a turbulent world.

Since the end of World War II, America has been found wherever freedom was under attack or wherever world peace was threatened. The stage has shifted many times.

The stakes have grown as man's capacity for destruction grew. But America's role has not changed. With constancy, we have pursued the defense of freedom and we have prevented nuclear destruction. We have patiently labored to construct a world order in which both peace and freedom could flourish.

We have lived so long with crisis and danger that we accept, almost without division, the premise of American concern for threats to order.

Yet this is a unique responsibility—unique for America and unique in history.

¹ Made before the American Bar Association at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 12 (White House press release; as-delivered text).

We accepted this responsibility, first, because at one time no other nation could do it. For the last 20 years, only under the shadow of our strength could friends keep their freedom and build their nations. Now that our allies have been restored to strength, they must share our responsibility in the pursuit of common purpose.

We have done this because we have, at painful cost, learned that we can no longer wait for the tides of conflict to touch our shores. Aggression and upheaval, in any part of the world, carry the seeds of destruction to our own freedom and, perhaps, to civilization itself.

We have done this, lastly, for a reason that is often difficult for others to understand. We have done it because it is right that we should.

Friendly cynics and fierce enemies alike often underestimate or ignore the strong thread of moral purpose which runs through the fabric of American history. Of course our security and welfare shape our policies. But much of the energy of our efforts has come from moral purpose.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1314 PUBLICATION 7727 AUGUST 31, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. PRICE: 52 issues, domestic \$10; foreign \$15; single copy, 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this publication approved by the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are not copyrighted and items contained herein may be reprinted. Citation of the Department of State Bulletin as the source will be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

It is right that the strong should help the weak defend their freedom.

It is right that the wealthy should help the poor emerge from their hunger.

It is right that help and understanding should flow from friendship and loyalty.

It is right that nations should be free from the coercion of others.

That these truths may coincide with interest does not make them less true.

There is another value which guides America's course. It is the deep American belief in the peaceful process of orderly settlement.

I would like this afternoon to briefly discuss two very different places where we are working at this hour for this principle—Cyprus and Viet-Nam.

The Conflict in Cyprus

The conflict in Cyprus comes from causes that are deeply rooted in the history and the circumstances of that troubled little island.

We do not know the final result of that conflict. We do know the United States should not stand idly by while two of its best friends are at the edge of kicking off a big war. Both Greece and Turkey are fellow members of the NATO alliance. They are both courageous and dedicated members of the free-world community. They have both been closely associated with us for the 17 years since the Truman Doctrine.

It is our duty to the alliance to help prevent its disruption. It is our duty to help settle any conflict which might erupt into a wider arena. It is our duty to help avoid large-scale loss of life among the peoples of Cyprus, whose true interests really lie in peace. It is our duty to work toward the acceptance of the principle that disputes should be settled without force. For, if orderly process is not accepted among friends, it will not be possible between adversaries.

In the pursuit of these responsibilities, I have sent our Under Secretary of State to all of the capitals concerned.

We invited the Heads of Government of Greece and Turkey to come to see me at the White House for long and serious talks.²

I have sent a distinguished former Secretary

of State, Mr. Acheson, to Geneva to work for peaceful agreement.

We have kept in close touch with Athens and Ankara and Nicosia by repeated personal messages from the President.

In this spirit, we have welcomed the efforts of the United Nations to arrange a cease-fire.³

America's Course in Viet-Nam

In Viet-Nam, too, we work for world order.

For 10 years, through the Eisenhower administration, the Kennedy administration, and this administration, we have had one consistent aim—observance of the 1954 agreements which guaranteed the independence of South Viet-Nam.

That independence has been the consistent target of aggression and terror. For 10 years our response to these attacks has followed a consistent pattern:

First, that the South Vietnamese have the basic responsibility for the defense of their own freedom.

Second, we would engage our strength and our resources to whatever extent needed to help others repel aggression.

Now, there are those who would have us depart from these tested principles. They have a variety of viewpoints. All of them, I am sure, you have heard in your local community.

Some say that we should withdraw from South Viet-Nam, that we have lost almost 200 lives there in the last 4 years, and we should come home. But the United States cannot and must not and will not turn aside and allow the freedom of a brave people to be handed over to Communist tyranny. This alternative is strategically unwise, we think, and it is morally unthinkable.

Some others are eager to enlarge the conflict. They call upon us to supply American boys to do the job that Asian boys should do. They ask us to take reckless action which might risk the lives of millions and engulf much of Asia and certainly threaten the peace of the entire world. Moreover, such action would offer no solution at all to the real problem of Viet-Nam. America can and America will meet any wider

² For background, see BULLETIN of July 13, 1964, p. 48.

³ See p. 318.

challenge from others, but our aim in Viet-Nam, as in the rest of the world, is to help restore the peace and to reestablish a decent order.

The course that we have chosen will require wisdom and endurance. But let no one doubt for a moment that we have the resources and the will to follow this course as long as it may take. No one should think for a moment that we will be worn down, nor will we be driven out, and we will not be provoked into rashness; but we will continue to meet aggression with firmness and unprovoked attack with measured reply.

That is the meaning of the prompt reaction of our destroyers to unprovoked attack. That is the meaning of the positive reply of our aircraft to a repetition of that attack. That is the meaning of the resolution passed by your Congress with 502 votes in favor and only 2 opposed. That is the meaning of the national unity that we have shown to all the world last week.⁴

There is another consideration. Wherever the forces of freedom are engaged, no one who commands the power of nuclear weapons can escape his responsibility for the life of our people and the life of your children.

It has never been the policy of any American to sympathetically or systematically place in hazard the life of this nation by threatening nuclear war. No American President has ever pursued so irresponsible a course. Our firmness at moments of crisis has always been matched by restraint—our determination by care. It was so under President Truman at Berlin, under President Eisenhower in the Formosa Straits, under President Kennedy in the Cuba missile crisis—and I pledge you that it will be so long as I am your President.

In Viet-Nam, in Cyprus, and in every continent, in a hundred different ways, America's efforts are directed toward world order. Only when all nations are willing to accept peaceful procedures as alternative to forceful settlement will the peace of our world be secure.

⁴ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258; for remarks made by the President upon signing the congressional resolution, see p. 302.

Dedication to Law and Order

While we work for peaceful process among nations, we must also maintain law and order among our own citizens. No person, whatever his grievance, can be allowed to attack the right of every American to be secure in his home, his shop, and in his streets. We will not permit any part of America to become a jungle, where the weak are the prey of the strong and the many.

Such acts must be stopped and punished, whether they occur in Mississippi or in the State of New York.

Under our Constitution, the local authorities have the central responsibility for civil peace. There is no place in our Federal system for a national police force. But where help is needed, or Federal law is violated, we shall be there. We will work together to punish all such law-breakers, wherever they may be, whether they are hooded nightriders on our highways or whether they are hoodlums in the city streets or parks.

Fulfillment of rights and prevention of disorder go hand in hand. Resort to violence blocks the path toward racial justice. The denial of rights invites increased disorder and violence.

Those who would hold back progress toward equality and, at the same time, promise racial peace are deluding themselves and deluding the people. Orderly progress, exact enforcement of law, are the only path to an end of racial strife.

The Emancipation Proclamation was signed more than 100 years ago. But as we all know, emancipation was a proclamation and not a fact. After a century of wanting and waiting, a compassionate and comprehensive law came into being. It was passed by more than two-thirds of all the Members of both parties of the Congress under the leadership of both Republican and Democratic leader sponsorship. This is a government of laws and not men. The Congress has passed the law, the President has signed the law, and the President will enforce the law.

I believe that our citizens will and must observe it. Neither demonstrations in the streets nor violence in the night can or will restrain

us from seeing to it that laws rightly passed will be justly observed. That is the path along which I intend to lead this nation.

And I am convinced that the same dedication to legal order, which will keep the peace in this land, will bring us nearer to peace among all lands. I have hopes, despite crisis and conflict, that that day may be coming nearer.

It was 19 years ago—19 years ago this month—that President Truman announced: “The force from which the sun draws its power has been loosed.”

When he heard the news, Albert Einstein exclaimed: “The world is not yet ready.” But, unprepared or not, the reality was there, and we have struggled together to master it.

Today, as we meet in freedom here, freedom is much stronger. For despite the difficulty and the danger, no nation has—no single nation—fallen to communism since Cuba in 1959.

War has been prevented. Danger has been receding. If we can continue that course, the future will perhaps some day say of us: “They became the masters and not the victims of the age.”

Under Secretary Ball Comments on Cyprus Situation

Following is the transcript of an interview with Under Secretary Ball by Columbia Broadcasting System correspondent Robert Pierpoint, taped at the Department of State on August 9 for use on CBS television news on that day.

Mr. Pierpoint: Mr. Secretary, just how serious is this crisis? What could happen if it's not solved soon?

Mr. Ball: The crisis obviously involves a very strategic area of the world, the eastern part of the Mediterranean. It involves two of our NATO allies, who together form the right flank of the NATO defense—Greece and Turkey. A conflict which could bring about a war between Greece and Turkey is a matter which could have the most serious consequences for the world. It could result in not merely a great deal of loss of life, but it could tend to

disrupt a very important element in Western defense.

Q. Could it deteriorate into a situation in which East and West come into direct confrontation on Cyprus?

A. There is always this possibility, of course, when you start a conflict like this—it can escalate. The other parties can get involved, and it can spread out. This is something we are necessarily at all times greatly concerned with. This is one reason why the President has spent so many hours in the last few days on this problem, as he has for a long time, ever since last February. This is why the rest of us have been so deeply absorbed in it.

Q. Is there any indication at present that the Soviet Union is involved in any way—and I'm thinking particularly on a military level?

A. Well, the Government of Cyprus has advised us in Nicosia, in the middle of the night last night, that they were asking the Soviet Union Government to intervene militarily. Whether they did so or not, I don't know. This was an expression of an intention on their part. We have seen no evidence of any response.

Let me say that the United Nations resolution, which was passed today,¹ provided—called on the member states not to take any action which would exacerbate this conflict or widen it in any way. The Soviet Union did not veto or vote against that resolution. It didn't vote for it, but it abstained. And I would hope that this matter can be kept where it is now, within the framework of the United Nations, and a solution can be found through the United Nations.

Q. Have you had any indications, Mr. Secretary, that the Soviet Union, if and when approached by the Cyprus Government, might actually intervene?

A. No, I have no view on that. I'm certain that the Soviet Union would recognize the seriousness of any such involvement on its part, and, as I say, it did not attempt to veto this resolution which certainly excludes that kind of intervention.

¹ See p. 318.

Q. What are the primary U.S. objectives at the moment? It's night now over there, and things can happen tomorrow morning. What are we actually trying to do tonight and tomorrow?

A. Well, the immediate objective, of course, is to bring about a cease-fire, which for the moment appears to have been achieved at least on a *de facto* basis, to stop—to cease firing on the island—to stop the Greek Cypriot Government forces from trying to take over some of the villages, which they have been engaged in doing, and the fighting between the Greek Cypriots and the Turk Cypriots, and at the same time to have the Turkish Government stand down the air offensive which they have been conducting against the island.

What we want to do is to safeguard the population, both Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot, to prevent a great bloodshed that could very easily occur, and to try to bring about as quickly as possible a peaceful solution of this very troublesome problem.

Q. Do we have any indication that the cease-fire that we are working for will actually last through the daylight hours tomorrow?

A. Well, we certainly hope so. And I think that the U.N. resolution today, which I think will be accepted by all parties, should make a great contribution toward this and the efforts of the general who is in command of the United Nations forces on the island, General [K. S.] Thimayya, who has performed valiantly. I think that with the background of this resolution he should be able to work out some arrangements which will bring about a cessation of the fighting.

Q. You indicated that you had some hope that the Cypriot Government would accept this resolution by the United Nations.

A. Well, the Cypriot Government, as I understand it, did accept it this afternoon, and our information tonight is that there is a *de facto* cease-fire at least.

Q. Has the NATO eastern flank been shattered as a result of what's happened in Cyprus?

A. Oh, I wouldn't say that. No. Greece

and Turkey are still members of the NATO alliance. They are not at war with one another, and, hopefully, if diplomacy can succeed in its efforts—and we are practicing it in the most intensive way—and if the United Nations can succeed in its efforts—and there is a great deal of concentrated effort being put into that—then we should avoid a conflict which could be disastrous for all concerned. And I think tonight that we made progress toward doing it, and I'm hopeful still that we will be able to bring this problem to a permanent solution rather quickly.

Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

President Signs Congressional Resolution on Southeast Asia

*Remarks by President Johnson*¹

My fellow Americans, 1 week ago, half a world away, our nation was faced by the challenge of deliberate and unprovoked acts of aggression in Southeast Asia. The cause of peace clearly required that we respond with a prompt and unmistakable reply.

As Commander in Chief, the responsibility was mine—and mine alone. I gave the orders for that reply, and it has been given.

But, as President, there rested upon me still another responsibility—the responsibility of submitting our course to the representatives of the people for them to verify it or veto it. I directed that to be done last Tuesday, too.

Within 24 hours, the resolution before me now had been placed before each House of Congress. In each House, the resolution was promptly examined in committee and reported for action. In each House, there followed free and serious debate. In each House, the resolution was passed on Friday last—with a total of 502 votes in support and 2 opposed.

¹ Made on Aug. 10 (White House press release; as-delivered text) upon the signing of H.J. 1145, a joint resolution to promote the maintenance of international peace and security in Southeast Asia; for background and text of resolution, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258.

Thus, today, our course is clearly known in every land. There can be no mistake—no miscalculation—of where America stands or what this generation of Americans stand for. The unanimity of the Congress reflects the unanimity of the country.

This resolution is short. It is straightforward. I hope it will be read around the world. The position of the United States is stated plainly.

To any armed attack upon our forces, we shall reply.

To any in Southeast Asia who ask our help in defending their freedom, we shall give it.

In that region, there is nothing we covet, nothing we seek—no territory, no military position, no political ambition. Our one desire—our one determination—is that the people of Southeast Asia be left in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way.

This resolution stands squarely within the four corners of the Constitution of the United States. It is clearly consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.

This is another new page in the outstanding record of accomplishment the 88th Congress is writing.

Americans of all parties and philosophies can be justly proud and justly grateful: proud that democracy has once again demonstrated its capacity to act swiftly and decisively against aggressors; grateful that there is in our National Government understanding, accord, and unity between the executive and the legislative branches—without regard to partisanship. This is a great strength that we must preserve.

This resolution confirms and reinforces powers of the Presidency. I pledge to all Americans to use those powers with all the wisdom and judgment God grants to me.

It is everlastingly right that we should be resolute in reply to aggression and steadfast in support of our friends.

But it is everlastingly necessary that our actions should be careful and measured. We are the most powerful of all nations—we must strive also to be the most responsible of nations.

So, in this spirit, and with this pledge, I now sign this resolution.

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant Visits Washington

U.N. Secretary-General U Thant paid an informal visit at Washington August 6-7 at the invitation of President Johnson. Following is the text of an exchange of greetings between the President and the Secretary-General upon the latter's arrival at the White House on August 6.

White House press release dated August 6

President Johnson

Mr. Secretary-General, Speaker [of the House of Representatives Charles A.] Halleck, Members of the Senate, ladies and gentlemen: On behalf of the American people, I am very privileged this morning and very proud to welcome you, Mr. Secretary-General, to our Capital City.

Our honor today is not honor alone for the office you hold or just the organization that you serve. It is rather an expression of our esteem and our respect for you and for your achievement as the faithful public servant of the entire world.

The world has lived through difficult hours during your tour as Secretary-General. Your wise and willing search for reason during those seasons of unreason has served us all well. The people of my country are grateful.

The United Nations lives today as evidence of the wish and the will of men everywhere for peace. That wish and that will runs nowhere stronger in all the world than in the United States of America.

In all that we do, America's purpose is to prevent war and to prevent others from provoking war. This nation has acted and this nation will always act when necessary in self-defense. Our actions have been and will be consistent with the principles and the purpose of the Charter of the United Nations.

Our nation has great strength and, with it, a sense of great trust. Our strength supports all men who cherish their independence and stand up for their freedom and respect the rights of others to govern themselves. Likewise, our strength opposes those who would abridge the independence, those who would breach the peace, those who would violate the rights of other men or other nations.

These convictions are deep in the character of my country, and that is why American Presidents and American Congresses and the American people support and will continue to support the United Nations.

That is why the United States believes in—and the United States works for—a stronger United Nations.

We want a United Nations that is better able to help keep the peace wherever and whenever and by whomever the peace is threatened.

We want a United Nations that is better able to arrive at peaceful solutions, to help settle world problems through negotiation and mediation and conciliation, arbitration and adjudication.

We want a United Nations that is better able to foster and to expand and to respect the rights of man.

We want a United Nations that is better able to serve as a center for growing cooperation among nations in the sciences and the arts and in all the works of human progress.

Yes, Mr. Secretary-General, we want in our country a United Nations that is better able to serve the world community by virtue of being solvent.

We stand ready today as we always have in the past to pay our share of the necessary cost. The pledges we make to the support of the United Nations are pledges that we shall keep.

So it makes me very happy this morning to be able to welcome you here to Washington, to the White House, to our rose garden, where many of the leaders of this nation have come to greet you and to express their personal welcome.

Our nation is honored to have you as our guest, and we are so pleased that you can spend the next few hours with us.

U Thant

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excellencies, and friends: I am, you may be sure, deeply appreciative of your kindness in asking me to come to Washington at this time.

I recall most soberly my visit here last fall when all the world shared your nation's grief at the tragic loss of your highly distinguished

predecessor. Permit me, Mr. President, to mention now the profound admiration I had for the remarkable strength you, Mr. President, demonstrated at that critical juncture which did so much to restore the confidence of a shaken world in this great country.

I feel that my visit here now is especially fitting and timely since, as you know, I have only just recently completed an extended journey more than halfway around the world. During that trip I had talks with the leaders of three states which are permanent members of the Security Council, as well as with a number of heads of African states in Cairo and with leaders of my own country.

I am certain that my talks with you and your associates in the United States Government will be equally useful and constructive to the further strengthening of the United Nations so that it may more effectively serve the cause of peace and good neighborliness amongst nations as provided for in the charter.

May I express on this occasion the profound gratitude I feel for your Government's long-standing and unwavering support of the United Nations and the support which was just reiterated by you, Mr. President, and here I may stress the United Nations peacekeeping activities throughout the world. I am quite convinced that you share with me, Mr. President, as well as with the leaders of other member states with whom I have talked recently, a mutual desire to see the United Nations develop into an ever more viable instrument of peace and human advancement in freedom, in rights, and in general well-being.

I am looking forward today to our discussions, which will certainly touch upon some important aspects of the overriding issues of these times.

While I was traveling at jet speed across three continents a few days ago, I learned of the incredible technological feat that was achieved by the space scientists and engineers of the United States in obtaining through the marvelous performance of Ranger VII the first truly closeup photographs of the surface of the moon. I extend to you, Mr. President, heartiest congratulations and also to your Government and to the American people, on this remarkable achievement in the peaceful application of sci-

ence and technology which unquestionably constitutes a major contribution to man's knowledge.

Again, let me thank you, Mr. President, and to you, Mrs. Johnson, for having bestowed upon me and my colleagues who have accompanied me this morning the high honor of being your guests in the Capital of your country and for your warm welcome here at the White House.

Let me also offer my very sincere thanks to you, Mr. President, for your very gracious words, not only about the United Nations to which you and your Government have been dedicated but also to me in particular. Thank you once again.

Alliance for Progress Exhibits Open at Pan American Union

*Remarks by Thomas C. Mann*¹

I am, indeed, pleased to participate with you in this ceremony opening these three exhibits on the Alliance for Progress. They demonstrate the history, the variety, and the scope of the multiple activities which the American nations, together, are taking to achieve the goals of the Charter of Punta del Este.

They demonstrate, too, the national and international efforts which are being made in this vast effort to bring a better life to all the peoples of the continent.

They show—most vividly—the physical accomplishments of these past 3 years—the factories, roads, homes, schools, and health centers which have been and are being built, and the changes on the land.

They also indicate the institutional progress which has been made—the establishment and the modernization of the entities and agencies through which future growth and change can occur.

We now have in this hemisphere a spirit of

¹ Made at the inauguration of three exhibits on the Alliance for Progress at the Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., on Aug. 12 (press release 367). Mr. Mann is Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress.

and for change—peaceful, progressive, and democratic change—which is greater, perhaps, than at any time since our revolutionary eras. The future progress of the alliance will draw upon that spirit. I think that we, and our peoples, can be well pleased with what we together have accomplished in these 3 years, although much—almost too much—remains to be done.

As President Johnson has said,² “We have reached a turning point. The foundations have been laid.”

I am pleased to announce, too—in keeping with the President's promise for accelerating the pace of United States action in support of the Alliance for Progress—that total United States public commitments to Latin America for the year ended June 30 were the highest on record. These commitments, from actions of the Agency for International Development, the Export-Import Bank, the Social Progress Trust Fund, Food for Peace, and the Peace Corps, totaled over \$1.2 billion.

These funds are being used in support of the efforts at self-help and reform of which we see such evidence in these exhibits. They are a testimonial, too, of the depth of the commitment of the United States, and of President Johnson, to the Alliance for Progress.

But, as he also said, speaking to many of you at the White House, the Alliance for Progress basically “depends on the courage and the leadership that we can bring to our own people in our own land.”² That leadership, in the years ahead, we must continue to supply as the best assurance of even greater growth than we today see here.

Thank you.

Letters of Credence

Rumania

The newly appointed Ambassador of the Rumanian People's Republic, Petre Balaceanu, presented his credentials to President Johnson on August 14. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 371 dated August 14.

² BULLETIN of June 1, 1964, p. 854.

The Alliance for Progress: August 1964

by W. W. Rostow

Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council¹

I have the privilege of serving my Government in two capacities: as Chairman of the Policy Planning Council in the Department of State and as United States member of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress—called CIAP, after its title in Spanish.

As planners in the field of foreign policy, we in the Council must concern ourselves with problems in every corner of the world, many of them with an important military element. On CIAP we are wholly concerned with the great creative challenge of bringing to life the solemn collective commitment of the governments of the hemisphere made at the Punta del Este Conference of August 1961:² a commitment to bring to the peoples of Latin America in this decade sustained economic development under conditions of increasing social justice and political democracy.

There is one major theme of United States foreign policy which binds together much of our work around the world and our commitment to the Alliance for Progress; and it is a theme which bears directly on the military profession which you here represent with such distinction: It is our aim to help nations and peoples remain independent and to help them build the longrun economic, social, and political foundations for that independence. From the enunciation of the Truman Doctrine and the launching

of the Marshall Plan in 1947 down to the present, we have honored the requests of governments which have sought our military and economic assistance to these ends. And from Berlin to Southeast Asia, from the Caribbean to the Middle East, we remain engaged in this historic mission, on every continent.

We understand that the military in other countries of the free world are the trustees of national independence, just as we know that those who have gone forth from this military academy at West Point have been for more than 160 years, along with their colleagues in other services, the trustees of the independence and security of the United States.

It is also clear that in the developing nations of the contemporary world the military are coming increasingly to accept the fact that independence requires more than military defense. In the world of modern science and technology—of communications which make of this whole planet a relatively small, interconnected community—independence requires that each nation build its own version of a modern society, bringing to its people the fruits of modern science and technology in ways which conform to its own history and traditions, its own culture and aspirations.

This link between national independence and the modernization of societies is no stranger to the American military tradition—indeed, to this very institution; for West Point was our first school of engineering in the United States. The men trained here in the first half of the 19th century not only protected and extended our

¹ Address made before the 1964 Conference of American Armies at the U.S. Military Academy, West Point, N.Y., on Aug. 7 (press release 359 dated Aug. 6, revised).

² BULLETIN of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

continental frontiers, but they also helped to lay our arteries of transportation and helped to build and even operate them. President Lincoln recalled General McClellan in 1861, from the presidency of the Illinois Central Railroad, to take command of the Union armies.

We were, perhaps, the first developing nation to have what would now be called a civic-action program run by the military, owing something, however, to the 18th-century tradition of the French; and that role of construction continues in our services to the present day. In fiscal year 1963 the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, for example, carried out some \$1.1 billion in public works on behalf of the Nation. I know that many of the services you represent are contributing—in construction as well as in defense—to the building of that modern independent Latin America which is rapidly emerging on the world scene. The armed forces in at least 16 Latin American countries are engaged in civic-action programs—programs of road building, public health, and education, among others, which not merely advance their nations' development but also tend to bind up in common effort the military and civil elements in their separate societies.

It is, therefore, wholly appropriate that I talk to you today, in this place, about the Alliance for Progress—where it now stands, its problems, and its prospects.

The Basis for the Inter-American Committee

I speak to you at a particular moment in the history of the Alliance for Progress. We have passed, I believe, a critical turning point in its affairs.

At São Paulo last November 15 the governments of the hemisphere decided to create in CIAP a kind of steering committee or board of directors for the Alliance for Progress.³ The Chairman of CIAP is Dr. Carlos Sanz de Santamaría, a distinguished Colombian who, I predict, will emerge in this hemisphere as Mr. Alliance for Progress. Under his chairmanship there are seven members of CIAP. Six

are Latin Americans. Each is chosen by a group of Latin American countries. Their job, like mine, is to think in terms of the enterprise as a whole and to set policy for the Alliance for Progress, as defined by the letter and spirit of the Charter of Punta del Este. We are advised by three distinguished Latin American leaders: the Secretary General of the OAS [Organization of American States], Dr. [José] Mora; Dr. Felipe Herrera, President of the Inter-American Bank; and Dr. José Antonio Mayobre, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America. In addition, there are the "nine wise men"—mainly Latin American economists of the greatest distinction, who advise the Latin American governments on planning and development policy and participate fully in the deliberations of CIAP.

Behind the creation of CIAP lay these fundamental perceptions shared by our governments.

First, the Alliance for Progress cannot and should not be viewed as a bilateral aid program between individual Latin American countries and the United States. It is, as I said earlier, a common commitment by the governments to their peoples that this is the decade in which we shall all work together to bring about in this hemisphere sustained economic growth under conditions of increasing social justice and political democracy. The Alliance for Progress is, in its essence, therefore, a collective and not a bilateral program.

Second, the primary responsibility for conducting the alliance must lie with the nations and peoples of Latin America themselves. No outside power or international institution can bring about the transformations required to yield sustained economic growth, along the social and political lines desired by a nation. Only the human beings within a nation, working together toward a common goal, building and improving their own institutions, can do the job. Moreover, more than 80 percent of the material resources now being invested in Latin America are the resources of the Latin American nations themselves. President Johnson has made it quite clear that the commitment of the United States to the Alliance for Progress has

³ For text of a statement made by Under Secretary Harriman before the Inter-American Economic and Social Council at São Paulo, Brazil, on Nov. 13, 1963, see *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 937.

never been stronger than it is today. And I am confident that this is also true of the international institutions—notably the World Bank, led by Mr. George Woods, and the Inter-American Bank, led by Dr. Felipe Herrera, who contributed so much to the CIAP meetings in Mexico City last month. But all of us working to generate and contribute resources from outside Latin America can only be junior partners in the enterprise. The heart of the task lies in the nations of Latin America themselves.

Third, the Alliance for Progress is a multilateral effort in a different sense. There is a strong impulse in Latin America to break out of the traditional national approaches to development, which have marked the last generation, and to work toward increased economic unity in Latin America. That impulse takes many forms, among them efforts to organize the Central American Common Market, the Latin American Free Trade Area, and to carry forward a growing list of development projects which involve more than one country and which would bind the nations of Latin America closer together. There is a desire among the Latin American nations and peoples to give increasing economic substance to the elements of common history, common tradition, and common culture of the region; and there are good technical and economic reasons which support this powerful sentiment.

Finally, those who met at São Paulo and created CIAP also perceived that the Alliance for Progress must be multilateral in the sense that all the agencies committed to assist Latin American development should concert their efforts on a team basis in support of the national and multinational plans, programs, and projects which are its substance.

All these insights and judgments lay behind the decision to multilateralize the Alliance for Progress and to create CIAP as an instrument for this purpose.

There was a second strand of thought present at the São Paulo meetings. Taking stock after some 3 years of practical experience with the Alliance for Progress, our governments had every reason to reaffirm the goals and principles of the Punta del Este Charter. But they felt it was time to identify the specific problems that were delaying forward movement and to attack

those problems on a practical basis with great energy. They judged that what was required was machinery to move the whole enterprise forward at a faster pace.

Thus, as the members of CIAP gathered in Mexico City last month at our first meeting, we were inspired and guided by these two principles: first, by the desire of our governments to reaffirm the alliance as a multilateral enterprise and to build it in a framework of true hemispheric partnership; and, second, by the need to get on with the job at an accelerated pace. It was in this collective and pragmatic spirit that we worked and wrote our report.⁴

Tasks Outlined by CIAP

I believe you will find our report a somewhat unusual international document. It does not consist of resolutions. It is a statement of a series of problems, followed by specific assignments of responsibility for dealing with them. It is strictly an action document.

The tasks of the alliance are broken down under four major headings: the domestic effort of the Latin American nations; foreign trade; problems of external assistance to Latin America; and Latin American economic integration. Under each heading we tried to isolate quite specific problems which have to be solved if the alliance is to reach its targets. We considered how these problems might be tackled; and we assigned action to those elements, within the whole machinery of the Alliance for Progress, which are most capable of bringing about solutions.

As a result of this method I can tell you we made a lot of work for ourselves, for our governments, and for the various institutions committed to the Alliance for Progress.

Between now and the next meeting of CIAP in October of this year we shall have to address ourselves to more than 20 specific tasks, including an intensive country-by-country review of the state of Alliance for Progress plans and programs. A good many of the problems we posed

⁴ *Final Report: First Meeting of the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress (CIAP)*; a limited number of copies are available upon request from the Press Division, Pan American Union, Washington, D.C., 20006.

will, of course, not be finally solved between now and October; but, in the wake of this CIAP meeting, I can report to you that, throughout the hemisphere, in the international institutions of the alliance connected with it, and in the Government of the United States, there is not merely great activity but a fresh determination to grapple with these problems and to get on with the job.

Let me briefly list some of these tasks.

We agreed that we must accelerate the formulation of national development plans and programs. Nine countries of the hemisphere have already completed such plans. It is our hope that in the year ahead all the others will do so. As we indicated in our report, we do not believe that such national programming is a panacea for economic development. We need national plans because they offer a useful and essential method for establishing priorities, for achieving balance in the process of economic growth, for identifying critical bottlenecks, and for providing a clear and rational basis for the allocation of external aid.

We agreed that it was necessary to launch a concerted program in Latin America designed to break down the market barriers between the cities and the countryside. Inefficient marketing arrangements not merely make agricultural products in the cities more expensive than they should be, but they also inhibit that expansion and diversification of agriculture which Latin America urgently requires. Moreover, the sluggishness of Latin American agriculture limits the size of industrial markets and prevents more rapid industrial development.

We agreed that the governments of Latin America should urgently seek greater efficiency in government-owned corporations. Large deficits in certain of these corporations in certain countries are not merely a drain on public revenues but also a major cause of inflation.

We agreed that, quite aside from the work going forward in the United Nations and other international bodies to expand Latin American trade, CIAP should take a hand, especially, in ironing out trade problems within the hemisphere and, if possible, in helping our colleagues in LAFTA get on with their mission.

We agreed that a major effort should be made

to generate more projects for external financing in Latin America; and that both Latin American resources and the resources of the governments and agencies engaged in external assistance should be mobilized for that purpose, since it is a fact that there are more resources available, particularly in the international banking institutions, than are now being fully exploited for the financing of projects.

We examined candidly what all the governments of the hemisphere, including the United States Government, could do to speed the flow of external assistance and streamline the methods for granting such assistance.

We launched a new effort to establish guidelines for the role of foreign private investment in Latin America that would reconcile the legitimate interests of the investor and the country concerned.

We examined a catalog of multinational projects now on the drawing boards, or further advanced, which, if completed, would tend to bind Latin America closer together; and we set up machinery to help push these along.

We made arrangements to refine and complete by October an overall review of Latin American economic requirements and the availability of external resources to meet them for the years 1956-65.

We made arrangements to try to help Costa Rica and Honduras, where, as you know, natural phenomena—the eruption of Irazu in Costa Rica and the forestry plague in Honduras—bear heavily on the economic life of these two nations.

The first CIAP action list is even longer than this. But we are under no illusion that defining problems and assigning men and institutions to work on them automatically insures success. CIAP will be judged by the governments and peoples of the hemisphere—and it should be judged—by the concrete results achieved in the months and years ahead.

What I can tell you now is simply this: Working together as brothers, we approached our task, not as representatives of nations engaged in negotiation or bargaining, but as the board of directors of a great common enterprise. To carry forward that enterprise will require the highest degree of cooperation, not

only among the governments of the hemisphere but among the various agencies seeking to assist in Latin American development. Both at the meeting in Mexico City and subsequently there has been heartening evidence of the willingness of all to work together on that team basis to a large common end.

As I said on a public occasion at the end of the CIAP meeting, I believe the Alliance for Progress has grown up; and it has grown up in the only way it could—through the assumption of responsibility and leadership by our Latin American friends.

There are no miracles in economic development. There is no easy way or cheap shortcut to restructuring a society so that it may absorb and apply the fruits of modern science and technology in ways which provide for all the people greater prosperity, greater social justice under conditions of human freedom. It is because the task is so inherently complex that we have always thought of the Alliance for Progress in terms of at least a decade's purposeful common effort.

Stages of Industrialization

In concluding let me draw back, for a moment, from these details of the program and say a word, if you would permit me, as an historian.

The nations of Latin America fall, broadly speaking, into two groups.

There is one group of Latin American nations which, in the last generation, have experienced their first major surge of industrialization. Great modern cities have been built, some of them among the most handsome in the world. Skills in government administration have been acquired. Competence has been developed not merely in textiles but in metalworking, chemicals, electronics, and other sophisticated branches of modern industry. A working force has been developed in these sectors with skills that match any in North America, Europe, or Japan. Engineers, industrial managers, and bankers have been trained. In the vocabulary of the *Stages of Economic Growth*, a takeoff has occurred in these Latin American countries; but the takeoff has been

centered, as has always been the case in the past, around a narrow group of sectors.

In the case of modern Latin America, the leading sectors of the takeoff have been in industries producing goods in substitution for imports. These have often been the kinds of luxury products which the more well-to-do groups in Latin America earlier purchased from abroad; for example, automobiles, refrigerators, radios, et cetera.

These import substitution takeoffs have given to the more advanced countries of Latin America critically important new assets. But the whole process has also created certain major distortions in the structure of these nations. Although much work has been done in the countryside of Latin America, it is clear, that, relative to the cities, rural life has been neglected. Agricultural production has not expanded in such a way as to take advantage of the possibilities not merely for providing food for the rapidly growing cities but for providing agricultural raw materials for industry and exports. Nor has the countryside, where most Latin Americans still live, become a vital market for manufactures.

Thus, with limited markets, the pace of industrialization has not been sufficient to absorb the families who have come from the villages and now live in poverty and semiunemployment around the edge of the cities.

Working behind high tariff barriers, Latin American industrialists have not yet developed the habits and disciplines of that efficiency which only the winds of competition can bring. And, as we noted at the CIAP meeting, certain government-owned corporations operate on deficits which weigh down the public budgets and either inhibit public investment or force governments into inflationary finance.

It is the existence of these distortions which explains the relatively slow rate of growth in some of the more advanced Latin American nations. In these nations the great historical task of the months and years ahead is to move to correct the structural distortions that came about in this first takeoff phase of industrialization and to open the road to a progressive spreading out from the cities of the methods,

techniques, and advantages of modern industrial life. The task in these Latin American countries is to move from the takeoff into a sustained drive to industrial maturity. What this involves is a simultaneous movement toward national integration within Latin American countries and toward regional integration of the whole area. The surge of industrialization begun over a narrow front—in a few sectors, in a few cities—must now be extended to become a national and regional phenomenon.

With a sustained and purposeful effort by all elements in their populations and assisted by all of us in the international community, I believe these more advanced countries in Latin America could, in a few years of hard and concerted work, recover from the distortions which developed during their takeoff phase and launch themselves along the path to technological maturity on a broad front.

There are other countries in Latin America which are at earlier stages of industrialization. They have not yet begun, or are just beginning, the takeoff process; for example, the countries of the Central American Common Market. In these cases our common task in the alliance is to help devise with them a takeoff process that moves them forward into the family of industrial and modernized nations in ways which avoid, if possible, the acute and sometimes painful economic and social distortions that have marked industrialization in Latin America over the past generation.

Looked at in this way, the Alliance for Progress should emerge as an instrument capable of assisting all the nations of Latin America to move forward, whatever their present stage of development, and to do so in ways which tighten the bonds of association and sense of communal destiny throughout the hemisphere.

All of us connected with the Alliance for Progress understand well that many problems lie ahead. But I, for one, have never been more confident that this effort will succeed. It will succeed because our friends in Latin America wish it to succeed and because they are acting with increased determination to make it succeed.

I have no doubt that this generation of Latin

American leaders in every walk of life—civil and military—is determined to see emerge a Latin America which has mastered and applied the arts of modern science and technology and made their fruits available to all their peoples. They intend to do so in ways which preserve and enlarge the great Latin American cultural heritage. And they intend to bring the nations and peoples of this remarkable continent onto the world stage in a role of dignity and increased responsibility.

In that effort they will have the steady support of the Government and people of the United States. We are happy and privileged to be partners of our neighbors in this—the most important decade of Latin American history since the Liberation.

U.S. and Australia To Establish Educational Foundation

Press release 363 dated August 10

Department Statement

The Department of State welcomes the opportunity to join with Australia in announcing that arrangements have been made to conclude an agreement establishing a joint Australian-American Educational Foundation.

This agreement is made possible, insofar as the United States is concerned, by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), which authorizes and encourages cost-sharing arrangements for educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and other countries.

The Department is pleased to associate itself with the following announcement, which is being made by the Government of Australia at 6:00 p.m. (4:00 a.m., e.d.t.), Monday, August 10, in Canberra.

Australian Announcement

The Prime Minister [Robert G. Menzies] announced today that arrangements have been made to conclude an agreement with the United States Government to establish a joint Austra-

lian-American Educational Foundation.

The basis of the agreement is that starting with the present financial year the two countries will contribute equally to provide an annual budget not exceeding 180,000 pounds (\$400,000) to finance a program of educational exchanges between the United States and Australia.

In announcing the new arrangements the Prime Minister said that the new scheme would, to a large extent, be modeled on the existing Fulbright program of educational exchanges. He recalled that the Fulbright program came into being in 1949 as one of the elements in the settlement of Australia's debt to the United States under the final accounting of the wartime lend-lease and reciprocal lend-lease arrangements. At that time, the United States generously agreed to apply part of the money it received in settlement of these debts to financing the United States Educational Foundation in Australia. As a result, a trust fund equivalent in Australian pounds to \$5 million was set up. This fund together with interest has since been used by the Foundation to finance the Fulbright program of educational exchanges between the United States and Australia. It is now nearly exhausted and the two Governments, conscious of the great value that has been derived from the Fulbright program, and of the desirability of continuing with something similar, jointly agreed to establish as equal partners a scheme to succeed it.

Under the Fulbright program, Australians have received travel grants to enable them to visit the United States, where they have taken up awards and posts made available by American institutions. Some of them have been lecturers and research scholars and others have been post-graduate students. The scheme has also provided travel grants to enable Australian teachers to exchange with American teachers. Under the Fulbright program, also, United States citizens in similar categories have been assisted to visit Australia by the provision of travel grants and living allowances.¹

The new foundation will be controlled by a joint Australian-American Board of Directors, which will be established in Australia. The Prime Minister said that he had every confidence that under the new arrangements the educational exchange program would at least match

the success of the present program. The money available annually to the new foundation will be above the annual expenditure in any year by the United States Educational Foundation in Australia.

The Prime Minister added that this was only a preliminary announcement corresponding with one being made in Washington at this time by the United States Government. He said that in due course there would be more detailed announcements of the terms of the agreement and of the membership of the Board of Directors of the Australian-American Educational Foundation.

Mrs. Johnson To Participate in Campobello Park Ceremonies

The White House announced on August 12 (White House press release) that Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson and Mrs. Lester B. Pearson, wife of the Canadian Prime Minister, will visit Campobello Island, New Brunswick, on August 20 to participate in ceremonies establishing the Roosevelt Campobello International Park at the summer home formerly belonging to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt.

During their meeting in Washington last January, the President and the Prime Minister signed an agreement to establish the international park.² The property has generously been donated by the Hammer family to the Governments of Canada and the United States as a memorial to President Roosevelt. Implementing legislation has now been passed by the Legislatures of both countries, and the final steps are now being taken to establish the park, which will be operated by a commission of three Canadian members and three United States members.

¹ Since 1949, when the Fulbright program was established, 1,396 academic grantees have been exchanged between the two countries: 801 Australians and 595 Americans. Categories of grants awarded to Australians were: university study, 373; teachers, 132; professors and research scholars, 296. Corresponding figures for the Americans: university study, 243; teachers, 88; professors and research scholars, 264.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 206.

The White House also announced the names of the members of the commission on the part of the United States. They will be Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Senator Edmund S. Muskie, and Sumner T. Pike. The alternates will be Miss Grace Tully, Samuel I. Rosenman, and Harry Umphrey.

U.S. and Japan Agree To Recess Aviation Consultations

Joint Communiqué

Press release 357 dated August 5

1. Consultation for the modification of the Schedule of the Civil Air Transport Agreement between Japan and the United States¹ was conducted, upon the request of the Japanese Government in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement, in Washington, D.C., between June 22 and August 5, 1964.

The delegations of Japan and of the United States, in a cordial and frank atmosphere, held thorough and earnest discussions on the review of air routes prescribed in the present Agreement, in plenary meetings as well as in several working group sessions.

2. In spite of the efforts of both delegations, it became apparent that there still was a marked discrepancy between the positions of the two sides. Therefore, the delegations agreed to recess the present consultations.

3. The two delegations further agreed to recommend to each Government that after devoting ample time to examining the matter, particularly the positions of both sides, centering on the proposals made at the current meetings, the two Governments would hold renewed consultations at an appropriate time in the near future.

4. In view of the friendly relations between the United States and Japan the two delegations expressed the hope it would be possible to reach an amicable and satisfactory agreement during the renewed consultations.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2854 and 4158.

Department Opposes Legislation Ending Aid to Indonesia

*Statement by Robert J. McCloskey
Deputy Director, Office of News*¹

The Department considers that it would be unwise for Congress to terminate U.S. aid to Indonesia, thereby reducing the administration's flexibility in the conduct of U.S. relations with that country. Our present aid program consists of malaria eradication, certain technical assistance, and training of selected groups of Indonesians in the United States and through U.S. university and other American specialists in Indonesia.

We hope that, after a full presentation of all the facts bearing on the question, the conference committee of the House and the Senate will eliminate or modify this provision prior to final passage of the assistance act.

President Names Additional Public Advisers for Trade Negotiations

The White House announced on August 13 that the President has appointed five additional members to the Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations which advises Governor Christian A. Herter, the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in connection with the current Kennedy Round of trade negotiations under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).² The five new appointees are: Joseph M. Baird, Dr. Persia Campbell, John M. Mathis, Sidney S. Sweet, and Dr. Caroline F. Ware.³

Dr. Campbell and Dr. Ware are members of the President's Advisory Committee on Consumer Affairs. The new appointments bring the membership of the Public Advisory Committee for Trade Negotiations up to 45.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 14.

² For texts of Executive orders relating to the Committee, see BULLETIN of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 506, and July 20, 1964, p. 92.

³ For biographic details, see White House press release dated Aug. 3; for names of other members of the Committee, see White House press release dated Mar. 2, 1964.

United States International Aviation Month, 1964

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS a diplomatic conference was convened at the invitation of the United States of America in Chicago, Illinois, on November 1, 1944, at which was formulated the Convention on International Civil Aviation, opened for signature on December 7, 1944, and signed by plenipotentiaries of the fifty-two participating governments; and

WHEREAS the United States as well as one hundred and five other governments have ratified or adhered to the Convention; and

WHEREAS the Convention created the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO); and

WHEREAS the council of ICAO has decided to observe on December 7, 1964, the twentieth anniversary of the signing of the Convention and to request all member governments to associate the anniversary with any special aviation event held during the year in their respective countries:

NOW, THEREFORE, I LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim the month of December 1964 as United States International Aviation Month; and I invite the Governors of the States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, and appropriate officials in other areas subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to issue similar proclamations and to join in the observance of the event at all appropriate levels.


I also request interested agencies of the Government, United States international air carriers, the United States aeronautical manufacturing industry, and other interested organizations to cooperate in arranging such activities during the month of observance as may be appropriate.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this 28th day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred

[SEAL] and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the

United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3602; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 11081.

THE CONGRESS

Foreign Policy and the Regulation of International Shipping

*Statement by G. Griffith Johnson
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs¹*

I welcome the opportunity to testify on behalf of the Department of State concerning the foreign policy implications of the Shipping Act of 1916 as amended in October 1961. Special foreign policy questions arise from our implementation of U.S. shipping legislation which requires certain information from carriers and conferences engaged in the foreign commerce of the United States and requires that dual rate contracts employed by steamship lines and members of shipping conferences conform to specifications established in U.S. law and regulations. The exports and imports of the United States are carried both in American-flag ships and in ships owned by nationals of other countries, chiefly the 10 leading maritime countries of Europe and Japan. The enforcement of U.S. regulatory activities consequently involves carriers, shipping conferences, and shippers located both in the United States and in other countries.

It is apparent that a basically different approach to the regulation of maritime shipping characterizes the United States on the one hand and the European maritime countries and Japan on the other. The attitude of the Europeans and Japanese generally is that government regulation of shipping in international trade is to be avoided.

The attitude of the United States, on the other hand, is that the public interest requires a degree of governmental regulation. The international character of shipping must affect the means by which we regulate, but it does not eliminate our concern for the welfare of citizens engaged in or

¹ Made before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on Aug. 11 (press release 364).

affected by foreign trade. Each nation, in the view of the United States, has the right to do what it considers proper to facilitate its trade, including regulation where it is deemed necessary. This is not a new principle, and it has standing in both law and practice. Carriers in international trade have long been aware that they must comply with the laws of each country involved.

There is another factor which inclines the United States to regulation of shipment of its foreign commerce. The U.S. Supreme Court in the *Isbrandtsen* case cast grave doubts on the legality of dual rate contracts under our anti-trust statutes. In 1958 Congress enacted interim legislation to legalize dual rate contracts. Public Law 87-346 authorizes ocean carriers and conferences serving the foreign commerce of the United States to enter into dual rate contracts with shippers and consignees provided the contract is filed with and approved by the Federal Maritime Commission.

Under the conference system, contracts are made and rates are set through conference action rather than by competition. It has been our policy to require some assurance that the terms of the contracts and the rates set in this fashion are not harmful to merchants nor discriminatory against our trade generally. To seek this assurance of fairness is far different from government setting or even government approval of rates. Countries which participate in carrying the U.S. trade do not always manifest an awareness that the Bonner Act is intended to legalize dual rate contracts in U.S. foreign commerce and thus to stabilize the conference system.

While for these reasons the United States has undertaken regulation of carriers in its foreign commerce, it has likewise recognized the limitations upon such regulation arising from principles of comity and international law. The difference between our attitude and that of the maritime nations of Europe and Japan on regulation of shipping creates also an area of disagreement as to the effect of these limitations. The Department of State believes that some of the differences in point of view may be resolved in discussion and negotiation. Mean-

while, I wish to repeat the point made earlier in these hearings by Admiral [John] Harllee that "unilateral regulation" is a correct description of U.S. action only in the sense that we choose to regulate in an area which the Europeans and Japanese do not choose to regulate. Our decision to regulate was prompted by the national interest and not by any desire to preempt the field from others. As I will be repeating in connection with the dual rate contracts, we do not claim an exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the carriers in the U.S. foreign trade. In the case of both our exports and our imports, there is a concurrent jurisdiction, which we recognize and are prepared to discuss. But the problem is of one kind if the United States alone wishes to regulate; it is of another kind if other countries wish to exercise their concurrent jurisdiction.

Information on Rates and Dual Rate Contracts

Now I wish to discuss the reaction of the Europeans and the Japanese in the matter of information on rates and dual rate contracts.

In November 1963 the Federal Maritime Commission issued orders under section 21 of the Shipping Act calling upon conference and steamship lines to produce information and documents in connection with the Commission's studies of rate disparities. A joint note was presented to the Department in December 1963 by the Netherlands Embassy on behalf of the Governments of Belgium, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, asserting that these orders violated their respective jurisdictions. The note likewise stated that the governments found it necessary to restrain their nationals from compliance. The Government of Finland associated itself with the protest of the 11 governments, and the Federal Republic of Germany and the United Kingdom submitted separate notes of protest on the subject. The Government of Ireland also presented a note.

At the request of the foreign governments the Federal Maritime Commission and the Department of State participated in meetings on this subject with the Europeans and Japanese

under the auspices of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris in February and June. At the June 23-24 session, Admiral Harllee proposed a plan for voluntary exchange of this information utilizing a government-to-government basis where the maritime countries wished. It is important that this longstanding problem should be resolved promptly, and preferably by a course of action which is mutually agreed.

The other area of regulatory activities concerns the dual rate contracts. The Shipping Act of 1916, as amended by the Bonner Act, authorizes ocean carriers and conferences serving the foreign commerce of the United States to enter into dual rate contracts with shippers and consignees, provided the contract is filed with and approved by the Commission. There was a long period of public hearings on the form of these contracts prior to their approval by the Commission on March 30, 1964. Foreign and domestic groups who had an interest were afforded ample opportunity to express their views. Moreover, in order to assist the transition from the old to the new contracts and to permit the conferences and shippers to continue to operate without interruption under a dual rate system, the Commission granted the conferences and shippers what was in effect a 90-day period of grace reaching to July 3, 1964. During this time the Commission, under the auspices of the Department of State, met with representatives of maritime countries in an attempt to resolve objections they had raised to particular clauses involving jurisdiction in the model contracts. Of the seven clauses to which the maritime countries took exception, the Commission agreed in principle to delete six.

On June 29, 1964, the Commission granted an additional period of grace until September 1, 1964, with a view to easing further the transition from the old to the new contracts.

Reaction of European Nations and Japan

The reaction of the European nations and Japan to the dual rate cases was presented last April 13 in a note by the Netherlands Embassy, on behalf of the same countries named in the note of December 1963.

The note stresses two difficulties of the dual

rate contracts from the standpoint of the Europeans and the Japanese. The first was their concern that, to enter into new contracts, the shippers and carriers would be required to break existing contracts. The U.S. reply of May 12, 1964, noted that the law requiring unapproved contracts to be terminated by April 4, 1963, later extended to April 4, 1964, had been enacted in October 1961. Nevertheless, the U.S. note emphasized the Federal Maritime Commission's willingness to give the utmost consideration to the problems of transition experienced by shippers and carriers, provided genuine effort was being made to adjust to the requirements of the U.S. law.

The second objection of the Europeans and Japanese was that the action of the Commission in enforcement of the provisions concerning dual rates constituted an infringement of their jurisdiction. The April 1964 note reserved the rights of the maritime countries to prohibit their nationals from accepting any imposed form of contract or terminating existing contracts governed by their laws.

In reply, the United States note of May 12, 1964, asserted the necessity of assuring that dual rate contracts in U.S. trade will conform to U.S. law. When the United States exercises jurisdiction over the shipment of foreign goods in a foreign-owned ship to the United States, we do not lay claim to an exclusive jurisdiction. The country of the shipper and shipowner has a concurrent jurisdiction. Moreover, we stated the United States continued to be open to discussion of ways of exercising our jurisdiction so as not to conflict with the jurisdiction of other sovereign nations. The present situation is not really one of conflicting jurisdictions but is essentially one in which the United States seeks to regulate that which the Europeans and Japanese would leave to the shipping conferences. To be concerned with U.S. trade in one direction only would not fulfill the letter nor the spirit of our law, nor does it meet the full obligation to protect the welfare of all in our foreign commerce. Since one purpose of this part of the law is to legalize a form of dual rate contracts and secure the conference system while at the same time giving assurance that there is no discrimination against U.S. interests, it remains the hope of the Department of State

that European and Japanese members of shipping conferences will comply.

On July 8 the Shipping Contracts and Commercial Documents Bill was introduced in the British Parliament and has now become law. It provides that a Minister of the Crown could give directions to a person in the United Kingdom prohibiting him from complying with the requirement to furnish to any court, tribunal, or authority of a foreign country any commercial document or to submit any contract which is not within the territorial jurisdiction of that country. I submit the following observations on the British bill:

1. As Admiral Harlee has already observed in these hearings, this bill explicitly confers on the executive of the United Kingdom the authority it and other maritime countries have explained to us they already have to restrain their nationals from compliance with the Federal Maritime Commission's requirements.

2. The bill does not constitute an attempt of the United Kingdom to regulate international shipping but rather authorizes prohibition of a British national from complying with certain requirements made by a foreign country.

3. The bill is permissive. At the second reading in the British Parliament on July 15 the British Minister of Transport said:

Its sole purpose is to give the government permissive powers to prevent encroachment on United Kingdom jurisdiction and to protect our interests. I hope that it will not be necessary to use these powers and that our difficulties can be settled by understanding and friendly negotiations.

That "our difficulties can be settled by understanding and friendly negotiations" is likewise the hope of the Department of State. The United States does not seek a trial of strength in which enforcement is sought against a defendant who uses the British bill or an executive order by one of the European or Japanese Governments as his defense. We hope a solution can be reached which will provide satisfaction to both sides. At the same time the United States is not willing to acquiesce in a mere succession of postponements of the effective date of dual rate contracts requirements.

In the Department's view any question of postponement should be judged according to substantial evidence as to whether additional time offers a real prospect of progress toward an accommodation of the U.S. regulatory objective and the European and Japanese view of jurisdiction.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

International Boundary and Water Commission, United States and Mexico. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 9444, H.R. 9445, and H.R. 7419. June 23-24, 1964. 49 pp.

Interest Equalization Tax Act. Hearings before the Senate Committee on Finance on H.R. 8000, an act to amend the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to impose a tax on acquisitions of certain foreign securities in order to equalize costs of longer term financing in the United States and in markets abroad, and for other purposes. June 29-July 2, 1964. 359 pp.

Reduction of Oil Pollution in the St. Lawrence Seaway and Adjacent Waters. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 45. S. Rept. 1244. July 28, 1964. 4 pp.

Appointment of a Commissioner General for United States Participation in the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition. Report to accompany S. 2905. S. Rept. 1248. July 28, 1964. 9 pp.

Foreign Service Buildings Act Amendments. Report to accompany H.R. 11754. S. Rept. 1250. July 28, 1964. 4 pp.

Promoting the Economic and Social Development of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 3198. S. Rept. 1258. July 29, 1964. 18 pp.

Report of the Seventh Meeting of the Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group, January 14-18, 1964, Washington, D.C. Submitted by Cornelius E. Gallagher, chairman of the House of Representatives delegation. H. Rept. 1693. August 4, 1964. 9 pp.

The International Bridge Act of 1964. Report to accompany S. 3074. S. Rept. 1304. August 4, 1964. 4 pp.

Providing for an Investigation and Study To Determine a Site for the Construction of a Sea Level Canal Connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. Report to accompany S. 2701. H. Rept. 1706. August 6, 1964. 10 pp.

Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 1964. Report to accompany H.R. 12253. H. Rept. 1728. August 8, 1964. 75 pp.

Providing for the Appointment of a Commissioner General for U.S. Participation in the Canadian Universal and International Exhibition. Report to accompany H.R. 11707. H. Rept. 1738. August 11 1964. 4 pp.

U.N. Security Council Calls for Cease-Fire in Cyprus

Following is a statement made by U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson in the U.N. Security Council on August 9, together with the text of a resolution adopted by the Council on the same day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON

U.S./U.N. press release 4430

All of us who have been present at the discussions of this question have had ample evidence of the depth of feeling that exists between the two communities in Cyprus and the homicidal consequences of their mistrust and bitterness. And we have had repeated and bloody reminders that the danger is not just to the inhabitants of Cyprus. The danger is even greater: The danger is international war.

The responsibility of the Council is to stop hostilities—and until *all* are stopped, *none* will stop. Archbishop Makarios says that unless Turkey stops its air attacks by 12:00 noon he will launch a full-scale attack on the Turkish community and forces. The Government of Turkey says that until the Greeks in Cyprus stop attacking the Turks the air attacks will continue.

I repeat that in these circumstances until *all* hostilities stop, *none* will stop, and, perhaps in a matter of hours, we will be over the brink and in the abyss. And none can see the bottom. Most of us, perhaps all of us, wanted an immediate cease-fire last night. We didn't get it.

Today the situation is even more urgent. The situation demands swift action. Our first responsibility is to stop the fighting before it is too late.

To ascertain and debate the facts, to try to apportion the blame for this deplorable situa-

tion, may be an appropriate task for the Security Council when time and circumstance permit. But unless the present flames are quenched, and quenched quickly, they will spread, fanned by these hot fires of fear. If that happens, our deliberations will not be an inquiry; they will be an autopsy.

An appeal for a cease-fire is the swiftest action the Council can take. The President [of the Security Council] has issued such an appeal. Accordingly, I propose the adoption—unanimously and quickly, I would hope—of the following resolution to formally endorse and affirm the President's appeal. The resolution is introduced by the United States and the United Kingdom and reads as follows:

The Security Council,

Concerned by the serious deterioration of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming the appeal the President of the Security Council has just addressed to the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus:

1. *Calls for an immediate cease-fire by all concerned;*
2. *Calls upon all concerned to cooperate fully with the U.N. Commander in the restoration of peace and security; and*
3. *Calls on all states to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.*

After the adoption of such a resolution we can resume our discussion of the situation and consider what further steps are desirable to preserve the peace while the mediator continues his efforts to find a peaceful solution.

TEXT OF RESOLUTION¹

The Security Council,

Concerned at the serious deterioration of the situation in Cyprus,

Reaffirming the resolutions of the Security Council on this issue dated 4 March (S/5575),² 13 March (S/

¹ U.N. doc. S/5868; adopted Aug. 9 by a vote of 9 to 0, with 2 abstentions (Czechoslovakia and U.S.S.R.).

² For text, see BULLETIN of Mar. 23, 1964, p. 466.

Anticipating the submission of the Secretary-General's report on the situation,

1. *Reaffirms* the appeal of the President of the Council just addressed to the Governments of Turkey and Cyprus, as follows: "The Security Council has authorized me to make an urgent appeal to the Government of Turkey to cease instantly the bombardment and the use of military force of any kind against Cyprus, and to the Government of Cyprus to order the armed forces under its control to cease firing immediately."

2. *Calls* for an immediate cease-fire by all concerned;

3. *Calls* upon all concerned to co-operate fully with the United Nations Commander in the restoration of peace and security; and

4. *Calls* on all States to refrain from any action that might exacerbate the situation or contribute to the broadening of hostilities.

U.S. Welcomes Inquiry of Cambodian Charge of Chemical Operations

U.S./U.N. press release 4435 dated August 14

Following is the text of a letter from Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson, U.S. Representative to the United Nations, to the President of the Security Council, Sivert A. Nielsen, concerning charges by Cambodia against the United States.

AUGUST 14, 1964

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have the honor to refer to the letter to you from the Deputy United States Representative of August 3, 1964 (S/5847),¹ which contained the United States Government's categorical rejection of the charges listed by the Foreign Minister of the Royal Government of Cambodia in his telegram of July 28, 1964 (S/5839). As you know, the United States has been charged by the Royal Government of Cambodia with spreading poisonous chemicals by aircraft on the Cambodian province of Ratanakiri, reportedly resulting in a loss of life.

My Government wishes to point out that the Royal Government of Cambodia, in its broad-

casts and official press statements, continues to air these charges in spite of the letters sent to the President of the Security Council by my Government and by the Government of the Republic of Vietnam. These letters clearly stated that no Republic of Vietnam or American aircraft had conducted chemical operations of any character whatever, whether adjacent to the Cambodian territory indicated, or over Cambodian territory, on any of the dates or at any time in the period cited by the Royal Government of Cambodia. My Government has also instructed me to state that similar charges recently made by Representatives of the Royal Cambodian Government concerning the spreading of poisonous chemicals in the Cambodian province of Svay Rieng are equally unsubstantiated and untrue.

In view of the serious nature of these allegations and their repetition following categorical denials from my Government and from the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, my Government has instructed me to reaffirm the statement made in its letter of August 3 that the United States Government would welcome an impartial international investigation of the Cambodian charges. We believe the Royal Cambodian Government is also obliged in the interests of fairness and justice to permit an impartial inquiry by a qualified international body. An international organization such as the World Health Organization or the International Committee of the Red Cross would seem well-qualified to carry out this kind of investigation and to report the facts to the Security Council. My Government is fully prepared to cooperate in any impartial international inquiry that the Royal Cambodian Government will allow to take place.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a Security Council document.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

ADLAI E. STEVENSON

His Excellency

SIVERT A. NIELSEN,

President of the Security Council.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 67.

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 274.

Social Security and the Alliance for Progress

SEVENTH INTER-AMERICAN CONFERENCE ON SOCIAL SECURITY ASUNCIÓN, PARAGUAY, MAY 31-JUNE 5, 1964

by Ida C. Merriam

The potential contribution of social security programs to economic and social development is an issue of increasing importance in many parts of the world. It emerged as one of the dominant themes in the formal sessions and the informal discussions at the Seventh Inter-American Conference on Social Security, held at Asunción, Paraguay, from May 31 to June 5, 1964.

The subject was presented formally in an agenda item for which the background paper was prepared by Dr. Manuel Germán Parra of the Mexican Social Security Institute. Dr. Parra's paper placed its major stress on the need to assure that social justice accompanies and informs economic development. Social security systems providing—on the Mexican pattern—not only cash benefits but also health care and social services can become one of the major institutions for equitable distribution of the fruits of economic progress.

In the discussions of this and other papers there was also a general recognition of the actual and potential impact of social security financing as an aid or a deterrent to economic development, with widely varying opinions expressed as to the most desirable method of

handling and investing social security funds.

The first national social security program in the Western Hemisphere was Chile's health and pension insurance system, initiated in 1924. The funds collected from employers and employees over the years since then have made possible the building of many hospitals and clinics and the provision of medical services throughout most of the country. Sixteen of the Latin American countries now have health insurance programs (ordinarily providing both cash sickness and medical-service benefits), and three others have maternity benefit programs. Fifteen have pension systems, ordinarily providing old-age, invalidity, and survivors benefits.

In few of the Latin countries, however, do the pension programs approach universal coverage even of wage and salary workers. In most countries there are two, three, four, or more pension funds for different occupational groups. Retirement ages tend to be low and benefits high in relation to past earnings for those who receive them. Social security contributions represent a substantial fraction of all governmental revenues in a number of the countries (in 1959, according to a recent World Bank study, total social security receipts were equal to more than half of government current revenues in Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay), and the directors of social security institutes frequently have considerable political power.

It is against this background that one should assess the resolution adopted by the Conference calling for increased attention to social security within the framework of the Alliance for Prog-

• *Mrs. Merriam is Director of the Division of Research and Statistics, Social Security Administration. She was head of the U.S. delegation to the Seventh Inter-American Conference on Social Security.*

ress. This resolution looks to the development, by the Permanent Inter-American Committee on Social Security, of an inter-American social security development plan which would be incorporated in a "resolution to be attached to the Punta del Este Charter." The Conference charged the secretariat with the formation of a special committee to prepare a general proposal for an inter-American social security development plan which all Latin American governments would be requested to support at subsequent meetings of the Inter-American Economic and Social Council.

The Asunción meetings lasted less than a week, and, with the crowded agenda, there was not time to reconcile divergent views. However, it is clear that what is intended is a general statement that would provide very broad guidelines for the development of national programs associating social security with other goals of the Alliance for Progress.

It is too early to know how rapidly and determinedly this project will be carried out. There is no doubt, however, as to the serious and widespread interest among top social security officials in Latin America in promoting greater attention to social security as an instrument that can either contribute to or place barriers in the way of both economic and social development. It is perhaps significant that other items in the Conference agenda included the problems of the extension of social security to the rural population and to independent workers, domestics, and home workers.

The Inter-American Conference on Social Security was established in 1942. The Permanent Committee, the continuing body of the organization, was headed by Arthur Altmeyer, the U.S. Social Security Commissioner, from 1942 until 1952.

In 1952 a question arose as to the relation of the activities of the Conference and Permanent Committee to those of the International Labor Organization and the Organization of American States. When this was not resolved, the United States withdrew as a member of the Permanent Committee but has continued to send delegations to the meetings of the Conference. A revised draft constitution was under

discussion at the Asunción meeting but was not acted upon there. The Permanent Committee is scheduled to meet again next year in Costa Rica and will presumably take up the question at that time.

The conference in Asunción brought together official representatives from 18 countries—Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, the United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela—and from the OAS, the ILO, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau, and the International Social Security Association.

The Conference was very well organized. The modern hotel in which the delegates stayed and the meetings were held, it might be noted, was built with social security funds. The Paraguayan Social Security Institute managed all arrangements efficiently as well as graciously.

The significance of this Conference for the United States lies in the challenge it presents to us to expand our interest in the question of social security in relation to economic and social development in this hemisphere. Through U.S. initiative in the Alliance for Progress, backed up by a strengthening of our capabilities to provide technical assistance and training in social security planning and administration, we have an opportunity to provide leadership in an area of increasing importance and one in which the United States' own achievements and technical know-how are highly regarded.

U.S. Supports International Hydrological Decade

The White House announced on August 1 (White House press release dated August 1, for release August 2) that President Johnson had on that day met with his Science Adviser, Dr. Donald Hornig, to discuss plans for the participation of the United States in the International Hydrological Decade—a worldwide effort to advance our knowledge of water. The International Hydrological Decade, beginning in 1965, will involve the establishment of sta-

tions and networks throughout the world to measure and track water in the hydrologic cycle from rain to the underground water table and eventually back to the atmosphere.

Dr. Hornig noted that only 3 percent of the world's supply of water is fresh and three-quarters of that small percentage is locked up in the great ice and snow masses of Antarctica, Greenland, and the Arctic. The prudent and skillful use of water is a common concern of all mankind. Much of the information obtained in this worldwide program will have immediate use in developing water supplies for homes, farms, and factories, for the control of floods and droughts, for developing hydroelectric power and improving navigation. But some of the research will be long range, looking to a time when new sources such as the seas and the ice fields may supply a portion of the growing demand for water.

The idea for this international effort originated in the United States and has been enthusiastically received by most of the nations of the world. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) will give international leadership to the plan.

The President pledged support of the plan by government agencies and urged that universities and scientific societies also cooperate. He pointed out that this was important both in making knowledge serve man's welfare and in finding common ground on which the nations of the world could solve common problems.

World Bank Reports Net Income of \$97.5 Million in Fiscal 1964

The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development reported on August 10 a net income of \$97.5 million for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1964. Loan commissions earned during the year amounted to \$33.2 million and were credited to the special reserve, increasing that reserve to \$288.1 million. These figures compared to net earnings of \$82.7 million and loan commissions of \$31.3 million in the fiscal year 1963.

Effective July 1, 1964, the treatment of a portion of loan charges, amounting to 1 percent per annum of the disbursed and outstanding portion of loans held by the Bank, as commission, and its automatic allocation to the special reserve, was discontinued. With minor exceptions, all income from loans thereafter will be considered as regular income, and future allocations to the special reserve will be a matter for the Bank's Executive Directors to decide.

Net income for the fiscal year 1964 was credited to net income account, in conformity with a resolution adopted by the Executive Directors in September 1963 and noted with approval by the Board of Governors. The resolution, retroactive to July 1, 1963, provided for discontinuance of the automatic allocation of net income to the supplemental reserve against losses on loans and guarantees. On July 30, 1964, the Executive Directors allocated \$47.5 million from the year's net income to the supplemental reserve, increasing it to \$605.6 million. This increased total reserves, including the special reserve, to \$893.7 million. As to the remaining \$50 million of the year's net earnings, the Executive Directors have recommended to the Board of Governors, for action at its forthcoming annual meeting in Tokyo, that this sum be transferred to the Bank's affiliate, the International Development Association.

Effective July 1, 1964, the annual commitment charge on undisbursed portions of the Bank's loans, including existing loans, was reduced from $\frac{3}{4}$ of 1 percent to $\frac{3}{8}$ of 1 percent.

Gross income for the fiscal year 1964, exclusive of loan commissions, was \$219.1 million, compared with \$203.9 million in the preceding year. Expenses, which included \$102.6 million for interest on Bank borrowing and other financial expenses, totaled \$121.7 million, compared with \$121.2 million last year.

During the year, the Bank made 37 loans totaling \$809.9 million, compared with a total of \$448.7 million last year. The loans were made in Algeria, Chile (two loans), China, Colombia (two loans), Costa Rica, Denmark, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Iran, Japan (two loans), Liberia, Malaysia (two loans), Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, New Zealand (two loans), Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan (three

loans), Peru (two loans), Portugal (two loans), Spain, Thailand, Tunisia, Venezuela, and Yugoslavia. This brought the total number of loans to 386 in 73 countries and territories and raised the gross total of commitments to \$7,931.3 million. By June 30, as a result of cancellations, exchange adjustments, repayments and sales of loans, the portion of loans signed still retained by the Bank had been reduced to \$5,191.9 million.

Disbursements on loans were \$558.9 million, compared with \$620.4 million in the preceding year. Cumulative disbursements amounted to \$5,984.4 million on June 30, 1964.

During the year the Bank sold or agreed to sell \$173.3 million principal amounts of loans, compared with sales of \$273.3 million last year. On June 30, the total of such sales was \$1,778.6 million, of which all except \$69 million had been made without the Bank's guarantee.

Repayments of principal received by the Bank during the year amounted to \$117.4 million, and repayments to purchasers of parts of loans amounted to \$150 million. Total principal repayments amounted to \$1,586.2 million on June 30, consisting of \$772.7 million repaid to the Bank and \$813.5 million repaid to purchasers of borrowers' obligations sold by the Bank.

On June 30 the outstanding funded debt of the Bank was \$2,491.8 million, reflecting a net decrease of \$27.4 million in the past year. During the year the funded debt was increased by \$104.5 million through the private placement of a \$100 million U.S. dollar bond issue and the delivery of \$4.5 million of bonds which had been subject to delayed delivery arrangements. The debt was decreased by \$131.9 million as a result of the maturing of the equivalent of \$107.8 million of bonds and of sinking fund and purchase fund transactions amounting to \$24.1 million.

During the fiscal year the following 17 countries became members of the Bank: Algeria, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo (Brazzaville), Congo (Léopoldville), Dahomey, Gabon, Guinea, Kenya, Malagasy Republic, Mali, Mauritania, Rwanda, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uganda. Subscribed capital amounted to \$21,186 million on June 30, 1964.

"Group of 10" Releases Report on International Monetary System

Following is the text of a ministerial statement issued at Washington on August 10 by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, chairman of the Ministers and Governors of the "Group of 10" countries of the International Monetary Fund participating in the General Arrangements To Borrow.

1st AUGUST 1964

1. The Ministers and Governors of the ten countries participating in the General Arrangements to Borrow¹ have, over the past year, examined, with a long-range perspective, the wider implications of the obligations which they have accepted for helping to assure the stability and adequacy of the international payments system. They have reviewed the functioning of the international monetary system and its probable future needs for liquidity. The necessary studies were entrusted to a Group of Deputies, to be carried out in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund and with the participation of representatives of the staffs of the International Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and the Bank for International Settlements, as well as of an observer of the Swiss National Bank. The conclusions and decisions of the Ministers and Governors were greatly assisted by these studies, the results of which are described in the accompanying Annex.²

2. In reviewing the functioning of the international monetary system, the Ministers and Governors reaffirmed their conviction that a structure based, as the present is, on fixed exchange rates and the established price of gold, has proved its value as a foundation on which to build for the future. They further agreed that increasingly close cooperation among monetary authorities was an essential element

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615.

² Not printed here. Copies of the ministerial statement, with the annex, are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (20 cents).

supporting the system. As concerns liquidity, the Ministers and Governors are agreed that, for the international monetary system as a whole, supplies of gold and reserve currencies are fully adequate for the present and are likely to be for the immediate future. These reserves are supplemented by a broad range of credit facilities. The continuing growth of world trade and payments is likely to entail a need for larger international liquidity. This need may be met by an expansion of credit facilities and, in the longer run, may possibly call for some new form of reserve asset.

3. The smooth functioning of the international monetary system depends on the avoidance of major and persistent international imbalances and on the effective use of appropriate policies by national governments to correct them when they occur. The Ministers and Governors have therefore decided to initiate a thorough study of the measures and instruments best suited for achieving this purpose compatibly with the pursuit of essential internal objectives. In view of the experience it has already acquired in this field, Working Party 3 of the O.E.C.D. is being invited to take charge of this study.

4. A significant development in the evolution and strengthening of the system has been the emergence of a wide range of bilateral and multilateral credit facilities, notably to cope with speculative movements and sudden pressures. There has at the same time been increasing recognition of the fact that the way in which balance of payments deficits and surpluses are financed has implications for countries other than those directly concerned. The Ministers and Governors have consequently agreed on the usefulness of participating, through the international institutions which are already concerned with these problems, in a "multilateral surveillance" of the ways and means of financing balance of payments disequilibria. To this end, they have approved arrangements which will give the monetary authorities of countries participating in them a more comprehensive and up-to-date view of major trends and will afford them a better basis for strengthening their policy cooperation in the international monetary sphere. This should help them to avoid excesses

or shortages in the means of financing surpluses or deficits in the balance of payments, as well as to discuss measures appropriate for each country in accordance with the general economic outlook. The Ministers and Governors of the Group will meet from time to time to survey current developments in this field.

5. Looking further into the future, since there is a possibility that the supply of gold and foreign exchange reserves may prove to be inadequate for the over-all reserve needs of the world economy, the Ministers and Governors, without prejudging any aspect of this question, have approved the arrangements made by their Deputies for a study group to examine various proposals regarding the creation of reserve assets either through the I.M.F. or otherwise.

6. Finally, the Ministers and Governors have exchanged views on the adequacy of international credit arrangements. The International Monetary Fund, with large resources of credit and a code of obligations, occupies a central position. In order to further the Fund's capabilities and while recognizing that the responsibility for decisions concerning the provision of additional resources rests with the competent authorities of the I.M.F., itself, the Ministers and Governors, for their part, are agreed that they will, in the forthcoming quinquennial review of Fund quotas during 1965, support a moderate general increase in member quotas. At the same time, they will support relative adjustments of those individual quotas which are clearly out of line. In addition, the Deputies are instructed to study the questions related to the renewal of the General Arrangements to Borrow and to make recommendations to the Ministers and Governors before September, 1965.

7. The Ministers and Governors believe that the review of the international monetary system conducted during the past year has helped to clarify the fundamental considerations which underlie the various national points of view and has brought a fuller recognition of common interests. They believe that the spirit and practice of cooperation that have now been achieved warrant confidence that fully adequate, but not excessive, resources will be made available to

meet the liquidity requirements of the world as a whole. This readiness of their countries to work together in meeting unexpected developments or longer range requirements will strengthen the capacity of the international monetary system to support and sustain the objectives of growth, employment, and price stability that are shared among all people.

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Micrographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands Covering the Period From June 27, 1963, to June 29, 1964. S/5783. July 16, 1964. 52 pp.

The Cyprus Situation:

Letter dated July 22 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5827. July 22, 1964. 2 pp.

Messages dated July 16 from the Secretary-General to the Governments of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey and to the Vice President of Cyprus and replies received between July 17 and 22. S/5828. July 23, 1964. 13 pp.

Letter dated July 24 from the Representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council. S/5831. July 27, 1964. 5 pp.

Letter dated July 27 from the Representative of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council. S/5835. July 27, 1964. 2 pp.

Letter dated July 27 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5837. July 27, 1964. 3 pp.

Letter dated July 27 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5838. July 27, 1964. 2 pp.

Messages dated July 22 from the Secretary-General to the Government of Cyprus and the Vice President of Cyprus and letter dated July 27 from the Representative of Cyprus, transmitting his Government's reply. S/5843, July 29, 1964, 4 pp.; S/5842, July 28, 1964, 4 pp.

Exchange of messages between the President of Cyprus and the Secretary-General on August 6 and 7. S/5855, August 6, 1964, 1 p.; S/5869, August 10, 1964, 1 p.

Letter dated July 28 from the Chargé d'Affaires of Greece to the Secretary-General. S/5844. July 29, 1964. 2 pp.

Letter dated August 6 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5858. August 8, 1964. 4 pp.

Letter dated August 8 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5860. August 8, 1964. 2 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the International Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement between the United States and Austria of July 22, 1959 (TIAS 4402), concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna June 15 and July 28, 1964. Enters into force after notification by both Governments and upon acceptance by the Agency of initial inventory.
Signatures: Austria, International Atomic Energy Agency, United States.

Bills of Lading

International convention for the unification of certain rules relating to bills of lading with protocol of signature. Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into force June 2, 1931; as to the United States December 29, 1937. 51 Stat. 233.
Accession deposited: Algeria, April 13, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, August 11, 1964.

Enters into force: September 10, 1964.

Salvage

Convention for the unification of certain rules with respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Done at Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into force March 1, 1913. 37 Stat. 1658.

Accession deposited: Algeria, April 13, 1964.

Slavery

Supplementary convention on the abolition of slavery, the slave trade and institutions and practices similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7, 1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.¹

Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 17, 1964.

Accession deposited: Switzerland, July 28, 1964.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Nicaragua, June 24, 1964.

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 1959) (TIAS 4893), with annexes and additional protocol. Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Enters into force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.

Notifications of approval: France, June 20, 1964; East African Posts and Telecommunications Administration on behalf of Kenya, Tanganyika, and Uganda, June 22, 1964.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

BILATERAL

China

Amendment to the agreement of July 18, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3307, 4176, 4514, 5105), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 8, 1964.

Entered into force: August 6, 1964.

International Atomic Energy Agency

Agreement for the application of safeguards to United States reactor facilities. Signed at Vienna June 15, 1964.

Entered into force: August 1, 1964.

Japan

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention of April 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1960.²

Ratified by the President: August 5, 1964.

Protocol modifying and supplementing convention of April 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901), for avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962.²

Ratified by the President: August 5, 1964.

Luxembourg

Convention with respect to taxes on income and property. Signed at Washington December 18, 1962.²

Ratified by the President: August 5, 1964.

Mexico

Agreement for relief from double taxation on earnings from operation of ships and aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 7, 1964. Entered into force August 7, 1964.

Netherlands

Protocol modifying and supplementing the extension to the Netherlands Antilles of the convention of April 29, 1948, as amended (TIAS 1855, 3366, 3367), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and certain other taxes. Signed at The Hague October 23, 1963.²

Ratified by the President: August 5, 1964.

Portugal

Amendment to the agreement of July 21, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3317, 3899, 4519, 5111), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 11, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Sweden

Convention supplementing convention and protocol of March 23, 1939 (54 Stat. 1759), for avoidance of double taxation and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in income and other taxes. Signed at Stockholm October 22, 1963.²

Ratified by the President: August 5, 1964.

Viet-Nam

Amendment to the agreement of April 22, 1959 (TIAS 4251), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 9, 1964.

Entered into force: August 10, 1964.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

The United States and Africa. This publication, the first in a new series of regional pamphlets, outlines U.S. foreign policy objectives of assisting the newly emerging African nations to establish independent and stable governments which can contribute uniquely to the world community, to meet the legitimate aspirations of their peoples for a better life, and to develop free societies and institutions in harmony with their own beliefs and cultures. Pub. 7710. African Series 40. 15 pp. 15¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the United Arab Republic, amending the agreement of October 8, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Cairo April 20, 1964. Entered into force April 20, 1964. TIAS 5579. 4 pp. 5¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Philippines—Signed at Manila May 14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5580. 10 pp. 10¢

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 10-16

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 10 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 357 of August 5 and 359 of August 6.

No.	Date	Subject
*362	8/10	U.S. participation in international conferences.
363	8/10	U.S.-Australia educational exchange foundation.
364	8/11	G. Griffith Johnson: House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Committee.
†365	8/10	Duke: Institute of World Affairs, San Diego State College (as-delivered text).
*366	8/11	Cleveland: American Bar Association wives, New York, N.Y.
367	8/12	Mann: Pan American Union.
*368	8/13	Program for visit of Prime Minister of Iceland.
*369	8/14	Department incentive program for learning "hard" languages.
*370	8/14	Cultural exchange (Southeast Asia).
371	8/14	Rumania credentials (rewrite).
†372	8/14	Malawi credentials (rewrite).

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

² Not in force.

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
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United States Policy and Africa

by Under Secretary Harriman¹

United States African policy is, of course, a part of our overall foreign policy. We seek good relations with the African nations in the same manner as we seek to maintain them with Asian and European nations and with our neighboring American Republics.

The policies of all these countries are not and cannot be expected to be the same. Not infrequently we find ourselves blamed for actions taken by other countries, even though we could not have influenced them.

The African nations, as the youngest members of the international community, are confronted with some special problems. A natural quality of youth is impatience, a quality which we ourselves still share, though at times our im-

pulses take us in somewhat different directions. We are today the oldest democracy in the world and yet still a young nation in historic terms. Founded in revolt against colonialism, our sympathies have consistently been with the desire of people to throw off similar bonds. We have been through the difficulties and hardships of establishing a nation and have shown our willingness to help new nations through that period.

On the other hand, our successful experience in granting independence to the Philippines has led us to understand the time and sound planning that is needed to achieve a viable political and economic life.

Objectives of U.S. Assistance Programs

Since World War II our energies have been exerted to further a peaceful world. At the end of the war we demobilized our enormously strong military forces more rapidly than has any nation in history. However, the overt

¹ Address made on Aug. 18 (press release 375) before the International Congress on French-Speaking Africa, held at Washington, D.C., Aug. 17-21 under the sponsorship of the African-American Institute, the Ford Foundation, Georgetown University, and the Department of State. Mr. Harriman also made some extemporaneous remarks.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1315 PUBLICATION 7730 SEPTEMBER 7, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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attack on Korea made it clear that there was an aggressive force in the world which required us to develop and maintain an adequate defensive force.

We now again have great military strength as a defense against any aggression. President Johnson has affirmed that it is our country's firm resolve to achieve peaceful settlements of international differences through the United Nations or in other ways. Our natural impulse is to use our great economic productivity to help overcome difficulties that confront other countries.

After the war we recognized the economic chaos of war-torn Europe, and in the Marshall Plan offered a helping hand to all of Europe. Some may have forgotten that General Marshall's proposal was for all the countries of Europe. He said:²

Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.

The Soviet Union, although it attended the first conference in Paris, withdrew and announced it would fight the plan. Moscow compelled Poland and Czechoslovakia to withdraw as well, although both countries had expressed a desire to participate.

The Marshall Plan has been enormously successful. The economies of the Western European nations are more dynamic and vigorous than ever, and these countries are now willing and able to give assistance to others requiring it.

Another program which is more directly of interest to the developing nations, such as those of Africa, was President Truman's Point 4 program. It is well to recall his words:³

Fourth, we must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. . . . For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffering of these people. . . . It must be a world-wide effort for the achievement of peace, plenty, and freedom . . . also against their ancient enemies—hunger, misery, and despair.

This was in January 1949. President Johnson has made it clear that this remains our

basic objective in relation to the developing nations. For 15 years we have consistently offered a helping hand to those countries that are willing and able to help themselves.

Why has the United States been willing to expend these vast sums and make these untiring efforts? First of all, the people of the United States crave peace. They now realize from the experience of two world wars that one must work to create conditions to preserve peace.

Then, too, it has been the historic attitude of our country to contribute to those who need help or are in distress. We have learned also that our own economic growth depends upon worldwide economic growth. Perhaps another factor is that we are a nation of people that have been drawn from almost every part of the world, and we have traditional ties with the lands of our forefathers.

These factors deeply affect our relations with the new nations of Africa. Twenty million Americans take pride in their African heritage. This is a force which gives us special interest in and concern for the African people.

America's Continuing Revolution

We consider our Revolution is the true revolution. It has recognized the inalienable rights of every individual citizen and has established that the responsibility of government is to protect those rights. We consider that our Revolution is a living dynamic force.

Today in our country you see a social revolution to achieve objectives which have been delayed in fulfillment. These goals are not easy to achieve. Discrimination among peoples is as old as the history of mankind. Under the leadership of President Johnson we are attempting to stamp out these discriminations here. And I can say to you with the greatest confidence that we are winning. We believe that there will be continuing progress in our nation in many areas of social and economic advance.

Heritage of the Good-Neighbor Policy

President Roosevelt's pronouncement of the good-neighbor policy some 30 years ago has profoundly affected our attitudes toward other nations. We adhere firmly to this concept.

President Roosevelt established another con-

² BULLETIN of June 15, 1947, p. 1159.

³ *Ibid.*, Jan. 30, 1949, p. 123.

cept that when the United States sits at an international gathering it is at a round table, with each country having equal right of expression and one vote for each country.

His pressure in advancing our anticolonial policies certainly influenced other countries to take action.

I well recall during the war his frequently urging Sir Winston Churchill to grant India its independence. Then, too, when President Roosevelt visited Casablanca in 1943, he spoke with the Sultan of Morocco, and we are led to believe that this meeting intensified the Sultan Mohammed's desire for his country's independence. I first met the then young Crown Prince, now King Hassan, at this conference, and he has recalled to me the deep impression that the meeting with President Roosevelt made on him.

With our long history of opposition to colonialism, it is somewhat absurd that the new forces of imperialism should be accusing the United States of colonialism or neocolonialism. Undoubtedly, this is being done to conceal their own ambitions.

U.S. Aid to French Africa

We have applauded the actions of France in granting independence to its former dependent territories. And we applaud the continuing assistance that France is giving. We take pride, too, that we are second only to France in the establishment of the most extensive system of diplomatic posts in the 18 former French territories and the 3 former Belgian territories which make up French-speaking Africa. We take pride, too, that there are several hundred American technicians, including Peace Corps volunteers, who are serving in these countries.

Our aid, though modest compared to France, has made a contribution to progress through grants and loans. In the case of Guinea, however, our aid has been more substantial to help that country support its independent development after it had fallen out with France.

American investment of private capital has played a supplementary role in economic development as well as in bringing technical skills. Through our Food for Peace program we have been fortunate in being able in Algeria, for example, to help a large section of the population

during its present economic dislocations. Our food is now the principal diet of one-third of the Algerian people. This help has been given in spite of the fact that the Algerian Government's actions in foreign policy are in some respects opposed to those of the United States.

There is ample proof that we have been taking a long view, rather than a short one. We have felt that in helping people we would in time develop the type of international cooperation which would contribute to world progress and peace.

In our relations with the former French territories, we feel, too, we have something in common with those of you who maintain close relations with France. We have not forgotten that France helped us at a critical moment in our long and hard Revolutionary War. This feeling is so deeply seated in the memory of the American people that it transcends our present difficulty in reaching understandings on some subjects with France.

The Congo's Difficult Period

The people of the Congo are going through a difficult period. They deserve the help of all countries that wish them well and that believe in the unity and integrity of the Congo.

Four years ago, when President Kasavubu and Prime Minister Lumumba asked the United Nations for help, all of us joined through the United Nations in supporting the Congolese in their desire for stability and unity. United Nations troops were able to maintain order and prevent secessionist movements in Katanga, Kasai, and Orientale provinces.

Through the United Nations we have helped further education and technical skills. Today the United Nations has some 1,700 teachers, technicians, and administrators assisting the Congolese Government and its people make progress.

In the 4 years of independence the Belgian Government has contributed over \$250 million and today is supporting 2,500 Belgian teachers and technicians performing essential tasks at the request of the Government.

Unhappily, with the withdrawal of the United Nations troops, rebel action is again threatening the Congo's security and national

integrity. It is not an accident, I fear, that the Chinese Communists have established embassies in Brazzaville to the west and in Bujumbura to the east, with large staffs, some of whom are known to have had extensive military and guerrilla experience. The Congolese rebels are dissident political elements who are playing on tribal differences and dissatisfactions. Unfortunately, in this vast country the forces of the Congolese Government have been unable to withstand this guerrilla insurgency.

At the request of the Congolese Government, we, among other countries, have come to its assistance. In our case we have supplied motor transport and air support. Recently, we have sent four of our large C-130 transport planes to make it possible for the Government to move its limited supplies to where they are needed. A few helicopters have been furnished for medical and other emergency supplies for the civilian population. We are also continuing our economic aid program. It is tragic that the economic recovery and increasing economic stability that has been evident during the course of this year has now been slowed down by rebel interference with some of the production needed for export.

A new factor in the Congo has been the return of M. [Moise] Tshombe to Léopoldville at the invitation of the Congolese leaders to take part in a move toward national reconciliation. One of his first acts was to release [Antoine] Gizenga, and he has indicated that he was ready to talk to any political figure who was prepared to work for unity in the Congo.

Mr. Tshombe's elevation by President Kasavubu to the position of Prime Minister was not expected. We did welcome his statement on his return that he was determined to work for the unity of the Congo. It seems odd that we who supported the United Nations in preventing his secession should now be credited with the responsibility for his present position in Léopoldville. Kasavubu is the constitutional President of the country, and under the new constitution he has powers somewhat comparable to

those of the President of France. He selected Mr. Tshombe as Prime Minister for the interim government until the elections are held next year.

We are continuing our aid to the Congolese Government now, just as we have in the past, and we are joining other countries, both through the United Nations and on a bilateral basis, in helping the Government to create stability and to give it strength to resist the new rebellion.

The frequent contacts between the rebel leaders and the Chinese Communist embassies in Bujumbura and Brazzaville are well known to those living in these capitals. Guerrilla handbooks of Chinese origin have been found in the Congo, translated into French and published in May 1964. The tactics used by the rebels show unmistakably Chinese Communist inspiration.

All of Africa has a keen interest in seeing that an outside power is not successful in upsetting a newly established government or in dividing a nation. What can succeed in one country may succeed in another. We hope the African nations will take the lead in helping the Government of the Congo restore order and unity in the country. Certainly, one of the first aims and determinations of all African governments is to maintain their independence and territorial integrity. This aim the United States will wholeheartedly support through the United Nations and in all appropriate ways.

We have welcomed the activities of the OAU [Organization of African Unity] and applaud the success it has achieved in its short life. I earnestly hope that through united action a new colonialism can be kept out of Africa.

I congratulate Georgetown University for bringing this distinguished group together. I am sure that through this international congress you will have a frank exchange of views which will lead to better understandings among us. It is only in this way that we can find common policy and action to carry out our common objectives.

Assistant Secretary Bundy Comments on Southeast Asia Developments in Voice of America Interview

Following is the transcript of an interview with Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs William P. Bundy taped for release August 15 on the Voice of America program "Press Conference, USA." The moderator was William McCrory of the Voice of America.

Mr. McCrory: Our guest this week has played a key role in the recent critical developments in Southeast Asia, and Viet-Nam particularly. He is William P. Bundy, the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. Mr. Bundy has already made a distinguished record in Government service despite the fact that he is still a young man. He is a graduate of Yale and later received his master of arts and law degrees from Harvard University. During World War II he served with the Signal Corps in the European theater of war. From 1947 to 1951 Mr. Bundy practiced law here in Washington. Then he joined the Central Intelligence Agency as a member of the Board of National Estimates, where he served until 1961. In 1961 he was appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and in 1963 he became an Assistant Secretary of Defense. Mr. Bundy was named to his present post, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, in March of this year.

Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Press Conference, USA."

Mr. Bundy: It is a pleasure to be here, Mr. McCrory. I am flattered to be called young. I am old enough to have been a schoolmate of President Kennedy.

Mr. McCrory: Now let's ask our panel of correspondents to identify themselves.

Mr. Herbert: This is Nicholas Herbert, of the Times of London.

Mr. Lambert: Tom Lambert, New York Herald Tribune.

Mr. Bolle: Maarten Bolle of Het Vrije Volk of Amsterdam.

Mr. McCrory: For the first question to Secretary Bundy, we call upon you, Mr. Herbert.

Mr. Herbert: Mr. Bundy, the President has said that he is going to send Mr. Henry Cabot Lodge to a number of Allied capitals to explain the American position on the Gulf of Tonkin incident. On the face of it, this would seem to be a rather unnecessary exercise since there has been so much communication about it already. I wonder if you could tell us the reasons behind the visit and also where else he might be going beyond Paris.

Mr. Bundy: Well, his mission is somewhat broader than simply to explain our position on the Gulf of Tonkin, because, as your question implies, I think our allies and the nations he is visiting—and, indeed, I think the world as a whole understands our position on that.¹ He will be explaining the situation in South Viet-Nam as we see it broadly, and indeed in all of the area, and covering the whole of that situation with which, of course, he is very intimately familiar because he only resigned as Ambassador in June.²

Beyond Paris, I think he will visit a number of the European capitals to discuss this situation frankly and informally with the appropriate people in those governments.

Mr. McCrory: Go ahead, Mr. Herbert.

Mr. Herbert: Well, there has been some suggestion that he will seek additional support

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258.

² For a statement by President Johnson, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 46.

from the Allies in South Viet-Nam. Is that one of them?

Mr. Bundy: I think the question of possible additional participation by other nations may come up in the course of his discussions, but his principal purpose is to review the whole situation. It is, after all, a complex situation, one where a full understanding, we thought, would be helpful to the positions and just basic understanding of these governments.

The Gulf of Tonkin Incident

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. Lambert: Mr. Bundy, I assume one of the questions Mr. Lodge will be asked will concern the recent incident in the Gulf of Tonkin, and there seems to be a considerable amount of uncertainty in some European capitals about the prelude to the first attack—the first North Viet-Nam torpedo attack on the *Maddox*—centering around the reported presence and attack earlier by a South Vietnamese gunboat on some North Vietnamese islands.

Could you straighten that out for us? Could you give us kind of a chronology of what actually did happen there?

Mr. Bundy: Well, I can tell you what the Government of North Viet-Nam has asserted, which is that there were South Vietnamese attacks on two islands off the coast of North Viet-Nam. Now, that problem of the sea areas has been a problem for some time, because the sea routes have been the source of a good deal of North Vietnamese infiltration into the south over a long period of time.

For example, in the latter part of 1961, before an effective junk patrol was established, something over a thousand men, we believe, were infiltrated from the north over those sea routes and that has been a continuing problem, and the North Vietnamese say the South Vietnamese did make this attack on the night of July 30th.

The point I would like to make perfectly clear is that at that time, assuming such an attack took place, the *Maddox* was at least 100 miles distant—was, in fact, down around the 17th parallel at that time. She entered the gulf thereafter pursuing a routine patrol of a kind we conducted on several occasions in the last 2 years and confining herself to inter-

national waters, naturally enough. She did proceed into the Gulf of Tonkin and was attacked approximately 2 days after this alleged South Vietnamese attack and at a time when she was well off the coast of North Viet-Nam, and the *Maddox*, as I think this account demonstrates—and this certainly was the case—had no connection whatever with whatever may have been going on in connection with these islands.

Mr. Lambert: You don't think the North Vietnamese might have interpreted the *Maddox's* presence there as a sort of convoy escort for another attack?

Mr. Bundy: It is very hard to suppose that could have been thought to be the case, because their detection and general observation would be such that they must have known that she was, in fact, much too far away to have played any part whatever.

Basis for Solution of Viet-Nam Problem

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Bolle?

Mr. Bolle: Mr. Secretary, the fighting has been going on now for a long time in Viet-Nam. Could you give us an idea of what you see as a possible practical and durable solution to the conflict there?

Mr. Bundy: Well, the only solution that we can see would be one in which North Viet-Nam ceased its subversive and aggressive activities in the south. That is the source of the trouble, that very simple fact. If that were withdrawn and you had thereby a return in essential respects to the terms of the Geneva accords of 1954,³ then I think you could have a solution in respect to the problem.

Basically it is a return to those Geneva accords that we seek and an end to the North Vietnamese effort. That is the perfectly simple and straightforward, at least in the explanation line, solution.

Mr. Bolle: How is that going to be brought about? Do you think it can be done simply by military action, or is any kind of political solution possible while military activities are still going on?

Mr. Bundy: It is very hard to see how any

³ For texts, see *American Foreign Policy, 1950-1955: Basic Documents*, vol. I (Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.

political discussions in the nature of a conference could serve a useful purpose at the present time. There must be a very strong measure of progress toward the control of the insurgency, which is supported in key respects from the north, or the North Vietnamese have to be agreeing to call it off before we could see much prospect of political solutions which, as I say, would be in essence a return to the already existing agreements for South Viet-Nam.

U.S. Role in South Viet-Nam

Mr. Bolle: A lot of American lives have been lost over the past few years in South Viet-Nam, Mr. Secretary. Could you describe for us and define precisely what the role is that the United States is playing there? Is it merely a question of advising and technically helping the South Vietnamese, or is there any American participation in actual operations in combating the Viet Cong?

Mr. Bundy: You are correct. We have had something over 180 combat deaths, and a number of other wounded, and so on, in South Viet-Nam.

The role we are playing is advice and assistance, as you describe it. I will be frank to say, of course, that involves the operation of helicopter and transport units in circumstances where they are likely to be shot at and where they have authority to return the fire if they are shot at, so that in that sense our men are engaged in protecting themselves in their role of supplying this logistic and advisory support, and those are the essential features of our role there.

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Bundy, how do you answer those who take a rather pessimistic view and say that the United States should withdraw completely from Viet-Nam?

Mr. Bundy: Well, Mr. McCrory, I think that would quite simply mean that the country would be turned over to Communist control. I think our advisory assistance and the equipment we have provided at the request of the South Vietnamese Government are vital to their standing up and maintaining their independence, and I think if we were to withdraw, that would be the result.

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Herbert?

Mr. Herbert: Mr. Bundy, there is another suggestion for prosecuting the war and that is that the supply routes in North Viet-Nam should be interdicted. Senator Goldwater, for one, has espoused this. Your suggestion that the problem is to stop the North Vietnamese from interfering in South Viet-Nam would seem to suggest that there might be some merit in that idea. Is that the case, or is the problem primarily indigenous in South Viet-Nam?

Mr. Bundy: I think it is basic to whatever one might do that you have to make the strongest possible effort. The Vietnamese Government has to make the strongest effort to deal with this thing within the country. Whatever one might do over and above that would be a supplement to and not a substitute for doing everything you had to do on the ground.

Now, as to the question of wider action against North Viet-Nam, the President has made it quite clear that we seek no wider war.⁴ We intend no rashness, but we are determined to use our strength.

Now, similarly, we have made it clear that we cannot exclude the possibility that wider action against the North might become necessary, and we have carefully studied what might be involved, and all the rest, but I think it is clear enough that anything in the nature of attacks on North Viet-Nam of a systematic character by the South Vietnamese or by ourselves would involve very grave issues and we would, therefore, prefer to pursue the policy we are now pursuing of maximum assistance in South Viet-Nam.

Mr. Herbert: In that connection, have you discerned any measurable effect on the war in South Viet-Nam of the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin and the raids on the patrol boat bases?

Mr. Bundy: No, there has been no appreciable change in the rate of Viet Cong activity in the south since the incidents. We expected that there might be at any time an increase in such activity, which has been the past practice in response to any change in the overall situation. So far that has not occurred, but we are keeping a close watch for it.

The attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin, I think,

⁴ BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 259.

did produce some lift in the morale of the Government and the people of South Viet-Nam and that, in itself, is helpful, but it has not really changed as yet any part of the overall situation in the country.

Communist Chinese Response to U.S. Action

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. Lambert: Mr. Bundy, it has been—what?—about 10 days since our carrier attack on the North Vietnamese bases, and as yet there has been no response, no violent response militarily, either from the North Vietnamese or the Chinese. Do you assume that the lack of a response over this period means there will be none?

Mr. Bundy: I don't think one can say at this point. The propaganda line of both Hanoi and Peiping, and particularly Peiping, has been pretty strident and has included what might be taken to be threats of early action, but so far there has been no such action other than the introduction of aircraft, combat aircraft, from Communist China into North Viet-Nam. That has taken place, and we are watching very closely to see if there is going to be any other response. I think it is a little too early to say there clearly will not be.

Mr. Lambert: What do you think is the purpose behind the introduction of those aircraft?

Mr. Bundy: The types of aircraft involved, we believe, in all probability will turn out to be MIG-15's and MIG-17's—that type of aircraft, which is, as you know, a fairly obsolete type of aircraft but has some capabilities in air defense, possibly very limited offensive capabilities. We think they were concerned at the clear vulnerability displayed in these attacks and that the introduction of these aircraft, therefore, was a response that was probably to be expected.

Mr. Lambert: Does this signify a wider Chinese participation in the war in Southeast Asia?

Mr. Bundy: We don't know at this time whether there are North Vietnamese pilots for these aircraft or not. Therefore, I really can't say whether this is direct Chinese Communist sending of these aircraft or not. I think the aircraft themselves came from the Chinese Com-

munist inventory because the North Vietnamese never hitherto had such aircraft.

U.S. Support of Geneva Accords

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Bolle.

Mr. Bolle: Perhaps you may try to look ahead a little, Mr. Bundy. Assuming that the South Vietnamese are successful in driving the Viet Cong out of their own territory and keeping them out of South Viet-Nam, do you think it will be possible after that to find any kind of political solution or settlement in that area without continued American military and economic presence there to guarantee the durability of a settlement of that kind, or do you see the end of any kind of American presence after political settlement has been agreed upon by both sides?

Mr. Bundy: I think if you had a settlement, Mr. Bolle, that provided the independence and security in South Viet-Nam, there would certainly have to be some form of guarantee, and I think there would also have to be freedom for the Government of South Viet-Nam to request and receive limited—and they would only have to be limited—quantities of military assistance. I return again to the parallel or the pattern that was established under the Geneva accords of 1954.

The Government of South Viet-Nam turned to us for limited economic and military help. We never had more than about 600 men at any time in the country as advisers in training people for the South Vietnamese armed forces. Something like that probably would be necessary again, because I think if one left a situation of a vacuum, even with paper guarantees and external military force available, there would be a constant temptation to return to subversion or even outright aggression on the Communist side.

Mr. Bolle: So an agreement on the part of the United States to stop any kind of alliance in the form of military or economic assistance to South Viet-Nam could not be part of a political settlement?

Mr. Bundy: The Geneva accords specifically provided that South Viet-Nam could not adhere to an alliance, and we accepted that at the time and would again accept it. There is no

need for South Viet-Nam to be part of an alliance, certainly not to be part of any military base or anything of that sort. It was not either of these things during the fifties, and we see no reason why it should wish to become so, or should wish to become so as far as our national interest or anybody else's interest is concerned. So we fully accept that.

As we have said repeatedly, we would like to see peace restored in this area and a stable situation. It would take something quite clear to remove temptation as a part of such a peaceful settlement.

Senate Action on Aid to Indonesia

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Herbert.

Mr. Herbert: I would like to change the subject at this appropriate point and ask you about Indonesia. The Senate has just voted to cut off all United States assistance to Indonesia over the opposition of the administration, and they have voted to cease forthwith all training of Indonesian military personnel here. I was wondering, first of all, how many such Indonesian military personnel are now being trained here, and, secondly, what are the reasons for the administration's opposing the Senate's action?

Mr. Bundy: Let me first start by saying, Mr. Herbert, as I am sure you are aware, knowing our legislative procedures, this is an action by one body in our Congress only. The House bill—the bill as passed by the House of Representatives—contained other amendments dating from last year that provided that we should continue our assistance to Indonesia only if the President determined it was important to our national interest, and so on, and this action by the Senate means that when the House and the Senate get together next week, or presumably next week, after the Senate has passed the bill, they will have to iron out differences between the House bill and the Senate bill.

Now, at that time, it is the hope of the administration that this provision that has been adopted by the Senate alone will not be retained in the final act and will, therefore, not become legislation.⁵

⁵ For a statement read to news correspondents on Aug. 14 by Robert J. McCloskey, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 313.

Now, we have had a continuing program of assistance to Indonesia because of Indonesia's policy of what they call "confrontation" with Malaysia. The volume of this assistance was very sharply reduced about a year ago, and it consists of such programs as malaria eradication, education programs, and training programs for military people.

You asked the number. It is something over 100 in standard forms of military training that do not relate to guerrilla operations or anything of that sort and a much larger number of civilian technicians who are trained in this country.

We have thought it important to continue with those programs, recognizing that Indonesia's policy in respect to Malaysia does create difficulties.

U.S. Position on Neutralization

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Lambert.

Mr. Lambert: Mr. Bundy, the United States Government seems adamantly opposed to any suggestion for neutralization for South Viet-Nam or for the Southeast Asian area on the grounds that the Communists would probably pay no more attention to a new neutrality agreement than to the ones that already exist covering neutrality and independence for Laos, Cambodia, and Viet-Nam.

In talking with proponents of neutralism, what arguments do they advance that indicate a belief possibly that they feel the Communists now might observe a new neutrality agreement?

Mr. Bundy: Mr. Lambert, I have heard none that I found persuasive, to be quite frank. We have made it clear that we would accept a neutral status for the successor states to Indochina, that is, for South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cambodia. This seems to us entirely appropriate.

What does seem to us very doubtful is that these countries could be left with no freedom to request the limited quantities of outside assistance they might require to be sure that their security is observed and that there exists, as I put it before, no temptation in this respect. And those are the key points about it. It is sometimes asserted that Communist China and North Viet-Nam would let countries alone if

there were no Western presence there. We frankly find that thesis not persuasive. We believe that there are regrettably very strong and immediate ambitions on the part of North Viet-Nam and very strong, long-term ambitions at least, possibly shorter than that, on the part of Communist China with respect to this area and that therefore it would be very unlikely that they would respect agreements that did not contain clear elements of guarantee or deterrents that would insure that there was no temptation to move in.

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Bolle.

Mr. Bolle: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned a little while ago that the reactions from Peiping had been very strident. In contrast I think the reactions from Moscow have been rather restrained. Moscow has been rather soft spoken as far as the events in the Gulf of Tonkin are concerned. What is your explanation of that?

Mr. Bundy: Well, it is very difficult to say what the motives were that led the North Vietnamese to take this action of attacking our naval vessels operating in international waters. It is possible that they had consulted with the Communist Chinese. One cannot say. I think it is clear that the Soviet Union had no part whatever in the action, and it has said some adverse things about our action, but I don't think that they were in any way participants in it and had no consultation whatever before. And I think it is hard to say just how this relates to the wider relationship between the Soviet Union and Communist China at this time.

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Herbert.

Mr. Herbert: Mr. Bundy, when you were talking just now in answer to Mr. Lambert about the possibility of neutralizing the former Indochinese states, you referred only to South Viet-Nam. I assume you meant to include North Viet-Nam as well?

Mr. Bundy: Yes, it would be desirable. Quite frankly, we don't see much realistic possibility that North Viet-Nam would deny itself the freedom to receive whatever assistance it thought it required from Communist China and indeed in the past from the Soviet Union. We think it would be a sound solution that they should be placed in the same status as the others, and we just don't see that they are likely

to cut themselves off in that way.

Mr. Herbert: It would be a precondition, wouldn't it?

Mr. Bundy: The provisions of the Geneva accords of 1954 did not preclude North Vietnamese receiving assistance of this sort. Again I say, basically we would be prepared to return to those agreements.

Mr. McCrory: Mr. Bundy, what about the current situation in Laos? Are you optimistic that we will ultimately reach a settlement there?

Mr. Bundy: The accords have been breached in a major respect, of course, by the Communist military offensive of May. At the moment there is some possibility that the three so-called factions in Laos will be able to start negotiations looking to see if the political situation and the military situation can be restored in such a way that a conference would make any sense. I can't say we are optimistic, but our policy remains to support the Geneva accords of 1962,⁶ which we think were a reasonable settlement with respect to Laos.

Mr. Lambert: Mr. Bundy, do you think our attack on the PT boat bases of the North Vietnamese has completely punctured the Chinese claim of the United States' only being a paper tiger as far as the rest of Asia is concerned?

Mr. Bundy: Well, as far as I can read the reactions that have been received in Asia, I think it has put a considerable dent in any impression that we were a paper tiger.

Mr. Bolle: I would like to ask the Secretary whether the administration is satisfied about the military effort that the South Vietnamese themselves are displaying in fighting the Viet Cong. Is there a sufficient amount of Vietnamese effort in that respect, and is there a sufficient amount of interest among the South Viet-Nam population to fight North Viet-Nam and free their own country?

Mr. Bundy: We believe there is, Mr. Bolle. Morale has been in trouble at various times because it is a very tough war. Basically we don't have any doubt that the people in the Army of South Viet-Nam are with this effort.

Mr. McCrory: Gentlemen, I am sorry, our time is up. My thanks to Mr. Bundy and to our panel of correspondents.

⁶ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 13, 1962, p. 259.

A World View of Freedom's Hopes and Dilemmas

*by Angier Biddle Duke
Chief of Protocol¹*

Last week Ranger VII gave us a dramatic closeup of the pock-marked face of the moon—so close up in fact that if there were houses on the moon, we could have looked in the windows.

And there are similar space devices in use right now which are able to give us an interesting and useful look at ourselves. For example, the meteorological satellite Tiros VII circles the earth in 97 minutes. Its wide-angle television cameras and other electronic probes record and transmit data which contribute to an interpretation and even a projection of our planet's weather.

You have given me a comparable task to do in 50 minutes: a world view of freedom's hopes and dilemmas. And we deal here with no such physical realities and scientific absolutes as precisely measured light and heat. Instead, we must try to discern and analyze far more elusive factors on the shifting world scene. They involve shadings of freedom and tyranny, and enigmatic variables of national leadership in changing countries.

"Freedom—Hope and Dilemma" is a universal theme which has inspired and confounded mankind over the centuries. At this juncture in history, the institute could not have chosen a more timely subject.

If a politicoeconomic or sociological satellite could be launched and orbit the earth today, it would need sensitive instruments, as yet un-invented, to register degrees of freedom and absolutism in the various groupings of political

power. It would need computer programmers with brilliant insight to distill clarity from complexity in areas of the world where the interests and forces of freedom conflict or, in some cases, coincide with those of its enemies.

However tempting simple formulations may be, the simplest views of the world can be the least reliable, fraught with the danger of self-deception. After the first successful Sputnik on October 4, 1957—nearly 7 revolutionary years ago—Chairman Mao voiced his surely understandable exultation. "The east wind," he said, "is prevailing over the west wind." Would he say that today? If he were to use the same words, they certainly would not be in the same context.

Four years later, in March of 1962 at Berkeley, California, President Kennedy perceived quite another shift in the wind:²

. . . the great currents of history (he said) are carrying the world away from the monolithic idea toward the pluralistic idea—away from communism and toward national independence and freedom. No one can doubt that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men. . . . We must seize the vision of a free and diverse world—and shape our policies to speed progress toward a more flexible world order.

The hopes then for freedom, if this interpretation is considered when we glimpse what is happening around the planet, are real and temperate hopes—and, therefore, should be realizable. They do not conform to specifications prescribed in any single doctrinaire blueprint. They proclaim that different nations and com-

¹ Address made before the Institute of World Affairs, San Diego State College, San Diego, Calif., on Aug. 10 (press release 365, as-delivered text).

² BULLETIN of Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615.

munities of nations will obviously differ in the priorities of their needs and their preferences as to the systems, methods, and measures required to meet them.

The pluralistic concept echoes Jefferson's phrasing in our Declaration of Independence, when he invoked what he termed "a decent respect to the opinions of mankind." Thus he assumed that opinions would vary and yet expressed implicit confidence that enough opinions would respond to the case for freedom.

Dr. Walt Whitman Rostow, Counselor and Chairman of our Department of State's Policy Planning Council, offers an overview in his admirable book *View From the Seventh Floor*.³ In this he makes quite clear that there will be frustrations, setbacks, crises, and dilemmas; he also cites an abundance of evidence in support of hope, even conviction, that "time is on the side of the things this nation stands for, if we use time well; and we intend to do so."

One incessantly reiterated article of faith in Communist doctrine is that time is on *its* side. Stalin assumed that, after the Second World War, the capitalist democracies of war-ravaged Europe would suffer convulsive cycles of economic panic. He counted on violent conflict between economic classes, upon the state of readiness to assume power of the very large Communist parties of Italy and France. The bolshevization of the entire European Continent seemed more than just a possibility.

Major Reasons for Hope

Our first major reason for hope is the fact that this did not happen. The prosperity of Europe, after Marshall Plan aid served as a primer and catalyst, is a turning point in the destiny of free men. This prosperity has been strengthened by the creation of the European Common Market, which is amalgamating the separate national economies of the six member states—Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands—into a single economic union, yet maintaining each nation's political personality. The success of the Common Market in stimulating trade and economic

growth is readily apparent from a few figures. Trade among Common Market states has more than doubled since 1958, and imports from third countries have increased by over 50 percent. The gross national product of the member states has risen by nearly a third in the same period. The European Free Trade Association, an industrial free trade area being formed among seven European countries, the "Outer Seven"—Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom—has also stimulated trade through the reduction of trade barriers.

The resurgence of Europe has caused the Soviet Union to turn away from the European Continent as its immediate objective, shifting the present Communist offensive to the developing areas of the world, where the drive for independence enlists and accepts help from every obtainable quarter.

But even in those areas lies our second major reason for hope. National independence is the dominant impulse of countries which have freed themselves from external rule in Asia and Africa. This is a drive toward freedom. We identify ourselves with that drive, recalling as we do our own Revolution and colonial past.

The President of the Malagasy Republic at the White House on July 27th, just 2 weeks ago, declared in his toast to the President and Mrs. Johnson that he was proud of, and took inspiration from, the progress and power that a former colony had made in the less than 200 years of American national existence. We have little to fear from the burgeoning forces for freedom in Africa, Asia, and Latin America unless we fail to continue our work of encouragement, assistance, and understanding.

The third reason is the unmistakable trend, within what was once a tight, monolithic Communist bloc, toward national independence. Beginning in June 1948 with the Yugoslav heresy, which eliminated Soviet interference in Yugoslav affairs, followed by the advent of the Gomulka government in Poland in 1956, and culminating in the split between the Soviet Union and Communist China, we see signs and symptoms of the development of national interests at the expense of bloc solidarity.

Prudence requires us to avoid exaggerating this third hopeful factor. As Dr. Rostow de-

³ W. W. Rostow, *View From the Seventh Floor*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964.

scribes what has occurred, “. . . the assertion of nationalist impulses” has “shattered the intellectual unity and organizational discipline of the international Communist movement.” This does not mean that the Eastern European countries have come to repudiate their Communist systems of political and economic life. But for all who are determined to avoid seeing come to pass George Orwell’s nightmare of a universally regimented world of 1984, these intramural nationalisms among the closed societies should be classified with the hopes for freedom.

The fourth major cause for hope is that there is such a force in being as the free world. This force is growing, gaining in strength and in prosperity in comparison with the Communist states. In fact, economic difficulties, and most conspicuously agricultural failures, of the Communist states have largely discredited their claims to be efficient, to be the road to the future, or to be the most scientific way of organizing society.

In terms of the use of its power the free world seems to be flexible enough to adjust to sharp, short, and sometimes desperate tests while having to maintain the far-reaching objectives of development and improvement on many fronts.

The tense short-run struggle consists of meeting real crises. The 1949 Berlin blockade and airlift, the defeat of Chinese Communist armies at the 38th parallel in Korea during the spring of 1951, forthright answers to the aggravations upon Berlin in July 1961 and February–March 1962, and the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis were all taut tests of power. So is the confrontation going on today in the Gulf of Tonkin.⁴ And our 6th Fleet may be steaming into another one off Cyprus.

The longer range objectives of development on many fronts involve the less dramatic continuing need for armed security while negotiating such specific but far-reaching steps toward peace as the atmospheric nuclear test ban, the “hot line” agreement, the banning of weapons from outer space, and the use of foreign aid in support of forces for economic development and greater social justice in Latin Amer-

ica, Asia, the Middle East, and Africa.

The world is complicated and dangerous enough to insure that crises will continue to arise. “Soviet policy appears to be based on sustained and sophisticated study of particular *areas* of vulnerability,” Dr. Rostow points out, “(e.g., northern Azerbaijan, Greece, Berlin, Indochina, South Korea) and particular types of vulnerability (e.g., the geographical position of Berlin, the shortage of local defenses against guerrilla warfare in Laos and South Vietnam).” And I might add technological vulnerability, even if temporary, as evidenced by their exploitation of initial space-race leads. Ideological vulnerability counts too. All the imperfections of our society, such as our agonizing problems in assuring civil rights to all our citizens, are, of course, mercilessly exploited wherever it will do us the most damage.

Parenthetically, an extract might be noted here from a statement made in November 1963 by Deputy Prime Minister Abba Eban of Israel to the effect that

. . . there is a direct link between the central problem of American society and the driving force of international life. It is inconceivable that thirty African nations can enter the community of sovereign states without any consequent effect on minority groups seeking equal rights within a society. A statesman who promotes the liberation of subject nations abroad cannot fail to combat the relics of old prejudice and discrimination within his gate. [President] Kennedy’s ardent pursuit of national freedom in Africa and Asia, his expanded vision of foreign aid, his Peace Corps which revived the volunteer urge within a rich society threatened by the domination of private satisfactions—all these were bound to lead him back to the heritage of the great predecessor who on another dark Friday ninety-eight years ago laid his life upon the altar of freedom. In the struggle for free societies and the equal rights of men, Lincoln and Kennedy are of a common lineage.

Personality Factor in Free-World Leadership

That leads me to discuss with you the factor of personality in free-world leadership. This is not perhaps properly within the field of this subject, but I cannot forbear from commenting upon the quality of leadership as personified by the heads of government and chiefs of state whom I have observed at close range over the past 3½ years. President Johnson has conferred with 24 such world figures since last No-

⁴For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258.

vember, and President Kennedy met with 83. As one entrusted with the task of arranging these meetings and, in most cases, sitting in on them, I have been able to form at least a subjective opinion of every one. The hopes for freedom in so many cases ride with such leaders.

I can with propriety call to mind a pertinent few—Sylvanus Olympio, for example. He was the only businessman ever to assume the Presidency of an African nation. From the post of vice president in charge of the Lever Brothers operations in West Africa, he was elected President of Togo. He had a wide-ranging mind, an excellent education, and a great heart. When he visited Washington at President Kennedy's invitation, the Congress was debating aid to the Volta Dam in Ghana. There was a good deal of opposition to it, particularly after President Nkrumah made it clear that neighboring Togo would not be permitted to tie in to the Volta project even though the proposed dam was to be 100 miles or so away. But when President Olympio was pressed for his views on this by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee—and subsequently by the press—he supported the idea of our aid for the project. "What is good for any country in West Africa is for the ultimate good of all West Africans," was his reply in effect. Such was the quality of one of Africa's finest free-world leaders. You may recall that when he died last year in his capital city, Lomé, he was pursued by his assassins to the steps of the American Embassy, where he had sought sanctuary.

President Johnson had another of freedom's towering figures as his guest last May—President Eamon de Valera of Ireland. This was the same Dev who, condemned to death as a rebel and traitor by the British, survived to fight further, to find freedom for his country, and subsequently to become its Prime Minister and today its President. When I introduced him to Sir Alec Douglas-Home at President Kennedy's funeral, he remarked that he was the first British Prime Minister with whom he had ever shaken hands. President de Valera was born in New York and sent over to Ireland at an early age. One evening, at the President's Guest House after a small dinner, I found him reminiscing.

One of his anecdotes touched upon Finley Peter Dunne, the author whose father had been brought over from Ireland at the age of 6 and remembered nothing about the old country. And yet, the President observed, bemused, Dunne could write, and I quote:

I don't believe all Irishmen are honest, loyal, capable, humorous, brave and musical. But let no Englishmen say they are not. My languid pulses respond at once to a tale of suffering of Ireland under British rule. I'm moved too, but not so much by the suffering of Ireland under Irish rule.

A totally different figure from the Irish President, yet the product of very nearly the same generation, is the Yugoslav President. Marshal Tito, now in his seventies, is very much the figure of a self-confident senior statesman who has earned his place on the world stage as the first national leader to prove the possibility of fragmenting the Soviet monolith. You may recall that he accepted an invitation to come to California last September, but unfortunately, at virtually the last moment, the trip had to be canceled. Tito wanted very much to come out here. However, he was exhausted after his long trip from South America, became ill, and ran a fever for several days. I remained with him and his party at Williamsburg, Virginia, where he spent much of his time looking at football games on television.

My wife in the meantime accompanied Mrs. Broz Tito on short motor trips to historic points around the Virginia countryside. One day they stopped at one of the old tidewater churches, where a box-lunch social was going on. As they picnicked there under the trees, it was explained to the former partisan fighter that the proceeds of the event were being devoted to maintaining the little country church. She mingled and talked with the group, most of whom, I am sure, had no idea who she was. Some of the feeling of the community that day must have reached her; I choose to believe that she understands us a little better since then.

The very fact that the President of the United States is able to communicate face to face with so many world leaders must contribute to more peaceful relationships among them. The jet age has made it possible and desirable as at no other period in history for

heads of government to confer with one another personally and quickly.

Economy of Abundance Needed

Now let me turn to a few of our dilemmas, and the first that comes to mind is the thought that freedom is necessarily insecure without an economy of abundance which is shared enough to make desperate measures unnecessary.

We live in a world where probably 1,500 million people go to bed hungry every night, rendering civil freedoms elsewhere somewhat beside the point. The Royal Bank of Canada published a bulletin last June, entitled "The Hungry World," stressing how far from free are malnourished people:

Being forced to live on anything below adequate food makes a man a social liability. He cannot work effectively on an empty stomach; he cannot study and learn as he must to improve his condition; he cannot think beyond the dominant immediate need, which is his next meal; he cannot build up resistance to wasting disease; he holds back not only the economic and social development of his own country but also the prosperity of the world.

Until China and India, for example, solve their problems of recurrent famine, the right to a free press appears secondary and even trivial to millions of their countrymen. I remember indelibly, when I was working for the International Rescue Committee, the tragedies of refugees who had fled, often at the risk of their lives, from Stalin's Eastern Europe to our displaced persons camps. Among them were some fine human beings who became so discouraged at the indifference of Western nations that they voluntarily returned to homelands behind the Iron Curtain where their freedoms were woefully inadequate but where there was at least prospect of work whereby they could support their families.

A Forward-Moving Process

A second dilemma is that freedom is no static condition but a forward-moving process which liberates the potential of more individuals to realize the best that is in them. It is founded upon a divine dissatisfaction with the way things are, a practical resolve to make things better—always more easily said than done.

Different parts of the world today are at varying stages of historic evolution in the quest for freedom. There is no predestined assurance that freedom for the individual will reach ever higher plateaus. History is littered with the stones and bones of nations which had what were high tides of free creativity for their times but succumbed to internal weakness or conquest.

No society, including our own, has attained anything like its culminating crescendo of freedom. Our enactment of a national civil rights law and our full-employment policy commit us to their realization. Gaps between profession and performance damage our national interest. If our setbacks are damaging in others' eyes as well, it is because for 188 years we have been the prophets and exponents of freedom.

We need not glory in comparative accomplishment. If we were to match the particulars in the U.N. Declaration of Human Rights against the condition of man in different lands, it would be true that on a sliding scale our realization of specific freedom is measurably in process. But free institutions atrophy unless they are usefully and fully used to make ever higher and wider advances for more human beings.

The war aims enunciated by Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill embraced the four well-known broad categories of freedom. Yet in large sections of the world today there is no freedom from fear. And until there is freedom from severe want, the freedoms of expression and worship appear to many to be luxuries.

In our country now we are marshaling resources in a war against poverty because we know that until all our people are free from want—and this often means schooling for employability—other freedoms will too often seem academic. It is well to note, however, that the free press brought us such a work as Michael Harrington's *The Other America*. This important book thrust the challenge of the neglected poor upon the consciousness of our highest leaders, so that forthright and increasingly hopeful actions are in prospect.

Another way of explaining the second dilemma—that freedom is not a condition but a process—is to say that it is not an absence of "unfreedom" but a positive force for overcoming injustice. It is as much a part of man's

progress as the discovery and application of physical truths in his conquest over ignorance, superstition, and drudgery. At the same time, freedom should be understood by those enjoying any measure of it. This understanding can be acquired either through painful, tragic experience or vicariously by drawing upon the experience of those who have tried to make its essence meaningful.

Education in a free country must convey more than training for occupational competence, even though it must do at least that. It should also advance an understanding of the magnificent repertory of words and works, soaring and eloquent, the human race has acquired so painfully in man's search for freedom.

Pericles' ode to the Athenian dead celebrates more than the sacrificial resolve of a small city-state of 100,000 citizens, women, and slaves to preserve its identity; it appreciates what it meant for a man to be a free citizen of Athens. "La Marseillaise" stirs visceral response, summoning up the blood at least as profoundly as does Shakespeare's appeal to comradeship in arms in Henry the Fifth's fight talk before the battle of Agincourt. Beethoven's withdrawal of his dedication to the "Eroica" symphony, after Napoleon's coronation in 1804—which the composer considered a betrayal of the rights of man—is a shining page in the book of freedom. Lincoln's Gettysburg Address mourns the men who perished in an inundation of fratricidal blood; its climax is his consecration of their memory to the preservation of a society deriving its powers from all those who are governed.

Evolving Institutions of Freedom

A third dilemma is that for freedom to endure it must not be at the mercy of any single ruler or faction, however capable and benevolent, but must build institutions sturdy enough to insure its succession through orderly procedures. In Asia, East Europe, and Africa many of the factors maintaining what there is of national independence and internal freedoms pivot on the resourcefulness of leaders who must evolve institutions for which there can be genuine popular respect.

Viet-Nam is a case in point. Ngo Dinh Diem

had a superb opportunity to build viable governmental organisms because of the tremendous popular mandate he received in the first plebiscite and elections after the departure of the French and the fall of Emperor Bao Dai. One of the tragedies of his legacy is the lack of evidence of the development of free institutions, such as an independent legislature or representative provincial governments.

Viet-Nam is in the throes of a guerrilla war, the military arm of what Mr. Khrushchev called the "wars of national liberation" which in 1961 he said the Communist world would support. These are attacks upon governments having difficulty in the revolutionary process of bringing to their peoples the benefits of modern technology.

Time for the Communists to seize power in developing areas is limited. As basic social problems inherited from the traditional society become solved, chances for communism decline. Our role is to protect the revolutionary modernizing process going forward. It is to our interest that truly independent nations emerge. We want a world environment permitting open societies to flourish.

Viet-Nam is one of the states on the periphery of the Communist world under acute military or quasi-military pressure. South Korea, Taiwan, Afghanistan, and Iran are other examples.

Also, as Secretary Rusk has said:⁵

The Communist assault on Laos, like that on South Viet-Nam, involves the larger question of whether anyone is to be permitted to succeed in aggression by terror, guerrilla warfare, and the infiltration of arms and military personnel across national frontiers. If they are allowed to gain from these assaults in Southeast Asia, the Communist advocates of militancy everywhere will feel encouraged.

The primary responsibility for dealing with guerrilla warfare cannot be American, according to Dr. Rostow's thinking, because it is fought out not primarily with weapons but by the underlying spirit and policy of those who run the government under fire. Outsiders can help create conditions under which such a war can be won. "We are determined to help destroy this international disease," he says, defin-

⁵ *Ibid.*, July 6, 1964, p. 3.

ing it as "guerrilla war designed, initiated, supplied, and led from outside an independent nation."

He stresses that the entire international community should accept responsibility for dealing with this form of aggression, which is just as clearly aggression as the violation of the 38th parallel by North Korean armies in 1950.

I attended the opening session of the Ninth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of American States in July and heard Secretary Rusk declare in this regard that,⁶

In the face of continued Cuban aggression the time has now come to make it abundantly clear to the Castro regime that the American governments in complete solidarity will no longer tolerate its efforts to export revolution through the classic Communist techniques of terror and guerrilla warfare and the infiltration of arms and subversive agents.

This is not yet clearly understood. Dr. Ros-tow describes the lack of recognition of what is at issue in these words:

In my conversations with representatives of foreign governments (he says), I am sometimes lectured that this or that government within the free world is not popular; they tell me that guerrilla warfare cannot be won unless the peoples are dissatisfied. These are, at best, half truths. The truth is that guerrilla warfare mounted from external bases—with rights of sanctuary—is a terrible burden to carry for any government in a society making its way toward modernization. As you know, it takes somewhere between ten and twenty soldiers to control one guerrilla in an organized operation. Moreover, the guerrilla force has this advantage: Its task is merely to destroy, while the government must build and protect what it is building. A guerrilla war mounted from outside a transitional nation is a crude act of international vandalism. There will be no peace in the world if the international community accepts the outcome of a guerrilla war, mounted from outside a nation, as tantamount to a free election.

Secretary Rusk's view is that such warfare, a present danger in Southeast Asia, could quickly become a major danger in Africa and Latin America. It is an unsubtle operation, based more on murder than on political or psychological appeal. When Communists speak of "wars of national liberation" and of their support for what they call "progressive forces,"

we now can only think of the systematic assassination of the health, agriculture, and educational officers in Vietnamese villages.

One last thought on institution building: It will be interesting to see whether the successors to Khrushchev, Mao, Gomulka, Kadar, Hoxha, and heads of the other closed states will come to power through orderly, nonviolent procedures. A gleam of hope is that Malenkov, Bulganin, and Molotov were reassigned and did not upon losing their high positions meet a fate like Beria's.

Defense of the Free World

The next dilemma I will cite is that freedom requires costly military strength to protect it, which must be directed with patient vigilance if a major war is to be avoided.

The defense of the free world depends in large measure upon American military strength, which, together with the contribution of our NATO allies, maintains the peace between closed and open societies. This strength is substantially underwritten by our investing more than \$50 billion annually in defense. That is roughly one-tenth of our gross national product. Fifteen billions is in defensive deterrent power.

As taxpayers we have learned that freedom does not come free or at bargain rates. Just as France's independent *force de frappe* is being achieved at roughly the cost of French education, so in America our ability to mount the truly full-scale war on poverty is diluted by the cost of arms.

Nuclear peace is one prerequisite if the world is ever to become free from fear and want, and that is well within man's power. Just think for a moment what resources we could release for mankind's needs if we were unyoked from the burdens of the arms race.

But let me go back to present realities. If our imaginary politicoeconomic satellite could orbit the world, its telemetry would convey evidence that real hopes for the survival and extension of freedom are bright. Its data would also confirm that these bright hopes are alloyed with dilemmas that are formidable indeed. Here are a few bittersweet examples.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

Human history, H. G. Wells wrote 44 years ago, becomes more and more a race between education and catastrophe. Our hopes are more than wishes, because we live in an era of explosive educational acceleration. Tom Mboya reminds us how Ghana, within 5 years of gaining its independence, raised the number of students in primary and middle schools from 571,000 to nearly a million. Julius Nyerere ordered 100,000 literacy primers directly upon entering office in Tanganyika. The recently reelected President Paz Estenssoro of Bolivia told us in Washington that he had built a new school every week for several years.

And yet only two people out of five in the entire world get any kind of formal education at all. To meet UNESCO's goal of getting all children into school by 1980 means that 9,500,000 new teachers must be trained!

It is surely hopeful that those who believe in a pluralistic world—or are bringing themselves to tolerate what they could not mold to their prefabricated dogmas—are granting the permissive theory that the planet is big enough for all of us. Thus it is here appropriate to repeat Secretary Rusk's statement that,⁷

... our policy toward the Communist states has several facets: to halt aggression, to reduce the danger of a great war, to encourage evolution toward more open societies, and to find elements of common interest based upon the human condition.

We can be encouraged, for example, by reports on conditions in Hungary. I will cite only the highlights of Joseph Wechsberg's account this past March. As you recall, Janos Kadar was widely regarded as the man who would suppress all dissent after the fall of Imre Nagy. Now, in 1964, Wechsberg's Hungarian source stated that Kadar has put into effect about 80 percent of the demands made by leaders of the 1956 revolt, starting after destalinization began in Moscow.

How specific have been the liberalizing changes? I will enumerate. Absurdly high production quotas have been reduced. Passports are issued to travel to the West. Leading Stalinists have been expelled from the

party; there has been amnesty of political prisoners, and discrimination against admission to the university of competitively qualified sons of the former middle class has been ended. There are still minefields and electrified barbed wire at the Western frontier. There are still Russian troops stationed within Hungary. Wechsberg's friend appraised the state of freedom in these words: "You can't do everything you want to do, but you don't have to do a lot of things you don't want to do. That makes a big difference. A few weeks ago, a man who is high up in the party telephoned me and asked me to do something. I turned him down, gave him my reasons, and hung up. A couple of years ago, I couldn't have afforded to do that."

The fact that there is more freedom in Hungary today means that the freedom fighters did not die in vain. What is more, their protest kindled courage that persists throughout Eastern Europe today.

One of their most bitterly eloquent tributes was written by the late Nobel Laureate Albert Camus, in 1957, marking the first anniversary of the revolt. "Hungary conquered and in chains," Camus wrote in *Franc Tireur*, "has done more for freedom and justice than any people in twenty years." Budapest, "the great city of insurrection," he wrote, "reminded Western Europe of its forgotten truth and greatness"

Our faith is that throughout the world, beside the impulse toward coercion and death that is darkening history, there is a growing impulse toward persuasion and life, a vast emancipatory movement called culture that is made up both of free creation and of free work.

Our daily task, our long vocation is to add to that culture by our labors and not to subtract, even temporarily, anything from it, but our proudest duty is to defend personally to the very end, against the impulse toward coercion and death, the freedom of that culture—in other words, the freedom of work and of creation.

The Hungarian workers and intellectuals, beside whom we stand today with so much impotent grief, realized that and made us realize it. That is why, if their suffering is ours, their hope belongs to us too. Despite their destitution, their exile, their chains, it took them but a single day to transmit to us the royal legacy of liberty. May we be worthy of it!

I believe we will be.

⁷ *Ibid.*, Aug. 17, 1964, p. 214.

Signing of Communications Satellite Agreements Hailed by the President

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated August 20

Over the years of man's history on this earth, men have undertaken many explorations of distant horizons. But, in all this long span, no new horizon has so clearly beckoned for nations to work together as the horizons of space.

Today it is a cause of gratification among men everywhere that 11 nations are this afternoon joining together to lay the foundation for an immeasurably valuable new use of space as medium for international communications. The two agreements¹ signed today provide for the establishment of a global commercial communications satellite system. These agreements are firm expressions of the policy written into the law of our land by the will of our people.

The United States—from the beginning of the age of space—has sought and encouraged cooperation among all nations for peaceful and practical uses of this new dimension. These agreements fulfill that objective.

We will continue to seek—as we have sought—the fullest measure of cooperation by all nations on this earth for the peaceful use of the realms of space around us.

These agreements are open for signatures by all countries that are members of the International Telecommunication Union. Countries that do not sign the agreements will be able to use the global system.

The prospects for development of communications systems in space outrun our imagination. In the future the voices, messages, and pictures will span the barriers of distance on earth and bring men and nations closer together in understanding and cooperation. By 1965 an experimental operational satellite is expected to link North America and Europe. In 1966 and 1967 a system will be launched to provide global coverage—for the first time. The benefits will be many to all of mankind.

¹ For texts, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 281.

We mark this day with pride and confidence: pride that nations are working together and we work with them, confidence that from such cooperation will come sure progress toward fulfillment of man's great hope for finding in our times the basis of honorable and universal peace.

Ranger VII Photographs of Moon Sent to Leaders of 110 Nations

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated August 16

In the name of the people of the United States, as an expression of their desire that human knowledge be used for human betterment, I am sending to the leaders of 110 nations a set of photographs of the moon taken by the cameras of the Ranger VII on its historic mission of July 31, 1964. Each set includes five photographs taken at distances from the lunar surface varying from 480 miles down to 100 feet.

The success of the Ranger VII exploration has been greeted with enthusiasm and interest around the world. Men of all nations recognize this is one of the greatest extensions of human knowledge about the lunar surface to occur in many centuries.

The American people can be justly proud. We started behind in the space age. But we placed our trust in our open society and free system. Our achievements in peaceful exploration of space give us all cause to be proud, grateful, and confident.

Since the beginning of our space effort, the United States has invited and urged all nations to make this vital new exploration a joint venture of international cooperation. More than 60 countries now work together voluntarily in this pursuit. We continue to hope that the extent of such international cooperation will be enlarged and that all nations will join through the United Nations to place the peaceful realms of space off limits to the designs of aggressors on earth.

The responsibility placed upon us by our role is great and continuing. I am sure the American people will continue to support what is necessary to assure leadership. In return they will rightfully expect that our program hold to the orderly and responsible course which has brought such outstanding success in such a short period.

U.S. Participation in the U. N. During 1963

*Following is the text of a message from President Johnson transmitting to the Congress the 18th annual report on U.S. participation in the United Nations.*¹

White House press release dated August 20

To the Congress of the United States:

Pursuant to the provisions of the United Nations Participation Act, I transmit herewith the eighteenth annual report covering United States participation in the United Nations during 1963.

This report describes in detail the day-to-day, month-to-month work of the United Nations system of agencies on behalf of peace and security, economic and social development, the trust territories, human rights and legal and constitutional developments. It also reports on administrative and financial matters.

The 18th General Assembly was concerned with many of the most urgent problems of our times: peace and disarmament, national independence and human rights, and international cooperation along a broad spectrum of human endeavor.

As in other years and with other institutions, the United Nations record for 1963 was an amalgam of progress and problems as the Organization sought to cope with many of the

world's most basic and difficult issues. This report is a factual accounting of what was accomplished on the United Nations agenda for mankind—and of its unfinished business.

In transmitting this report to the Congress I should like to add two observations which go beyond the scope of the objective record of United Nations activities during the year.

First, the extraordinary importance which this Government attaches to the United Nations was underscored by the fact that two Presidents of the United States addressed the same Assembly.

On September 20, President Kennedy went to the rostrum of the General Assembly to tell the delegates of more than a hundred countries that:²

“... the badge of responsibility in the modern world is a willingness to seek peaceful solutions.

“... if either of our countries [the United States and the Soviet Union] is to be fully secure, we need a much better weapon than the H-bomb—a weapon better than ballistic missiles or nuclear submarines—and that better weapon is peaceful cooperation.”

When tragedy struck two months later, the General Assembly convened a special plenary meeting in honor of President Kennedy. Speaker after speaker rose to pay solemn tribute to the great qualities of my predecessor—and above all to the United States commitment to the United Nations which he both symbolized and strengthened.

When Ambassador Stevenson expressed the gratitude of our people to all the peoples who shared our grief, he also assured the delegates, on my behalf, that “... there will be no Johnson policy toward the United Nations, any more than there was a Kennedy policy. There was—and is—only a United States policy.”³

By this time the work of the United Nations for 1963 was drawing rapidly to a close. Christmas was approaching. My own schedule was crowded by the extraordinary pressures of the first weeks in office.

¹ *U.S. Participation in the UN: Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963* (H. Doc. 188, 88th Cong., 2d sess.); Department of State publication 7675, for sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (\$1.25).

² BULLETIN of Oct. 7, 1963, p. 530.

³ *Ibid.*, Dec. 9, 1963, p. 894.

Yet I asked to go to the United Nations in the closing days of its work to address the General Assembly. I wanted to demonstrate to the world that neither tragedy nor transition could cause this country's support for the United Nations to waver. I wanted to confirm personally that international cooperation lies at the heart of United States foreign policy regardless of who sits in the office of the President and regardless of what party label he wears.

I told the assembled delegates at that moment:⁴

"The greatest of human problems, and the greatest of our common tasks, is to keep the peace and save the future. . . . If there is one commitment more than any other that I would like to leave with you today, it is my unswerving commitment to the keeping and to the strengthening of the peace."

"Now, on the world scale the time has come, as it came to America 30 years ago, for a new era of hope—hope and progress for that one-third of mankind that is still beset by hunger, poverty, and disease."

". . . And more than ever we support the United Nations as the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind."

Second, the work of the United Nations reflected the often harsh and sometimes hopeful political and economic realities of the world in which it operates, and thus demonstrated once again its relevance to contemporary international affairs.

We see this relevance in the stepped-up activities of the Security Council over the past months, particularly in the peacekeeping field.

We see it in the dialogue on trade and economic policies now beginning between developed and developing countries.

We see it in the Assembly debates over the final steps in the process of decolonization.

We see it in the universal relief and overwhelming acceptance which greeted Assembly resolutions endorsing the limited nuclear test ban agreement,⁵ the new communications link

between Moscow and Washington,⁶ the expressed intent of the United States and the Soviet Union not to place weapons of mass destruction in outer space,⁷ and renewed efforts by the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee to seek agreement "with energy and determination."⁸

We see it in the Assembly resolution setting forth certain legal principles to govern the use of outer space⁹—and in calls for continuing cooperation in scientific exploration, weather forecasting, and communications in outer space.¹⁰

And we see it, finally, in the peacekeeping efforts which continued in the Congo and along the armistice lines between Israel and the United Arab Republic. In these efforts, as more recently in Cyprus,¹¹ the members of the United Nations reaffirmed their commitment to the increasingly vital task of helping to keep the peace—a task of growing importance to this Nation and to the world.

In short, the General Assembly was a faithful mirror of political reality, which is another way of saying that it was useful because it dealt in an intensely practical way with current human events.

I take this occasion to remind the Congress of these points because they are not all recorded in the following report, and because they illustrate how closely we associate our future hopes for world peace and progress with the fortunes of the United Nations.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
August 20, 1964

⁴ U.N. doc. A/RES/1908 (XVIII); for text of the agreement, see *ibid.*, July 8, 1963, p. 50.

⁷ U.N. doc. A/RES/1884 (XVIII); for text, see *ibid.*, Nov. 11, 1963, p. 754.

⁸ U.N. doc. A/RES/1908 (XVIII).

⁹ U.N. doc. A/RES/1962 (XVIII); for text, see BULLETIN of Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1012.

¹⁰ U.N. doc. A/RES/1963 (XVIII); for text, see *ibid.*, p. 1013.

¹¹ For background and text of a resolution adopted by the Security Council on Aug. 9, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 318.

⁴ *Ibid.*, Jan. 6, 1964, p. 2.

⁵ U.N. doc. A/RES/1910 (XVIII); for text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.

The Roles and Critics of the United Nations

by Harlan Cleveland

*Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs*¹

At the working sessions of the ABA there is always a good deal of talk about the international rule of law. But this luncheon is not a working session, and you share with your husbands a wider duty and a tougher task than the law—you are citizens of the world's greatest, and therefore most responsible, power.

For us who work on your behalf at the complex and fascinating job of helping the President to manage that power, the exhilaration exceeds the exhaustion, but not by much. You may have noticed the President, the Secretary of State, the United States Representative to the United Nations, a number of key American ambassadors, and quite a slice of other workers in the diplomatic vineyard have been on continuous night and weekend duty of late. And so have key elements of our Armed Forces at home and abroad.

This is because, in time of crisis, the U.S. Government uses all the instruments available—from military power to foreign aid, to direct diplomacy, to regional alliances, to the machinery of the United Nations—to substitute reason for unreason and patch up again and again the frail fabric of peace.

All these instruments, and more, are part of the day-to-day management of crisis diplomacy. The planning of what to do, with whom, in what order, through what channel—a complex process for which the word "orchestration" is currently favored in Washington—is one of the

fateful tasks we Americans demand of our President.

I cannot tell you what the whole orchestra looks like from the conductor's stand—only the President and the Secretary of State could do that. But maybe I can usefully talk for a moment here about a part of the orchestra I work in.

As an instrument of diplomacy, the U.N. sometimes blares like the brass section or sounds as if each man in the percussion section has the score to a different selection. But sometimes, especially when the U.N. is being most useful to peace, it can be as quiet as the rustle of the curtain backstage.

In recent days we have seen the U.N. in four different roles—one in the Gulf of Tonkin incident² and three others in the Cyprus affair.

When the United States responded to attacks on its vessels in international waters, the President asked Ambassador Adlai Stevenson to call for a meeting of the Security Council and explain before the world the reasons for our action, the limits we had placed on it, and the constancy of our commitment to peace.

During a perilous weekend in Cyprus, the U.N. has also served other nations as sounding board for public presentation of their views. But it has also been performing three other major functions—as an international authority to demand a cease-fire, as a peacekeeping organization with 6,000 blue-helmeted troops on the spot, and as a conciliation service on the fundamentals of the dispute.

¹ This is a condensed version of an address Mr. Cleveland made before the wives of the members of the American Bar Association at New York, N.Y., on Aug. 11.

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.

Thus in New York the Security Council spent the weekend in emergency session and the Secretary-General has been hard at work.

In Cyprus the United Nations Peace Force kept the Greeks and the Turks from each other's throats for over 2 months before brinkmanship on the island led to the edge of the precipice of war.

In Geneva United Nations mediation has been trying to untangle this ancient grudge fight and find some formula for a permanent solution.

And while President Johnson was using his time, his staff, and his influence to halt the spread of massacre—while the Secretary of State and his colleagues were in continuous touch with more than two dozen nations, while Ambassador Stevenson was urging the Security Council to call for a cease-fire, while the U.S. Ambassadors in Nicosia and Athens and Ankara were working day and night—the U.N. Commander on the ground in Cyprus has become the key man in giving precarious effect to the cease-fire resolution which was voted by the Security Council on Sunday afternoon.³

We do not yet know whether an ancient feud will condemn two allies to conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. But if this latest threat to world peace is brought under control, it will be difficult to escape the conclusion that a central—indeed a quite indispensable—role was played by the United Nations.

American Support for the U.N.

The American people sense almost instinctively that in these dangerous and complex times we need a world organization which can serve as the impartial third man in quarrels between parties too passionately committed to agree between themselves to settle things rationally.

Not long ago I was invited to take part in a three-cornered debate with a U.N. hater and an advocate of instant peace. I agreed, if the sponsors of the meeting would meet one simple condition. They were to place 20 chairs in a row across the speakers' platform. The other two speakers could sit at either end of the row.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 31, 1964, p. 318.

And I would bring with me enough people to fill the other 18 seats—Americans who, for various reasons and with varying degrees of enthusiasm, think the U.N. is a "good thing" and that we should keep trying to strengthen it.

In that way, I suggested, we would represent honestly to the audience the current state of public opinion about the United Nations in the United States of America.

Americans are, in fact, overwhelmingly in favor of supporting and strengthening the world organization. The professional polls regularly find that 83 to 90 percent of us will sign on to pro-U.N. sentiments. Seldom do you find such a solid support for anything important enough to justify sampling public opinion.

The reason, of course, is easy to come by and utterly simple: The first job of the United Nations is to preserve the peace of the world.

The "U.N. Haters"

Not everybody agrees. Political labels to one side, the vocal critics of the U.N. can be divided into two main camps: those who think the U.N. is doing too much and those who think it is not doing enough.

One group fears an effective international organization *as such*; the other group fears that without a much more effective international organization, all will be lost.

At the fringe of one extreme is a doughty band of fundamentalists who look upon the United Nations as the work of a Communist conspiracy, perhaps of the Devil himself. This tiny group survives, year in and year out, on a diet of moldy tidbits: "Alger Hiss wrote the charter," General MacArthur, in Korea, "took orders from a Russian general at the U.N.," and other improbable but imperishable canards.

Less frantic critics in this group are those Americans who have learned that we cannot remain aloof from the world but who still think we should somehow run it ourselves. They are rightly impressed with the raw power available to the United States but have missed the paradox of power: The stronger you are, the less able you are to act alone. For a great power, of course, toughness is measured not by the decibels of bluster but by the degree of restraint with which its power is exercised.

This is, of course, a pretty frustrating world for Americans—a world in which Europeans we helped make prosperous are driving hard bargains with their new prosperity—a world in which nations we sought independence for are acting independent—a world in which a Communist monolith we wanted broken up is breaking up.

In the agony of our success a minority of militant folk is heady with leadership but has not yet come to terms with the simplest requirement of political leadership, common to every political body from the high school student council to the General Assembly of the United Nations. That requirement is, above all, that the leader must make sure that those he leads are going where they think they want to go.

The militants want—or say they want—the U.N. as an international debating society but without the ability to *do* anything. Action, to these people, is direct and unilateral use of our own power. They cannot see—or do not wish to see—that a U.N. able to keep the peace in local conflicts increases the options open to American policymakers in dealing with the turbulence which can always blow up into a threat to our own national security.

In handling more and more of these threats—in the Middle East, in the Congo, in Cyprus, and elsewhere—dialog and debate are somehow not enough. And the direct, unilateral use of power, which was fashionable and even effective in another day, involves deeper involvement and graver risks than most Americans are ready to assume for the satisfaction of settling some ancient grudge fight in another hemisphere.

So at one extreme of public opinion are people who are critical of the U.N. either because they fear any form of international organization at all or because the only exercise of national power they understand is the old-fashioned method of going it alone.

The Dedicated Idealists

The other group of critics—also small and vocal, but better informed and less profane in their correspondence than the U.N. haters—are those who bewail the fact that the U.N. has not given us instant world peace. Because they

favor world peace through world organization, they are much more effective critics.

I have seen recently a well-written, well-designed, well-printed pamphlet sponsored by a group of highly respected citizens and bearing the signature of a distinguished international lawyer. The United Nations, says the pamphlet, is a “failure.” And this is so because the United Nations has not brought about:

- general and complete disarmament,
- an accepted body of comprehensive international law,
- an enforceable system of world order,
- a world legislature, and
- a world executive with a world police force to insure compliance with its decisions.

The allegations, of course, are true—though one wonders why they are leveled at the United Nations, which was never intended to be a world government. None of its principal organizers, least of all the United States, would have signed the charter had it been so intended.

Lacking the attributes of world government, the United Nations—which is to say the *members* of the United Nations, acting within the machinery of the world organization—simply have sought to deal with the real world. It is, for better or worse, a world where national sovereignty is still held sacred by people and politicians; where national security is still held to rest upon national arms; where old grudges and new conflicts still bedevil the peacemakers; where the Western concept of law is still unknown to many and rejected by some; and where nation-states are still learning that they must act in concert in matters of common interest but are not yet ready to merge national interests in a universal union.

Learning To Deal With the World as It Is

If the fundamentalist U.N. haters are living in a past that never was, the dedicated writers of ideal constitutions are dreaming of a future too far down the corridors of time to have much bearing on the world as it is. When President Kennedy launched the initiative that led to the treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, under water, and in outer space, he launched it from the proposition that we must learn to

deal with the world as it is. That phrase has the toneless ring of a truism; but one merit of a truism is that it is true.

From an American standpoint, the best instrument we have for keeping the general peace is the strength and modernity of our Military Establishment—and the restraint with which it is used. But most Americans perceive that the U.N. is also a peacekeeping instrument of growing usefulness, because it is important to our national security to keep or restore the peace in local fights which could too easily become global wars.

This is, I suppose, why so lopsided a majority of Americans, being practical men and women, are prepared to see the U.N. grow in experience and strength from one crisis to the next.

And this is why the United States Government keeps working, in Cyprus and elsewhere, at the job of making sure that, if the requisite majority of governments can find the will to act together to keep the peace, the United Nations will not be lacking for ready resources to do the job.

General Pulaski's Memorial Day, 1964

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS during the American war for independence a young Polish patriot in exile, Count Casimir Pulaski, joined and fought brilliantly with the Continental Army, was promoted by Congress to brigadier general and commander of cavalry, and organized and commanded a corps called the Pulaski Legion; and

WHEREAS General Pulaski died on October 11, 1779, of a wound received two days earlier while leading a cavalry charge in the city of Savannah, Georgia; and

WHEREAS it is appropriate that we should continue to take pride in General Pulaski's devotion to our Nation and to the cause of universal freedom by marking the one hundred and eighty-fifth anniversary of his death; and

WHEREAS this occasion reminds us of the great contributions made to the progress and security of this Nation by our many citizens of Polish origin; and


WHEREAS it is fitting that we acknowledge our debt to General Pulaski and his countrymen and honor the memory of this gallant Polish patriot:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Sunday, October 11, 1964, as General Pulaski's Memo-

rial Day; and I direct the appropriate Government officials to display the flag of the United States on all Government buildings on that day. I also invite the people of the United States to observe the day with appropriate ceremonies in honor of the memory of General Pulaski and the noble cause for which he gave his life.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this Fifteenth day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:

DEAN RUSK,

Secretary of State.

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Semiannual Report of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Problems. Letter from the Secretary of the Treasury transmitting a report on the activities of the Council for the period July 1–December 31, 1963. H. Doc. 200. June 23, 1964. 56 pp.

Forty-Fifth Report to Congress on Lend-Lease Operations. Message from the President transmitting the report for the year ending December 31, 1963. H. Doc. 310. August 6, 1964. 21 pp.

International Exposition for Southern California. Report to accompany H.J. Res. 952. H. Rept. 1737. August 11, 1964. 6 pp.

Importation of Refuse Screenings. Report to accompany H.R. 3607. H. Rept. 1742. August 11, 1964. 7 pp.

Expressing the Sense of the Congress With Respect to the Enforcement of the Provisions of Article 19 of the United Nations Charter. Report to accompany H. Con. Res. 343. H. Rept. 1756. August 11, 1964. 4 pp.

Determination of Claims of U.S. Nationals Against the Government of Cuba. Report to accompany H.R. 12259. H. Rept. 1759. August 11, 1964. 37 pp.

Extension and Amendment of Public Law 480. Report to accompany H.R. 12298. H. Rept. 1767. August 11, 1964. 47 pp.; and report (additional views) to accompany H.R. 12298, H. Rept. 1767, Part 2, August 12, 1964. 3 pp.

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill, 1965. Report to accompany H.R. 11134, S. Rept. 1380, August 12, 1964. 29 pp.; and conference report to accompany H.R. 11134, H. Rept. 1817, August 15, 1964. 7 pp.

¹ No. 3605; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 11797.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings¹

In Session as of August 31, 1964

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament	Geneva	Mar. 14, 1962-
32d Biennial International Art Exhibition	Venice	June 20, 1964-
13th Triennale	Milan	July 1-
U.N. Special Committee on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States.	México, D.F.	Aug. 27-
3d U.N. International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.	Geneva	Aug. 31-

Scheduled September Through November 1964

3d Meeting of the Central American Ministers of Interior/Government.	Tegucigalpa.	Sept. 1-
ICAO Legal Committee: 15th Session	Montreal.	Sept. 1-
Inter-American Statistical Institute: Committee on Improvement of National Statistics.	Panama	Sept. 2-
3d FAO Regional Conference for Africa	Addis Ababa.	Sept. 3-
NATO Petroleum Planning Committee	Paris.	Sept. 7-
FAO Technical Working Party on Cocoa Production	Rome.	Sept. 7-
ILO Meeting of Experts on Statistics of Wages and Labor Costs .	Geneva.	Sept. 7-
OECD Trade Committee: Working Party	Paris.	Sept. 7-
OECD Executive Committee	Paris.	Sept. 8-
ICEM Subcommittee on Budget and Finance: 10th Session . . .	Washington.	Sept. 8-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 9th Session	London.	Sept. 8-
IMCO Special Assembly	Washington.	Sept. 8-
OECD General Working Group of the Special Committee for Oil .	Paris.	Sept. 10-
IAEA Board of Governors	Vienna	Sept. 11-
PAHO Executive Committee	México, D.F.	Sept. 12-
UNESCO Arab States Regional Literacy Conference	Cairo.	Sept. 12-
GATT Committee on Legal and Institutional Framework	Geneva.	Sept. 14-
U.N. ECE Working Party on the Construction of Motor Vehicles.	Geneva.	Sept. 14-
FAO Study Group on Jute, Kenaf, and Allied Fibers: 1st Session .	Rome	Sept. 14-
IAEA General Conference: 8th Regular Session	Vienna	Sept. 14-
U.N. ECA Industrial Coordination Conference on West Africa .	Bamako, Mali	Sept. 15-
IMCO Council: 13th Session	London	Sept. 15-
U.N. Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions.	New York	Sept. 15-
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 156th Session.	Manila	Sept. 17-
OECD Agriculture Committee	Paris	Sept. 17-
OECD Joint Agriculture and Trade Working Party	Paris	Sept. 21
UNESCO Conference on Scientific Land Research and Aerial Survey Methods.	Toulouse	Sept. 21-
U.N. ECE Steel Committee: 32d Session	Geneva	Sept. 21-
U.N. ECOSOC Group of Experts on Explosives: Meeting of Experts on Dangerous Goods.	Geneva	Sept. 21-
ECE Gas Committee: Symposium on Natural Gas Storage Techniques.	Paris	Sept. 21-
2d FAO Near East Meeting on Animal Production and Health .	Beirut	Sept. 21-

¹ Prepared in the Office of International Conferences, Aug. 20, 1964. Following is a list of abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IA-ECOSOC, Inter-American Economic and Social Council; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Agency; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congress; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings—*Continued*

Scheduled September Through November 1964—*Continued*

ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting for the Clothing Industry . . .	Geneva	Sept. 21-
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 37th Session	Rome	Sept. 22-
FAO Asia-Pacific Forestry Commission: 7th Session	Auckland	Sept. 22-
BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee	Geneva	Sept. 28-
U.N. ECE Coal Committee	Geneva	Sept. 28-
FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 2d Session	Geneva	Sept. 28-
International Council for the Exploration of the Sea	Copenhagen	Sept. 28-
WMO Commission for Hydrometeorology: 2d Session	Warsaw	Sept. 29-
UNESCO Executive Board: 68th Session	Paris	Sept. 29-
International Criminal Police Organization: 33d Assembly . . .	Caracas	Sept. 30-
Inter-American Children's Institute: 45th Meeting of the Direct- ing Council.	Montevideo	September
IA-ECOSOC Permanent Technical Committee on Ports	Lima	September
UNESCO Headquarters Committee: 43d Session	Paris	September
U.N. Trade and Development Committee: Special Committee on Procedures.	New York	September
U.N. Special Working Group of 21	New York	September
U.N. Security Council Experts Committee on <i>Apartheid</i>	New York	September
U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on the Application of Science and Technology to Development.	New York	Oct. 2-
U.N. ECA West African Subregional Meeting	Tangier	Oct. 5-
U.N. ECE Timber Committee: 22d Session	Geneva	Oct. 5-
IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: 1st Session of Subcommittee on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other Than Grain.	London	Oct. 5-
ILO Technical Meeting Concerning Certain Aspects of Labor- Management Relations Within Undertakings.	Geneva	Oct. 5-
FAO Council: 43d Session	Rome	Oct. 5-
ILO Experts on Welfare Facilities for Industrial Workers . . .	Geneva	Oct. 5-
NATO Science Committee	Paris	Oct. 5-
12th General Conference on Weights and Measures	Paris	Oct. 6-
BIRPI Committee of Experts on International Classification of Industrial Designs.	Geneva	Oct. 12-
U.N. ECE Governmental Experts on Rational Utilization of Water Resources.	Geneva	Oct. 12-
ITU African LF/MF Broadcasting Conference	Geneva	Oct. 12-
FAO Latin American Forestry Commission: 9th Session	Curitiba, Brazil	Oct. 13-
South Pacific Commission: 26th Session	Nouméa, New Caledonia	Oct. 14-
FAO Indo-Pacific Fisheries Council: 11th Session	Kuala Lumpur	Oct. 16-
U.N. ECE Conference of European Statisticians: 12th Plenary Assembly.	Geneva	Oct. 19-
5th Inter-American Indian Conference	Quito	Oct. 19-
2d U.N. ECAFE Conference of Asian Economic Planners.	Bangkok	Oct. 19-
U.N. ECE Committee on the Development of Trade: 13th Session.	Geneva	Oct. 19-
7th FAO Regional Conference for the Near East	Cairo	Oct. 19-
UNESCO General Conference: 13th Session	Paris	Oct. 20-
International Lead and Zinc Study Group: 8th Session	Madrid	Oct. 21-
4th FAO Regional Conference for Europe	Salzburg	Oct. 26-
FAO <i>Ad Hoc</i> Meeting on Bananas	Quito	Oct. 26-
U.N. ECAFE Railway Subcommittee: 8th Session	Bangkok	Oct. 27-
Canadian Peacekeeping Conference	Ottawa	October
Executive Committee of the U.N. High Commissioner's Program for Refugees: 12th Session.	Geneva	October
FAO International Rice Commission: 9th Session	Manila	Nov. 2-
IMCO Subcommittee on the International Code of Signals: 7th Session.	London	Nov. 2-
U.N. ECE Senior Economic Advisers	Geneva	Nov. 2-
UNESCO Science and Technology Advisory Committee	New York	Nov. 2-
Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Development in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan): 16th Meeting.	London	Nov. 2-
International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 11th Meeting .	Tokyo	Nov. 2-
ICEM Executive Committee: 24th Session	Geneva	Nov. 2-
7th FAO Regional Conference for Asia and the Far East	Manila	Nov. 7-
PAHC Permanent Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety . .	Washington	Nov. 9-
ICEM Council: 22d Session	Geneva	Nov. 9-
ILO Governing Body (and its committees): 160th Session . . .	Geneva	Nov. 9-
U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session	New York	Nov. 10-
NATO Senior Civil Emergency Planning Committee	Paris	Nov. 11-
6th U.N. ECAFE Regional Conference on Water Resources Development.	Bangkok	Nov. 12-

GATT Contracting Parties: 24th General Session	Geneva	Nov. 14-
U.N. Pledging Conference on the Expanded Program of Technical Assistance and the Special Fund.	New York	Nov. 16-
U.N. ECA Senior Economic Planners	Dakar	Nov. 16-
2d ILO African Regional Conference	undetermined	Nov. 20-
IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems: 3d Session.	London	Nov. 23-
U.N. ECE Gas Committee: 11th Session	Geneva	Nov. 23-
U.N. ECAFE Inland Transport and Communications Committee: 13th Session.	Bangkok	Nov. 23-
U.N. ECA Standing Committee on Housing and Physical Planning.	Addis Ababa	Nov. 23-
U.N. ECE Electric Power Committee: 23d Session	Geneva	Nov. 30-
FAO Technical Working Party on Coconut Production, Protection, and Processing: 2d Meeting.	Colombo	Nov. 30-
ILO Coal Mines Committee: 8th Session	Geneva	Nov. 30-
U.N. ECE <i>Ad Hoc</i> Group on Obstacles to Development of Trade Between ECE Countries: 2d Session.	Geneva	Nov. 30-
3d IA-ECOSOC Annual Meeting at the Expert Level	Lima	Nov. 30-
Inter-American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly	Montevideo	November
UNESCO Meeting of Asian Ministers of Education	Bangkok	November

Current U.N. Documents: A Selected Bibliography

Mimographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

The Cyprus Question:

- Letter dated August 7 from the Chargé d'Affaires, a.i., of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council. S/5865. August 8, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 9 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5870. August 10, 1964. 2 pp.
- Telegram dated August 10 from the President of Cyprus to the President of the Security Council. S/5871. August 10, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 10 from the Acting Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the Security Council, transmitting texts of messages addressed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. to the Prime Minister of Turkey, the President of Cyprus, and the U.N. Secretary-General on August 9. S/5873. August 10, 1964. 4 pp.
- Letter dated August 10 from the Prime Minister of Turkey to the President of the Security Council. S/5875. August 10, 1964. 3 pp.
- Statement by the Secretary-General on Cyprus. S/5879. August 10, 1964. 2 pp.
- Exchange of cables dated August 10 between the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. and the Secretary-General. S/5880 and S/5881. August 10, 1964. 1 p. each.
- Exchange of messages between the Prime Minister of the Sudan and the Secretary-General. S/5882. August 11, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 11 from the Representative of Greece to the President of the Security Council. S/5884. August 11, 1964. 2 pp.
- Cambodia-South Viet-Nam Border Dispute:
Letters from the Representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council regarding various incidents of alleged aggression by armed forces

of the Republic of Viet-Nam. S/5826, July 22, 1964, 1 p.; S/5840, July 28, 1964, 1 p.; S/5848, August 4, 1964, 1 p.; S/5850, August 5, 1964, 1 p.; S/5857, August 7, 1964, 1 p.; S/5883, August 11, 1964, 1 p.

Letter dated July 22 from the Representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council charging that U.S. soldiers had landed on Cambodian territory. S/5829. July 23, 1964. 1 p.

TREATY INFORMATION

Mexico and United States Sign Civil Air Agreement

Press release 374 dated August 17

By an exchange of diplomatic notes¹ which took place August 14, Mexico and the United States extended through June 30, 1965, the air transport agreement² in force between the two countries. This exchange of notes, which took place in Mexico City between the Mexican Ministry of Foreign Relations and the American Embassy, gives effect to the ad referendum agreement reached by representatives of Mexico and the United States during civil air negotiations in Washington in June.³

¹ Not printed here.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 4675 and 5513.

³ For background, see BULLETIN of July 27, 1964, p. 133.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: New Zealand, June 11, 1964.

Application to: Cook Islands (including Niue) and Tokelau Islands, June 11, 1964.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: New Zealand, June 11, 1964.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: New Zealand, June 11, 1964.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Accession deposited: New Zealand, June 11, 1964.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention of February 8, 1949 (TIAS 2089), for the Northwest Atlantic fisheries relating to harp and hood seals. Done at Washington July 15, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Spain, August 17, 1964.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

Signatures: Australia, Canada, Denmark, France (subject to ratification), Italy (subject to ratification), Japan, Netherlands (subject to approval), Spain, United Kingdom, United States, and Vatican City State, August 20, 1964.

Declaration of provisional application: Netherlands, August 20, 1964.

Special agreement to establish interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

Signatures for: Canadian Overseas Telecommunications Corporation; Directorate General for Post and Telegraph of Denmark; France; Kokusai Den Shin Denwa Company Ltd., of Japan; Netherlands; Spain; Her Britannic Majesty's Postmaster General; Communications Satellite Corporation of the United States; and Vatican City State, August 20, 1964; Overseas Telecommunications Commission, Australia, August 24, 1964.

Trade

Long-term arrangements regarding international trade in cotton textiles. Concluded at Geneva February 9,

¹Not in force.

1962. Entered into force October 1, 1962. TIAS 5240.

Accession deposited: Turkey, August 4, 1964.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement relating to the services of a research chemist from U.S. Bureau of Mines for spectrometric research. Effected by exchange of notes at Washington August 14 and 19, 1964. Entered into force August 19, 1964.

Israel

Amendment to the agreement of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 4407, 4507, 5079), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington August 19, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Italy

Agreement amending agreement concerning exportation of cotton velveteen fabrics from Italy to the United States of July 6, 1962 (TIAS 5186). Effected by exchange of notes at Washington July 29, 1964. Entered into force July 29, 1964.

Norway

Agreement amending the agreement of March 15, 1948 (TIAS 1758), for the exchange of official publications. Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo August 10 and 11, 1964. Enters into force September 1, 1964.

Peru

Agreement for the continuation of the cooperative meteorological program in Peru. Effected by exchange of notes at Lima July 7, 1964. Entered into force July 7, 1964.

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 17-23

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to August 17 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 365 of August 10.

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*373	8/17	U.S. participation in international conferences.
374	8/17	Civil air agreement with Mexico.
375	8/18	Harriman: International Congress on French-Speaking Africa.
*376	8/20	Diplomatic authors exhibit.
*377	8/21	Battle sworn in as Ambassador to the United Arab Republic (biographic details).
*378	8/21	Harriman: National Bar Association, Baltimore (excerpts).

*Not printed.

Africa. United States Policy and Africa (Harriman) 330

Asia. Assistant Secretary Bundy Comments on Southeast Asia Developments in Voice of America Interview 334

Aviation. Mexico and United States Sign Civil Air Agreement 357

China, Communist. Assistant Secretary Bundy Comments on Southeast Asia Developments in Voice of America Interview 334

Communism. A World View of Freedom's Hopes and Dilemmas (Duke) 340

Congo (Léopoldville). United States Policy and Africa (Harriman) 330

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Europe. A World View of Freedom's Hopes and Dilemmas (Duke) 340

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Human Rights. A World View of Freedom's Hopes and Dilemmas (Duke) 340

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International Organizations and Conferences. Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 355

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
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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE

BULLETIN



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September 14, 1964

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Freedom in the Postwar World

Address by Secretary Rusk¹

It is a keen personal pleasure for me to renew old friendships here and to express my thanks to this great organization to which I am so much indebted. You honored me greatly in 1950 when you chose me as the recipient of your first World Peace Award.² Later you honored me again by asking me to serve as chairman of AMVETS' International Affairs Council.

AMVETS has traditionally taken its stand for a strong and constructive foreign policy—a policy aimed to achieve an “enduring world peace which permits our great institutions of freedom not only to survive but to flourish” and in which all mankind can enjoy freedom.

In supporting measures designed to move the

world toward that goal, AMVETS has been consistently nonpartisan. The recipients of your Silver Helmet Peace Awards have included Dwight D. Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy, John Foster Dulles, Eleanor Roosevelt, Lucius D. Clay, and Henry Cabot Lodge. You have exerted your influence to make, and keep, our foreign policy genuinely national.

It is of great importance that our foreign policy *be* genuinely national—that it have the reliability, the consistency, which come from bipartisan support. For the United States, with all its strength and its inescapable role of leadership in the struggle for freedom, cannot zig and zag without seriously unsettling the world situation and endangering all that we cherish.

As Secretary of State, I am particularly grateful for the support which AMVETS has given to our national foreign policies and to all the means, including defense budgets and foreign aid, which are essential to protect and promote freedom. Commander [Edmund M.] Gulewicz, I read with the deepest interest your

¹ Made before the national convention of the American Veterans of World War II and Korea at Philadelphia, Pa., on Aug. 29 (press release 384).

² For excerpts from an address made before the national convention at Cleveland, Ohio, on Sept. 9, 1950, by Mr. Rusk, who was then Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs, see BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1950, p. 465.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1316 PUBLICATION 7734 SEPTEMBER 14, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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recent statements to the Republican and Democratic platform committees. I wish every American citizen would read them. If every American organization expressed itself on foreign policy with such understanding and wisdom, the tasks of a President and a Secretary of State would be lightened.

It was 14 years ago next month that AMVETS so generously honored me with the Peace Award. Tonight I should like to reflect on some of the significant changes that have occurred in these 14 years.

Changes in the World Since 1950

In 1950 Germany, Austria, and Japan were still under military occupation. The realm dominated by the Kremlin was monolithic. In the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe Stalin's will was unchallenged. Mainland China had just been conquered by Communists and was heavily dependent upon Moscow.

The free world had frustrated Stalin's first postwar efforts to expand his domain by his pressures on Iran, Greece, and Turkey and through the Berlin blockade. But Western Europe was far from secure. Economically, it had not yet recovered from the war. The Marshall Plan had been in operation only a year. Robert Schuman of France had just proposed—in May 1950—the pooling of French and German coal and steel production in a community open to other European nations, as a first step toward a "United States of Europe." The North Atlantic Treaty had been signed in 1949, but as yet there was no NATO command and Western Europe was protected on the ground only by relatively small occupation forces.

In the Far East, in addition to the war in Korea, there was the war in former French Indochina. Communist guerrillas were active in Malaya, the Philippines, and Burma. India, Pakistan, and Ceylon were independent but not yet moving ahead economically. Indonesia had just achieved independence. Japan was struggling along on a gross national product of a little more than \$200 per person per year and had no security forces of its own. And the armed forces of the Republic of Korea, about 100,000 in number, were more an armed constabulary than a combat force.

Then there were only 4 independent nations in Africa. Now there are 35, with more still to come. The United States had diplomatic relations with 77 countries, today with 114.

In the Western Hemisphere, the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance—more commonly known as the Rio Treaty—had been agreed upon in 1947, and the Charter of the Organization of American States had been adopted at Bogotá in 1948. But not many of our neighbors were coming to grips with their intensifying social problems; the end of wartime prosperity in the early fifties aggravated their economic difficulties; and in some countries dictators only temporarily deferred a day of reckoning. AMVETS had the foresight to propose as early as 1954 the sort of cooperative economic and social development program for the Western Hemisphere which came into being as the Alliance for Progress.

During the fiscal year ended June 30, 1950, we spent \$11,900,000,000 on our Military Establishment. We had less than 1,500,000 men in our Armed Forces. The Army officially carried 10 divisions; but 5 of these were on occupation assignments and the remaining 5, stationed at home, functioned primarily as training divisions. Our strategic retaliatory forces consisted of World War II B-29's, its up-dated version, the B-50, and the B-36—all with piston engines. We had no jet bombers. The United States Fleet had only seven attack carriers; the Marine Corps was down to 75,000 men in widely dispersed units. Guided missiles were still in the realm of research and experiment.

The Communist attack in Korea jolted the free world into a realization that any period of relaxation which we thought we had earned after World War II was finished. We went to work to strengthen our defenses and those of our friends. We sent additional forces to Europe. At the request of President Truman, General Eisenhower returned to active duty to organize SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe]. Turkey and Greece joined NATO. The Western Powers granted sovereignty to the Federal Republic of Germany, and it was admitted to partnership in NATO. While continuing the Marshall Plan for the economic recovery of Europe, we

assisted our European friends to strengthen their armed forces.

In the Pacific, we took the lead in negotiating the peace treaty with Japan. In this, John Foster Dulles, as a Special Assistant to President Truman, worked in close partnership with Secretary of State Dean Acheson. We signed defensive alliances with the Philippines, Australia and New Zealand, Japan, the Republic of China on Taiwan, and the Republic of Korea. We joined in forming the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. In West Asia we supported the defensive alliance now called CENTO [Central Treaty Organization]; and through the Eisenhower Doctrine and bilateral pledges to Iran as well as to Pakistan and Turkey, with whom we were already allied, we made plain our intent to assist the nations of that area in repelling Communist aggression. Some of these initiatives were taken by a Democratic administration, some by its Republican successor. But all had broad bipartisan support.

We initiated or supported measures to strengthen the free world politically and economically. We encouraged the formation of the European economic communities. We took part in and encouraged the work of the OEEC [Organization for European Economic Cooperation] and its successor, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. We developed our partnerships with Canada, with a democratic Japan, and with other free nations of the Pacific. We set in motion more systematic programs of assistance to the less developed nations. We made clear our sympathy for the former colonial peoples who had attained or were still trying to attain their freedom.

We initiated or supported various steps to strengthen the United Nations and its related agencies, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund.

We repeatedly sought to resolve or reduce dangerous disputes with our Communist adversaries and finally achieved an Austrian state treaty.

We repeatedly sought agreement on measures to curb and reduce armaments and lessen the danger of war by surprise or miscalculation. Last year we got the limited test ban treaty

and installed the direct line for emergency communication between Washington and Moscow.³ The so-called "hot line" remains, fortunately, unused; any suggestion that it is for use behind the backs of our allies is simply mischiefmaking. We and the Soviets joined in United Nations declarations against the orbiting of weapons of mass destruction and on principles of law for outer space.

It is gratifying to have had AMVETS' endorsement of both the test ban treaty and the "hot line." You also have served the cause of peace and national security by your earlier resolutions favoring the creation of the Disarmament Agency—which, as you know, was set up in 1961—and by your continuing support for international agreements to reduce armaments, with controls to assure compliance, and on safeguards against surprise attack.

Where We Stand Today

Where do we stand today in the worldwide struggle between the Communist world of coercion and the world of freedom?

Unquestionably certain developments have been unfavorable from our viewpoint. By far the most important of these was the Soviet Union's achievement during the mid-1950's of a very substantial thermonuclear guided missile capacity. This has required the United States to build up its own strategic forces to almost unimaginable levels of power and has introduced the sobering fact that a devastating nuclear exchange is an operational possibility to which men must address themselves.

I was present when President Truman decided to go to the assistance of Korea in 1950. I was also present when President Kennedy made his decision to defend West Berlin, with whatever means might become necessary, and to insist that offensive missiles be withdrawn from Cuba. President Kennedy's decisions were taken in full consideration of a new fact of the modern world—the potential devastation of much of the Northern Hemisphere. Great powers looked squarely at the realities of a thermonuclear exchange. Those moments of high crisis were eased, but they left the entire

³ For a statement on the first anniversary of the "hot line" agreement, see p. 369.

world just a bit more sober than it had been before.

In Southeast Asia the free world suffered a setback in 1954 when, after the defeat at Dien Bien Phu, Viet-Nam was divided and a Communist regime was consolidated in Hanoi. We helped South Viet-Nam to get on its feet and to build its military defenses. It made remarkable progress for a few years—which is perhaps why Communist North Viet-Nam, with the backing of Communist China, renewed its aggression against South Viet-Nam in 1959. In 1961 President Kennedy reviewed the situation, concluded that the assault from the north had been underestimated, and substantially increased our assistance to the Government and people of South Viet-Nam.

In 1960 the independence of Laos also was seriously threatened. Neutralist forces were cooperating with the Communist Pathet Lao, which were directed and supported and reinforced from North Viet-Nam, with the backing of both Peiping and Moscow. Late in the year Moscow began airlifting supplies from Hanoi to the neutralist and Pathet Lao forces. While we supported the Government forces, we did not wish to see Laos become a cockpit of great-power rivalry. We felt the best solution was an international agreement to leave the Laotians to manage their own affairs. Khrushchev said he also favored such an arrangement. In July 1962 an international agreement on the neutralization and independence of Laos was reached at Geneva. The Laos Communists and Hanoi have never fully complied with this agreement. But now the neutralists are cooperating with the conservatives, and leaders of all three Laos factions are now meeting in Paris to explore the possibility of returning to the 1962 accord and making it effective.

Hanoi and Peiping have not yet learned that they must leave their neighbors alone. But this is a decision which they must reach. We and our SEATO allies have declared that the Communist aggressions in Southeast Asia must be defeated. As you said, Commander Gulewicz, in your statement to the platform committees of the two major parties, “. . . we cannot afford to abandon the free people of Viet-Nam. The world watches because South Viet-Nam is a critical test-case for new Communist strategy.”

The free world suffered a setback when the Communists were allowed to take over Cuba in 1959–60. Prevention having failed, the Kennedy-Johnson administration inherited the more difficult problem of finding a cure. We have not yet effected a cure, but we have made significant progress. With our Latin American partners we have taken effective steps to isolate Cuba from the hemisphere, to insulate the hemisphere against aggression and subversion based on Cuba, and to make it clear that Cuba will not be allowed to serve as a base for missiles or other strategic weapons. The Cuban economy has gone from bad to worse, despite massive Soviet assistance. It has become increasingly clear that Castroism has no future either in the rest of the hemisphere or in Cuba itself.

We and the free world suffered a temporary setback in prestige when the Soviets got the jump on us in space, first with sputniks and luniks and then with some of their manned space vehicles. But since we went to work in earnest we have achieved many “firsts,” thus largely offsetting our initial loss. I am confident that, in time, we shall lead in every important phase of space exploration. Many free nations cooperate in our space efforts. And I would hope that cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States in this field would develop, as President Johnson has urged—indeed, that the Soviet and American space programs would eventually be joined. Man's effort to reach out from this tiny speck in the universe should be made on behalf of the human race as a whole.

In the last 14 years the free world has grown vastly in strength—strength of all forms. Our military power has been increased almost beyond imagination. Our nuclear deterrent has grown mightily and been made increasingly invulnerable. Our conventional forces have been enlarged, modernized, and made more mobile. We maintain nearly 2,700,000 men under arms. And we have greatly increased our capacity to help our friends deal with guerrilla warfare.

The military strength of our allies likewise has greatly increased. Defense expenditures of our European allies have increased 300 percent in the past 14 years. The divisional strength in Western Europe has about doubled, and the

number of aircraft in the same area has increased eightfold.

In the Far East, the Republic of Korea maintains armed forces of more than a half million, equipped and trained for sustained combat. Japan has developed a modern self-defense force of nearly 250,000. The armed forces of the Republic of China, South Viet-Nam, and Thailand have been greatly strengthened. And the United States maintains more than 200,000 men in full readiness west of Hawaii, with more in Hawaii and at home ready for immediate deployment. We can airlift combat forces in significant numbers to any part of the world.

In economic strength, also, the free world has made immense gains since 1950, both absolutely and in relation to the Communist world.

Since 1950 Western Europe and Canada have gained as much in gross national product as the Soviet Union plus all the Soviet bloc countries combined. And, of course, living standards average far higher in Western Europe, as well as in Canada, than in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Since 1950 the United States has gained even more in gross national product than Western Europe and Canada combined.

Thus, since 1950, the North Atlantic community alone has gained, in gross national product, more than twice as much as the entire Soviet empire and nearly twice as much as the entire Communist world.

In Asia, Japan alone has increased its gross national product almost as much as Communist China plus the smaller Communist countries, whose population is seven or more times that of Japan.

Many other nations in the Western Pacific and Asia have far outstripped Communist China in economic performance: Australia, New Zealand, Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and the Republic of China on Taiwan, among others. In South Asia, India and Pakistan have made significant economic gains. Further west, Iran has made far-reaching economic and social advances. Many other free nations have registered impressive gains. And they have stubbornly defended their own independence. So far, no nation which achieved

its independence since the Second World War has been taken over by Communists.

And, increasingly, free men have learned the truth about Communist objectives, tactics, and performance. The boast that communism is a shortcut to economic progress has been proved false. The Soviet people have been promised abundance but, despite some gains, are threadbare by modern standards. Communist China's "great leap forward" turned out to be a "great leap backward." Its hopes of becoming a great industrial power have receded into the indefinite future. And nearly all the Communist countries in which agriculture is collectivized have experienced chronic difficulties in food production.

And the Communists have fallen out among themselves. The dispute between Peiping and Moscow is far-reaching. The smaller Eastern European Communist states have gained more autonomy and are trying to restore more of their traditional ties with the West. And in the Soviet Union, as well as in the smaller European Communist states, one can see rising demands not only for better living and working conditions but for more personal freedom.

Unfinished Business of Peace and Freedom

But you and I know that both major branches of the Communist world are still intent on burying us and all the rest of the free world. You and I know that we must not relax.

You and I know that there are burdens to be borne, sacrifices to be made, aggressor appetites still to be checked, disputes within the free world to be resolved. We know that the unfinished business of peace and freedom requires:

- a large defense budget to provide the military might required to insure the peace;

- a strong space effort to insure that there be no advantage here for those who would destroy freedom;

- three to four cents of our Federal tax dollar for foreign aid to build the political and economic strength of those determined to be free;

- steady support for and strengthening of the United Nations;

- determination to meet the commitments of our great alliances and to help those whose freedom and security are under pressure or attack;

—our help, when it is sought, to resolve disputes between our friends.

You and I know that grave and dangerous issues remain unresolved:

- the division of Berlin and Germany;
- self-determination for the peoples of Eastern Europe;
- the recovery of freedom by the people of Cuba;
- how to turn the arms race downward—how to bring the superweapons under control;
- Communist aggressions and threats in Asia;
- Cyprus;
- peace and stability in the Congo;
- the Kashmir dispute;
- and others.

As President Johnson said two nights ago:⁴

This is a dangerous and a difficult world in which we live. I promise no easy answers. But I do promise this: I pledge the firmness to defend freedom, the strength to support that firmness, and a constant, patient effort to move the world toward peace instead of war.

During these years I have been reviewing, we have borne the leadership of the free world. We can justly take pride in how we have conducted ourselves. We have used our great power firmly but with restraint and prudence. We have acted consistently, regardless of election campaigns and domestic political changes. Through the cooperation and wisdom of leaders of both parties experienced in world affairs, we have developed and carried forward a national foreign policy. That policy has produced good results. In the fateful contest with communism—a contest that is for keeps—the free world has gained and continues to gain. How foolish we would be to depart from the tested ways and bipartisan spirit which have served so well our security and the cause of freedom!

We are on the right track. We are making headway. Let's keep moving down that track toward our great goal—a goal aspired to by a great majority of mankind—a worldwide victory for peace and freedom.

⁴ For text of remarks made by President Johnson before the National Democratic Convention at Atlantic City, N.J., on Aug. 27, see White House press release dated Aug. 27.

U.S. Reaffirms Position on NATO Multilateral Nuclear Force

Following is the text of a U.S. note delivered on August 28 to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

Press release 382 dated August 28

The Embassy of the United States of America presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and has the honor to refer to the Ministry's note of July 11, 1964,¹ which sets forth the views of the Soviet Government on the question of the creation of a multilateral nuclear force now under discussion among a number of NATO members.

The United States presented a full exposition of its views on the question of non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, the question of the multilateral nuclear force and on the unfounded accusations against the Federal Republic of Germany, in its note of May 18, 1963.² This note was in reply to Soviet charges in the Ministry's note of April 8, 1963,³ which are similar to those which it now reiterates.

In order to clear away any possible misunderstanding, the United States sets forth once again its views on these important issues.

First, the proposed multilateral force is entirely defensive in purpose. It is designed to provide NATO with a deterrent against an extensive array of Soviet nuclear weapons directed against the members of the Atlantic Alliance. Its purpose is not aggressive, either in conception or in fact. It is, of course, inconceivable that the nations of NATO should unilaterally deny themselves the weapons necessary to meet the dangers posed by Soviet arms, which the Soviet Government has explicitly threatened to use against them on a number of occasions.

Second, the United States reaffirms its longstanding opposition to the proliferation of national nuclear weapons capabilities. The MLF is specifically designed to be consistent with this position. The principles of multilateral man-

¹ Not printed here.

² For text, see BULLETIN of June 3, 1963, p. 860.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 862.

ning and ownership will assure that the multilateral force could be used only by decision of its governing body on which all members would be represented in accordance with control arrangements consistent with principles of non-dissemination. Furthermore, the force would be subject to the same safeguards as other NATO nuclear forces to prevent its use in an accidental or unauthorized manner.

Third, the United States stands ready to conclude an international agreement on the non-dissemination of nuclear weapons, in conformity with United Nations resolution 1665 (XVI) of December 4, 1961. Such an agreement has been a continuing goal of the United States in bilateral discussions, in discussions at the Geneva disarmament conference and has been endorsed by the United Nations. If the Soviet Union is sincere in its view that the multilateral force is simply a stepping stone to the transfer of ownership and control of nuclear weapons to a specific non-nuclear power, the signature of an international agreement along the lines the United States has proposed would give additional assurance to the Soviet Union beyond that derived from the unilateral expression of United States policy. As President Johnson indicated in his letter of January 18⁴ to Premier Khrushchev, the United States remains ready at all times to discuss this urgent issue, but with the clear understanding that such discussions cannot be used to frustrate security arrangements for the defense of the United States and its allies.

A principal purpose of the multilateral force is to strengthen NATO and the political ties which bind together the nations of the Atlantic Alliance. Accordingly we recognize that certain governments will not abandon all objections to this force. However, it is important that the purposes and arrangements governing its creation not be misunderstood, and we are prepared to reiterate these purposes and explain these arrangements.

The United States notes with extreme disappointment that once more the Soviet Government has seen fit to characterize the aims and

intentions of the Federal Government of Germany in terms which are nothing short of slanderous. The United States seriously questions whether these unrealistic and unrestrained charges serve any real purpose for anyone, including the Soviet Union. As the Soviet Union knows, the Government of the Federal Republic has solemnly declared that it will resolve any international dispute by peaceful means. It has voluntarily associated itself for purposes of common defense with other countries of Europe with whom it shares a dedication to the objectives of a secure world peace. The desire to ensure the peaceful reunification of Germany on the basis of self-determination is not "revanchist" but a legitimate aim, which the United States fully supports, which it considers essential for a secure and enduring peace in Europe and which is a goal it will continue to seek through negotiation.

The United States expresses the sincere hope that these considerations, in addition to those expressed in its note of May 18 of last year, will receive the most thoughtful study by the Soviet Government.

U.S., U.K., France Reaffirm Right of Free Air Access to Berlin

U.S. Statement¹

In reply to a Soviet note dated June 20, 1964, which questioned the free use of Berlin air corridors for international flights,² the Governments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France, in notes³ delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (August 22), have reaffirmed their unrestricted right of air access to Berlin. This right is confirmed by quadripartite agreements and by longstanding practice.

¹ Released simultaneously on Aug. 24 by the Department of State at Washington, D.C., and by the U.S. Embassy at Moscow.

² For text of a Department statement of June 23, see BULLETIN of July 13, 1964, p. 44.

³ Not printed.

⁴ For text, see *ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1964, p. 157.

The replies of the three governments emphasized that the U.S.S.R. has a continuing obligation to insure the safety of international and of all other Allied flights in the Berlin air corridors and that the U.S.S.R. would bear responsibility for the consequences of any attempt to interfere with or impair the safety of such flights.

Department Notes Anniversary of "Hot Line" Agreement

*Department Statement*¹

On August 31, 1963, the "hot line," a direct communications link between Washington and Moscow, became operational.² The establishment of this link between the two major nuclear powers was an important first step in reducing the risk that war might occur by accident or miscalculation.

Arrangements for the "hot line" were negotiated with the full backing of our allies. The link constitutes a safeguard for them as well as for us. It has not yet been necessary to use it, and it will only be used by this country in an emergency. While immediate and effective communication with our allies has never been a problem, this has not been the case with the Soviet Union. The "hot line," which is not a panacea for the resolution of critical problems but a ready and effective means of emergency communication, remedies this deficiency.

This Government remains firmly committed to the unremitting search for effective ways to reduce the risk of nuclear war. The establishment of the "hot line"—one of a number of steps originally proposed by the United States at the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in Geneva—demonstrates our dedication to this all-important purpose.

¹ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 29 by Robert J. McCloskey, Acting Director of the Office of News.

² For text of the agreement, see BULLETIN of July 8, 1963, p. 50.

Mr. Blumenthal Holds Trade Talks in Three Latin American Countries

The Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations announced on August 17 that W. Michael Blumenthal, a Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, would visit Latin America from August 19 to September 2 in connection with the current round of international trade negotiations—known as the Kennedy Round—under the auspices of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Mr. Blumenthal was scheduled to leave Geneva, Switzerland, August 17 and to return there September 3 after consulting with officials of the Argentine, Brazilian, and Peruvian Governments. His visit is in accordance with the interest repeatedly expressed by the United States at the recent U.N. Conference on Trade and Development in promoting the exports of the developing countries, with its pledge of maximum effort in the Kennedy Round to achieve this objective, and with its desire for active and energetic participation by these countries in the negotiations.

Mr. Blumenthal will exchange views with officials in Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Lima on rules and procedures of concern to the developing nations, in order that their interests can be taken into account in U.S. planning for the negotiations. While it has been agreed that the developing countries will not be expected to provide full reciprocity for the benefits they receive in the Kennedy Round, Mr. Blumenthal will explore with them what contributions they could make in the light of their trade and development needs.

Letters of Credence

Malawi

The newly appointed Ambassador of Malawi, James David Rubadiri, presented his credentials to President Johnson on August 14. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and the President's reply, see Department of State press release 372 dated August 14.

How the Department of State Got Its Name

by Richard S. Patterson and Harold D. Langley

September 15 of this year marks the 175th anniversary of the name of the Department of State.

In most nations the office charged with foreign policy and foreign relations is known as the Department (or Ministry) of (or for) Foreign Affairs (or Foreign Relations) or, more briefly, the Foreign Office. In the United States, however, this office has since 1789 been called the Department of State.

The terms "Department of State" and "Secretary of State," although of British origin, are now distinctly American. With reference to the Government of the United States, they originated in a motion introduced in the House of Representatives on July 23, 1789, by Theodore Sedgwick, of Massachusetts. That motion was defeated, but Sedgwick proposed the terms again in a bill that he brought in on July 31. This bill, modified but still containing the terms in question, became the act approved by President Washington on September 15, 1789.

So the Department of State is indebted for its present name and for the title of its principal officer primarily to Theodore Sedgwick.

The origins of the Department, and of its name, are part of an interesting chapter in American history.

The Continental Congress, throughout its 14½ years, from September 1774 to March 1789, exercised control over American foreign relations. The actual management of foreign

affairs was, from September 1775 to October 1781, in the hands of committees of Congress. Chief of these committees were the Secret Committee, which later became the Committee of Commerce; the Marine Committee, which was the progenitor of the Department of the Navy; and the Committee of Correspondence (or Secret Correspondence), which later became the Committee for Foreign Affairs. Congress made frequent changes in the memberships of these committees; and often it acted on matters of foreign affairs either without reference to any committee or after report of a special committee.

When the committees proved ineffectual, Congress on January 10, 1781, provided for the establishment of a Department of Foreign Affairs and the appointment of a Secretary of Foreign Affairs. On August 10, 1781, it elected Robert R. Livingston, of New York, to that office. Livingston entered upon his duties on October 20, 1781, and served until June 4, 1783.

Pending the appointment and qualification of Livingston's successor, the President of Congress acted as Secretary of (or for) Foreign Affairs ad interim. On March 2, 1784, Congress elected Henry Remsen, Jr., of New York, as "under secretary in the office of foreign affairs, to take charge of the papers in that office." Remsen was the sole employee of the Department of Foreign Affairs until Livingston's successor took office in December 1784.

On May 7, 1784, Congress elected John Jay, of New York, who was then in France, Secretary for Foreign Affairs. Jay entered upon his duties on December 21, 1784, and served through the rest of the Continental Congress period. By remaining at his post, "though not

• *Mr. Patterson and Mr. Langley are officers in the Historical Studies Division, Historical Office, Department of State.*

officially," after March 4, 1789, Jay kept the Department in continuous operation until Thomas Jefferson—commissioned September 26, 1789—took office as the first Secretary of State on March 22, 1790.

Organizing the New Government

At the time of the changeover of the American Government from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution, the National Capital was New York City. In the spring of 1789 the executive and legislative officers elected under the Constitution began to assemble in New York. The new Congress commenced its first session there on March 4, 1789. The House of Representatives had a quorum on April 1, and the Senate on April 6. Washington took the oath of office as President on April 30.

Of the vital and urgent tasks then facing the new Government, one of the most pressing was that of creating executive departments.

On May 19, 1789, in the House of Representatives—that body having "resolved itself into a Committee of the whole House on the state of the Union"—Elias Boudinot, of New Jersey, introduced the subject of executive departments. Boudinot proposed the establishment of three, namely, the Departments of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs.

In the course of the discussion that day, John Vining, of Delaware, maintained there should be one other, a Home or Domestic Department, to deal with the territorial possessions and domestic affairs of the country. Vining stated that "this department, in his opinion, was of absolute necessity, more requisite than either of the other three, except the Department of Finance."

Differing with Vining, Samuel Livermore, of New Hampshire, said that the duties of the proposed Home or Domestic Department "might be blended" with those of the other departments, thereby saving "the expense of one grand department." Livermore suggested that Vining "wait to see" what duties Congress might assign to the other three departments. Vining accordingly "withdrew his motion for the present."

On May 20, 1789, the day after the discussion in the House of Representatives, Vining

wrote a note to Charles Thomson, former Secretary of Congress, asking him "to give his Idea of a Domestick Department, and the Duties necessary to be comprehended within such an office." Thomson replied the same day:

Mr. Thomson presents his compliments to Mr. Vining and hopes that for obvious reasons Mr. V will excuse his not entering into a discussion of the subject mentioned in his note, more especially when it is considered that the complex nature of the general government of the United States, the variety of interests comprehended under it, the states of which it is composed, the necessity of reconciling them one to another and to the general government so as to form one united nation, not to mention the Indians who live within the territories of the United States, and who have rights and claims which must be attended to, cannot fail to suggest to the enlightened body of which Mr. Vining is a member, that the care of our domestic affairs and the preserving peace and harmony at home is of as much importance and may require as much time, attention and abilities as any of the departments which have been brought before them.

Question of a "Home" or "Domestic" Department

Vining waited until after House action on the bills for establishing the Departments of Foreign Affairs, War, and Treasury. Finding that none of them embraced the domestic duties he had in mind, on July 23, in Committee of the Whole, he renewed his proposal for a Home Department in the following language:

... That an executive department ought to be established, and to be denominated the home department, the head of which to be called the secretary of the United States for the home department; whose duty it shall be to correspond with the several states, and to see to the execution of the laws of the union—to keep the great seal, and affix the same to all public papers, when necessary—to keep the lesser seal, and to affix it to commissions, &c. to make out commissions, and enregister the same, to keep authentic copies of all public acts, &c. and transmit the same to the several states—to procure the acts of the several states, and report on the same when contrary to the laws of the United States—to take into his custody the archives of the late congress—to report to the president plans for the protection and improvement of manufactures, agriculture, and commerce—to obtain a geographical account of the several states, their rivers, towns, roads, &c.—to report what post-roads shall be established—to receive and record the census—to receive reports respecting the western territory—to receive the models and specimens presented by inventors and authors—to enter all books for which patents are

granted—to issue patents, &c. and in general to do and attend to all such matters and things as he may be directed to by the president.

According to the record of debate on the foregoing proposal, most of Vining's colleagues in the House felt that such a department would be an unnecessary expense and that the duties in question might better be lodged elsewhere. Among others, Alexander White, of Virginia, "was not convinced that there was a necessity for establishing a separate department for all or any of the duties contained in the resolution." He suggested, among other things, that the Great Seal and also "the lesser seal" might be "kept by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs." Benjamin Huntington, of Connecticut, "thought the Secretary of Foreign Affairs was not so much overcharged with business but that he might attend to the major part of the duties mentioned in the resolution." Vining's vigorous defense of his proposal was to no avail. When later that day the question was put on the first part of his proposition, namely, "That an Executive Department ought to be established, to be denominated the Home Department," it "lost by a considerable majority."

Sedgwick's Proposal

Thereupon Theodore Sedgwick offered the following motion in the House:

... that a committee be appointed to bring in a bill, supplementary to the act for establishing the department of foreign affairs, declaring that department to be hereafter denominated [blank space], and that the principal officer in that department shall have the custody of the records, and seal of the United States, and that such bill do contain provision for the fees of office, to be taken for copies of records, and further provision for the due publication of the acts of congress, and other matters relating to the premises, as the committee shall deem necessary to be reported to this house.

Although this motion then (July 23) received a negative vote, it was nevertheless the beginning of what became the act of Congress approved September 15, 1789. The wording above quoted indicates that Sedgwick contemplated a new name for the Department of Foreign Affairs. That wording is copied from Thomas Lloyd's contemporary *Congressional Register*. Identical wording, though with differences of capitalization and punctuation, is to be found in Childs and Swaine's contemporary

Journal of the House of Representatives and in Gales and Seaton's later *Journal of the House of Representatives*. Slightly revised wording is in the *Annals of Congress*. Each of these four sources includes a blank space after the word "denominated."

This motion focuses attention on Sedgwick as one directly and immediately interested in a new name for the Department.

An examination of contemporary newspaper accounts of the House proceedings on July 23, 1789, reveals the following paragraph in the New York Daily Advertiser of July 24, 1789, under the heading "Yesterday's Business":

A motion was then made by Mr. Sedgwick, that a committee should be appointed to bring in a bill supplementary to the act establishing a department of foreign affairs, providing that the department should in future be denominated the Department of State, and that certain domestic duties which he enumerated should be annexed to the department, such as the keeping the seals, making out commissions, and affixing to them the seal of the United States, &c.

Sedgwick, it thus appears, was the person who first proposed for the present Department the name "Department of State." He did so as early as July 23, 1789.

Four days later, on July 27, while President Washington was signing the act "for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs," the House of Representatives was taking steps to change it. In Committee of the Whole, the House that day considered a report of a committee which, in conference with a Senate committee, had prepared "joint rules to be established between the two Houses for the enrolment, attestation, publication, and preservation of the acts of Congress, and to regulate the mode of presenting addresses and other acts to the President." In due course the Committee of the Whole reported that it had "come to several resolutions thereupon." These resolutions were read twice and agreed to by the House. The second of the two resolutions, which alone is here pertinent, reads as follows:

Resolved, That it is the opinion of this committee, that a committee ought to be appointed to prepare, and bring in a bill or bills, to provide, without the establishment of a new department, for the safe keeping of the accounts [acts], records and seal of the United States; for the authentication of records and papers,

for establishing the fees of office to be taken for commissions, and for copies of records and papers, for making out and recording commissions, and prescribing their form, and to provide for the due publication of the acts of congress.

Pursuant to the foregoing resolution, a committee was thereupon appointed, consisting of George Mathews, of Georgia, and Henry Wynkoop, of Pennsylvania, with Theodore Sedgwick as chairman.

On July 31 Sedgwick brought in, on behalf of the committee,

... a bill to provide for the safe keeping of the acts, records, and seal of the United States; for the due publication of the acts of Congress; for the authentication of copies of records; for making out and recording commissions, and prescribing their form; and for establishing the fees of office to be taken for making such commissions, and for copies of records and papers.

This bill was then read and laid on the table. Its text as of that date has not been found.

Debate on the Bill of July 31, 1789

On August 3 the bill was read a second time and ordered "to be committed to a Committee of the Whole House on Friday next." This order was read on Friday, August 7, and was postponed from day to day thereafter until August 25. On that day the House, in Committee of the Whole, resumed consideration of the bill, and the pertinent records include the statement that after "some time spent thereon, the committee rose, and reported progress, and obtained leave to sit again" the next day.

Further information regarding the proceedings of the Committee of the Whole on August 25 is in John Fenno's *Gazette of the United States* (New York) for the following day, under the heading "Tuesday, August 25," as follows:

In committee of the whole, Mr. BODINOT in the chair.

The bill to provide for the safe keeping of the acts, records and great seal of the United States, &c. was taken into consideration. This bill states that the department of "foreign affairs" shall be denominated THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, to which a variety of duties of a domestic nature are to be annexed, and the principal officer therein to be denominated THE SECRETARY OF STATE. Considerable progress was made in the discussion: several clauses were altered, and others struck out; but the time not admitting of its completion, the committee rose, and the chairman reported progress.

Francis Childs' *Daily Advertiser* (New York) for August 26, under the heading "Business of Yesterday," gives certain additional information:

The house then resolved itself into a committee on the bill to provide for the safe keeping of the acts, records and seal of the United States, for the publication of the acts of Congress, for the authentication of records, the custody of the seal, &c.

Mr. BODINOT in the chair.

Mr. SMITH (S.C.) moved to strike out that part of the first clause of the bill, which respects the denomination of the office, that is, which provides that the department of foreign affairs shall henceforth be denominated the *department of state* and that the principal officer shall be called the *secretary of state*, and to insert a clause providing for the establishment of an officer to be denominated ———. He said he should move that the principal in this office should be styled "keeper of the seals."

Mr. SMITH was supported by Mr. VINING, Mr. HARTLEY and Mr. CLYMER, and strongly opposed by Mr. SEDGWICK, Mr. GERRY and Mr. LAWRENCE.

A doubt was suggested from the chair, whether the above motion was in order: it appearing inconsistent with a rule of the house, that no motion shall be received under colour of amendment, which operates as a substitute for the whole clause.

On this question being referred to the committee, they resolved that the motion was not in order.

Mr. SMITH then moved to strike out the whole clause. This was negatived.

Mr. TUCKER moved to strike out the word "State," in the style of the office, and to insert the words "the United States." This was lost.

The committee then proceeded to the other parts of the bill—Several amendments were made; and the committee rose without going through the bill.

It is clear from the foregoing quotation that Sedgwick's bill as originally drafted included the designations "Department of State" and "Secretary of State."

In advocating these designations, Sedgwick had the support of Elbridge Gerry, of Massachusetts, and John Laurance, of New York. On the other hand, William L. Smith, of South Carolina, opposed the designations and proposed instead the title "Keeper of the Seals." Smith was supported by John Vining and by Thomas Hartley and George Clymer, both of Pennsylvania. When Smith's endeavors to change or strike out Sedgwick's designations failed, Thomas Tudor Tucker, of South Carolina, proposed the title "Secretary of the United States," but this motion was lost.

The next day, August 26, the House, again

resolving itself into a Committee of the Whole, took the bill under consideration and went through it, making "several amendments." Subsequently Elias Boudinot, after serving as chairman of the Committee of the Whole, reported to the House and delivered the committee's amendments to the Clerk of the House. The amendments were then "read, amended, and agreed to by the House," which ordered that "the said bill, with the amendments, be engrossed, and read the third time to-morrow."

On August 27 the bill was read the third time; and it was then given its final title and passed.

On August 28 the Clerk of the House carried the engrossed bill to the Senate and requested concurrence. On September 1 the bill was read a second time in the Senate, which ordered "the third reading to-morrow." The bill was accordingly read the third time on September 2; and it was thereupon ordered committed to Rufus King, of New York, William Paterson, of New Jersey, and George Read, of Delaware. On September 7 the Senate "proceeded in the third reading of the bill" and, on the report of the above-named committee, resolved to "concur therein, with fourteen amendments."

While no record has been found of what the Senate amendments were, they seem to have presented no problem. The next day, September 8, the House considered these amendments, agreed to them, and informed the Senate of its concurrence. Two days later the Vice President and the Speaker of the House signed the enrolled bill, and it was then laid before the President, who approved it on September 15, 1789.

The enrolled bill, written on parchment, is now in the National Archives. The handwriting, which has not been identified, is the same as that of various other bills of the period July-September 1789 that originated in the House of Representatives. The manuscript shows five erasures, all of which are evidently the result of scrivener's errors; they appear to bear no relationship to the amendments of either the House or the Senate.

The full record, so far as it exists, of proceedings on the bill that became the act approved September 15, 1789, has now been examined. This record supports a claim on behalf of Theodore Sedgwick to major credit for nam-

ing the Department the "Department of State" and its principal officer the "Secretary of State."

Theodore Sedgwick of Massachusetts

Who, then, was this man Sedgwick?

As a legislator and jurist, Theodore Sedgwick attained prominence in his day. Born May 9, 1746, in West Hartford, Conn., son of Benjamin and Ann (Thompson) Sedgwick, he attended Yale, studied theology and law, was admitted to the bar in 1766, and practiced in Great Barrington and Sheffield, Mass. He took an active part in the Revolution, though only briefly a soldier, and was a member of the State house of representatives in 1780, 1782, 1783, 1787, and 1788, and a senator in 1784 and 1785. A Member of the Continental Congress from 1785 to 1788, and later a Representative in the First, Second, Third, and Fourth Congresses, he gained a reputation as a vigorous debater. On Alexander Hamilton's resignation, Sedgwick was offered and declined the office of Secretary of the Treasury. Elected to the Senate to fill an unexpired term in 1796, he served as President pro tempore for a few weeks in 1798. From 1799 to 1801 he was again in the House, where he was Speaker during the Sixth Congress. In 1802 he received a life appointment to the supreme judicial court of Massachusetts. He died while on a visit to Boston, January 24, 1813.

Early British Usage

It seems certain that Theodore Sedgwick was the one who first proposed in Congress the terms "Department of State" and "Secretary of State." He did not, however, create those terms. On the contrary, he borrowed them from British usage. Presumably they were familiar to every Member of Congress in 1789 through their use by the British Government.

In Great Britain scholars have traced the history of the office of Secretary of State back to the earliest known reference to a secretary to the Sovereign, in the year 1253. A second secretary to the Sovereign appears to have been appointed for the first time in 1433. About 1539, during the reign of Henry VIII, the office of "King's Principal Secretary" was divided between two persons with equal rank and duties.

Beginning about 1592, in the reign of Elizabeth I, the title "Secretary of Estate" began to replace that of "Secretary," and by the early 17th century the title "Principal Secretary of State" was in established usage as a successor office to the King's (or Queen's) Secretary of the Tudor period.

By the end of the 17th century there were regularly two Principal Secretaries of State—one for the Northern Department (dealing generally with foreign affairs relating to the northern European nations) and one for the Southern Department (dealing generally with foreign affairs relating to the southern European nations and also with Irish and colonial affairs and with certain domestic matters). These two Secretaries were sometimes addressed collectively as "His Majesty's Principal Secretaries of State for Foreign Affairs." The practice of appointing a Principal Secretary of State for the Northern Department and a Principal Secretary of State for the Southern Department continued until 1782. There was also from time to time a third Principal Secretary of State. This was the case in 1616; from 1707 to 1746, when there was usually a Secretary for Scottish affairs; and from 1768 to 1782, when there was a Secretary for colonial affairs, including relations with the American Colonies.

In 1782 the British Government reverted from three to two Principal Secretaries of State and established a new division of duties between them. Colonial and domestic (or home) affairs were assigned to one, who became the organizational ancestor of the present Home Secretary, and foreign affairs to the other, who became the predecessor of the present Foreign Secretary. Charles James Fox was appointed on March 27, 1782, as the first sole Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

Domestic Duties Assigned to Department

In effect, the act of the United States Congress approved September 15, 1789, combined in one department, called the Department of State, the functions of the two British departments, and combined in one officer, called the Secretary of State, the responsibilities of the British Home Secretary and Foreign Secretary.

The act approved September 15, 1789, is en-

titled "An Act to provide for the safe keeping of the Acts, Records, and Seal of the United States, and for other purposes." It modified the act approved 7 weeks earlier, on July 27, 1789, entitled "An Act for establishing an Executive Department, to be denominated the Department of Foreign Affairs." Besides changing the name of the Department to "Department of State" and changing the designation of the principal officer to "Secretary of State," the later act added various domestic affairs functions to the foreign affairs functions specified in the earlier act. The domestic functions imposed by the act approved September 15, 1789, were briefly these: (1) receiving, publishing, distributing, and preserving the laws of the United States; (2) making out, sealing, and recording commissions to all civil officers of the United States appointed by the President; (3) making out and authenticating copies of records, and authenticating copies of records or papers under the seal of the Department; (4) having custody of the Great Seal of the United States and the seal of the Department; and (5) having custody of all books, records, and papers of the former Secretary of the Continental Congress except those pertaining to the Treasury and War Departments.

For a number of years after 1789, as a result of legislation, or Executive direction, or spontaneous development, the Department's load of domestic duties increased. At one time or another this load included, besides the tasks already mentioned, the following: (1) issuing patents on inventions; (2) managing the mint; (3) controlling copyrights; (4) publishing the census returns; (5) performing certain supervisory duties, including submission of an annual report to Congress, relating to the impressment of American seamen; (6) publishing the biennial *Official Register of the United States*; (7) receiving petitions for Presidential pardons and making out and recording Presidential warrants of pardon and commutations of sentence; (8) directing territorial affairs and publishing *Territorial Papers*; (9) countersigning and recording land patents; (10) receiving, as a depository, refusals to accept, or resignations from, the offices of President and Vice President of the United States; (11) receiving, as a depository, texts of inter-State

compacts; (12) procuring the statutes of the several States; (13) issuing letters of marque and reprisal; (14) corresponding with Federal judges and issuing instructions to Federal marshals and attorneys; (15) receiving from collectors of customs and transmitting to Congress quarterly reports of all passengers arriving in the United States; (16) controlling immigration; (17) performing certain ministerial duties relating to proposed amendments to the Constitution, including certification of the adoption of such amendments; and (18) performing certain ministerial duties relating to presidential elections.

The burden of domestic duties has gradually been shifted elsewhere until now only a few are left to the Department. Among those remaining—and they may have a foreign affairs as well as a domestic affairs aspect—are keeping and affixing the Great Seal; performing protocol functions for the White House; draft-

ing certain Presidential proclamations; and replying to certain inquiries from the public.

Through the years the act approved July 27, 1789, has formed the basis for the foreign affairs functions of the Department, while the act approved September 15, 1789, has formed the basis for the domestic affairs functions. These two acts, from the beginning, have given the Department a duality of character that has made it distinctly different from the Foreign Offices of other nations. The change of name in 1789 from the precise and specific one of "Department of Foreign Affairs" to the more general and comprehensive one of "Department of State" was intended to underline this duality of character. Although the name is now less accurately descriptive than it was a hundred years ago, it has the sanction of long usage, it has become almost uniquely associated with the United States of America, and it is familiar throughout the world.

Improving the Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance to International Rural Development

A Conference on International Rural Development, jointly sponsored by the Agency for International Development, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges, was held at Washington, D.C., July 27-28. Following are addresses made before the Conference on July 27 by Administrator David E. Bell of the Agency for International Development and Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Freeman.

ADDRESS BY MR. BELL

It's a great pleasure for those of us in the Agency for International Development to join with the land-grant universities and the Department of Agriculture in this Conference on International Rural Development. We are convinced of the very great importance of im-

proving the effectiveness of United States assistance to rural development in the less developed countries. And we are convinced that the sponsors of this Conference jointly command the strong resources of competence and experience to achieve that end. Together we can do far more than has been done thus far to enlarge the horizons and enrich the lives of rural people in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

Everyone here knows of the enormous impact upon life in the United States of the work of the land-grant universities and the Department of Agriculture over the last century. The results of this mutual effort by the universities and the Department are visible not only in our country's highly productive agriculture and our prosperous rural communities but also in the productivity and strength of our entire national economy. Moreover, the results of this century of mutual effort are also found in the structure

and workings of our nation's free institutions, urban as well as rural, political and social as well as economic.

I say these things not just by way of polite introduction. I say them because, stated in broadest terms, we have come together here today to consider what we can do to help achieve similar results in the less developed countries of the world. All of us in the United States would like to see in the developing countries a growth in agricultural productivity and in rural living standards, coupled with a strengthening of local public and private institutions, just as we have seen these things happen in the United States over the last century. If we can help bring this about, it will benefit the United States as well as the people of the developing countries. Rural development in Asia and Africa and Latin America will benefit us by strengthening the prospects for peace and freedom around the world; it will contribute to a stronger and healthier world economy in which our own exports and our own foreign investments can flourish; and it is certainly essential to our own self-respect to use a share of the resources of the strongest nation in the world to help our fellow human beings.

These are elements of the broad framework within which our Conference is set. In these introductory remarks I would like to say a word or two about each of three main questions: first, the nature of the problem of rural development in the less developed countries; second, the role of U.S. resources, particularly the resources represented in this room, in helping to meet the rural development problem; and third, the direct and immediate work of this Conference today and tomorrow.

The Problem of Rural Development

U.S. economic assistance is now being provided to about 75 countries, with a combined population of about 1,250,000,000 people. About three-fourths of those people live in rural areas and make their living in rural occupations. Moreover, the rural populations of these countries invariably are the poorest elements in the country—poorest in income, in health, in education, in opportunities. The problem of rural

development therefore is the largest and in many respects the most serious part of the job of achieving economic and social progress in the less developed countries.

There is no need to describe at length for this audience what rural life is like in the less developed countries. Most of us in this room have seen it at first hand, and many of those present have worked for years in such areas.

The facts regarding India can serve as illustration. India has more than 460 million people, 80 percent of them rural, living in half a million villages, many without road connections, most without electricity, clean water supply, or health facilities. Less than one-quarter of the population is literate.

To feed themselves and their animals, India has 385 million acres of arable land, compared to 457 million acres in the United States. India's land is divided into 60 million farms, 70 percent of which contain less than 5 acres—and these small farms are commonly fragmented into several separated fields.

Agricultural credit is inadequate, and 80 percent of the money farmers borrow comes from moneylenders at rates of 25 to 75 percent per year. Farm technology is primitive. Indian fertilizer consumption of 2.4 pounds of nutrient per acre compares to 235 pounds per acre for Japan. Prices for grains fluctuate widely, and price relationships are unfavorable, the cost of fertilizer in terms of rice being three times that in Japan. Small wonder that yields per acre are among the lowest in the world—18 bushels per acre for rice, 11.5 bushels per acre for wheat—and that food production has not been keeping pace with population growth.

We have been taught correctly by the anthropologists that village life in different countries is tremendously varied in cultural and historic background, in languages and leadership, in the methods by which change is accomplished. The people of Indian villages are very different from the people of Nigerian or Honduran villages. Nevertheless, there are common threads of poverty, of exposure to disease and brief life spans, of narrow horizons of knowledge and opportunity, which run through village life in all the continents.

It is therefore permissible to generalize about the rural development problem so long as we

do not forget that every generalization has to be adapted to the particular circumstances of each cultural setting.

Recognizing this important qualification, I would suggest to this Conference that a good deal has been learned in the last two decades about how to deal with the problem of rural development.

Lessons Learned in Last Two Decades

First, I suggest that we have learned that rural development requires much more than an improvement in agricultural technology. Along with better agricultural techniques, rural development requires improvements in marketing and transportation arrangements, in education and health facilities, in better institutions of local government and of private cooperation. Without such broad changes on the local scene, improvements in agricultural technology will neither take root nor be effective.

Let me cite an illustration. Most of you will have heard of the striking improvement in the rural sector in Taiwan over the last 10 years, and some of you may have heard this attributed to the success of the land reform program there. It is true that the rural development effort in Taiwan included a very important redistribution of ownership rights in the land. But it was far more than that. In addition to changes in land ownership, the rural development program has included better agricultural methods, better markets and roads, better schools and health services—and all these matters have been related to each other under the leadership of the Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction. The very great gains in agricultural productivity and income in Taiwan, and in the enrichment of rural living there, provide an impressive example of the necessity for considering rural development as a problem of rural societies, not just a problem in agricultural technology.

A second suggestion which may be derived, I believe, from the experience of the last two decades is that rural development is not a single-factor problem. The experience under the Marshall Plan in Europe was misread by some to indicate that there was something very close to “instant development”—just add capi-

tal and stand back. We have long since recognized, however, that restoring effective economies in Europe and creating effective economies in Africa or Asia or Latin America are problems of very different kinds.

There was a time also when some were dazzled by the apparent magic of transferring know-how. Just take hybrid corn and contour plowing and artificial insemination and teach them to the farmers of the world, and the millennium would follow. Hard experience has demonstrated the contrary. All of us know today that what works in Bozeman may not work at all in Bolivia, that useful know-how must be derived from research and experimentation on the spot where the know-how is to be applied, and that in any event know-how by itself is helpless without capital on the one hand and economic and social institutions on the other with which to put it to work.

Today, therefore, there is general agreement that rural development requires capital plus know-how plus institutional development. But there are some elements even beyond these, namely, the attitudes, incentives, and systems of values which provide drive and motivation for the people in a country. This is particularly important in the newer nations, where it is frequently necessary to develop a sense of national identity that gives the people respect for themselves and confidence in their ability to meet the future successfully.

These matters are not easy to define, and the way they grow is not easy to measure. But those who have thought most deeply about the situation of the less developed countries would, I think, agree that the commitment of energy and leadership, the will to achieve economic and social progress, is more important than any other single factor in accomplishing development. To be able to walk in dignity before the world is undoubtedly the most powerful motivation affecting the less developed nations today.

A third and final suggestion which may be derived from the experience of the last two decades is that rural development must be achieved from within by the people of the less developed countries themselves. It cannot be imposed from without. This is a lesson we

have had to learn over and over again. All of us know of excellent reports, impressive schemes, beautiful blueprints which have been drawn up by outsiders, showing convincingly how the rural people of one country or another could overcome the obstacles that confront them. But in case after case nothing has happened. And the hard fact is that nothing will happen unless the local people are at the center of the process, unless they help plan and execute the projects, unless they understand how to maintain and carry on and use what has been built.

Illustrations of this point can be seen in many places. Stanley Andrews has told me of the village wells in Ethiopia, which were dug with much fanfare 10 or 15 years ago but which invariably ended up a few years later out of commission and filled with rocks. To dig wells seemed to be something which would obviously be good for the villagers, and which indeed they welcomed, but in the absence of an understanding of how to maintain and operate the simple equipment involved, the wells soon became worthless.

One of the most striking successes in the whole field of rural development at the present time is the rural public works program which began at Comilla in East Pakistan and has been spearheaded by a remarkable local leader named Akhtar Hamid Khan, whom some of you may have the privilege of knowing. The key to this program is the development of leadership within the village and the organization by village people themselves of local work forces to build roads, dikes, schools, clinics, canals, drainage facilities—improvements which they want, which they understand, and which they are capable of maintaining. External help is vital, both in the form of money and in the form of engineering advice, but the projects are truly local and they will live. Moreover, in the process, local institutions are being built, both cooperatives and local governments, which will be able to handle more and larger problems in the future.

The lessons that have been drawn by the people who have been working at Comilla are of great significance to all those interested in rural development. I cite four of them briefly because they crystallize so much wisdom so briefly:

—Responsible local government is necessary to utilize the services of central government effectively.

—The villagers have great potential for leadership and can perform local government functions if trained and assisted by people in whom they have confidence.

—Village leaders selected by the villagers themselves are the most effective communicators of improved methods.

—The creation of organized groups such as co-ops maximizes the results of demonstration and training.

All these points emphasize the necessity of thinking about rural development as basically a process of change that must be achieved by rural people themselves.

These then are some major conclusions I believe we are entitled to reach about the problem of rural development in less developed countries. First, we must think of the improvement of a complex group of rural institutions and services, not just of agricultural technology. Second, we must think about a whole range of factors with which to bring about change, not just capital, or just know-how, or just institutional development. And third, we must think of means and methods which will permit rural development to be achieved by the people of an area, not just conceived of as an intellectual exercise by outside experts.

Role of U.S. Resources

If these conclusions correctly describe important elements of the rural development problem in the less developed countries, they establish some limits and indicate some means by which we in the United States can help.

First of all, we can clearly help through research to discover the precise methods, techniques, varieties, institutional modifications, and so on, which will fit the local needs of different places and circumstances.

A good deal of such research is underway, financed by the foundations and by U.S. research organizations with their own funds. Until recently the foreign aid program of the United States Government did not support any significant research. That neglect ended with the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Over the

past 3 years we have begun to build a respectable research program. It is still small—\$6 million in the last fiscal year—little enough in view of the entire range of national development problems that needs to be covered. But it is growing; we have asked Congress for \$15 million for fiscal 1965. And we believe it is soundly guided, with men like Dr. [Albert] Moseman of the Rockefeller Foundation, Dr. [Arthur] Moshier of the Agricultural Development Council, and Professor [Kenneth] Parsons of the University of Wisconsin serving on the Research Advisory Committee which reviews each of our projects before it is approved. We hope through this program to enlist more of the research talent of U.S. universities and institutions to address questions of moment to the less developed countries.

In the long run it will be at least as important to help build effective research institutions in the developing countries themselves. This is the great significance of the agricultural research center at Chapingo, Mexico, and of the International Rice Research Institute at Los Baños in the Philippines, both organized under the careful, experienced guidance of the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations, both capable of extraordinary impact on whole regions of the world and on generations of young researchers.

Research is far from the only contribution we can make to international rural development. We can also, through education and training in the United States, build skills, competence, knowledge, and attitudes in foreign students who will be the leaders of their countries in the future. AID is financing perhaps 10,000 trainees now in this country, many of them enrolled in the universities represented here today, and there are thousands more in the United States under other sources of financing. I think we have much to learn about how to make their learning experiences more beneficial. Too much of what these young people learn in our country today is relevant to Kansas but not to Katmandu. But already the contribution of U.S. training is very large.

Certainly more influential in terms of numbers in the long run, we in the United States can help create educational institutions of high quality in the developing countries. Many of the universities represented here today have en-

gaged in this kind of work—helping to establish new universities or to upgrade existing ones. All of us know how difficult, how sensitive, how slow these tasks can be. But all of us know also the very great “multiplier effect” that can follow from the success of a well-planned, well-executed project of this kind—a project like that of Michigan State at Nsukka in Eastern Nigeria or that of Cornell in the Philippines.

The United States can make major contributions to international rural development through research and teaching, here and abroad—substantially greater contributions, in my opinion, than we have yet made. But this is not the limit of our assistance.

We can help, and we have helped, to apply knowledge to the actual problems of rural development on the spot in less developed countries. American advisers and advisory teams, publicly or privately financed, have applied their brains and experience in one country or another to just about every practical problem of rural life, from the planning of agricultural price-support laws to the design of sanitary privies.

It is quite clear, however, to anyone who examines this experience that most projects have been rather narrow in concept, and in most cases the United States institutions involved—the Department of Agriculture, a land-grant university, or whoever—have been used rather narrowly. Typically a university, or the Department, has been asked to help train certain specified participants in certain specific fields or to organize a team of advisers to execute a limited project which has been planned by somebody else.

This has begun to change, and it is a fundamental assumption underlying this Conference that it should change further and faster. As we have come to realize the breadth and depth of the rural development problem, so also have we come to realize the need to associate American expertise more broadly and more deeply with the process of change in rural life in less developed countries.

Let me illustrate by referring to the work now underway in Peru by North Carolina State and by Iowa State Universities in two separate but related projects, both of which are much broader than has been customary in the past.

North Carolina State is working with the national agricultural university at La Molina and with the national Ministry of Agriculture. The purpose of this work is to assist Peru in developing a combined program of agricultural education, research, and extension. North Carolina State has staff members today working not only at the site of the university at La Molina but in half a dozen other locations in Peru.

Iowa State is working with the National Planning Commission of the Peruvian Government to develop a national rural development plan, to establish through research the necessary basis of data and analysis for the plan, and to develop through training the local competence for effective rural development planning, with special emphasis on the land tenure and other institutional adjustments required for rural development in Peru.

The nature of these tasks has been recognized to be very broad, and the universities involved, the Government of Peru, and AID have all undertaken them in the expectation that they will require a wide range of skills, an extensive commitment of first-class talent, and a series of years of steady effort to yield the results we are all hoping for.

These illustrations indicate the very great challenge to be found in properly conceived technical cooperation work. They also illustrate, incidentally, the possibilities of using more than one land-grant university in a country in a complementary relationship, without blurring the clear-cut allocation of responsibility necessary for accomplishing effective results.

The Work of the Conference

Thus far I have suggested that the task of rural development is necessarily a broad and complex one which hinges upon the effective participation of rural people. I have also suggested that the United States can assist the rural development process through research, through teaching, and through active participation in solving developmental problems and that to do so effectively will require improvements on our past record. It is essentially the business of this Conference to consider these conclusions, and if they are generally accepted, to discuss

their meaning for our mutual efforts.

Without presuming to speak for anyone else, let me mention briefly three or four conclusions we in AID have come to. It is our firm conviction that we must seek to engage the resources of the Department of Agriculture and the universities more broadly than they have been engaged thus far in international rural development work. We would like to involve the Department and the universities more than we have in the past in country planning processes—both in helping our overseas missions to decide which activities the United States can most usefully conduct in different countries and, more importantly, to assist less developed countries with the development of their own plans and policies. We would like to involve the Department and the universities more than has often been the case in project planning and evaluation, as well as in project execution. We would like to conduct more of our projects in the future through contract relationships and fewer through direct-hire staff. We would like to assist in the substantial strengthening of the competence and capacity of the Department and the universities in research and training, both here and abroad, in the broad spectrum of fields which are relevant to rural development.

We have reached these conclusions and seek these changes in recognition of the extraordinary significance of the problem of rural development in the world and in the belief that we should be contributing to the mobilization and application of the highest quality talent the United States affords to the solution of this problem.

We in AID recognize fully that, if we are to achieve these objectives, we must first of all change many of our own patterns of work, many of our own attitudes, many of our past practices. We have been guided in coming to this conclusion, as many of you know, by a remarkable report which was prepared at our request by John Gardner of the Carnegie Corporation, entitled *A.I.D. and the Universities*.¹ It is a published report, and I would urge those

¹ A limited number of copies of the report are available upon request from the News Division, Agency for International Development, Washington, D.C., 20502.

of you who have not seen it to have a look at it.

We have accepted the major conclusions of President Gardner's report. We are now seeking to put them into practice. To summarize them very briefly, Dr. Gardner's conclusions, first of all, were that if we wanted to work effectively with the universities, we had to embark on the process as a partnership and not as a contractual relationship in the normal buyer-seller context. We had to have the universities in on the takeoffs as well as the landings. We had to recognize that they are at least as able as we are to decide what ought to be done as well as to do it.

Secondly, Dr. Gardner's advice to us is that if we want to use the universities more extensively, we must ourselves contribute to the enlargement of the strength of the universities to participate in this kind of work, which means enlarging their capacity for research, enlarging their capacity for training, advancing, and improving the competence and quality of their staffs, et cetera.

Many of the conclusions of the Gardner report are reflected in and are paralleled by the draft committee reports which have been jointly prepared for this Conference by the Department of Agriculture, the universities, and AID. Speaking for AID we are prepared to accept these reports without significant qualification. If this Conference, after considering these reports and modifying them as it may wish to do, sees fit to adopt reports along the lines of these drafts, we will be prepared to accept them as working guidelines and to proceed to put them into effect so far as that lies within our competence. The preparatory work for this Conference seems to me to have been of extraordinarily high quality, and I believe the draft committee reports embody the basis for a most significant series of understandings and agreements.

Some Words of Caution

Let me in closing express one or two cautionary words to avoid any possible misunderstanding.

First of all, we should expect, I think, to continue to move forward in the rural development field abroad on a careful, step-by-step basis.

All of our overseas work is conducted, so to speak, in the other fellow's backyard. It can be successful only when his interest and his conviction are joined with ours. The opportunities for effective work therefore depend only in part on our own energy and wisdom. They also depend on the varying environments of dozens of local situations in the less developed countries. We must continue to seek effective opportunities for our useful work, but we must never mistake zeal on our part for receptivity on theirs.

Secondly, none of us can project with any degree of precision the likely volume of rural development work that will call for United States resources in the future, recognizing that there are important sources in other countries of similar research, training, and advisory skills. Nor can we even state with any precision the likely future volume of AID contracting. We have today between \$150 and \$200 million worth of contracts in effect with over 100 American universities. We believe the number and dollar volume of contracts is likely to rise somewhat. In our view, however, it is more important to improve the quality than the volume of our joint work, and we ourselves expect to concentrate more on questions of quality than on the simple expansion of our total effort.

Lastly, I think it is most important for all of us to recognize that the work of assisting rural development in other countries is a task of the utmost complexity and sensitivity. It cannot be accomplished by anything less than our very best talent. The Department of Agriculture, the other governmental departments and agencies who will be involved, and those land-grant universities that wish to participate in this work, must expect to put some of their ablest people into it. We will have to have some of your best people—not too many, but some—for our own AID staffs in Washington and the field, and you will have to commit some of your best people to any training, research, and advisory activities that you may wish to undertake. No doubt some of the land-grant universities will not wish, or will not feel able, to undertake overseas activities. We hope enough will do so to meet the needs we see. And, as the committee reports indicate,

AID recognizes that we should help to develop the research facilities and to train the people who will be necessary to carry out this work.

I think it is important to recognize these cautionary notes. But I think we should approach the task of international rural development with zest and vigor. It is challenging, rewarding work, which combines high personal satisfaction with high contributions to great national objectives.

In that spirit I invite your attention to the work of this Conference.

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY FREEMAN

I am very happy to have this opportunity to speak to the participants in this Conference on International Rural Development and to the Members of the Congress who, in spite of very heavy pressure of work, have honored this occasion by their presence tonight. I am sure they have joined us because they understand very well that the subject of this Conference has an important bearing on their efforts to legislate wisely in the national interest. I therefore extend a special welcome to them.

I would also welcome most sincerely those of you who represent the State universities and land-grant colleges. Your participation is highly essential and deeply appreciated. The Department of Agriculture and the land-grant colleges have shared a history of cooperation toward common goals for more than a century. All of the people of this nation, in our cities as well as on our farms and in our rural communities, have benefited by this cooperative effort.

I would especially like to pay tribute tonight to the State universities and land-grant colleges for the development of concepts and services that have contributed immeasurably to the progress of our nation and that have much to contribute throughout the world.

You represent the great educational institutions of this nation—institutions that are not only the centers of scientific and technological research and development but also the sources of ideas and ideals by which we seek to solve the problems of human relationships. You are a fundamental part of the great American edu-

cational ideal that insists on education for the masses as well as for the scholars; of the great American educational tradition that encompasses pure research as well as training in everyday skills; of the emphasis on freedom of inquiry in the search of truth, as well as the widespread dissemination of truth and understanding in the cause of freedom.

I would also like to extend special recognition to those guests here tonight who represent America's great foundations, and to those who represent our great farm and cooperative organizations.

The very high degree of cooperation between citizen and government—between private, voluntary organizations of Americans on the one hand and agencies of the Government on the other—is, I believe, a uniquely important development in the United States. We find it at all levels, local, State, and Federal. We find it in our extension services. We find it when AID contracts with educational institutions and with farm and cooperative organizations to carry out technical assistance programs. We find it when voluntary agencies help distribute our Food for Peace. We find it where the USDA cooperates with private groups to develop markets abroad, and where we set up citizens advisory committees with important responsibilities.

I believe that the Congress acted very wisely when it enacted, in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, legislation to provide that the Agency for International Development should, wherever appropriate, make use of especially competent resources that may be found in the private sector and in other agencies of Government. By this action it recognized the need for the most efficient use of our most valuable resource—the ability and competence of those called upon to do the work. It also recognized the value of the American tradition of partnership between citizen and government which is, in my opinion, an important part of America's answer to the conflict of ideologies in the world.

And, finally, may I extend my welcome to the officials of AID and the USDA and of the other agencies of the Federal Government who make up the rest of the participants here to-

night. I would especially express my appreciation of the increasingly effective interagency cooperation that is developing between AID and the USDA. I am confident that it will result in better programs and more efficient operation. The Department of Agriculture set up its International Agricultural Development Service last year in order to further this goal. And we deeply appreciate both the leadership and cooperation of the AID Administrator, David Bell, and of his staff.

Mr. Bell spoke to you this morning about the needs and problems of rural development in the less developed countries of the world and described the role of U.S. resources in helping to solve those problems. He challenged us to enlist the services of our ablest personnel in fulfilling this sensitive and complex responsibility. I support this position wholeheartedly, and I am confident that qualified Americans can be found to meet this challenge. Four agencies in the Department of Agriculture very recently asked their field station directors, State directors of education, and other State agricultural officials for assistance in recruiting technicians in certain specialized fields for Viet-Nam. To date, over 80 applicants have responded from all over the country, many of them highly qualified.

President Ellis [Elmer Ellis, president of the Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges] presented the unique opportunity and challenge that international rural development presents to American State universities and land-grant colleges. He spoke of a "great new common market of ideas and knowledge." He suggested that, in meetings like these, we have an opportunity to work out cooperative arrangements "which may some day seem as historic as the Morrill Act and the establishment of Agriculture as a Department at Cabinet level."

As Secretary of Agriculture I am deeply concerned with rural development here in the United States. Community programs in rural areas development, along with programs for commodities and programs for consumers, constitute the "Three C's" that make up our far-reaching program for agriculture in the sixties.

But tonight I should like to emphasize why,

as Secretary of Agriculture, I must be deeply concerned about our nation's stake in rural development abroad.

Why are we concerned about agricultural progress and general economic growth of the developing countries of the free world? Why should the United States help to provide technical assistance in international rural development? And why, specifically, should a department of the U.S. Government that is concerned with agriculture be involved in such an assistance program?

These questions can be answered in terms of cold dollars and cents. They can be answered in terms of the kind of world we want, for ourselves and our children, in the years ahead. They can be answered in terms of basic human decency and moral imperatives. President Johnson has warned that "we will be laying up a harvest of woe for us and our children if we shrink from the task of grappling in the world community with poverty and ignorance."²

We support technical assistance programs for rural development in the less developed countries of the free world for at least three reasons:

1. It is economically advantageous to do so.
2. It strengthens political independence and freedom and thus contributes to security and peace.
3. It is morally right.

U.S. Stake in Rural Development Abroad

Let us consider, first, our own economic interest in foreign economic growth; and particularly the interest of American agriculture in the development of higher levels of living in the less developed countries.

Every segment of the American economy stands to gain by expanding international trade, but American agriculture is proportionately more concerned with expanding exports than is American industry. Production from one acre out of every four harvested in 1963 was exported.

Our agricultural exports have been increasing rapidly in recent years. In the 1963-64 fiscal year U.S. agricultural exports reached a

² For text of President Johnson's message to the Congress on foreign aid, see BULLETIN of Apr. 6, 1964, p. 518.

new record high level of \$6.1 billion—\$1 billion larger than the previous year. All of this increase was in commercial sales for dollars. In the year just ended our exports were 35 percent larger than in 1959.

Expansion in agricultural exports has resulted from many things. The high level of production efficiency on American farms makes our products competitive in international markets. Effective processing and selling of our farm products makes them attractive in world markets. Economic growth in foreign countries has brought about rising incomes that make it possible for their people to purchase more and better quality food, clothing, and other essentials for improved living standards. Our Food for Peace programs have supplied agricultural products to help developing countries meet emergency needs and achieve more rapid economic growth.

The single most important question in expanding exports is whether those who want to buy can pay.

Thus it is traditional that the best export markets for U.S. agricultural products have been the highly developed countries. These countries have higher incomes per person, and their consumers demand not only a larger volume of farm products but also much greater variety. U.S. agricultural trade with the developed countries has grown about in line with increases in their national incomes. And it may continue to expand in line with increases in population and income growth, particularly if we are successful in international trade negotiations.

But in future years the most rapid growth in our markets for farm products must be found in that great undeveloped market that lies in the developing countries of the world. Population in these countries is increasing more than twice as fast as in the more highly developed countries. Most of the people in these countries have been underfed and poorly clothed. They will want both more and better food and clothing as their incomes improve. This tremendous need for more food and fiber will be translated into market demand if economic growth can be stimulated and incomes increased.

Let me illustrate with a few figures how U.S.

agricultural exports depend on income levels abroad.

In the less developed countries of Asia and Africa, where per capita incomes are a little over \$100 a year, our commercial exports of farm products average about 25 cents per person per year.

In Japan, where per capita incomes are about \$350 a year, our commercial exports of farm products average \$4.70 per person.

In the European Common Market countries, where incomes are about \$850 per person, our exports of farm products average \$6 per person.

In the European Free Trade Area, where incomes are a little over \$1,000 per person, our exports of farm products average \$7 per person.

And in Canada, where per capita incomes are close to \$1,600, our farm exports average \$24 per person.

What could indicate more clearly the stake of American agriculture in world economic growth? There are large potential markets for our farm products in the emerging countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa. But, if these countries are to become effective commercial markets, they must achieve economic growth and rising incomes.

Small increases in income for the 1.4 billion people that live in these countries would have large effects on their imports. We find that we export about \$1 worth of farm products for each \$100 of income in both developed and less developed countries. Thus, if these less developed countries were able to increase their incomes by \$100 per person, they would likely import over \$3 billion worth of agricultural products from the United States each year, or about double the \$1.5 billion we now export to them.

Increased incomes bring about a demand for more and better clothing as well as for more and better food. Cotton consumption, for example, in the underdeveloped areas of the world ranges from 4 to 6 pounds per person as compared with about 22 pounds in the United States. In India, where cotton consumption is only about 4.5 pounds per capita, approximately 500,000 bales of cotton would be required to provide each person with one shirt or its equivalent in

other clothing. Approximately 1.8 million bales of cotton would be required to supply each of the 1.4 billion people in the less developed countries with one additional shirt or its equivalent.

What is the connection between all this and our efforts to help the developing countries improve their agriculture? Simply that no nation can hope to climb into the takeoff stage of economic development without first achieving substantial gains in its own agricultural productivity. Imports of farm products from other countries, such as those we are supplying under the Food for Peace program, can meet a part of the rapidly growing needs and contribute significantly to economic development. But most of the rising requirements must be met by expanding domestic agricultural production.

It is a mistake to assume that such expansion of agriculture in the less developed countries means smaller markets for our products. Quite the contrary. Consider what has happened in Japan during the last decade. Its domestic agricultural production increased 3.7 percent a year, while its population increased only about 1.4 percent annually. Yet, during that same decade, Japan became our largest customer for farm products—with a volume over \$600 million during fiscal 1963-64.

The connection between aid and trade is thus abundantly clear. Increased international trade will benefit all Americans and will be of special benefit to American agriculture. But let me repeat that trade with the less developed countries can increase only as their economies grow and their incomes rise. And this economic growth, in turn, depends upon their ability to improve their agriculture and achieve real rural development. Assistance in rural development abroad is therefore clearly in the national interest of the United States because our own continued economic growth demands rising standards elsewhere, among people with whom we hope to develop expanding trade relations.

U.S. Technical Assistance

An even more important national interest is involved when we consider the kind of world we want in the years ahead. We need only to

scan the headlines in any newspaper to see how much we are affected by conditions and events in the less developed nations of the world. The course of history for the next hundred years will be sharply influenced, if not determined, by the course of development in those nations. Our own security depends in a large measure on the prevalence of conditions under which the people of those nations can hope to achieve higher standards of living and the other benefits of modern civilization in peace and freedom.

If the developing nations can be helped to achieve satisfactory growth rates under free institutions, the security of the free world will be immeasurably strengthened. If they choose other institutions and other methods, freedom may be jeopardized even where it now exists.

The Communist world is always ready with its promises, even if it lacks the ability to deliver. Yet in no area is our superiority more dramatically demonstrated than it is in agriculture. Last spring a group of four businessmen spent several weeks in India studying the problems of food distribution. On their return they reported their impressions of the success of our Food for Peace program. They also noted that there was one recent international event that had made a great impression upon all of the Indian leaders with whom they talked—the fact that the Soviet Union had found it necessary to come to the United States to purchase wheat. In their opinion this sale constituted one of the greatest propaganda victories ever scored by the United States. I wonder if there may not be a very real connection between that event and the recent increased interest in technical assistance from the United States in the field of agricultural policy and rural development.

The technical assistance that can be provided by the combined resources of AID, the USDA, and the State universities and land-grant colleges is of two kinds. First, there is the sharing of all kinds of technical and scientific knowledge relating to better farming—including such things as irrigation, soil fertility, the breeding and development of better field crops and farm animals, the use of improved tools and machines. These are important and essential for increased productivity.

But this kind of assistance has limited value unless it is accompanied by education for those who cultivate the land, unless it provides a system under which they can get a fair return for their increased productivity, unless it includes assistance in making the kind of social and institutional changes that will help bring about better use of both natural and human resources, unless it contributes to the development of economic and social institutions under which economic growth can proceed in a free society.

Even as we recognize that it may not be possible, or even desirable, to transplant our particular institutions in all their specific details to countries with widely differing conditions, we have a wealth of institutional experience that can be adapted constructively and effectively.

Certainly this is true of the principle of education at all levels: the training of scientists and the emphasis on research and experimentation; the education of children and adults on the farms and in the villages as well as in the cities; the unique values of our extension services.

Certainly we have much to offer out of our experience with cooperatives and with the development of grassroots participation in local and community affairs.

We have had wide experience with agricultural credit and with the kind of supervised credit that has done so much to improve conditions in rural areas in this country. Assistance that we have already given in this field has proved its worth in several of the developing nations.

Questions of Land Tenure and Ownership

I happen to believe that one of the institutions that has contributed immeasurably to American agriculture and that can contribute as much to agriculture in much of the developing world is our system of land tenure and private ownership of farms, under which efficiency and progress is stimulated by individual ownership and personal incentive.

Many of the emerging nations have not yet settled such questions as land tenure and ownership. Many of them face major problems in their search for agrarian reform. Those who

till the soil seek to realize the age-old dream for ownership of the land they cultivate. Yet ownership and management bring the need for ability, knowledge, skill, and credit that are not always available.

It is not only in America that the pattern of individually owned and operated family farms has demonstrated its superiority. When American assistance in Taiwan helped to increase the percentage of farm land operated by its owners from 57 to 87 percent, productivity increased by 31 percent in only a few years. When farm tenancy in Japan was reduced from 46 percent of the arable acreage to 10 percent, production per cultivated unit increased 44 percent even though the size of such units had been reduced. Total agricultural net real income increased by 32 percent.

On the other hand, repudiation of the principle of farmer ownership of his land has had serious results. Recent history shows what an appalling price in hunger, food deficits, and lagging productivity has been paid where governments have sought to destroy individual incentive and ownership in agricultural production.

If land tenure reform can follow the pattern of individually owned and operated family farms, free institutions in the entire rural community are strengthened. No other tenure system has ever equaled its productivity, its contribution to economic growth, or its development of a high level of citizenship and sense of personal dignity and worth.

These are some of the examples of how technical assistance for rural development can encourage free institutions among rural people, which means among the great majority of all the people in most of the less developed countries. By this means, and by encouraging increased productivity and economic growth, it can help to narrow the gap between the "have" and the "have not" nations and thus lessen the danger of a worldwide explosion. It thus contributes significantly to our national security.

President Johnson has summarized the reasons for our assistance programs as follows:³

They "aid in frustrating the ambitions of Communist imperialism, reduce the hazards of

³ *Ibid.*

widespread conflict, and support the moral commitment of free men everywhere to work for a just and peaceful world."

Achieving Abundance for All People

Finally, we share with the developing nations both our agricultural abundance and the know-how that makes that abundance possible because it is morally right. We know how extensive is the poverty and how great is the need. We know, too, that the physical and technological barriers that lie in the way of the production of plenty have been overcome. We know that it is physically possible to achieve abundance for all people in every nation. We have not yet overcome the barriers of human relations; we have not yet solved the problems of social engineering that must be solved before we can achieve that goal.

But simply because we can see the goal, we must strive to reach it. We can do no less and still keep faith with the ethical principles by which we live. We can do no less and still be worthy of the great society to which we aspire.

National Freedom From Hunger Week, 1964

A P R O C L A M A T I O N ¹

WHEREAS the United States, as a member of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, is participating with over one hundred other countries of the world in the international Freedom from Hunger Campaign; and

WHEREAS the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation has been established to provide citizen leadership for the Campaign in the United States; and

WHEREAS the farmers of this Nation have produced an abundance of food which this country is willing to share with others; and

WHEREAS industry and labor organizations of this Nation have demonstrated their concern with the world-wide problem of hunger through their willingness to share their technical knowledge and other resources with the developing countries; and

WHEREAS the people of the United States have also demonstrated their concern with this world-wide prob-

lem through their generous support of overseas assistance programs of religious organizations, voluntary agencies, and private groups and foundations, and through Food For Peace and other governmental programs; and

WHEREAS there is a need for a rededication of men's minds and hearts to the inspiring possibilities of working together to free the world from hunger:


NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate the week of November 15 through November 21, 1964, as National Freedom from Hunger Week.

I ask the American Freedom from Hunger Foundation to take national leadership in planning appropriate observance of National Freedom from Hunger Week; and I urge all Americans to cooperate with the Foundation and to participate actively in the observance of that week.

I direct the departments and agencies of the Federal Government which have responsibilities in the field of food, nutrition, and international relations to take appropriate steps to observe, and to cooperate with private groups in observing, National Freedom from Hunger Week.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this Fifteenth day of August in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

Highest Caliber U.S. Candidates Sought for International Agencies

White House press release dated August 16

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

I have issued a memorandum which seeks to assure that the very highest caliber of Americans will be available for staffing the international organizations in which the United States plays a role.

Over the years United States participation in

¹ No. 3606; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 11799.

such organizations has been constantly increasing. We have sponsored many of them, and we contribute financially to all of them. At the present time we belong to more than 50 such groups.

It seems to me to be the part of wisdom to back our stake in such groups with the very highest caliber of people available. The capacity and effectiveness of these organizations depend upon the quality of those who administer them. And even though I have a great deal of respect for the efforts of those Americans already working in them, I do not feel we have done enough to help these agencies secure the services of highly qualified American men and women from private life and from Government agencies.

Final responsibility for selecting people rests quite properly with the appropriate agencies themselves. But it is our duty, not only to the international agencies but to our own country, to be certain that in recruiting their personnel these agencies have ready access to talented and dedicated Americans who are qualified by every prudent test.

With that thought in mind, I have approved the attached memorandum.

TEXT OF MEMORANDUM¹

THE WHITE HOUSE,
Washington, August 15, 1964.

MEMORANDUM TO THE HEADS OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

It is the policy of this government to do its full share to assist in the development of sound, efficient international organizations to keep the peace, to resolve disputes, to promote peaceful change, to conduct a world war against poverty, to exchange technology, and for other purposes.

At the present time we belong to more than half a hundred such organizations. We have sponsored many of them. We contribute financially to all of them.

But the capacity and efficiency of these organizations depend, in the end, upon the quality and the motivations of the international civil servants who administer them. These organizations—and our national interest in their fortunes—deserve the services of some of the ablest citizens of the United States. In

past years we have not done enough to help these agencies secure the services of highly qualified men and women from private life and from government agencies.

Final responsibility for selection of personnel to staff international organizations rests, of course, with the appropriate officers of those organizations. But we must make sure that recruitment of their personnel is supported by ready access to talented citizens of this country who are qualified for positions in the international agencies.

It is my desire that:

(1) All Executive Departments and Agencies take affirmative and continuing steps to assist international organizations to obtain properly qualified United States candidates for employment.

(2) All Executive Departments and Agencies encourage their able employees to accept assignments with international organizations in accordance with the authority of Public Law 85-795, and give positive recognition to the government's interest in the training and career advancement advantages of such employment.

(3) All Executive Departments and Agencies continue employer contributions toward Federal retirement and insurance benefits for employees serving international organizations in accordance with the authority of Public Law 85-795, in the absence of arrangements for such contributions by the employing international organization.

(4) All Executive Departments and Agencies assist actively in finding qualified candidates in their fields of specialization when requested to do so by the Agencies having primary responsibility.

(5) The Secretary of State provide leadership and coordination of this effort and develop policies and procedures to advance it, including the seeking of assistance from the state and local governments and from non-governmental organizations in locating qualified candidates in private employment.

(6) The Secretary of State report annually on the effectiveness of the recruitment program in behalf of international organizations established herein.

This memorandum shall be published in the Federal Register.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on August 15 confirmed the nomination of James L. Greenfield to be Assistant Secretary of State.

¹ 29 Fed. Reg. 11807.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention on road traffic with annexes. Done at Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Accession deposited: Japan, August 8, 1964.

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000.
Adherence deposited: Algeria, June 2, 1964.
Confirmation of continued application: Syrian Arab Republic, April 13, 1964.

Protocol to amend convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929 (49 Stat. 3000). Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Canada, April 18, 1964.

Adherence deposited: Algeria, June 2, 1964.

Confirmation of continued application: Syrian Arab Republic, April 13, 1964.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 28, 1964.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 28, 1964.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention concerning the application of that convention to the works of certain international organizations. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 28, 1964.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention concerning the effective date of instruments of ratification or acceptance of or accession to that convention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Guatemala, July 28, 1964.

Cultural Relations

Convention for the promotion of inter-American cultural relations. Signed at Caracas March 28, 1954. Entered into force February 18, 1955; for the United States October 3, 1957. TIAS 3936.

Ratification deposited: Costa Rica, August 27, 1964.

North Atlantic Treaty—Atomic Information

Agreement between the parties to the North Atlantic Treaty for cooperation regarding atomic information. Done at Paris June 18, 1964.²

Notification received that it is willing to be bound by terms of the agreement: Portugal, August 24, 1964.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a global commercial communications satellite system. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

Signature: Norway, August 31, 1964.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

Signature for: Telegrafstyret, Norway, August 31, 1964.

Slavery

Slavery convention signed at Geneva September 25, 1926, as amended (TIAS 3532). Entered into force March 9, 1927; for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat. 2183.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Jamaica, July 30, 1964.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with six annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. Entered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892.

Ratification deposited: Iran, July 8, 1964.

BILATERAL

Australia

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Canberra August 28, 1964. Entered into force August 28, 1964.

Agreement providing for the establishment of an educational foundation and the financing of programs, as amended (TIAS 3060). Signed at Canberra November 26, 1949. Entered into force November 26, 1949. TIAS 1994.

Terminated: August 28, 1964 (superseded by agreement of August 28, 1964, *supra*).

Canada

Agreement for the establishment of Roosevelt Campobello International Park. Signed at Washington January 22, 1964.

Entered into force: August 14, 1964.

Indonesia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of February 19, 1962, as amended (TIAS 4952, 5054, 5118, 5254, 5381). Effected by exchange of notes at Djakarta August 13, 1964. Entered into force August 13, 1964.

United Kingdom

Agreement providing for a new annex D to the agreement of February 10, 1961 (TIAS 4734), concerning U.S. defense areas in the Federation of the West Indies, with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at London August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

Agreement relating to the future status and use of Beane Field, St. Lucia. Effected by exchange of notes at London August 20, 1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964.

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to August 24 which appears in this issue of the BULLETIN is No. 372 of August 14.

No.	Date	Subject
*379	8/24	U.S. participation in international conferences.
		water conversion.
†380	8/24	International symposium on saline water conversion.
*381	8/26	McPherson sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Cultural Affairs (biographic details).
	382	8/28 U.S. reply to Soviet note on multilateral nuclear force.
†383	8/28	Delegation to 3d U.N. International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy (rewrite.)
	384	8/29 Rusk: "Freedom in the Postwar World."

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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Vol. LI, No. 1317



September 21, 1964

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Secretary Rusk Interviewed on "Meet the Press"

Following is the transcript of an interview with Secretary Rusk on the National Broadcasting Company's radio and television program "Meet the Press" on August 30. Members of the panel were Elie Abel, NBC News; Stewart Hensley, United Press International; John Hightower, Associated Press; and Peter Lisagor, Chicago Daily News. Bryson Rash was moderator of the program.

Mr. Rash: This is Bryson Rash, inviting you to "Meet the Press." (Announcement.) Our guest today on "Meet the Press" is Secretary of State Dean Rusk. We will have the first question now from Elie Abel, NBC News.

Mr. Abel: Mr. Secretary, Senator Goldwater has called for a full, frank revelation of what our basic policy in Viet-Nam is. He calls it "long overdue" and asks specifically for the facts of our involvement, if any, in the rioting in Saigon and what he called "the game of musical chairs" there. What about that?

Secretary Rusk: Well, in the first place, the policy of the United States in South Viet-Nam is utterly simple and well known both here and throughout the world. For the past 10 years we have been engaged in giving assist-

ance—and large assistance—to the Government of South Viet-Nam and to its people, to enable them to defend themselves against the aggression from the north represented by these guerrillas called the Viet Cong. That has been a consistent effort for at least a decade. That is our purpose. When that country becomes safe and independent, secure, so that its people can work out their own future for themselves, American military presence will not be required and South Viet-Nam can be independent.

Now, as far as these recent events are concerned—I have checked the cables today—there is nothing behind the scenes that cuts across or throws a different picture on the reporting—the very extensive reporting—that has been coming out of Saigon in the last few days. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr. [Nguyen Xuan] Oanh, has been temporarily put in charge of the government. General [Nguyen] Khanh is taking a few days' rest. Just how long we don't know.

Mr. Abel: Do you expect him back?

Secretary Rusk: We do expect him back, and the Acting Prime Minister has indicated that he will be coming back and he remains the Prime Minister.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LI, NO. 1317 PUBLICATION 7738 SEPTEMBER 21, 1964

The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

Publications of the Department, United Nations documents, and legislative material in the field of international relations are listed currently.

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The demonstrations have subsided in Saigon as they had 2 days ago in Hue and Da Nang and other centers. What has been happening there has been an attempt to work out on a long-range basis some changes in the constitutional situation, along the lines that General Khanh has been thinking about and working on for some time. He has wanted to organize a government in which civilian affairs could be more heavily in charge of civilians or under the direction of civilians so that he and the military could give primary attention to the military problems. He has also been trying to organize a more representative group—whether one calls it a national assembly or legislative council or whatever—that would try to bring about the authentic leadership of the different elements in the population so he could achieve a greater degree of unity in getting on with the major effort, the war effort.

Mr. Abel: Then you regard the changes of the last day or two as merely temporary, I take it?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the leaders who are in charge of South Viet-Nam are leaders who have been in charge of South Viet-Nam for the past several months. There has been an adjustment from time to time in the responsibilities of individuals, but we do not see here a change of government in the usual sense.

Foreign Policy Goals

Mr. Abel: Senator Goldwater also has charged that this administration has 120 different foreign policies. What is your comment on that, sir?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that simply turns upside down a remark which President Johnson made some time ago and which I have made from time to time, and that is that we are dealing in the world with 114 governments that we recognize, plus about another 6 authorities that we don't recognize as governments, such as Peiping, or North Viet-Nam, or North Korea. Each one of those governments and authorities have their own foreign policy. There are 120 different foreign policies in the world, and when the United States, therefore, tries to work out its own foreign policy, it comes up against the fact that there are 120 others making their

own foreign policy. This does not mean that the United States has in any sort of flitting sense 120 different foreign policies. Our principal foreign policy goals are those written into the United Nations Charter or those contained in our Declaration of Independence, and I think they are very well understood all over the world.

Mr. Abel: Today's newspapers, Mr. Secretary, or some of them, say that official Washington is optimistic about the possibility of sorting this thing out in Saigon and establishing a more stable regime. Can you tell us what you see in that situation that warrants optimism?

Secretary Rusk: It is a little hard to be a prophet in a matter of this sort, but basically I think we can say with confidence that we do not see in South Viet-Nam any group other than the Viet Cong itself—and they are limited in number—who seem to want to turn to Hanoi for their answers. These are people who want to be free, who do not accept the leadership of Hanoi and would like to build in South Viet-Nam their own country. And I think this is the fundamental problem—the fundamental situation.

Now, when religious groups have differences with each other and when there are rivalries of one sort or another among the South Vietnamese themselves, we look upon these as matters which ought to be put aside until the main issue against the Viet Cong has been resolved, and so this is why we have been urging upon everybody maximum unity and a moratorium on lesser matters until this great national victory over the Viet Cong can be achieved.

Mr. Rash: We will be back with "Meet the Press" and more questions for our guest, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, but first this message. (*Announcement.*) Now resuming our interview, our guest today is Secretary of State Dean Rusk. You have just met Mr. Elie Abel of NBC News. Our other reporters are Mr. Peter Lisagor of the Chicago Daily News, Mr. John Hightower of the Associated Press, and Stewart Hensley, of the United Press International. Lawrence Spivak, permanent member of the "Meet the Press" panel, will be back next week. We will continue the questions with Mr. Lisagor.

Demonstrations in Saigon

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, some of the reports from South Viet-Nam suggest that this is a battle—some of the instability and unrest is caused because of differences between the Catholics and Buddhists, and I think you touched on this a moment ago. How much really is there—how much difference is there, really, between the Buddhists and the Catholics in a religious sense, and how much is it agitation by the Communists?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it is very hard to be completely accurate about the mix. You will recall that in the closing period of President [Ngo Dinh] Diem's regime there was considerable controversy, hostility, and violence between Catholic and Buddhist groups. In the following period General Khanh has attempted to be a moderating factor between these two groups and to remove religion as an issue. Indeed, in these past several days Buddhist and Catholic leaders have joined to urge calm and peace upon their respective followers.

Now, when demonstrations occur, however, almost any element that tends to divide one from the other might play a role, and I think there has been some tension between some of the Buddhist elements and some of the Catholic elements in these recent riotings. But I gather that in the last few days it has been found that there had been some infiltration, not only by the Viet Cong but also by some people with very long criminal records, and certain arrests have been made on that basis.

But I do not believe myself that there is any need for extensive hostility between the two religious groups. I think they are moving toward an adjustment of their differences and their leaders understand the importance of their working together because both of them object to what the Viet Cong are trying to do.

Mr. Lisagor: If the South Vietnamese are unable to control the situation in the streets in Saigon, would you foresee the possibility that they might call upon American military personnel to act as a kind of a police force—

Secretary Rusk: No, no, I think that is not our role. As a matter of fact, when these demonstrations first occurred about—what? 4 or 5 days ago—we knew, we were told by the Gov-

ernment, that they did not intend to use force against these demonstrations but to let them have a period in which they could make their views known. You will recall that in the first 2 or 3 days the police were there, certain elements of the Army were there without arms. Now, when the rioting became more severe, then the police and certain of the armed elements moved in to restore order, but this is not a job for the United States.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, in an unstable situation like this it seems entirely conceivable that a regime might come to power in South Viet-Nam which would invite the United States to get out. What would we do in that case?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't—I don't have any reason to look at that question because we have no impression that there is any significant element in South Viet-Nam that has that view.

Mr. Hightower: Mr. Secretary, to follow up on this line of inquiry, do you think the United States may have to take a larger political responsibility if the government crisis in Saigon continues?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think the basic political responsibility must rest with the South Vietnamese, and our sounding of the opinions of the leaders of the various groups there makes it clear to us that they do have fundamentally a common objective insofar as the Viet Cong are concerned. Now, they have differences of view about how the Government ought to be organized and who ought to be in particular positions as among the parties, the military and Buddhist and Catholic and other elements there, but we have no doubt at all about the underlying commitment of all important elements with respect to the Viet Cong.

Mr. Hightower: I think the thing that worries a lot of people is, how can you carry on a war when there is so much confusion in the government which is primarily responsible?

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is something that we are concerned about. I would say—remind you, however—that during these past several days the war against the Viet Cong has continued. This does not seem to affect what is going on in the field against the guerrillas. There have been 25 to 30 battalions operating

on every day, there have been some 2,000 small unit actions every day looking for the Viet Cong, there have been 1,000 or more junks searched at sea every day, maybe 900 or 1,000 air sorties every day. In other words, these problems in Saigon have not yet affected the operations against the Viet Cong in the field.

Choices Available to U.S.

Mr. Hightower: Some time ago—I am speaking in terms of weeks—there was quite a lot of discussion about the possibility of broadening the war, escalating the war, there. What are the choices available to the United States at the present time?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there is no change in that situation. The problem about broadening the war has been discussed many times. Much of this depends upon the other side, depends upon the North. What we are trying to do is to bring Hanoi and Peiping to the necessary decision to leave their southern neighbors alone without a general war, if possible. If they continue to press in South Viet-Nam, then there is going to be a very serious problem ahead for the free world in that situation. But we hope very much that they will see the necessity of leaving their neighbors to the South alone before it comes to that.

Mr. Hightower: Under present circumstances, do you see any possibility at all, in the predictable future, of making a negotiated settlement?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have had a negotiated settlement in 1954. We had another one in Laos in 1962. It is hard for me at the moment to envisage just what a negotiation would be about—what speeches the delegates would make when they first sit down at the table. Because if the North is prepared to leave their neighbors in the South alone, then there is no problem and a negotiation to register that and to work out the consequences would be very simple indeed. If they are determined to continue to press against their neighbors to the South, then I don't quite see how a negotiation can simply pave the way for such aggression and I don't see how a conference to deal with that subject could do more than break up in

violent disagreement and leave the situation worse than it was before.

Mr. Hensley: Mr. Secretary, I'd like to broaden the thing into the political field a little more. As President Johnson's chief adviser on foreign policy you are obviously going to have to answer some criticism from the other side. Now, without going into the specifics of what Senator Goldwater may or may not have said about any particular situation, it seems that the general thrust of the Republican argument against the administration is that it is acting with too much timidity, that it is not moving to take advantage of the situation created by the difficulties which Mr. Khrushchev is having at home and abroad. The Republicans imply, and indeed state, that they would take stronger action to exploit situations such as exist in Eastern Europe and Cuba and so forth. What is your answer to that, sir?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think as far as Southeast Asia and South Viet-Nam are concerned, we have got to wait until we see what they really have in mind as they discuss this matter during the course of the campaign. There was a period when some of them were saying on the Republican side that we either ought to get out or to make it into a big war. This is quite a choice and we don't know what their choice is in that matter, and I am not at all clear about what Senator Goldwater meant the other day when he talked about a negotiated solution, something that he felt in his bones. I think we have to have those matters trotted out and talked over.

I don't myself believe that this great bipartisan policy which the American people have followed since World War II needs revision in the interests of greater aggressiveness.

Mr. Hensley: Well, Mr. Secretary, I am sure you don't feel it needs revision, and the bipartisan policy has been followed since the time of Senator Vandenberg because both parties took the same general approach abroad. But there is a difference this time, I think, in that it is not a question of the outs saying, "We can do it better than the ins." They say, "We would do it differently in some instances."

Secretary Rusk: I think that is a matter that ought to be clarified in great detail in the course

of the discussion here, in our campaign. Because since World War II the main lines of American foreign policy have been genuinely bipartisan in character: aid to Greece and Turkey; the building of the United Nations and support for the United Nations; the Marshall Plan, NATO, our other alliances; the Middle East and Formosa resolutions; the recent resolution on Southeast Asia; the nuclear test ban treaty; foreign aid; the expansion of trade. All these great elements of American foreign policy have been based upon a broad, bipartisan support. Now, if a choice is being offered, over against that basic policy of the postwar period, then we certainly ought to know, and the people ought to know what that choice is supposed to be.

Policy Toward Cuba

Mr. Hensley: Well, to take one specific case where there is indeed something on the record, the Republican Party has said that with respect to Cuba they would recognize a government in exile to give some sort of focus around which to build resistance, I suppose, and also give all manner of help to guerrillas fighting the Castro regime. They contend that the policy of economic and diplomatic isolation is not really going to work in the long run. I mean, what is your answer to that?

Secretary Rusk: I think if they were occupying seats of responsibility, they would want to look a little longer at this question of isolation, because that is moving with good effect and with broad agreement among our allies in the hemisphere. This question of recognizing a government in exile is a rather delicate matter in this hemisphere, because the other nations of our own inter-American system are rather sensitive about recognizing governments in exile. So there are some problems there I think that they have not really grappled with when they make such statements.

Mr. Abel: You're a Democrat, Mr. Rusk. You testified before the platform committee of the Democratic Convention and gave what seemed to some a rather optimistic view of this administration's achievements in foreign affairs. Do you feel that you have up to now stayed clear of involvement in the campaign?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, I don't think that any Secretary of State can be completely clear of problems that arise in the course of a campaign, because foreign policy is and ought to be thoroughly discussed in the course of a campaign and I don't suppose anyone would say that, under those conditions, the Secretary of State is the only one in the country who ought to be silent.

But there is another matter which draws me inevitably into the atmosphere of a campaign, and that is that during our own electoral period here we must continue to carry on our business with other nations, and when something comes along which could affect immediately our relations with other nations, then I must do my best to sort those out. For example, when an implication was made that the President had given authority to our military commanders in the Gulf of Tonkin to use nuclear weapons, I felt we had to clarify that immediately. Otherwise we would have dozens of ambassadors in here asking us what was going on.

And when the suggestion was made that this "hot line" was somehow being used to negotiate with the Soviet Union behind the backs of our allies—when I knew it—anyone else could know with a 15-second telephone call, that this is just not so—this had to be straightened out immediately because this could create suspicions and unnecessary problems with our allies, and so there are points that would come up from time to time where I will have to do my part in keeping the record straight.

Mr. Abel: You intend then to go on speaking out this way when you feel that the basic policy of this country is being misrepresented?

Secretary Rusk: I intend to continue to talk about what our policy is and what we are trying to do against the background of this great bipartisan effort of the postwar period and on specific points that need immediate clarification, because of foreign policy considerations in our relations with other countries. Then I must move to correct the record.

Mr. Lisagor: Mr. Secretary, there is some support for the belief that foreign powers, our enemies and sometimes our friends, take advantage of election periods in the United States to do certain things—stir up things in their own interests. Do you share this belief?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I haven't actually seen any instances of that. I think there might be some questions that are temporarily marking time because of our electoral period here, and it may be that some issues will be taken up after the election by foreign governments that they are not taking up at the moment. I don't know just exactly which ones those might be, but I haven't had that impression during this period.

The Cyprus Situation

Mr. Lisagor: Could I take you to Cyprus for a moment, another one of those hot spots? Is it the American view that the Communists are deeply involved in the whole Cypriot trouble, or do we believe this is simply a matter between the Greeks and the Turks on that island?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think in the first instance this is overwhelmingly a problem of relationships between the Greek Cypriots and the Turk Cypriots on the island and this in turn draws in great difficulty between Greece and Turkey, who feel an interest and a responsibility for their conationals, as they see it, on the Island of Cyprus.

Mr. Lisagor: Do you feel, as some people seem to, that there is a real possibility here of having a kind of Cuba in the eastern Mediterranean, and if so, what would that do to our NATO eastern flank?

Secretary Rusk: Well, one of the reasons why we have ourselves tried, through informal and private discussions, to find some basis of agreement among the parties is that we feel that Cyprus and Greece and Turkey and Britain, the four countries primarily concerned, should try to settle this amongst themselves and not have a situation festering which gives an open invitation to outsiders to interfere and try to fish in troubled waters.

The Congo

Mr. Hightower: Another crisis area, Mr. Secretary, is the Congo. To what degree do you have persuasion or evidence that Communist China is behind some of the revolutionary activities of tribal groups in the Congo?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have information

that indicates there has been some Chinese Communist interest and a few Chinese Communist personnel wandering around in the eastern Congo trying to stir up trouble. We do not believe in terms of magnitude that this is a substantial problem at the present time—that most of the difficulty lies within the Congo and within Congolese factions and elements and tribes, but nevertheless we do think that the Chinese Communists are trying to find ways in which to fish in those waters.

Mr. Hightower: Do you think there is a serious danger that the Congo, in spite of all the U.N. did there at one point, might still become a major arena of conflict between the United States and the Communist side?

Secretary Rusk: There is always that possibility, Mr. Hightower, but this is certainly something that, from the United States point of view, we should like to avoid. This is why President Eisenhower put this matter before the United Nations, or helped to put it before the United Nations, in 1960 and started our policy of backing the United Nations effort there. This is why we at the present time are very hopeful that when the African states themselves meet, as they are apparently going to meet in early September, they can find an answer for the Congo on an African basis, in discussions among themselves and with the Government of the Congo, because this is a great area, as large as the United States east of the Mississippi, in the heart of Africa and it would be very important that this important area not become a battlefield of the contending great powers if that can be avoided.

Mr. Hightower: I would like to return briefly to the subject of bipartisan foreign policy. You have talked about it publicly sometimes—I think this was true in your Philadelphia speech last night¹—as if you thought there are some issues, or some basic positions in foreign policy, which should be beyond political debate in this country. Is that true, and if so, what issues do you consider to be in that sacrosanct position?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe, Mr. Hightower, that there is any issue that ought to be protected from public discussion, but I do think that when there are two great parties, one

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 14, 1964, p. 362.

of whom will be responsible for the White House, and two candidates, one of whom will be President, they should make it very clear as to how they stand on the great commitments of the American people since 1945. I am thinking about such things as support for the United Nations, the attitude toward the control of nuclear weapons, attitude toward our alliances and consultations with our allies and respect for the views of our allies, and such commitments as foreign aid, and all the other inescapable burdens and tasks that are with us. I am not suggesting that there is any public issue that ought not to be publicly discussed. I am simply saying that those who have or hope to have responsibility ought to clarify their views on those with complete precision.

Mr. Rash: We have about 30 seconds. Mr. Hensley.

Mr. Hensley: I would like to ask in these 30 seconds how deep the United States is involved in the the Congo and how much is [Prime Minister Moise] Tshombe's policy of recruitment of white mercenaries going to rub off on us?

Secretary Rusk: We have during the United Nations period, and to some extent since, provided assistance to the Government of the Congo in support of the general policy of supporting the unity and the integrity of the Congo as a country and as a government.

Mr. Rash: I am very sorry I am going to have to interrupt at this time, but our time is up. Thank you, Secretary Rusk, for being with us.

Tenth Anniversary of SEATO

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Press release 390 dated September 5, for release September 7

Ten years ago today [September 8] eight nations met together in the Philippines and signed the Manila Pact,¹ creating the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. The Senate approved that treaty by a nearly unanimous vote on a strong bipartisan basis. The intervening years have been eventful ones, marked by danger and challenge. This has been especially true of Southeast Asia, which has faced major problems of internal security and economic

development. In some of the countries of the area, these problems have been compounded by externally directed and supported guerrilla warfare.

In a decade filled with turmoil and change our eight member nations can take justifiable pride in the record of SEATO, which has made a notable contribution to the security of its members through its deterrence of armed aggression. We can feel deep satisfaction in this fundamental SEATO achievement.

It was my privilege to represent the United States at the meeting of the foreign ministers of SEATO in Manila last April,² where we were warmly received by President Macapagal. This meeting took place at a time of critical challenge in Southeast Asia. The final communique of that meeting reaffirmed the determination of the SEATO member nations to defeat any aggression against the treaty area, whether overt or through guerrilla warfare.

The regular and less dramatic work of SEATO, which we sometimes tend to take for granted, nevertheless deserves mention. Through a comprehensive and continuing program of military exercises, SEATO is making an important contribution to the military capability of the member nations, both individually and collectively, and to improved coordination among the armed forces of the SEATO powers. Valuable work has been undertaken by SEATO in the field of countersubversion. And serious attention has been devoted to the economic, educational, and cultural development of the SEATO region, where significant progress has been registered.

In acknowledging the achievements of the member nations in the group endeavors of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, I should like on this anniversary to pay tribute to the very great contribution to SEATO by its first Secretary General, Mr. Pote Sarasin, to his able successor, Mr. Konthi Suphamongkhon, and to the personnel of the SEATO secretariat in Bangkok for their untiring assistance in building and improving the organization.

As we are all aware, the goal of SEATO is

¹ For text, see BULLETIN of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

² For a statement by Secretary Rusk and text of a communique, see *ibid.*, May 4, 1964, p. 690.

peace, and progress toward this goal in South-east Asia will bring us closer to a world in which both peace and freedom are secure. In this common task the member nations will find the United States loyal and determined in the fulfillment of our commitments.

And on this anniversary, therefore, I salute SEATO with pride in its accomplishments and with renewed faith in its ability to overcome any threat to its members or to the treaty area.

Leif Erikson Day, 1964

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS Leif Erikson, Norseman, son of Erik the Red and great seafarer, in the year 1000 valiantly explored the shores of the American Continent; and

WHEREAS the intrepid exploits of the Vikings of Erikson's time strike a responsive chord in the hearts of all the American people, who as a nation are today embarked upon an adventurous exploration of the unfathomed realms of space; and


WHEREAS many of our citizens of Scandinavian descent take inspiration from and annually celebrate Leif Erikson's momentous voyage; and

WHEREAS the Congress of the United States by a joint resolution approved September 2, 1964, has authorized the President of the United States to proclaim October 9 in each year as Leif Erikson Day:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, do hereby designate Friday, October 9, 1964, as Leif Erikson Day and direct Government officials to display the flag on all Government buildings on that day. Further, I invite the people of the United States to honor on that day the memory of Leif Erikson by holding appropriate exercises and ceremonies in schools and churches, or other suitable places.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this second day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen [SEAL] hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



By the President:
DEAN RUSK,
Secretary of State.

¹ No. 3610; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 12669.

Income Tax Protocol With Japan Enters Into Force

Press release 389 dated September 2

On September 2, Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Ryuji Takeuchi of Japan exchanged the instruments of ratification of the protocol between the United States and Japan, signed at Tokyo on May 7, 1960, modifying and supplementing the convention of April 16, 1954,¹ for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.

The supplementary protocol was brought into force by this exchange of instruments of ratification. By the terms of the protocol, it is applicable to income or profits derived during taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1964.

In some respects the supplementary protocol is designed to clarify certain provisions of the existing convention. In other respects it is designed to make certain provisions of the convention conform in substance with other income tax conventions to which the United States is a party.

Article I redefines the term "competent authorities." Under article II the exemption from income tax with respect to interest received is extended to the Bank of Japan and the Federal Reserve Bank of the United States. Article III clarifies a provision in the existing convention relating to taxation of certain rental income. Article IV expands the present exemptions with respect to government employees so that the scope is similar to that of other income tax conventions to which the United States is a party. Article V expands the existing source rule in the convention with respect to interest. Article VI modifies the credit provisions of the convention by omitting, with reference to the Internal Revenue Code, the words "as in effect on the first day of January 1954." Article VII provides that the supplementary protocol of March 23, 1957, shall terminate when the 1960 protocol enters into force.

¹ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 3176 and 3901.

United States Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica

EXCERPTS FROM PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO CONGRESS¹

LETTERS OF TRANSMITTAL

The President to the Congress

To the Congress of the United States:

I am pleased to transmit to the Congress this special report on United States Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica.

Men and nations alike tend to concentrate their energies on unsolved problems. In foreign affairs, disagreements all too often distract public attention from accords and agreements.

But preoccupation with world problems should not obscure situations like Antarctica where this country and others work together harmoniously to construct the prototypes of peace.

The Treaty² provides for freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and for carrying on undiminished the cooperation started during the International Geophysical Year. It prohibits nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste.

¹ H. Doc. 358, 88th Cong., 2d sess.; transmitted on Sept. 2. The full report includes, in addition to the portions printed here, sections on the historical background of Antarctic exploration, the negotiation and ratification of the Antarctic Treaty, and the consultative meetings of 1961 and 1962, together with three annexes: Annex I, Exchanges of Official Representatives on Antarctic Expeditions; Annex II, Examples of International Cooperation in Providing Logistic Support and Rescue Services; and Annex III, Documents (texts of pertinent documents).

² For text of the Antarctic Treaty, see BULLETIN of Dec. 21, 1959, p. 914.

To see that the Treaty is complied with, national Observers may be sent at any time to any part of Antarctica to inspect various national installations. In late 1963, the United States sent two such inspection teams to examine facilities of six other countries. In January 1964 they reported that no Treaty violations were observed in any of the installations visited.

Since the Treaty came into force in 1961,³ the parties have held periodic meetings in a rare spirit of frankness and cooperation to find acceptable ways to carry out various provisions of the Treaty.

On Antarctica's icy wastes, scientists visit freely between their various national installations, sometimes spending an entire year working with their counterparts from other countries. Many important expeditions have been completed and lives saved in time of danger because of timely assistance from other national stations.

Thus the Antarctic Treaty to which the Senate of the United States gave its advice and consent to ratification on August 10, 1960, serves not only as a pact guaranteeing freedom of scientific inquiry in the Continent of Antarctica but, more importantly, as an outstanding example of practical cooperation between nations and a positive step toward a peaceful world.

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 2, 1964.

³ For a statement made by President Kennedy on June 23, 1961, see *ibid.*, July 10, 1961, p. 91.

The Secretary of State to the President

DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, July 31, 1964.

THE PRESIDENT:

I have the honor to submit to you, with a view to its transmission to the Congress, a report on United States Policy and International Cooperation in Antarctica.

As you know, the Antarctic Treaty was signed on December 1, 1959 and entered into force on June 23, 1961.

Since that time there have been meetings of the signatory powers to devise measures in furtherance of the provisions and objectives of the Treaty. These meetings were devoted to finding practical ways of meeting Treaty requirements, and differences of opinion were negotiated in a spirit of cooperation.

In November 1963, the inspections provided for in the Treaty were begun. The United States inspected stations of Argentina, Chile, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom also designated Observers who inspected United States stations.

Our Observers were able to report that they received full cooperation, that the nations concerned were providing the advance information on their activities required under the Treaty, and that the provisions of that Treaty were being respected. They found no evidence of military activity or nuclear explosions. There is freedom of scientific research, and active international cooperation in scientific investigation.

For its part, the United States is conducting a vigorous scientific program under the direction of the National Science Foundation, with logistic support furnished by the Department of Defense. In keeping with the Treaty, the United States invites foreign scientists to participate in our programs, and our scientists have the opportunity to work actively in the research projects of other countries.

On the basis of these facts, and the details contained in the present report, it may properly be said that the Antarctic Treaty is achieving the purpose for which it was intended.

I recommend that you approve the report for transmittal to the Congress.

Respectfully submitted,

DEAN RUSK

EXCERPTS FROM REPORT

UNITED STATES POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN ANTARCTICA: A HISTORICAL SUMMARY WITH EMPHASIS ON RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Introduction

The nations active in Antarctica, in an unprecedented linking of forces, have mounted a massive multinational attack to conquer for the world the outer reaches of the Southern Hemisphere. They have not only made expanded, coordinated efforts in recent years to best the elements and unlock Antarctic doors to scientific knowledge; they have also negotiated, ratified, and proceeded to implement a treaty of a type unique in world history—a treaty to demilitarize and insure international cooperation in the entire area of Antarctica. The parties to this treaty are Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States which are original signatories, and Poland and Czechoslovakia, which later acceded to the Treaty.

This dynamic internationalism concerning Antarctica has developed at a time, and in spite, of serious tensions elsewhere in the world. It is a healthy expression of the rising interest in an area where maritime nations have been sporadically active for almost 200 years. The record of those years shows frequent cooperation, even from the beginning, among the nations probing this most remote of the continents.

The Antarctic Treaty, December 1, 1959

A pioneering document, the Antarctic Treaty provides that in the Antarctic area there shall be freedom of scientific investigation and continued international cooperation and that the

area shall be used for peaceful purposes only. It bans nuclear explosions and the disposal of atomic waste in Antarctica pending general international agreement on the subject (but does not prohibit the use of nuclear reactors). It grants to the parties to the Treaty the right of inspection and aerial observation in all areas of Antarctica and obligates them to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, to the end that no one should engage in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the principles or purposes of the Treaty. While implying neither renunciation nor recognition of rights or asserted claims, it prohibits for the duration of the Treaty the making of new claims, the enlarging of existing claims, and the use of activities in Antarctica as a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying territorial claims. Finally, the Treaty provided for periodic meetings among the signatories, the first to take place at Canberra within 2 months after the date of its entry into force, and included an accession clause permitting members of the United Nations, or other countries unanimously agreed upon, to acquire the rights and obligations set forth in the Treaty.

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Research and Exploration Under the Antarctic Treaty, 1961-1964

Within the framework of the Antarctic Treaty and of the recommendations adopted at the Consultative Meetings, Antarctic research continued unabated. The story in the three seasons from 1961 to 1964 was about the same as in the immediately preceding years—a tale of broad and often daring scientific effort supported by increasingly effective logistics and coordinated by the many participating nations in a spirit of close understanding.

United States scientists carried forward research started in previous years, expanded the research in biology, and undertook research programs at new locations in the Antarctic. One of the innovations—for study of the outermost layer of the atmosphere—was to compare data from a new summer station called Sky-Hi, at the base of Palmer Peninsula, with data from its magnetically conjugate station near Quebec, Canada. (Sky-Hi was converted later

to a year-round station named Eights.) In July 1962 the United States for the first time sent into Antarctic waters a vessel with the exclusive function of conducting research; the research was in the fields of oceanography, marine biology, and upper atmospheric physics. This vessel, the USNS *Eltanin*, a recently converted cargo ship with a reinforced hull capable of withstanding the pounding of Antarctic ice floes, was operated for the National Science Foundation by the Military Sea Transportation Service. Two marine biologists on its third cruise into the area, November 24, 1962–January 23, 1963, were the first American women scientists to undertake research in the Antarctic.

In the course of their research United States scientists went on many new traverses. They made two especially important treks in the 1961-1962 season: an Ellsworth Land traverse on which they covered over 1,000 miles and discovered previously unknown mountains, and a traverse of 1,100 miles between Cape Adare and Beardmore Glacier, which was made by topographic engineers using helicopters and electronic measuring devices and which paved the way for the mapping of a 100,000-square-mile area. In the following season United States scientists set up field camps from which they conducted research in geology and biology, including penguin navigation, on the polar plateau, the Ross Ice Shelf, and Marie Byrd Land. In the course of the 1963-1964 season, geophysicists covered 1,900 miles in tracked vehicles to study the outline and composition of the land beneath the ice east and southeast of Byrd Station and to determine the precise boundaries of the Filchner Ice Shelf.

During the 1961-1962 season a United States icebreaker cruised from McMurdo Sound along the coast of Marie Byrd Land, farther east than any ship had gone previously. Also, in that season, support personnel installed at McMurdo Station the first nuclear reactor plant in Antarctica; the plant first produced power for heat and light in March 1962 and is expected in the near future to produce drinking water distilled from the sea. Moreover, under-snow buildings were virtually completed at Byrd Station, heavy tractors were driven there from Kainan Bay on the Ross Ice Shelf, and

additional scientific laboratories were set up at Hallett Station.

The following season was opened earlier than any previous one when Rear Admiral [David M.] Tyree flew to McMurdo Sound on September 15, 1962. In the weeks thereafter, icebreakers opened in the frozen Ross Sea a channel of unprecedented length (63 miles) to admit United States and New Zealand cargo ships supporting the scientific program. But even more striking than either of these events were two daring flights accomplished in 1963 by Rear Admiral James R. Reedy, who had relieved Admiral Tyree as Commander, United States Naval Support Force, Antarctica, on November 26, 1962, and also assumed Tyree's duties as United States Antarctic Projects Officer on June 6, 1963: In February 1963 Reedy flew 3,470 statute miles nonstop from McMurdo Sound to the Pole of Inaccessibility via the South Pole and returned to McMurdo, completing the longest exploratory flight in the history of Antarctica; in the fall of 1963 he made the first nonstop flight from Cape Town, South Africa, to McMurdo Sound, a distance of 4,700 miles across the South Indian Ocean, uncharted Queen Maud Land, and the Antarctic Plateau.

C-130 ski-equipped aircraft and helicopters contributed greatly to the expansion of research in the Antarctic summer and to startling innovations in logistics. By carrying scientists to remote points in Antarctica and retrieving them at the end of the summer, these aircraft made summer research more attractive since they ended the need to winter over and thus shortened absences from classrooms and laboratories. During Deep Freeze 62, C-130's set down and retrieved vehicles, equipment, and supplies for the Ellsworth Land traverse party and established a glaciological party on Roosevelt Island; then, together with other aircraft, they carried personnel, prefabricated housing, supplies, equipment, and fuel from McMurdo Sound for a distance of 1,400 miles to establish Sky-Hi Station. During execution of the major logistic feat of Deep Freeze 63, conversion of this station to a year-round mobile facility, C-130's flew in completed building units and personnel, and other aircraft dropped fuel supplies. The station, renamed Eights Station

after Dr. James Eights, the first American scientist to visit Antarctica in 1829-1831, was operational just 20 days after the arrival of the first of the new housing units. Eights Station is unique because the entire complex can be airlifted to another location and because components can be shifted as necessary. During the 1963-1964 season C-130 aircraft transported a geological field party with its equipment and with three turbine helicopters to a base camp in the Ellsworth Mountains where they supplied and later evacuated the party. On this project geologists discovered areas with record quantities of plant and animal fossils as well as possibly the first fresh water streams and waterfalls in the interior of the continent; the helicopters quickly lifted scientists over rugged and crevassed terrain to summits as high as 12,000 feet, making it possible to complete three summers of research in 2 months.

The nations active in Antarctica meanwhile continued to send official representatives on one another's relief and supply expeditions, to exchange personnel and information on their Antarctic projects, and to participate in joint research. Scientists and technicians from Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan, Lebanon, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom participated in United States research programs during all three seasons; others from Argentina, Australia, Austria, and Norway took part during the 1961-1962 season; others from Belgium, Brazil, Chile, and Italy did so during the 1962-1963 season; and still others from Australia, the Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark participated during the 1963-1964 season. The Chileans participating in the 1962-1963 season included two women marine biologists, who did research aboard the USNS *Eltanin* during its fourth cruise, along with the women marine biologists from the United States who had come aboard on the previous cruise. United States scientists, in turn, participated in the programs of three foreign nations—geologists who did research at a Chilean station on Palmer Peninsula (1961-1962), a geologist who joined a New Zealand party working in the McMurdo Sound area (1962-1963), and oceanographers who joined Argentine scientists aboard an

Argentine vessel to conduct surveys in Drake Passage and in the South Antillean Sea (1961-1962). In addition, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to exchange scientists: Soviet meteorologists worked at McMurdo Station during the 1961-1962 and 1962-1963 seasons; a United States biologist wintered over at Mirnyy Station (1961-1962); an oceanographer from the United States and one from the Soviet Union performed research aboard, respectively, the Soviet research vessel *Ob* and the USNS *Eltanin* (1962-1963); and an atmospheric physicist from the United States began research at the Soviet Station Vostok and one from the Soviet Union did so at Byrd Station (1963-1964).

The various nations likewise continued to exchange publications on Antarctica and to circulate in advance of each season information on the activities they were planning in Antarctica. In circulating advance information, they followed the practice initiated as a voluntary action in 1960 and later outlined in a more formal way in recommendations of the two Consultative Meetings.

The United States continued to participate in joint research programs with New Zealand at Hallett and with Australia at Wilkes Stations, as well as in the multination effort at the International Antarctic Analysis Centre in Melbourne. It also continued its joint effort with Argentina at Ellsworth Station until the completion of the program for 1961-1962.

Besides all this, the United States and other countries joined hands in various new projects. For example, in the 1961-1962 season, scientists and technicians of Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom assisted those of the United States who were exploring the Palmer Peninsula and adjacent islands for suitable sites for research stations. Again, in the same season, Chile gave scientific advice and other assistance to United States geologists studying the mountains at the southern tip of South America and on the Palmer Peninsula. But one of the most promising new projects is a joint program of research in cosmic rays initiated by the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union in the 1963-1964 season. This effort is part of the program for the International Years of the Quiet Sun

(IQSY), a 2-year (1964-1965) global effort by 66 nations to study solar effects on the earth's environment. At one of the Soviet stations, Vostok, the United States erected an antenna for use in this joint program. Australia and France plan tentatively to participate in this new project in time for the second year of the IQSY.

In support of the research and exploration conducted in Antarctica, the nations active in the area continued to provide one another with a wide range of logistic services. For example, they provided weather information, airfield services, accommodations, and fuel and other supplies, which facilitated long-range flights; they also provided vital medical assistance.

Inspection Under the Treaty, 1963-1964

Four of the signatory states, Australia, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States, carried out during the 1963-1964 season the first inspections of other nations' activities in Antarctica. They acted in accordance with the provision of the Antarctic Treaty (Article VII) which provides for the designation of Observers to carry out inspection "to promote the objectives and ensure the observance" of the Treaty. The first inspection was conducted by New Zealand in November-December 1963 when their two Observers inspected three United States stations: McMurdo, South Pole, and Byrd. The Australian and the United Kingdom Observers in December 1963 also inspected these three United States stations; in addition they inspected the New Zealand Scott Station. The United States facilitated the inspection of its stations by these countries by providing their Observers with logistic support, including transportation, accommodations, and other supplies.

The United States announced its inspection plans on September 13, 1963,⁴ when it explained that the decision to inspect was "not based on any anticipation that there had been treaty violations by any signatory power." Rather, the announcement continued, the United States believed that any inspection conducted under the Treaty would "in fact reinforce the basis

⁴ *Ibid.*, Sept. 30, 1963, p. 513.

of mutual confidence that prevails in Antarctica.” The announcement pointed out, too, that the United States had informed the other signatory powers that it would welcome inspection of its stations.

In appointing the United States Observers in November 1963, Secretary of State Rusk wrote in his letters to them: ⁵

The purpose of the inspection is to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty. You may expect to have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. This includes all stations, installations and equipment and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica.

While performing inspections, you should bear constantly in mind that all states active in Antarctica have been both friendly and cooperative with the United States in matters relating to the continent, and it is the policy of the United States to preserve and enhance this situation. You should conduct your activities in compliance with this policy.

The United States Observers conducted their inspection in January 1964. They visited British, Soviet, Argentine, New Zealand, and Chilean stations and overflew a French station.

Conclusion

The gradual but sustained growth in scientific and political cooperation in Antarctica has resulted from the successful fusion of science, technology, and diplomacy. The need of men engaged in research in this laboratory which is Antarctica, their need to join together and mesh their efforts, has caused nations to harmonize their plans and enter into political agreements to assure continuing cooperation and coordination. Thus, they have concluded the Antarctic Treaty to insure that Antarctica will be used for peaceful purposes only and to provide for international cooperation and periodic consultation “on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica.” As the nations concert their probing of Antarctica’s mysteries, they undoubtedly will devise further ways and means of facilitating research and will extend the scope of their cooperation on questions concerning Antarctica.

⁵ For a Department announcement of Nov. 18, 1963, see *ibid.*, Dec. 16, 1963, p. 932.

The challenge in Antarctica is similar to the challenge in outer space. The nations cooperating under the Antarctic Treaty are extracting from this hushed and desolate continent many kinds of scientific data which may give rise to new and fundamental conceptions of the nature and origin of the universe, and they are opening up a vast new area which is challenging the ingenuity of scientists, engineers, and explorers in overcoming obstacles of nature which have frustrated and baffled the human race through the centuries.

In a speech on the general subject of advancing the frontiers of human knowledge, made at the dedication of the new National Geographic Society Building in Washington on January 18, 1964, President Johnson declared: ⁶

“Explorations and discoveries of centuries past were most often meant to serve the interest and the advantage of individual nations. Today . . . we believe that the explorations and the discoveries of decades ahead must be meant to serve the aspirations and the well-being of individual men in all nations.

“This nation is committed now to the most intensive effort ever made by any peoples to advance the frontiers of human knowledge. We shall remain committed. The cost of knowledge, whatever its price, is small against the price mankind has already paid throughout all history for his ignorance and for the darkness.”

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign Policy

88th Congress, 2d Session

Extending Recognition to the International Exposition for Southern California in 1968. Report to accompany S.J. Res. 162. S. Rept. 1384. August 13, 1964. 5 pp.

Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure. Report to accompany H.R. 9436. S. Rept. 1385. August 13, 1964. 5 pp.

International Coffee Agreement Act of 1964. Conference report to accompany H.R. 8864. H. Rept. 1803. August 13, 1964. 2 pp.

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation for the Inter-oceanic Canal Commission. Communication from the President transmitting a proposed supplemental appropriation for the fiscal year 1965 in the amount of \$5 million. H. Doc. 341. August 14, 1964. 2 pp.

⁶ *Ibid.*, Feb. 3, 1964, p. 150.

Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy Opens at Geneva

The Third United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy was held at Geneva, Switzerland, from August 31 to September 9. Scientists from 113 countries met to exchange information on advances in nuclear research and peaceful application of nuclear energy which have occurred since the last such conference in 1958. Following is a statement made at a U.S. delegation news conference in Geneva on August 29 by Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and head of the U.S. delegation, and the filmed remarks of President Johnson which were shown on August 30 at the opening of the U.S. Technical Exhibit, together with an announcement of the names of the principal members of the U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY DR. SEABORG

I am very grateful, indeed, for this opportunity to meet with you—the representatives of the world's communications media—before the start of this Third United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. My purpose is to tell you something about the preparations the United States has made for this conference and to do my best to answer any questions you may have.

We have every expectation that this conference will be as productive technically and as beneficial in other ways as were the first and second conferences, held here in 1955¹ and 1958.²

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 22, 1955, p. 300; Sept. 15, 1955, p. 381; and Oct. 10, 1955, p. 555.

² For background, see *ibid.*, Sept. 29, 1958, p. 493.

We also are confident that through your efforts it will be successful in attracting and holding the attention and interest of the general public. The work we and other nations are doing in this field is for the public benefit. The peaceful atom guarantees the energy we and future generations will need; it promises better methods of diagnosing and treating disease; and it holds out hope for the beneficial use of the atom in countless other fields.

We are here in Geneva to report on our work. The information to be exchanged by the scientists, engineers, and administrators convened here will, through your efforts, reach distant and diverse audiences.

Nine years have passed since we held the first international conference on the peaceful atom. Now, as we convene for the third time, I think we do so with a feeling that as we look at the status of nuclear energy development we see something solid. We find that quietly, without fanfare, the thing we have been waiting for has happened: The age of nuclear power has begun. I believe this will be brought out by the presentations to the conference and will be the central theme of the conference.

As I am sure you know, the United States played an important role in stimulating the decision of the United Nations to sponsor this conference. In doing so, my country incurred the responsibility of doing all it could to insure the success of this venture. We believe we have done this.

We are participating in four major categories. Our scientists have prepared scores of papers covering a very broad spectrum of nuclear energy research and development; we have developed a Technical Exhibit closely correlated to the papers our representatives will

offer; we have produced numerous technical films, all keyed to the subject matter covered in our papers; and we will make available, through our Technical Information Center, many publications of interest to our colleagues from other lands.

The Scientific Advisory Committee for the conference has accepted 98 U.S. papers. All will be published in the conference proceedings, and 67 have been selected for oral presentation.

Strides Made in Reactor Technology

The nuclear engineer must work in diverse and complex areas in his efforts to develop efficient, economical, safe reactors. A brief review of some of the areas in which reactor technology has made great strides, but in which progress must continue, may be useful to place our total conference presentation in perspective.

A reactor in operation produces conditions present in few other modern devices. The almost incredible speed of the fission process, the great extremes of temperature, the tremendous amounts of raw power developed, and the continuing effects of radiation occupy the attention of the reactor physicist, the reactor engineer, the metallurgist, and the specialist who cannot be given the label of any of these disciplines.

For future plants these people must develop the best fuels, the best methods of containing these fuels in the reactor, the most efficient cooling systems, the most efficient moderators, the most durable structural materials, and the best methods of converting heat into power.

There are other areas which require continuing exploration as we look ahead to newer, more powerful, and more efficient designs for the reactors of tomorrow. One of our primary concerns, of course, is safety. This means that in our efforts to develop safe nuclear plants we must establish sound criteria for the siting of these plants, we must develop adequate containment without adding unnecessarily to capital costs by overdesigning, we must provide sophisticated and reliable instrumentation for the control of the reactors, and we must continue to add to our knowledge of and experience

with the materials which go into a reactor.

These challenges have been met successfully in the reactors which have been "on line" in the United States for a number of years. There is no reason to believe they will not be met as successfully in building the reactors which now are on the drawing boards.

U.S. Papers Prepared for Conference

Now a word about the papers our scientists and engineers have prepared for this conference. We will present papers at five of the general sessions. These will be review papers on the energy resources and international cooperation aspects of nuclear power development; on progress in research on controlled fusion; on the uses and potentialities of research reactors; on advances in radioisotope production and utilization; on certain aspects of the biological effects of ionizing radiation; and on the uses of radiation in medicine.

Most of the technical sessions are to deal with central-station nuclear power experience and technology. The United States will present technical papers across the entire range of this broad subject. For example, survey papers will be presented on the major power reactor concepts under development in the United States. These include pressurized water reactors; boiling water reactors; the spectral shift and seed-blanket reactor concepts; heavy water and organic cooled reactors; sodium-cooled reactors, both thermal and fast; and high temperature gas-cooled reactors. A paper will also be given on several advanced reactor concepts now in an early stage of development. There also will be survey papers on the siting of nuclear power plants and on the experience to date in integrating these plants into the U.S. electrical power network.

In addition, a series of technical papers will be given covering particular areas of power reactor technology such as the physics of thermal and fast reactor systems; coolant, moderator, and control materials technology; heat transfer and fluid flow; the design and manufacture of reactor components; control instrumentation; vapor containment systems; and the like. This series will include several papers on reactor safety, including a review of the U.S. Atomic

Energy Commission's safety research and test program.

Another series of U.S. technical papers will deal with fuel technology. Topics to be covered include uranium exploration; the fabrication and irradiation testing of various types of fuel elements; the use of thorium and plutonium fuel materials; the reprocessing of spent fuel elements; and the handling of radioactive wastes.

In the aggregate these papers constitute an important library of information on the U.S. program in the central-station nuclear power field.

Our contribution does not end here, however. U.S. papers also will relate to other fields of power reactor application. One that is of particular interest and importance concerns use of reactors which will desalt vast quantities of saline water at the same time the reactors are producing power. Another is the propulsion of merchant ships, and a third is the supply of small amounts of electricity and heat at remote locations.

There also will be papers on nuclear power applications which have nothing to do with reactors. One will deal with isotopic generators, which are small, battery-like devices that can produce up to hundreds of watts of electricity from the decay heat of radioisotopes. Another will deal with our Plowshare program, which involves research on the use of nuclear explosives for such peaceful purposes as canal construction.

Still other presentations will treat topics not directly related to nuclear power. For example, there will be papers on the design of advanced U.S. research reactors and test reactors; on the production of heavy water; and on so-called "chemonuclear" reactors, which are of potential importance in the manufacture of chemicals.

U.S. Technical Exhibit

Now I should like to call to your attention our Technical Exhibit.

The exhibit is designed to serve as a meeting place as well as a display area. There are two conference rooms which can be reserved by small groups of delegates for informal meetings

or used for the showing of films. There also are several "quiet islands" on the main floor of the exhibit hall where delegates can sit and talk. It goes without saying that informal contacts in a conference of this kind are at least as valuable as the formal proceedings.

The displays which make up the body of our exhibit are closely keyed to our papers. They include models of many of the types of power reactors already mentioned and presentations of many of the areas of reactor technology.

I'm quite sure that several other displays will be of particular interest to you. One demonstrates how atomic energy through the use of radiation can give to inexpensive softwoods properties equal to or better than those of more expensive hardwoods. Another exhibit explains the use of neutron activation in medical investigations, space exploration, crime detection, and other fields, and I think you will be rewarded if you will have a look at the exhibits describing the Plowshare and the desalinization concepts I mentioned earlier.

As part of the Technical Exhibit we also have provided a Technical Information Center for the use of our fellow scientists and engineers. Three hundred technical books, produced since the 1958 conference, will be available, along with a special section of publications sponsored by the United States Atomic Energy Commission, a library of basic reference works, and a reactor information center containing about 2,000 documents in microfiche form.

In addition, we have established a publication center which will distribute booklets prepared by the USAEC. They are part of a series called *Understanding the Atom*, and there are about 15 of them, available in English, French, and Spanish. I think you will find these useful in your efforts to interpret nuclear science and engineering for the layman.

I hope you will take the opportunity to see the technical films we have produced for the conference. There are 24, and I can assure you they were prepared with meticulous care—again with the objective of supplementing the information presented in our technical papers.

The films will be projected at the Technical Information Center, and you will be able to select a sound track in any of the four official

languages of the conference—English, French, Spanish, or Russian.

Nuclear Power in the United States

Earlier I suggested that the age of nuclear power has now begun. Let me conclude this statement by commenting further on this topic with particular reference to the situation in the United States. I will be brief, as I do not want to intrude on territory to be covered by our formal conference presentations. The principal points I would like to make—and I make them as a sort of backdrop to our participation in this conference—are these:

1. The operating experience we have had with more than a dozen prototype and demonstration nuclear power plants of several different types and in sizes up to approximately 200 megawatts has been excellent.

2. Projections of the cost of power from water-cooled plants in sizes of 500 to 600 megawatts which can now be purchased on a firm-price basis with performance warranties indicate that nuclear power is now in a position to offer competition for an appreciable share—perhaps as much as half—of the new steam-electric capacity to be added to the U.S. utility network in the decade or so ahead.

3. We in the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission have revised upward the projection of nuclear power plant construction we made less than 2 years ago. At that time we estimated that some 40,000 megawatts of nuclear capacity would be in operation in the United States by 1980. Our new figure for 1980 will be about 70,000 megawatts.

4. Major changes have just been made in the U.S. atomic energy statute to permit, and in due course require, private ownership of the basic fuel materials used and produced in nuclear power plants. The new statute essentially completes the transition that began a decade ago when the first steps were taken to convert what was then a Government nuclear power project into an independent nuclear power industry.

These four points amount to a declaration of confidence in the ability of nuclear power to carry an increasing part of our heavy energy burden. I am sure that other nations have the

same outlook and that a spirit of confidence in this remarkable new energy technology will characterize this conference.

It is very gratifying to me that President Lyndon B. Johnson fully recognizes our country's responsibility for sharing with the rest of the world our knowledge of the peaceful atom. He has followed with interest our preparations for this conference and has supported our efforts.

I am pleased to tell you that tomorrow, in conjunction with the opening of the Technical Exhibit, President Johnson will provide a message concerning the continued participation of the United States in the international development of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

I know you will be interested in this message. I am not in a position to elaborate on it at this time, but if you have questions bearing on other aspects of the United States participation in this conference, my fellow delegates and I will attempt to answer them for you.

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated August 30

I would like to extend my best wishes to all the delegates at this Third International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy.

A great challenge confronts you. You can hasten the day when the atom will be harnessed to hard labor for man's welfare. You can reduce the risk that the atom will be used for man's destruction.

We stand at the threshold of the age of nuclear power, but whether nuclear power will meet our needs tomorrow depends on our work and our wisdom today.

In the United States we have been working and learning. We have now learned how to build large-scale reactors whose electric power will be economically competitive in many parts of our country and the world.

Our utility companies now aim to build or purchase reactors producing electricity at between 4 and 6 mills per kilowatt hour. This achievement has come from 15 years of concentrated research and development. The United States Government has spent more than \$1.6 billion on this effort. American private enter-

prise has spent an additional \$500 million.

These expenditures are an investment of our people and an investment in the future of all mankind. Through our Government and through private enterprise we are prepared to use this vast new technology to help other countries meet their energy needs.

At present the large-scale reactor offers the best hope of economic production of electricity. Not every country and not every community will use this large size, but our rapid rate of progress should soon lead to economic production in smaller reactors, too.

A further application of nuclear energy will be large-scale desalting of water. The time is coming when a single desalting plant powered by nuclear energy will produce hundreds of millions of dollars' worth of precious water and large amounts of electricity every day.

Our Government is proceeding with an aggressive program of nuclear desalting. What we learn in this program will be shared with other nations. Already we have begun cooperative exchanges with Mexico, with Israel,³ and with the Soviet Union.⁴

Today I invite all of you to join with us in this enterprise. As we move ahead we look to the International Atomic Energy Agency to play an ever larger role in these peaceful efforts. Already it has set standards for the care and for the keeping of nuclear materials. This achievement has raised our hopes for a workable system of world law on nuclear energy.

For almost 20 years we have known the atom's terror as a weapon of war. Today we begin to know its hope as a powerhouse of peace. Today at last we really have good reason for be-

lieving that the atom can be made the servant and not the scourge of mankind.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on August 28 (press release 383) that Dr. Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, would head the U.S. delegation to the Third United Nations International Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, which was held at Geneva, Switzerland, August 31-September 9. The meeting was convened in response to a resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly in 1962.

The U.S. delegation was comprised largely of scientists who presented professional papers. Principal members of the delegation were:⁵

U.S. Representatives

Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology
Isidor I. Rabi, Consultant at Large to the President's Science Advisory Committee
Frederick Seitz, President, National Academy of Sciences—National Research Council
Henry D. Smyth, U.S. Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Vienna

Alternate U.S. Representatives

Mary I. Bunting, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
John G. Palfrey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
James T. Ramey, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
Ragnar Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, Department of State
Gerald F. Tape, Commissioner, Atomic Energy Commission
Roger W. Tubby, U.S. Representative to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations, Geneva

Congressional Advisers

John O. Pastore, U.S. Senate
John B. Anderson, U.S. House of Representatives

³ For background, see *ibid.*, June 29, 1964, p. 1001, and Aug. 17, 1964, p. 230.

⁴ For background, see *ibid.*, July 13, 1964, p. 60, and Aug. 3, 1964, p. 144.

⁵ For the names of the scientists presenting papers at the conference and advisers to the delegation, see Department of State press release 383 dated Aug. 28.

U.S. Outlines Verification Measures To Assure Compliance With Proposed Freeze of Strategic Nuclear Vehicles

*Statement by Clare H. Timberlake*¹

In his message of January 21, 1964,² President Johnson presented to this conference a series of specific proposals for collateral measures of disarmament. Those proposals were designed as practical, meaningful ways of arresting the arms race and reducing the dangers present in today's world. They were designed to be readily possible of agreement and to bring about real progress now toward the goals of this conference. Among those proposals is one of the most significant and far-reaching measures before this conference, short of general and complete disarmament. I refer to the verified freeze of offensive and defensive strategic nuclear vehicles, the exploration of which President Johnson urged upon this Committee.

Today I should like to elaborate on that proposal by presenting some illustrative material on the nature of the verification that would be required in its support. The procedures which I shall outline will, of course, require further detailed discussion and negotiation within this conference. Also, it is not intended that this presentation should cover all aspects of the verification of the freeze. For example, I shall not discuss the problem of verifying the freeze of strategic anti-ballistic-missile systems, which we have previously indicated would be included

along with offensive delivery vehicles. However, I believe that the material which I present today will provide a basis for a sound understanding of the nature of the verification system we contemplate and for initiating explorations of the freeze proposal.

I believe that it is appropriate to set forth this material on verification of a freeze in some detail at this time for two reasons. First, questions raised by other delegations in past discussions, especially by the delegation of the Soviet Union, indicate that there is some misunderstanding of the nature and extent of the verification measures we propose. Second, we wish to make this information available for study by the other delegations and their governments while the conference is in recess.

Armaments To Be Declared

As regards the matters to be negotiated, it might be helpful to begin by noting those elements which would be necessary for effective operation of the verification arrangements. It will, of course, be necessary to agree on the armaments affected by the agreement. Each party would submit a list indicating which of its armaments it considered to be affected. It will also be necessary to agree on the nonstrategic military and nonmilitary vehicles possessing weight, thrust, and range characteristics falling within the categories included in the agreement. Any differences of opinion would be negotiated.

Agreement would also have to be reached on the specified major subassemblies affected by the

¹ Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Aug. 27. Mr. Timberlake is Deputy U.S. Representative on the Committee.

² For text, see BULLETIN of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224; for U.S. statements made on Jan. 31, Apr. 16, and June 9, see *ibid.*, Mar. 2, 1964, p. 350; May 11, 1964, p. 756, and June 29, 1964, p. 1004.

agreement. The United States believes that the following subassemblies should be specified: (a) for ballistic missiles—liquid rocket engines and tankage, solid rocket motors, stage assemblies, and mobile launchers; (b) for cruise-type missiles and aircraft—fuselages.

Affected armaments and specified major subassemblies could continue to be produced on the basis of a one-for-one replacement by an armament or subassembly of the same type. Each party would submit a list indicating which of its armaments it considered to be of the same type and describing each model within a type by gross external characteristics, such as major dimensions and gross configuration. Any differences of opinion would be negotiated. This procedure would assist in precluding the possibility of introducing more advanced weapons through replacement production. The parties would seek to agree on acceptable replacements for the armaments and specified major subassemblies no longer in production.

It would be necessary also to agree on annual production quotas for each of the allowed armament and specified subassembly replacements. This would be done by deciding upon: (a) an annual number of permitted confidence and training firings for each type of missile; (b) an estimate of the number of vehicles lost annually by accident for each type of vehicle; (c) the anticipated number of replacements due to natural attrition—such as end of maintenance life or malfunction—for each type of armament and specified subassembly.

We believe that there should be an arrangement under which all quotas would be reviewed at the request of any party. Parties would have to agree, of course, upon arrangements relating to verification, such as the annual quotas of inspections and the rights of inspectors.

As regards declarations, each party would describe and give the location of the facilities involved, or those which had been involved, in producing the affected armaments and the specified major subassemblies and retaining a capability to produce those items. The parties would identify those facilities intended for use for allowed replacement production and those to be converted to peaceful uses or closed down.

Facilities To Be Declared

The facilities to be declared would include the following:

(a) Facilities performing final production-line assembly of the armaments or vehicles in the affected categories. However, this would not be interpreted to include military installations not engaged in manufacturing at which partial assembly or disassembly might be performed for operational or maintenance purposes.

(b) Facilities producing the specified major subassemblies—that is, those producing or testing ballistic-missile, liquid-fueled engines or solid-fueled motors; those fabricating and assembling tankage, ballistic-missile stage assemblies, and mobile launchers; and those manufacturing aircraft or cruise-type missile fuselages.

(c) Facilities manufacturing ship hulls used for launching sea-based missiles.

Armament production quotas would also be declared. Thus, the yearly amount and type of each affected armament and/or specified major subassembly to be produced at each of the facilities performing allowed replacement production would be declared. Each party would be responsible for scheduling its production in conformance with its annual quota.

In addition, each party would describe and give the location of those facilities involved, or which had been involved, in space or aircraft programs which retain a capability to produce affected armaments or specified major subassemblies. Those facilities would be allowed to continue to perform their declared allowed activities, and the anticipated production of specified subassemblies of aircraft and space boosters would be declared.

Parties to the agreement would declare all installations to be used for space-vehicle launchings and all sites to be used for allowed firings of vehicles affected by the agreement. No other operational launching sites would have to be declared.

The aforementioned disclosures would be made after any agreement had been concluded but before implementation had begun. During the course of the agreement the following addi-

tional disclosures would have to be made:

The parties would declare any facilities which were converted or constructed after the initial declarations and which could be used to produce or assemble the affected armaments and specified subassemblies. The declarations would be made at the time conversion or construction was begun.

The parties would, in addition, give notice of any armaments and specified subassemblies to be destroyed because of natural attrition. They would supply the date and location of the destruction, with sufficient advance notice to permit observers to be present at the destruction site. In the event of accidental destruction, appropriate evidence would have to be supplied as a basis for replacement production. If no replacement production were required, no notice or evidence would be required.

To the extent that launcher replacement is permitted, appropriate declarations relating to such replacement would be required.

Parties would also have to give appropriate notice of the planned production of space boosters, including the anticipated utilization of each booster in their space programs, to provide reasonable assurance against stockpiling. That would not mean, however, that the nature of the payload would have to be announced.

As regards all space launchings and allowed missile firings, the parties would have to give advance notice of the time and launching site location. Information to be provided would include identification of the booster designated for each space launching and the type of missile for each allowed firing. Notification would have to be given in sufficient time to permit on-site observation of the vehicle prior to launching. In the case of missiles launched from submarines or ships, notification would have to be sufficiently in advance to permit observation ships to be in the vicinity.

With respect to the question of scheduling, each party would be responsible for maintaining a balance between the accidental destruction or expenditure of armaments, including allowed missile firings, and the scheduled annual production. That is to say, for each year and for each type of armament, the number of arma-

ments produced would not be permitted to exceed the number destroyed or lost through firings or accidents; a similar balance would be required for each specified major subassembly and for space boosters.

Verification and Inspection Procedures

Turning now to the verification procedures, we believe that inspectors should conduct an initial check of declared facilities no longer producing the affected armaments and specified subassemblies to insure that they had been dismantled, closed, or converted to other production activities. This initial inspection probably could be accomplished at each facility in several days and would include an examination of all manufacturing areas of the facility. Since many months are required to establish the production lines of relevant armaments and the specified subassemblies and to attain a reasonable production rate, occasional unannounced checks of these facilities subsequent to the initial inspection would be adequate.

As regards declared operating production facilities, inspectors would monitor the allowed production of armaments and specified major subassemblies at the declared facilities. They would verify that only agreed numbers and configurations of affected items were being produced for purposes of replacement or allowed missile firings. The allowed production of aircraft and space boosters falling within the affected categories would also be monitored to insure that only declared, permitted activities were taking place.

The inspectors would conduct an initial check of declared operating production facilities. With the assistance of liaison personnel from the inspected country, they would determine the layout and organization of the facilities to be inspected. The inspectors would develop inspection procedures most suited to each facility. Suitable production schedules would be provided by the inspected party.

After this initial check, the inspectors would have access to manufacturing, testing, and assembly areas involved in the production cycle of the declared facilities. Within these areas the inspected country would be required to ex-

pose equipment and processes only insofar as this was necessary to permit the inspectors to confirm the number and configuration of affected items produced. I should point out that in monitoring the production of these items the inspectors would check their external characteristics by visual observation and would not require detailed information such as engineering drawings.

The destruction of armaments to be replaced would be performed by the party owning the armaments. Inspectors at the designated depots would verify by visual observation that the armaments and specified major subassemblies submitted for destruction were of the declared types and would record the numbers and types destroyed.

Observers would witness announced missile and space firings to insure that the proper types and numbers of vehicles were being launched. It is our view that prelaunch inspection should consist of visual observation of the gross characteristics of the vehicles being launched.

Accidental losses or destruction of vehicles and launchers would normally be verified by on-site inspection. If physical difficulties prevented such inspection, provision would have to be made for confirmation of such losses in a manner satisfactory to all parties. In the event that one of the parties could demonstrate to the satisfaction of the other parties that its accident rate had exceeded that allowed in any annual period, it could produce agreed replacement items during the succeeding year to replace those accidentally expended. Should no replacement allowance be required, no inspection to confirm accidental loss or destruction would be required.

Inspection of Launchers and Launching Sites

There would be appropriate inspection procedures relating to limitations on launchers for the purpose of insuring that violations of any agreed limitations on launcher replacement, construction, and improvement were not taking place. The United States, however, does not feel that either declarations or inspection of existing inventories of armaments or of the number and deployment of existing launchers

would be required as part of a strategic nuclear vehicle freeze agreement. This would not preclude the inspection of existing launchers or launching sites for possible unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities as provided for in the following discussion.

With regard to any undeclared production facilities or unauthorized launcher construction and improvement activities, an inspection system that would include a specified number of inspections per year at times and places selected by the inspecting power would be required to provide reasonable assurance against possible prohibited activities and to deter possible violations. The inspectors should, of course, have at their disposal appropriate transportation to insure that inspections could be conducted without delay.

Within the agreed quotas, inspections would have to be initiated and carried out by parties other than the party whose territory was to be inspected. This is sometimes referred to as "adversary inspection." For example, the United States would be allowed to initiate and carry out inspections in the territory of the Soviet Union, and the Soviet Union, on the other hand, would be allowed to initiate and carry out inspections in the United States; suitable arrangements would be made for inspection in the territories of other parties which might participate. It would not be necessary to disclose any evidence to justify the selection of the site to be inspected. However, mutually acceptable arrangements should and, we believe, could be developed to protect the host country against abuse of inspection privileges for the purpose of observing sensitive activities or facilities which did not legitimately fall within the scope of objects subject to inspection. In particular, while the inspected country would endeavor to provide the other parties with assurance that undeclared production and unauthorized launcher construction and improvement were not taking place, it would be permitted to institute appropriate safeguards to insure the security of sensitive installations.

The United States has already indicated that a treaty embodying the provisions of a freeze should contain a withdrawal clause similar to

that contained in the partial test ban treaty.³ I know the Committee is familiar with the text of that treaty, and I know the Soviet representative is familiar with its history and development. The freeze agreement should also contain a provision that a conference would be held, periodically or at the call of any party, to consider whether the treaty should be continued or modified. It should be further provided that after such a conference any party could consider whether to exercise its right under the withdrawal clause on the basis of the results of the conference. That withdrawal clause could be used to prevent the safeguards designed to insure the security of sensitive installations from being used to evade the provisions of the agreement. If, in its judgment, a party felt that a safeguard was being used to evade the provisions of the agreement, this could be a reason for that party to invoke the withdrawal procedures of the agreement.

The United States believes that an inspection arrangement of the type I have just described, together with such additional procedures as might be required, would be much less intrusive than that required for general and complete disarmament and yet sufficient to afford the necessary level of assurance of compliance with the proposed freeze of strategic nuclear vehicles.

I have noted both the extent and the limits of the verification requirements. Some degree of technical complexity cannot be avoided; but it is necessary not only to insure that a freeze can be achieved with security and confidence of compliance but also to insure that verification requirements are not excessive. The procedures I have sketched would, as I have said, require further detailed discussion and negotiation. They have been put forth as a basis for exploration in the same spirit as that in which my Government has already proposed the basic principles of the freeze. It is my sincere hope that other delegations will examine this proposal further. That hope is particularly directed at those delegations whose countries also possess such vehicles and therefore also bear particularly heavy responsibility for the continued security of the human race.

³ For text, see *ibid.*, Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239:

International Symposium on Water Desalination To Be Held in 1965

Press release 380 dated August 24

Invitations have been extended to 114 governments to participate in the First International Symposium on Water Desalination, to be held October 3-9, 1965, at Washington, D.C.

The invitations were forwarded by the U.S. Government through its embassies and legations as a followup to the recent announcement by President Johnson that the United States will be host to such a meeting.¹ The symposium is being organized by the Department of the Interior and the Department of State with the cooperation of the Agency for International Development and the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization. Arrangements for the Department of the Interior are being coordinated by its Office of Saline Water.

Each government has been invited to accredit not more than five representatives and has been asked to signify not later than October 1, 1964, whether it intends to participate and the number of persons it plans to accredit.

President Johnson has laid great stress on desalination research and development and has taken a personal interest in progress made toward economical desalting of water to provide fresh water. The invitations note that the U.S. Government believes that since so many of the economic and social problems in the world relate directly to the absence or dearth of fresh water, the symposium will attract wide interest.

The symposium will provide for the first time an international forum for the exchange of technical information on the economical conversion of sea and brackish waters to fresh. It will be attended by the highest officials of the U.S. Government, as well as by outstanding members of the scientific, academic, and industrial communities.

The 7-day meeting at Washington will be followed by a visit to the Department of the Interior's Office of Saline Water Research and Development Test Station at Wrightsville Beach, N.C. This unique installation is the

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 17, 1964, p. 230.

principal facility in the world dealing with saline water conversion engineering development work. The Office of Saline Water also will cooperate in arranging visits, at the expense of the individuals, to other research installations it operates.

The symposium will provide an opportunity for the presentation of technical papers and the exchange of information. It will be divided into three sections: basic research, engineering development and conversion plant operation.

Further information on the symposium, the program, and rules of procedure will be announced later.

Merrill M. Blevins, a career Foreign Service officer, has been appointed Secretary General of the symposium, and his office will be in Room 1417, Department of State, Washington, D.C. However, mail concerning the symposium should be addressed to the Office of Saline Water, Department of the Interior, Washington, D.C., 20240.

Expanding and Protecting Human Rights Throughout the World

Statement by Franklin H. Williams¹

My delegation wishes to make a few observations on the work of the Social Committee—contained in document E/3952, the Report of the Commission on Human Rights. We feel that, in this Council especially, it is incumbent upon us to voice our own deeply held convictions on the subject of human freedom, and we also desire to communicate the determination of our Government to insure the constant expansion and protection of human rights throughout the world as well as within our borders. Mr. President, we hope that all other member states will evince a similar concern with fundamental individual rights.

Nineteen years ago, when the founding nations of the United Nations met in my home city of San Francisco, fresh in the world's consciousness was the horrible slaughter and worldwide conflict triggered by some madmen's racist conviction that their natural lot was to rule while

the lot of men of other races and religions was to live or die devoid of rights or dignity. In considering how best to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war" and to promote "better standards of life in larger freedom," the men who drafted the U.N. Charter did not use words and create structures simply to insure the economic development and political security of nations. If one examines the charter closely, he will find that references to "fundamental human rights," the "dignity and worth of the human person," "equal rights," "justice," "social progress," and "fundamental freedoms" run throughout its provisions. This is a reflection of the hard-learned lesson that respect for the dignity of man is a necessary prerequisite to lasting world peace and to members of the United Nations should be of equal concern as economic development or political security.

The Commission on Human Rights, whose report we are here considering, is the one United Nations body created to concern itself exclusively with the entire range of man's rights, his freedom and his dignity. To my delega-

¹ Made before the 37th session of the U.N. Economic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on July 30. Mr. Williams is the U.S. representative on the Council.

tion, therefore, no subject is more appropriate for full and frank discussion here than the reports of this Commission.

As I have sat and participated in the business of this Council, I have been deeply impressed by the attention and care given to the economic ills which affect the world. In fact, the work of this session of the Economic and Social Council to date has been dominated by pressing problems of trade and economic development. This is appropriate, I believe, for the correction of the international imbalance which exists in these areas is one of the great challenges of our time. The economic problems of all our countries are tremendous, but the problems facing the lesser developed nations are so vast as to stagger one's imagination and we properly are impatient in the search for solutions to them. However, Mr. President, our responsibility under the charter is far greater than this. We also possess the heavy charge to develop plans, programs, and institutions to achieve better standards of life in larger freedom—with insuring man's inalienable right to live in human dignity and individual security.

We cannot, we must not, lose sight of or neglect this charge. This Council would fail in its duty if we became so preoccupied with economic concerns that we neglected to promote universal respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.

Urgency of Need

With this in mind my delegation experienced a certain degree of dismay at the meager accomplishments reflected in the present report of the Social Committee. We do not suggest that nothing was done, for the Committee has worked long and hard, but, in comparison with how much needs to be done, very little was accomplished. We believe it appropriate to state this opinion openly and honestly. Unfortunately, the report before us does not reflect the urgency with which we feel this important subject should be viewed. Daily we see a great forward surge for the full recognition of human rights throughout the world, but we see also on this great panoramic scene far too many in-

stances of governments deliberately denying human rights and individual freedoms—too many examples of “man's inhumanity to man.”

The Committee has recommended that the Council forward to the General Assembly the draft convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination. We applaud this, for we recognize that racial discrimination is a pernicious disease which must be eradicated as quickly as possible from all societies, everywhere. There is scarcely any quarter of the globe free from this ill; and to deny this is, in my view, to lack candor or to be blind to the facts. Discrimination exists in practically every area of the world, either on the basis of color, race, ethnic origin, or religion. Mr. President, in my country we have struggled for more than a hundred years to root out this ill—this cancer—of racial and religious prejudice—these contradictions of our American creed.

In any society which, as ours, permits freedom of speech, freedom of thought and of association, there are men who do not subscribe to justice and equality, who do not accept these values basic to our way of life. Freedom of speech and freedom of thought connote the right to disagree and dissent—yes, even the right to like or dislike one's fellow man. Such attitudes frequently can cause pain, but such pain is one of the prices of freedom and we believe it is one worth paying. When we defend the right of others to disagree and to express that disagreement, regardless of how distasteful it may be, we insure those rights for ourselves.

Some people in our country and elsewhere protest that legislation cannot end discrimination, for they contend prejudice is in the hearts of men. This may be true, but we believe that national legislation sets a standard for acceptable social conduct and can penalize the abuses and excesses which lead men to violence against their fellow men. We also believe it appropriate and effective for the international community of nations to declare standards against which national respect for the dignity and worth of the human person can be measured. This is why we regret the paucity of the Social Committee's achievements in this area.

U.S. Steps To Insure Civil Rights

Mr. President, upon the signing of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, President Lyndon Johnson reminded the world that our country, like many of those newly independent nations represented here, had to fight for its freedom.² He told how 188 years ago America began a long struggle for freedom, a struggle not just to found a nation but "to forge an ideal of freedom, not only for political independence but for personal liberty, not only to eliminate foreign rule but to establish the rule of justice in the affairs of men."

More than 100 years ago our nation was again convulsed in a war to insure for all its people the right to personal liberty and human dignity. Since that time Americans, black and white alike, have struggled to make these rights a reality. The road from slavery to full and unfettered citizenship has been long, tortuous, and slow. As we have traversed this road, there has been much national pain and widespread individual suffering and sacrifice. But, sir, the concepts of freedom so basic to our society and our system are being realized and will be secured for this and succeeding generations of Americans.

It should be noted that my Government has made no effort to hide or to cover up our internal social contradictions. To the contrary, official Government agencies—one, the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights—in report after report have documented the barriers and pitfalls which faced the Negro on his road to equality and freedom and have detailed the challenges to our democracy which these conditions represent. Such public self-criticism by government, we believe, is a healthy thing for free societies to practice. I say free societies, Mr. President, for only a free people would dare to expose its problems for world view and comment from friend and foe alike.

Mr. President, my country is meeting the challenge that faces us. In recent years we have seen our judiciary apply, without compromise, to wide areas of social contact the consti-

tutional requirement for equal protection of the law. Our executives have used the full power and influence of their office to assure greater respect for the equal rights of individual citizens. And recently we have seen a determined National Legislature enact one of the greatest documents in our history, the Civil Rights Act of 1964, signed by our President this month, on July 2d. In my country a process has been set in motion that will see a sure, steady, and constant improvement in the recognition and respect for human rights. We may assure you that this process will not cease until we are truly a land of the free, in fact as well as in law.

Mr. President, the clashes, the protests, the expressions of anger and discontent of which you read are not directed against my country, its leaders, or its concepts. Rather they are directed against the imperfections of human beings, the contradictions of our national creed which mark the conduct of some of our people. I wish to say without hesitation, sir, that these manifestations of discontent are not merely sound and fury demanding freedom. They are, in a real sense, the very evidences of freedom. When almost a quarter of a million citizens can march in their nation's capital—there to be greeted by the President and welcomed by leaders of the National Legislature—when so many thousands are free to present their petition for redress of just grievances without interference or intimidation, then, sir, this truly is the evidence of freedom itself. It will be a glorious and refreshing day indeed when all nations of the world, without exception, north and south, east and west, provide the means and respect the use of techniques by their discontented citizens to so dramatically and effectively express their discontent.

Mr. President, as we read the news stories of conflict and turmoil in some areas of my country, weep not for my people. I assure you, sir, that these conditions mark the closing days of a century of struggle with the cancer of racism which settled in our nation's breast following the proclamation of emancipation. Unfortunately, this cancer still eats and gnaws at the vitals of far too many nations on the face of this earth, who deny its existence the while it rots their very national intestines.

² For President Johnson's remarks upon signing the act into law, see White House press release dated July 2.

The Social Sore of Anti-Semitism

We do not know what the final outcome of the convention on the elimination of all forms of racial discrimination will be, since it has not been considered yet by the General Assembly. We will, therefore, wait and express ourselves on its substance during deliberations next fall.

However, we had hoped that the Social Committee would complete the draft convention and approve the draft article submitted by the United States on the question of anti-Semitism. Unfortunately, anti-Semitism still flourishes in many areas of the world. In the last few years we have seen this social sore erupt in several countries, and, indeed, the Secretary-General has issued a report on this situation.

Mr. President, anti-Semitism has also not been unknown in our country, but, as with racial discrimination, our national policy condemns and is designed to eliminate the remaining vestiges of this evil. We are determined that our minority races and religions shall enjoy the full benefits of American citizenship, and our basic laws, Executive decrees, legislative enactments, and national policy generally are directed toward achieving this goal. We had hoped that every nation would examine its laws and policies relative to the rights of various racial and religious groups and bring them into line with the concepts of decency, humanity, and freedom which stand out so clearly in the Charter of the United Nations.

The article on anti-Semitism which my Government proposed for adoption would not eradicate this evil, but at least, we believe, it would go a long way to assist countries in discouraging its practice. Though anti-Semitism is as old as history itself, the terrible specter of Nazi Germany with its racial and religious excesses is still fresh in our minds.

Mr. President, as responsible members of this Council and of the United Nations, we must condemn discrimination in all its manifestations. We believe it is incumbent upon all members of the civilized world to take positive action to insure that such condemnation is effective.

My delegation deeply regrets that our views on these matters were not shared by enough of the members on the Committee to have pre-

vailed. It does seem strange that the declaration against religious intolerance should have received such unsympathetic treatment in the Committee, for a reading of article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights indicates that the proposed draft declaration is a natural extension of the principle of freedom of religion. We feel strongly, Mr. President, that at least we should have made a start. The completion of the draft declaration is a different matter, but I am reminded of the statement of Thomas Masaryk that "each step must be down to earth, practical, realistic, but the whole journey must be an eternal poem." According to the report before us, the Committee failed even to take that first step.

Members of the Council will recall that my delegation put forward an amendment to this resolution in the report before us to enable us to take that first step, but the amendment failed by a 13-13 vote. My delegation was prepared to resubmit our amendment in this plenary. However, Mr. President, we respect the views of others and desire only a harmonious and fruitful session of the Council. It is not our desire in any matter which comes before this Council to use techniques, although perfectly justified under the rules of procedure, which would be misconstrued as arbitrary or intransigent.

Fulfilling Man's Destiny

Mr. President, my delegation is concerned that so many who espouse the just cause of national independence, self-determination, and international equality should be so little concerned with the basic rights of the individual. The love of liberty and the will to be free are not enough in themselves to advance fundamental human rights. We must have a thorough knowledge of the rights of man, and we must be prepared to assert ourselves in behalf of these rights no matter what the occasion might be. Therefore, we hope that the General Assembly in its collective wisdom will undertake the drafting of this declaration with the view to its completion next fall.

Mr. President, as a newcomer to this Council and one not too familiar with the niceties of diplomatic debate, perhaps you will pardon me

if I have spoken too bluntly about these issues of human rights. I have not meant to affront or to offend.

It is easy to proclaim principles, to mouth phrases and high-sounding statements. But it takes sincerity and determination to carry out commitments. It is incumbent upon all who love liberty and freedom to work for the fulfillment of man's destiny, free of fear, free of want. It is equally our task to toil endlessly and tirelessly for those rights which man must have if he is to be truly free.

My Government is determined that the goals we seek for our own society are those which we will fight for and die for, if need be, throughout the world. We believe that justice, equality, freedom, and dignity for all men are the glue which will make the United Nations strong and bind the community of man together. Until we vigorously assume and achieve our charter obligation to respect, expand, and protect the rights of man, we cannot envisage a world at peace. This, perhaps, was what our late President Kennedy had in mind when he said just over a year ago, ". . . is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"³

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention for unification of certain rules relating to international transportation by air, and additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat. 3000. *Notification received that it considers itself bound:* Western Samoa, October 16, 1963.

³ BULLETIN of July 1, 1963, p. 3.

Protocol to amend convention for unification of certain rules relating to international carriage by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929, *supra*. Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered into force August 1, 1963.¹

Ratification deposited: Mali, December 30, 1963.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Western Samoa, October 16, 1963.

Marriage

Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age for marriage, and registration of marriages. Opened for signature at the United Nations December 10, 1962.²

Accession deposited: Mali, August 19, 1964.

Weights and Measures

Convention for the creation of an International office of weights and measures. Signed at Paris May 20, 1875. Entered into force January 1, 1876. 20 Stat. 709.

Adherence effective: South Africa, July 31, 1964.

Convention amending the convention relating to weights and measures of May 20, 1875, *supra*. Done at Sèvres October 6, 1921. Entered into force February 10, 1923. 43 Stat. 1686.

Adherence effective: South Africa, July 31, 1964.

BILATERAL

Brazil

Amendment to the agreement of August 5, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3303, 4255, 4539, 5110), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington September 1, 1964. Enters into force on the date on which each Government shall have received from the other written notification that it has complied with all statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force.

Costa Rica

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio operators of either country to operate their stations in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes at San José August 17 and 24, 1964. Entered into force August 24, 1964.

Japan

Protocol supplementing convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income of April 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901). Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1960.

Ratifications exchanged: September 2, 1964.

Entered into force: September 2, 1964.

Protocol supplementing the convention for avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo March 23, 1957. Entered into force September 9, 1957. TIAS 3901.

Terminated: September 2, 1964 (superseded by supplementary protocol of May 7, 1960, *supra*).

¹ Not in force for the United States.

² Not in force.

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Check List of Department of State Press Releases: August 31-September 6

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to August 31 which appear in this issue of the BULLETIN are Nos. 380 of August 24 and 383 of August 28.

No.	Date	Subject
*385	8/31	U.S. participation in international conferences.
*386	8/31	"Hard language" courses begin at Foreign Service Institute.
†387	8/31	Educational exchange agreement with Ceylon.
†388	8/31	Australian-American Educational Foundation.
389	9/2	Income tax protocol with Japan enters into force.
390	9/5	Rusk: 10th anniversary of SEATO.

*Not printed.

†Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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U.S. Participation in the UN Report by the President to the Congress for the Year 1963

This is the 18th annual report, covering U.S. participation in the work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies for the year 1963.

In his letter of transmittal, President Johnson reaffirms U.S. support of the United Nations as "the best instrument yet devised to promote the peace of the world and to promote the well-being of mankind." Further, he calls the 18th General Assembly "a faithful mirror of political reality" as "it dealt in an intensely practical way with current human events."

The activities of the United Nations for that calendar year and this Government's participation therein are fully described in this 433-page volume. The appendixes contain U.N. charts and other organizational information, as well as information on U.N. publications and documentation.

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THE
DEPARTMENT
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BULLETIN

Vol. LI, No. 1318



September 28, 1964

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Press release 393 dated September 10

Secretary Rusk: I apologize to my colleagues. We have been temporarily displaced from our regular room, so I might use a word that has become controversial; I hope you will not be bothered by the "echoes" in this room today.

I would like to make a brief statement on the bill to extend Public Law 480 which will be subject to conference between the Senate and the House.

It is very significant that both the House and the Senate versions point to the success of this unique instrument of assistance. The Senate bill, for instance, calls the Food for Peace program "of incalculable benefit to the many recipient countries of the free world as well as to the United States. . . ." ¹ The House bill describes it as "the most effective instrument ever devised by any government to share its food abundance with free and hungry people the world over." ² It is important, therefore, that

¹ S. Rept. 1467 to accompany S. 2687.

² H. Rept. 1767 to accompany H.R. 12298.

we do not cripple this program with amendments which would lessen its effectiveness.

As both House and Senate bills state, the desire to share our surplus agricultural commodities not only represents the compassionate spirit of the American people but has been invaluable in implementing our policies throughout the world. Public Law 480 has been successful because the President has been able to use this authority with flexibility. Rigid restrictions such as would be placed on this program by several amendments to the bills now in conference can only weaken our pursuit of peace.

With particular reference, for example, to the restrictions in the House bill with respect to Public Law 480 assistance to Poland and Yugoslavia, it is not only that there are important political considerations which militate in favor of maximum flexibility in the hands of the President, but this bill makes it possible for us to develop substantial commercial markets for our agricultural surpluses because in many of these situations Public Law 480 assistance is combined with commercial transactions that are

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The Department of State Bulletin, a weekly publication issued by the Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, provides the public and interested agencies of the Government with information on developments in the field of foreign relations and on the work of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. The Bulletin includes selected press releases on foreign policy, issued by the White House and the Department, and statements and addresses made by the President and by the Secretary of State and other officers of the Department,

as well as special articles on various phases of international affairs and the functions of the Department. Information is included concerning treaties and international agreements to which the United States is or may become a party and treaties of general international interest.

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an important part of our effort to sell our agricultural commodities abroad.

So we would hope that Public Law 480 would not become the instrument for devising specific and rigid legislative policies that would impair the flexibility which the President might have in the conduct of our foreign relations.

I am now available for your questions.

The Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have now had 3 days of conferences with Ambassador [Maxwell D.] Taylor.³ How do you assess the war in Viet-Nam and its prospects for the future?

A. Well, let me comment on the events, say, of the last 2 weeks in South Viet-Nam—the last 2 or 3 weeks.

In the first place, this is not a coup situation. This has not been a sweeping change in the administration of the leadership of the Government. This is especially important in the provinces, where the main weight of the effort against the Viet Cong has been conducted.

Secondly, these events have not interfered with the prosecution of the effort against the Viet Cong in the countryside. The armed forces continue their daily operations on a large scale, to seek out, locate, and overcome Viet Cong efforts to attack the civil administration of the countryside and the civilian population.

Third, I think it is clear that in these events of the last 2 or 3 weeks there has appeared no significant element of South Viet-Nam leadership, no significant group in South Viet-Nam, that looks to Hanoi for any answers. They are all convinced that Hanoi cannot provide the answer, that South Viet-Nam must be secure and in position to find its own way.

I would also add that we have not seen any significant element of anti-American feeling in these events. There have been a few placards here and there, but we have a very considerable number of American personnel intimately involved with South Vietnamese all over the country and we would know very quickly if there were any anti-American feeling developing because our people are working in the most inti-

mate partnership with South Vietnamese throughout the Government and in the countryside, and we would know that very well.

What these recent events have involved has been an attempt to organize a government on a broader base and on a more unified base. And we have been encouraged to see the important elements of the leadership commit themselves to the program which has been outlined and to commit themselves to the necessity for the continued effort against the Viet Cong.

What is in prospect is that a national commission will be formed under the direction of the triumvirate, whose task—a national commission which will represent the important groups and elements in the population—whose task will be to devise a constitution and pull together the major elements in the country for the common tasks which face the country.

Now, obviously these events have caused some dislocation particularly in the upper echelons of the South Vietnamese Government. We are hopeful that what has been laid down as the program ahead will lead to the constitution—a more permanent type of constitutional system so that all Vietnamese will know what the arrangements are and that the major elements of the population will feel that they are adequately represented in the Vietnamese Government.

Ambassador Taylor has given us his appreciation of the situation. Obviously there are some problems in organizing the kind of government which I have described. But the main effort continues, and the problem continues to be—the central problem continues to be—the attempt on the part of the Viet Cong guerrillas to try to undermine and attack the civilian structure of the country, and this attempt—supported and directed, in part supplied, from the outside—is the main issue and continues to be the main issue in South Viet-Nam.

Q. Will you tell us about the military situation and particularly with regard to any consideration of going into the North and into the bombing of the supply lines in the North?

A. I don't want to get into the role of a prophet here. What happens will depend very much on the attitude of the North—Hanoi, Peiping—because they themselves may take

³ See p. 432.

steps which would involve a new situation. But I have followed the daily operational reports with great care. The operations in the field continue to go on. The problem continues to be that of finding and fixing these Viet Cong elements in order to deal with them, because the Viet Cong habitually does not attack the armed forces of South Viet-Nam. They attack civilians, the civilian structure of government, the district leaders, the educational leaders, the health authorities, and civilian families. The hit-and-run technique, the traditional guerrilla technique, is a most difficult one to deal with by organized armed forces, and this effort continues with a combination of armed forces, police effort, civilian, political, economic effort in the countryside. But I don't want to speculate about the future.

Obviously the problem is a serious one, continues to be. Our commitments are flat and very firm, and we believe the commitments of the South Vietnamese people are equally firm on this particular point.

Cyprus and the Congo

Q. Mr. Secretary, you have recalled the ambassadors to Athens and Ankara. Does this represent a new element in the old crisis?

A. We have felt that, after Dean Acheson returned from Geneva, it would be worth while for us to bring our ambassadors in Athens and Ankara, and indeed in Nicosia, back for a few days of consultation, so that we can get a first-hand and complete appreciation of the situation in those countries that are most intimately involved in the Cyprus situation.

We will continue to be available to those parties most directly concerned if there are ways in which we can be of some help in finding a solution to that problem. It is a distressing problem and has in it great elements of danger to the parties and members of NATO, three of them—in fact the three guarantor powers are all members of NATO. This is not primarily our problem. The United Nations is there trying to find a solution, but nevertheless we have a deep interest in a satisfactory result and, if there are ways in which we can be of further help, we are at their disposal. We will be re-

viewing these matters with our ambassadors while they are back on consultation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what reports Assistant Secretary Mennen Williams has brought to you about the condition and prospects of the Congo? And also could you give us your views as to what significance the mercenaries might have on the situation in the Congo and its relations with other African states?

A. Well, you will have seen or will be getting, I think, full press reports on the meeting of the Organization of African Unity, which has just completed its sessions in Addis Ababa. We feel that this meeting has been very constructive. There was a recognition among almost all of them present that the Congo is basically an African problem. We ourselves would like to see a solution which is dealt with as an African matter without the intervention of great powers from the outside to make the Congo a cockpit of great-power rivalries. We understand that the general feeling there has been that these discussions have been very constructive and that the prospect is that the African states now will take more responsibility and more of an interest in a solution to the Congo problem. I gather that at that meeting the question of the mercenaries was discussed, and other related topics. I think it would be improper for me, since the African states themselves have just completed their discussions, to get specifically now into a point of that sort.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the new agreement between the United States and NATO on the exchange of atomic information⁴ has caused some concern in congressional quarters. For instance, Congressman [Benjamin S.] Rosenthal of New York has just asked why a new agreement when the Americans already have nine bilateral agreements with the NATO countries which enable the United States to give any information they want. Would you address yourself to this question?

A. Oh, yes. We have increased over the last 2 or 3 years our consultation with NATO allies

⁴ For background and text of agreement, see BULLETIN of July 20, 1964, p. 93.

on nuclear matters very substantially. We have provided them with a great deal more information about our own nuclear situation, our estimates of the nuclear situation in Eastern Europe. We have drawn our NATO allies into the discussion of nuclear strategy on such questions as nuclear targeting. We have NATO staff officers in some of the key headquarters dealing with nuclear affairs. This agreement that is now before the Congress permits us to continue that kind of consultation on the basis of close cooperation, on the basis of the same understanding of the underlying facts. This has nothing whatever to do with the issue of nonproliferation. Our view continues to be that we should not ourselves take any steps looking in that direction.

Q. Sir.

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What is the United States position on Malaysia's charges against Indonesia following the parachutists?

A. We will be speaking, I believe, in the Security Council in the United Nations this afternoon.⁵ We feel that these recent actions, in dropping parachutists into Malaysia, are very serious indeed, that they cannot be accepted at the United Nations, and that if such actions continue there will develop a very serious situation, the end of which no one can predict. We feel that it is very important that, if there are issues between Indonesia and Malaysia, they should be pursued by peaceful means and only by peaceful means, and that the problem of military confrontation should be brought to an end as quickly as possible.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the U.K., Italy, and Japan have rejected U.S. requests for an international wool textiles agreement. Does the United States intend to make any further efforts in the wool textiles field?

A. Well, we have been discussing woolen textiles with the principal woolen suppliers, that is, exporters to the American market, during the summer, and I must say that no particular re-

sult has yet been achieved in those discussions. We will continue those discussions in the weeks and months ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, back on the subject of Viet-Nam, can you tell us, sir, what variations in the pursuit of the military and the political program General Taylor will be taking back with him in terms of U.S. decisions?

A. I think not in detail. He will be coming back periodically to review the program out there. We continue to look for ways and means for improving our own assistance to South Viet-Nam and look for suggestions which the South Vietnamese might wish to adopt themselves about how the action against the Viet Cong can be pressed more effectively. But I think that it would not be for me today to go into details.

Question of "Negotiated Settlement"

Q. Mr. Secretary, the question of whether it is possible, or under some circumstances desirable, to have a negotiated settlement of the conflict in South Viet-Nam continues to crop up. What is your view of that problem at this stage?

A. Well, first let me say that I don't know of any negotiations now going on anywhere, overt or covert, about a settlement in South Viet-Nam. The principal negotiation that is before us is the talk in Paris among at least two of the three so-called factions in Laos. The tripartite talks have not yet started in Paris. Whether they will or not depends upon an exchange now going on between Prince Souvanna Phouma, the Prime Minister, and Prince Souphannouvong, the leader of the Pathet Lao. We think that these talks are of very considerable importance because they might give us some indication one way or the other as to whether the Pathet Lao, backed by Hanoi and Peiping, are now prepared to begin to work their way back to the 1962 accords on Laos, or whether Hanoi and Peiping are committed to a continuation of pressures and interventions in Southeast Asia.

Now, these talks themselves, looked at simply within themselves, may not be of overriding importance, but in terms of an ability to estimate the intentions of Hanoi and Peiping they are

⁵ See p. 448.

of very considerable importance, and so we are watching those very closely indeed. I would suppose that if there is no indication even in Laos, where there are agreements and flat commitments made as recently as 1962—if there are no indications that Hanoi and Peiping are prepared to leave their neighbors to the south alone, then we know pretty clearly that they have not yet come to that decision which they must ultimately reach to leave their neighbors alone, and we will have to go on from there. But I don't myself see any prospects for fruitful negotiations on Viet-Nam at the present time, because we have no indication that the other side is prepared to stop its illegal aggression against a neighbor.

And so we will just have to watch this situation and meet the problem of aggression from the North. If we could return to the 1962 accords on Laos, that would be an important step, but thus far we have had no clear indication that that is what is in the mind of the other side. There is no particular—there is no point, as I see it, in an alleged negotiation or an alleged conference which is doomed to failure before it meets, and something which would simply lead to the registration of violently opposed differences and adjourn leaving the situation even worse than it was before. So there needs to be some indication that a conference on Laos could be successful, and some indication that the North is prepared to leave their southern neighbors alone.

Q. What would you regard as such an indication?

A. Well, Prince Souvanna Phouma has indicated some conditions which seem to him to be necessary for a successful conference on Laos: a clear and full recognition that he is the Prime Minister of Laos, all of Laos, that the International Control Commission should be permitted to carry out the duties which it was assigned under the Geneva accords, and that the Pathet Lao pull back from the territory in the Plaine des Jarres that they took away from the neutralists in offensives back in—I think it was April—some indication, such as those, that the 1962 accords do in fact mean something to the other side. Because as far as we are concerned,

we are prepared for complete and meticulous compliance with those accords, and it has been the failure of the other side to comply with those accords that has produced the problem in Laos and also flags their intention to continue pressures into the rest of Southeast Asia.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Barry Goldwater charges the administration is trying to obscure its foreign policy mistakes and predicts some sort of crisis between now and November 3d, yet he won't say where it's going to happen. What is your answer?

A. Well, I can assure you that the Democratic National Committee has not made arrangements with Indonesia to drop parachutists into Malaysia [laughter] or made arrangements with the rebels to occupy Stanleyville in the Congo.

Statements on this subject that you refer to seem to me to reflect a basic lack of understanding of the responsibilities of a President of the United States in dealing with great issues of war and peace. And I don't understand it. If I could find a way to remove all the crises around the world between now and November, I would seize the opportunity to do so. [Laughter.]

Panel of Foreign Policy Advisers

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about having 14 new foreign policy advisers,⁶ and what do you propose doing with them?

A. Oh [laughter], as a matter of fact, I welcome this announcement myself, because if you look at that list you will see that it contains the names of a number of people who have worked with us very closely on one or another aspect of our foreign policy, whether on Cyprus or in disarmament or in other problems.

I myself some years ago felt that it would be a great advantage to have a group of distinguished private citizens who would be available immediately to the President and the Secretary of State for service, not only advice, but sometimes in negotiation or discussion with other

⁶ See p. 441.

governments of various problems that we are confronted with.

We will be meeting with these, as we have been already in a number of cases—we will be meeting with them from time to time in various combinations, depending upon the subject matter and their own interest and background. But I think this will be a very important help to us in the weeks and months ahead.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is it possible for you to give any general evaluation as to what you see as the course of the political debate on foreign policy in this campaign? Has it shaped up to any clear dimension from your standpoint?

Q. Repeat the question, please.

A. Would you repeat your question more loudly? It was not heard back there.

Q. The question was whether the Secretary was in a position to give his evaluation as to how the political discussion of foreign policy appears to be shaping up in the present campaign.

A. I perhaps am not the best person to get into that subject. But to me the central question is what happens to—in the course of this debate, what happens to the great bipartisan foreign policies that have been followed by administrations of both parties since World War II.

Thus far in presidential elections the key question has been, and properly so under our constitutional system, who should be in charge of that foreign policy, who shall occupy the White House, which party shall be responsible for the executive branch of the Government, along with the legislative, of course. But the main debates have not been on the subject of the inner structure of that great bipartisan policy.

Now, the principal question now is whether that bipartisan policy is being confronted with a choice of another sort and, if so, what that choice is—what the alternative policy or policies are to be. And, on that, we need a great deal more clarification.

Just yesterday the Republican candidate referred to the foreign policy of this administra-

tion and the similar ones that preceded it. Well, I am not quite sure just what that means.

So that the big question before the American public it seems to me is: Do we continue on the great bipartisan policies of the postwar period, or do we veer off in some other direction, and, if so, what is that direction and what does it mean?

I think we don't have the answers to that yet.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have any plans right now to make speeches on your—on the administration's foreign policy concept?

A. Yes; I will be making a number of speeches in the months ahead. I will not be speaking to party and political meetings during that period but will be speaking to the normal kinds of platforms that regularly invite the Secretary of State to appear. But I will be going to Detroit, Chapel Hill, California, and other places in the next 3 or 4 months.

West Germany and the Soviet Union

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you care to comment at this time on the efforts of the West German and Soviet Governments to reopen their dialog on their mutual problems?

A. I think not. It is not for me to get into that.

We, of course, are in very close touch with the Federal Republic on major issues of policy. We are relaxed about questions as to whether or not Mr. Khrushchev and Chancellor Erhard meet to talk over some of these matters. We have a good understanding on common policies and common Western policies, and the great issues that are of concern to both our countries. But I think it would not be for me to comment on matters that are directly their responsibility.

Q. Well, may I rephrase the question? Do you welcome the reopening of these discussions?

A. Well, I think it is easier to answer that kind of a question after discussions have been held than before. I mean, if they can have a good result, fine; if they create problems, then that's another question.

But that is not something—I mean diplomacy

always tries to work on the basis of a residue of optimism. That's the function of diplomacy—to try to find answers to questions. And so, as I say, we are quite relaxed about this.

European Unity

Q. Mr. Secretary, [Foreign Minister Paul-Henri] Spaak of Belgium is reported to be more agreeable to the Fouchet plan⁷ than was heard earlier. In addition, it apparently was supported by the Foreign Ministers of Germany, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. The United States was rather cool to this idea. Is there any change now in our policy, our thinking?

A. Well, I suppose that you could take the temperature of the United States on a matter of this sort by taking the temperature of Europe.

The organization of Europe, basically, in the most fundamental sense, is a European problem. This is a matter not of the passing events from one year to another but is a matter of the historical development of a great continent.

I feel myself, for example, that our capacity now to say that, with real confidence, a world war is not going to start within Western Europe after several centuries—that this is a very important historical statement to be able to make.

Now, the organization of Europe is at that level of historical importance. And these problems involve great transformations in the life of the Continent. And, obviously, these are matters which only the Europeans themselves can basically determine in the discussions among themselves.

We wish them well in moving toward greater unity. From the point of view of the United States, the greater the unity the more we might be pleased. But this is for Europe to answer. We will be glad to adapt our policies and to work out our procedures with Europe, as Europe wishes to organize itself, in whatever way they do.

⁷ Reference is made to the negotiations among the six members of the European Economic Community (Belgium, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands) for closer political relations leading to political union.

We, obviously, have been, over the years, in favor of a European unity and a very close transatlantic partnership. But, as I say, again, we leave this basic question to Europe, because it is their lives, their nations, their involvements, that are very much at the heart of the matter.

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

President Johnson Holds High-Level Review of Viet-Nam Questions

On September 10 President Johnson, Secretary Rusk, Secretary McNamara, and other Government officials and congressional leaders concluded a 4-day series of meetings with the American Ambassador to the Republic of Viet-Nam, Maxwell D. Taylor, who had returned to Washington for consultation. Following are the text of a statement read by the President at a news conference on September 9 and the transcript of a news conference held by Ambassador Taylor at the White House earlier that day, together with a statement made to news correspondents on September 10 by former Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge as he left the White House after a meeting with the President. Mr. Lodge had reported to the President on a trip to European capitals during which he had explained and discussed U.S. policies on Viet-Nam.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

At a regular bipartisan meeting of the congressional leadership called by the President, Ambassador Taylor gave a detailed report of recent political developments in South Viet-Nam and his assessments of progress toward a more stable government there. The Ambassador was able to report continued progress in the field in the Vietnamese Army's fight against the Communist Viet Cong and to answer the leadership's questions about the general situation there. Secretaries Rusk and McNamara and General Wheeler [Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff] and Mr. McCone

[John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence] also participated in the meeting.

It was a full and frank examination of the whole situation—a discussion of the sort of which we have had at least 11 since November and we hope to be able to provide frequently for further meetings of the joint leadership in the future.

You of the press have already received from General Taylor a good account of his report to us. Other meetings were held in November, in December, in January, in February, April, May, and August.

AMBASSADOR TAYLOR'S NEWS CONFERENCE

Ambassador Taylor: Ladies and gentlemen, I can only give a very broad-brush description of what we have been discussing.

Obviously, I have made my report on the three principal areas of activity in South Viet-Nam: the military, the economic, and the political.

The military situation, in spite of the disturbances of the last 10 days in August, remained essentially normal. If General Westmoreland [William C. Westmoreland, Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam] were here, I think he would say he feels there is a general upward trend—that his armed forces are growing stronger in numbers, experience, tactics, and techniques, and also the experience of the increase in advisers is being felt as they reach down to the lower echelon of commands.

The economic situation has been relatively favorable in spite of the VC [Viet Cong] activities. If this were a normal country, it would be a rich country. I never fly over it without looking down on the lush fields and reflecting on the great pity that the Communist insurgency has prevented a promising country from growing and taking its place as a peaceful, prosperous country.

The principal discussions I have had have been in the political field, which is the area in which our present difficulties lie.

I think you know generally the course of events the last 2 weeks and where we are today.

Prime Minister [Nguyen] Khanh is very

definitely head of the interim government. He has set for himself the very hard task of producing a new provisional government within 2 months. In order to accomplish that, he and his associates on the Steering Committee—General [Duong Van] Minh and General [Tran Thien] Khiem—are selecting a Committee of National Security which in turn will develop the blueprint for the provisional government, which should be ready to go into effect around the first of November or mid-November. What form that government will take will depend upon this committee.

I think there is a general feeling it will follow the presidential pattern, with the independent legislative, executive, and judiciary, with which we are all familiar.

So, by November, we hope there will be a provisional government which will have full powers to move ahead, taking as its ultimate goal a full representative constitutional government, recognizing, however, that that will take perhaps a year.

This task is not going to be easy because there are many minority groups to reconcile within South Viet-Nam. Fortunately, as the outcome of the turbulence of the last 2 weeks, General Khanh has the backing of the principal elements of the society. He has the military, the Buddhists, the Catholics, the so-called sects, and a pretty broad indication of general support throughout the urban area.

In spite of that, he has his work cut out for him, as any leader of a government in transformation would have. Whether he can stay on the schedule he has laid out still, I am not sure, but certainly he is showing every indication of pressing forward as rapidly as he can to produce a stable government.

Meanwhile, I am happy to say, as I suggested at the outset, the activities in the provinces where the war is being conducted show no visible signs of retardation. This is a small unit war—the war of the squadron, the platoon, and the company. So, by the very nature, it does not require the centralized governmental direction which would be the case in a so-called conventional war. Therefore, I have every hope that we can get over this political crisis without accepting a setback in the goals which we have for the pacification of the Republic.

That is about all I can report for the moment on the principal subject of discussion.

Q. General Taylor, do you have any idea whether the Viet Cong laid low during this political crisis in Viet-Nam?

A. No, I can only speculate that, first, they were caught by surprise by these events. You have the feeling they are standing back watching to decide really what is taking place and how to interpret it.

I think it is not implausible that they don't want to do anything which would drive the country together, so to speak. In other words, they are afraid that any aggressive action on their part might facilitate the unifying of the various political elements, whereas they are very happy, of course, to see them separated.

Q. General, after you came to Washington, there were reports from Saigon that you were actively interested in some decision on bombing around the Tchepone area to interdict the supply flow.

A. That was speculation and has no basis.

Q. Is this a live subject?

A. Only in the sense that any subject is live that bears upon the conduct of the war against the VC. Peripheral actions are always under study. I know of no special interest in this particular one.

Q. How do you interpret the making of General Minh as the chairman of the triumvirate?

A. It was quite a natural thing to do. They tried to set back the clock prior to August 16th, which was the date of the announcement of the charter which was eventually rescinded. At that time, Khanh was Prime Minister and Minh was the Head of State. Now Khanh is back again as Prime Minister, and Minh is almost in the same position; namely, he is chairman of the Steering Committee with the attributes of Head of State. He receives the credentials of the ambassadors, he has powers of clemency, and that kind of thing.

Q. You don't see anything to worry about in the way of some rivalry?

A. No; it is quite the natural thing to do.

Q. There has been some criticism of policy out there on the grounds that we seem to be wanting to make Khanh into a potential Nasser. How do you answer that?

A. I have nothing in my directive which suggests we should make Khanh into a Nasser.

Q. Sir, what do you think is the ultimate aim—

A. Khanh is a very independent Head of State, incidentally. We are not in the business of redesigning the character of the Head of State of a friendly government.

Q. What do you see as the ultimate aim of the Buddhists? There is speculation that the Buddhists would like to see a Buddhist government.

A. It is hard not to have a Buddhist government when 80 percent of the population of the country are Buddhists. I would answer it this way: I think Buddhist leadership have had fears of certain individuals whom they would say have Diemist associations in the past. It has been, rather, fears of possible dangers from some of these individuals rather than oppression of any sort which appears to have been the driving force behind the Buddhist movement.

Q. Sir, do you think the 2-month timetable will eliminate the possibility of any kind of dictatorial government which would have to continue because of the crisis?

A. General Khanh is very sincerely committed to principles of getting the military out of the Government. We Americans certainly can't argue with that principle. He has gone to the extreme, however, of accepting the resignation of all the military ministers who are in his own government, and he has a hard task now of finding civilians who are able and willing to fill those positions. He may have some difficulties in that respect. I am not sure that was the point you raised.

Q. Sir, do you think the recent political events there will result in any kind of change in the U.S. approach to the problem—U.S. effort?

A. No, our objectives remain the same. We are supporting the Khanh government and the

South Vietnamese for the purpose of allowing them to determine their own future as a free, non-Communist state. These events have nothing to do with our basic purpose.

Q. Do you see any basic changes in the U.S. attitude or conduct of affairs out there as a result of your meeting and your talks here now?

A. No. I would say we are on a given beam and we are going to stay on that.

Q. What about changes in economic aid?

A. There will be some changes. We are studying that now. The overall effort will remain essentially the same. We are examining now to be sure whether our priorities are right.

Gentlemen, I have a note saying my time is up, and I have to go to another meeting.

The Press: Thank you, General.

STATEMENT BY MR. LODGE

Broadly speaking, the governments which I visited expressed appreciation for United States efforts in Viet-Nam, hoped for the success of these efforts, and gave assurances of help. In particular, Prime Minister [Théo] Lefèvre of Belgium publicly stated that Belgium would open an Embassy in Saigon. Prime Minister [V. G. M.] Marijnen of the Netherlands publicly stated that Dutch personnel would be sent to Viet-Nam to give technical assistance and Vietnamese students would be taken to Holland for education. The Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Mr. [Ludwig] Erhard, stated that Germany would contribute help in nonmilitary ways. The Foreign Minister of Spain, Mr. [Fernando María] Castiello [y Maiz], said Spain would furnish technical personnel, probably in the field of medicine. In the United Kingdom, Foreign Minister [R. A.] Butler said his Government intended to expand its programs in Viet-Nam.

The outlook, therefore, is for "more flags" in Viet-Nam and for more people in the field who will share some of the dangers and discomforts.

These governments showed no trace of defeatism. They also keenly realized two things:

The struggle in Viet-Nam is for the self-determination of the Vietnamese people, and it is also the direct concern of every nation in the world which values its own freedom.

U.S. and Brazil Reaffirm Commitment to Peace

White House press release dated September 5

Following are texts of an exchange of letters between President Castelo Branco of Brazil and President Johnson.

President Castelo Branco to President Johnson

AUGUST 11, 1964.

MY DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I have received from your Ambassador, Your Excellency's message on the armed attacks by North Viet-Nam against warships of the United States on the high seas.¹ Your Excellency is right in believing that I share your deep concern in view of this attack. I consider this resort to force as being contrary to the principles of the United Nations Charter and I deem it to fully justify the exercise of the right of self-defense as was done by the United States of America.

I have instructed the Brazilian representative to the Security Council to act there in accordance with the above indications and to express, furthermore our hope that the North Vietnamese authorities will modify their attitude and that all governments will endeavor to prevent the aggravation of tensions in Southeast Asia.

In expressing to Your Excellency my solidarity, I do so with the certainty that Brazil and the United States are bound together in the same desire for peace and in the same feeling of repulsion for violent solutions to international disputes.

With the assurance of my high regard and esteem,

HUMBERTO DE ALENCAR CASTELO BRANCO,
*President of the Republic of the
United States of Brazil.*

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 258.

President Johnson to President Castelo Branco

AUGUST 25, 1964.

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: I send my very warm thanks for your message of solidarity on the attacks by North Vietnam on United States naval vessels. We found in the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, and again in the Foreign Ministers meeting at Washington in July 1964,² that our adversaries take heed when the free world stands solidly together and refuses to be intimidated by wanton aggression or threats of aggression. I especially welcome the renewed strength which Brazil brings to the cause of peace and allied unity. Brazil has a proud tradition of service in two world wars and in its current contributions to the peace efforts of the United Nations in Gaza and the Congo. Your timely and friendly letter is a reaffirmation of that tradition.

I share your conviction that Brazil and the United States are bound together in a common desire for peace. We want no wider war, as I have said repeatedly. But as you suggest, there comes a point at which countries such as the United States and Brazil, firmly committed to the peaceful solution of problems, must exercise their basic right of self-defense.

The struggle for freedom in South Vietnam is closely related to the struggle for freedom everywhere. We face not only the armed struggle in the rice paddies of South Vietnam, but also—as you say in your recent telegram on the anniversary of Punta del Este—the “struggle of the Peoples” for a future that will enable man “to achieve his just aspirations in a climate of freedom.”

We are joined in that struggle in the Alliance for Progress. The Charter of Punta del Este was not only a commitment, but a challenge to achieve that historic mission.

We in the United States have been heartened—and I believe the whole Hemisphere looks to the future with more optimism—because of

the vigorous manner in which your government has accepted this challenge. We have followed with great interest the initial efforts of your government to reverse the serious economic deterioration which confronted you when you took office, and to step firmly forward on the road to economic prosperity and well-being. We know that decisive action in the economic life of Brazil can and must come only from the Brazilian government and people. But I want to assure you, as you press forward on constructive programs for the welfare of Brazil, that my country stands ready to give its sincere support through the Alliance for Progress.

The fraternal commitment which we feel toward Brazil—the sense of responsibility which flows from the policy of the good neighbor—is but a part of the larger common cause which we share with all of the American Republics and with our allies throughout the world. I know, from your speech to the graduates of the Brazilian foreign service academy, that you feel that same commitment. You spoke of Brazil’s commitment to the Western democratic system, its support of free enterprise and the orderly encouragement of private capital, its tradition of inter-American solidarity, and of your confidence that our two nations “can join their economic and commercial interests on a plane of honorable policy and friendly reciprocity.”

Brazil and the United States, I believe, have entered a new era of understanding and comprehension. The peoples of our two great countries understand that fact; history would not forgive us if we did not understand it and act upon it. In the months and years ahead, I look forward to an ever closer relationship between our countries: to cooperation for the economic and social benefit of our peoples; and to the fulfillment of our solemn commitments to freedom and peace.

Sincerely,

LYNDON B. JOHNSON

² *Ibid.*, Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

Teaching the Fundamentals of International Understanding

*Remarks by Secretary Rusk*¹

I should like to extend to you a very warm welcome to the Department of State for your meetings, and with a special word of greeting to those of you who have come from NATO countries to be with us.

Perhaps it is not irrelevant to the subject of your discussion for me to recall that when I was a student in Germany I was once asked to give a talk to my fellow German students about agricultural problems at home. I was asked to speak in German. After about 30 minutes of my talk, a young German student came forward and said, "I enjoyed your remarks, but I was not here when you were introduced. Where is your home?" I said, "My home is in Georgia." He said, "Oh, yes, I should have known. I thought you were speaking German with a Russian accent." [Laughter.] It was not until the following day that I wondered which one of us had been provincial.

My chief regret is that I will not be able to sit through your discussions with you, because I myself had been a teacher of international relations for 6 years before the war and had spent some time in a private foundation in which these matters were of great personal interest. But I shall be looking forward to getting a good report on the course of your talks.

Our friends in NATO are visiting a country which has made a basic commitment to universal education. It is a commitment that carries with it the most formidable problems, and

not all of those problems have by any means been solved. And although that commitment may be debated and discussed and questioned, I myself am convinced that it is irreversible—that the American people have made this commitment, and for a variety of reasons.

Education and Economic Development

When this continent was being settled, those who came here brought with them ideas which impelled them toward education for all. Then, in the middle of the 19th century, we developed here a vast appetite for educated and trained people in the course of our own economic development. You will recall, for example, that a hundred years ago we invented the land-grant college, typically the agricultural and mechanical college, for the purpose of assisting this nation in its economic development. Incidentally, this particular type of institution is one which is of considerable interest to many younger developing countries at the present time.

But nevertheless, in the very process of our development we found that there was an elementary need for educated and trained people. When, for example, in the southern part of our country efforts were made at the end of the 19th century to attack the then serious public-health problems, such as malaria, hookworm, or in some areas even yellow fever, it was found that attacks on these diseases could not be successful without an educated population. Effort after effort failed before such simple notions as the germ theory of disease, the operations of insect carriers, could be made a matter of common knowledge throughout the community.

¹Made at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 8 before the 5th Biennial Atlantic Study Conference on Education, sponsored by the Atlantic Council of the United States, the National Association of Secondary School Principals, and the Atlantic Information Center for Teachers.

And that affected all other elements of our development.

Most of you are now engaged in assisting the younger developing countries. And I dare say that those of you who have had personal contact with those problems see that education, or the lack of education, is indeed the overriding obstacle to rapid development.

Here of late a new dimension has been added, not only in this country but in others, and that is that we are moving into a period of high technological sophistication. It is going to be difficult for us to find a decent place in our society for the untrained and the uneducated, whether we are talking about the housewife, who has to be a modest engineer to operate iceboxes and washing machines; or whether we are talking about the men who run the machines that chew up our garbage; or whether we are talking about the infantry soldier who has to use modern weapons and communications. The great bulk of your unemployment problem in the United States today is at that level of the untrained, uneducated—one of the most serious problems we have in our nation today.

So we have that commitment, and yet you will find that the Government of the United States, although it plays a major role in support of our educational system, leaves the educational decisions, by and large, in the hands of local authorities—with a possible distortion in our educational process, or our university process, which is brought about by the tremendous appetite of government for scientific and technical research. In almost all of the educational activities in which government plays some part, the educational decisions are distributed to the lowest levels of local self-government. That creates a variety, sometimes a disarray, sometimes confusion, but, nevertheless, a strong feeling that that is basically where it belongs.

Educational Exchange

This country has been long used to educational exchange. We stoked our own educational furnaces by drawing upon our motherlands in Europe throughout most of our history, and continue to do so today. If we are to understand ourselves, we must reach back into our history, which becomes your history too at a certain

point; and because of that we have always had a strong educational exchange tradition between ourselves and our cultural cousins and ancestors in Western Europe.

Today there are about 92,000—at least in the spring when our educational system was in full bloom, there were some 92,000 people who had come to the United States on educational business. We were sending about 20,000 of our Americans abroad on similar missions. And about 10,000 of those some 112,000 are under direct government sponsorship in one way or another.

Under our AID program, we have 140 contracts with about 108 of our colleges to enable them to undertake some fraternal relationship with colleges and universities in some 42 other countries. The beginning theory of those contracts was to be of assistance to someone else. But the true worth of those contracts derives from the fact that both sides become educated, that this is a two-way process by which our own life and culture in this country are strongly enriched by this type of exchange with peoples of other continents.

In the Peace Corps we have some 2,600 young teachers, again in almost 40 countries, and about 1,800 of those are in secondary education.

Education for Citizenship

I am diffident about addressing myself to the topic of your discussion because I have some feeling for its difficulty. If we should have 30 different meetings of this sort to consider how to handle 30 different fields of human knowledge at the level of secondary education, and if we should act upon the recommendations of those 30 meetings, we should undoubtedly occupy at least the first 40 years of men's lives in secondary education!

We should like, of course, to add to what we are doing. But to add means to subtract. There is the problem of student time. How then do we develop an educational strategy to take into account the enormous field of human knowledge which alert, successful citizens need to know something about, given the limitations upon time which is available in the formal educational process?

It is true that there are those of us who think

that in our own country we could use more of our young people's time for education. Basically we still organize our school year on the theory that young people are needed for 3 months of the summer in order to gather the crops from the farms. But nevertheless, there is a problem of time. And I can only say that it seems to me that the educational process might begin with the permanent and move through the various stages of the educational process toward the more complex and perhaps the more transient, and that the lower the level of education the stronger the attention might well be placed on the more permanent elements in this process of understanding the world around us.

I am quite certain that what we call international understanding is not a matter which can be dealt with through sentiment or amiability. We are in a fast, turbulent world, and, as the storms blow, these sentiments will be caught up in swirling change and will not be very enduring.

Understanding depends upon knowledge—genuine knowledge. When a young person comes to this country and spends 1, 2, or 3 years in studies, he goes away knowing some of the things that he likes about us, but he also knows some of the things that he does not like about us. His understanding becomes more real, because it is more realistic.

Personal Involvement in International Affairs

Another element that concerns me deeply is that somehow we must alert our young people to the fact that the rest of the world will be in their own living rooms for the rest of their lives; that these great matters of foreign policy are intimate to them in the most personal sense; that there can be no such thing now as personal isolation in this world about us. Again, referring to my own country to illustrate the point, almost 30 million of us have been in uniform during and since World War II. There are almost a million Americans in uniform outside the continental United States. That means that in every part of the country there is the neighbor's boy in uniform in some distant part of the world. That means that these great issues of war and peace, involving, as

some of them do, the existence of the Northern Hemisphere—these are now matters of personal concern. And unless we somehow let our young people get some picture of their personal involvement, this will come to them as a great shock when their personal engagement with these issues as citizens or as soldiers becomes apparent to them.

I would think that these are some of the more permanent elements that could well be emphasized in any educational system at a relatively early level in the educational process. I feel, for example, that there still needs to be more done in the broad fields of human and political and economic geography, the shape of the world, what it looks like, who lives on it, what kind of people, how do they make a living. Because those are likely to be the more permanent and enduring features, when we talk about the swirling political controversies of a particular moment.

Understanding the Historical Process

I also feel that it would be a pity to sacrifice a deep understanding of the historical process, and the historical roots of one's own society, in the interest of the passing day-by-day headlines. Media of mass information—the newspapers, radio, television—are so up-to-date, indeed up-to-the-minute, and are so persuasive, they tend to leave the impression that most of our problems started with this morning's broadcast. And it is difficult for us to remind our people that these problems have deep roots, some of them for decades, some of them for centuries, and that many of these problems are part of a very long process.

I am somewhat skeptical—perhaps you find me a little old-fashioned—but I am somewhat skeptical of the capacity of an individual to understand another culture unless he has a good understanding of his own. He needs some platform from which to look out, to look at other cultures. And if we all could have a deep understanding of who we are, where we have been, what we are all about, then those sitting around this table would find in that very process the great common interests, the great common origins, the great common commitments that have done so much to tie the Western World together.

I feel that there is much always to be done in this ideological sphere to give our young people some picture, some feeling for the great commitments of freedom, the great history of the struggle for freedom. We tend to take these ideas for granted. But these are ideas which, like muscles, need exercise. And we need to be reminded that they were not gifts—they were ideas that required struggle, required time, required dedication—and that they came from a human discourse in which no nation was alone, in which all have participated for the past 2,000 years.

I am thinking, for example, of a simple notion which Thomas Jefferson articulated for us: that governments derive their just powers "from the consent of the governed." Now, the philosophers can play with that idea, chew it to pieces, find all sorts of problems with it. But this is a simple idea in which the American people really do believe. And I think in many respects you will find that it is an idea which is a close relative of similar ideas which ordinary men and women in most parts of the world themselves also believe.

But I am not sure that we have done a good job in presenting the background of these elementary commitments that are not just sentiments but are operational elements of policy. Again, take this "consent of the governed" notion. As far as the United States is concerned, it helps to explain our almost instinctive reactions on so-called colonial issues. It is basically why we have been so concerned about what has happened in Eastern Europe or within the Communist world. It is why it is simpler for us to work in close intimacy with a democracy than with a dictatorship. It is why we are so deeply concerned about the failures of our own society to live up to these elementary commitments, and why we have addressed ourselves in these last few years to the historic problem of coming right on our own racial situation here in our own country.

But there are other elements that perhaps need examination among younger people more than time has permitted. The notion of constitutional and moral limitations upon the exercise of raw power—what a thrilling and dramatic story! I tried 4 or 5 years ago to find a good exposition of the simple notion of the pre-

sumption of innocence. Here is some of the cement that holds free citizens together in a free society. It was extremely difficult to find in a book or exposition that was usable in terms of presenting the elementary idea and how it developed over a long process of struggle in the courts of law to establish this simple notion of the presumption of innocence.

Principles of the U.N. Charter

The simple principles of the U.N. Charter have come in for a good deal of cynicism. I feel that we ought to go back to remind people how those principles became established in the U.N. Charter. These were written by many governments, drafting together after the fires of a great war, at a time when they were thinking long and deeply about the structure of the world society; and this was what they said after that last holocaust.

Perhaps one could call that charter a lesson learned. But here is the important point: We shall not have a chance to learn a lesson that way again. A third world war can't complete the lesson we might not have learned fully effectively after the Second World War. Because a third world war not only changes the questions; it changes the answers. It almost eliminates the questions. We have got to learn these lessons before world war III.

And so the U.N. Charter seems to me to be a good point to take off.

Well, I am not suggesting what you should say or do. I am just commenting rather casually, not in a formal speech—I am commenting rather casually upon your being here and what the subject of your discussion stimulates in my own mind. I have no doubt that the subject is of critical importance. For as long as I can see into the future, the underlying crisis in our period of history is going to be the contest between those who would organize a world society on the basis of broad notions of freedom, along the broad lines set out in the United Nations Charter, and those who have frankly and plainly announced that they wish to reorganize that world society on the basis of what they call their "world revolution." And this contest between freedom and coercion, as old as man himself—this contest continues, but with

all of the special urgency, the pace and complexity, and the dangers of a modern world, which will survive and prosper together, or which shall fail together.

Thank you very much.

President Names Panel of Citizens as Consultants on World Problems

*Statement by President Johnson*¹

I want to announce the formation of a panel of distinguished citizens who will consult with the President during the coming months on major international problems facing the United States. I reviewed this with the [congressional] leadership earlier today and I made the statement to them, but this is the first public announcement made.

Members of the panel will be consulted in matters where the advice of highly qualified and experienced men in private life may be helpful in finding effective courses of action in the quest for peace and the advancement of the national security. They will not act as a committee, nor will they hold regular meetings. Instead, they will be asked for advice as individuals, under flexible and informal arrangements suited to the needs of the problem at hand. Their regular point of contact will be the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, and their services will be available not only to the President but to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense. I have conferred with both the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense in some detail about the membership on this panel.

All of these distinguished men have served informally in this fashion in the past, but it seems to me useful and important to reemphasize the role of leading private citizens, without regard to party, as counselors to the President.

The consultants named today have a distinction that is above partisan politics, and their services will be available not only to me this year but also to the man who is President in

¹ Read by the President at his news conference on Sept. 9.

1965. If I am President next year, I expect to use their help.

The members of the panel are: Arthur Dean, John Cowles, Morris Leibman, General Omar Bradley, James Wadsworth, Arthur Larson, James Perkins, Teodoro Moscoso, Robert Lovett, George Kistiakowsky, Roswell Gilpatric, Dean Acheson, Paul Hoffman, Eugene Black, John McCloy, and Allen W. Dulles.

U.S., Canada, and Japan Resume Fisheries Talks at Ottawa

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated September 4

The third round of negotiations with Canada and Japan on North Pacific fisheries problems is scheduled to begin in Ottawa on September 9. I have just received a report on the issues involved from Ambassador Benjamin A. Smith II, who will head the United States delegation in these negotiations. The major problem with which the negotiations will deal is the revision of the existing international arrangements for the conservation and rational utilization of the fishery resources in the North Pacific Ocean.

Two earlier rounds of negotiations were held in Washington and Tokyo last year.¹ They made substantial progress toward full agreement. I hope the negotiations can be completed during the new round of discussions.

The primary objective of the United States in these negotiations is to protect the interests of Alaska and the Pacific Northwest in the North Pacific fisheries, which consist principally of salmon and halibut. The economy of these regions is heavily dependent upon the U.S. fisheries supported by these resources. The interests of the United States in these fishery stocks have been advanced by the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean.² Basic to that convention is the concept that in special situa-

¹ For background, see BULLETIN of Nov. 4, 1963, p. 709.

² Treaties and Other International Acts Series 2786 and 5385.

tions, such as those exemplified by the North American salmon and halibut fisheries, where the countries participating in the fisheries have built up and maintained the resources through major research and regulatory programs, other countries should exercise restraints on their fishing of the type provided for in that convention. This concept provides the incentives necessary to the establishment and continuation of the conservation measures essential to the attainment, both now and in the future, of the maximum harvest of food for mankind. This will insure the conservation of important marine resources and prevent irreparable damage to them through overexploitation. This is in the common interest of Japan, Canada, and the United States.

Over the years we have made major contributions to the restoration and maintenance of the salmon and halibut fisheries. For this reason we have a special interest in them. We are determined to protect that interest, while giving every consideration to the legitimate interests of the other parties to the convention. I am confident that Ambassador Smith, who was the United States representative during the earlier discussions, will effectively present our point of view.

I urge that the three delegations work out a solution that will permit the conservation of these resources for future generations, taking into account the unique circumstances surrounding the convention and the interests of all parties to it.

Canadian Issues To Be Exempt From Interest Equalization Tax

AN EXECUTIVE ORDER¹


EXCLUSION FOR ORIGINAL OR NEW CANADIAN ISSUES AS REQUIRED FOR INTERNATIONAL MONETARY STABILITY

By virtue of the authority vested in me by section 4917(a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, approved September 2, 1964 (Public Law 88-563), by section 301 of title 3 of the United States Code, and as President of the United States, it is hereby determined that the application of the tax imposed by section 4911

of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as added by section 2 of the Interest Equalization Tax Act, will have such consequences for Canada as to imperil or threaten to imperil the stability of the international monetary system and it is hereby ordered that the tax imposed by section 4911 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 shall not apply to the acquisition by a United States person of stock or a debt obligation of Canada or a political subdivision thereof, any agency or instrumentality of Canada, any corporation, partnership, or trust (other than a company registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (54 Stat. 847; 15 U.S.C. 80a-1 to 80a-52)) organized under the laws of Canada or a political subdivision thereof, or any individual resident in Canada, to the extent that such stock or debt obligation is acquired as all or part of an original or new issue as to which there is filed the notice of acquisition prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate. The exemption from tax provided in the preceding sentence shall apply to all acquisitions made during the period commencing on July 19, 1963, and continuing until otherwise provided in an amendment of this order.

The Secretary of the Treasury or his delegate is authorized to prescribe from time to time regulations, rulings, directions, and instructions to carry out the purposes of this order.

This order shall be effective upon its filing for publication in the Federal Register.



THE WHITE HOUSE,
September 2, 1964.

Educational Exchange Agreements Signed With Australia and Ceylon

Australia

Press release 388 dated August 31

The Governments of Australia and the United States signed at Canberra on August 28 an agreement extending educational exchanges between the two countries and establishing a joint Australian-American Educational Foundation.

Prime Minister R. G. Menzies signed for Australia, and American Ambassador William C. Battle for the United States.

Announcement was made on August 10¹ of

¹ No. 11175; 29 *Fed. Reg.* 12605.

¹ BULLETIN of Aug. 31, 1964, p. 311.

arrangements to conclude an agreement to create such a foundation and to share costs of future exchanges.

Under the agreement the two countries will, starting with the present year, contribute equally to provide an annual budget not exceeding 180,000 pounds (\$400,000) to finance a program of educational exchanges. Such an agreement was made possible, insofar as the United States is concerned, by the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), which authorizes and encourages cost-sharing arrangements for educational and cultural exchanges between the United States and other countries.

The new foundation, which will be established in Australia, will be controlled by a joint Board of Directors made up equally of Americans living there and of Australians. The Fulbright exchange program with Australia began in 1949.

Ceylon

Press release 387 dated August 31

The Governments of Ceylon and the United States announced on August 31 the signing at Colombo of a revised agreement continuing the program of educational exchanges between the two countries begun in 1952.

The current agreement is the latest in a series renewed in various participating countries under the authority of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961. It was signed on August 29 by the Minister of Finance of Ceylon, Dr. N. M. Perera, and by the American Ambassador, Frances E. Willis. Under the new agreement, the U.S. Educational Foundation in Ceylon will be enabled to carry out a wide range of educational and cultural programs.

Since the initiation of the program in 1952 and through the last program year ended June 30, 1964, a total of 204 Ceylonese have come to the United States under grants in the following categories: students, 141; research scholars, 9; university professors, 4; teachers, 48; and youth leaders, 2. In the same period 36 Americans have gone to Ceylon, as follows: students, 5; research scholar, 1; and university professors, 30.

President Determines Immigration Quota for Kingdom of Tonga

A PROCLAMATION¹

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, each independent country, self-governing dominion, mandated territory, and territory under the international trusteeship system of the United Nations, other than independent countries of North, Central, and South America, is entitled to be treated as a separate quota area when approved by the Secretary of State; and

WHEREAS under the provisions of section 201(b) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General, jointly are required to determine the annual quota of any quota area established pursuant to the provisions of section 202(a) of the said Act, and to report to the President the quota of each quota area so determined; and

WHEREAS it has been determined that the Kingdom of Tonga is entitled to be treated as an independent country within the meaning of section 202(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act; and

WHEREAS the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Attorney General have jointly determined and reported to me the immigration quota hereinafter set forth:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President of the United States of America, acting under and by virtue of the authority vested in me by the aforesaid Act of Congress, do hereby proclaim and make known that the annual immigration quota of the quota area hereinafter designated has been determined in accordance with the law to be, and shall be, as follows:


Quota Area	Quota
Tonga, Kingdom of	100

The establishment of an immigration quota for any quota area is solely for the purpose of compliance with the pertinent provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act and is not to be considered as having any significance extraneous to such purpose.

Proclamation No. 3298 of June 3, 1959,² as amended, entitled "Immigration Quotas," is further amended by the addition of the quota for the Kingdom of Tonga.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the Seal of the United States of America to be affixed.

DONE at the City of Washington this fourth day of September in the year of our Lord nineteen hundred and sixty-four, and of the Independence of the United States of America the one hundred and eighty-ninth.



¹ No. 3613; 29 Fed. Reg. 12815.

² For text, see BULLETIN of July 6, 1959, p. 19.

The Developing Strength of the International Monetary System

*Statement by Douglas Dillon
Secretary of the Treasury*¹

My colleagues and I are delighted to be in this fascinating city, where tradition and courtesy combine so charmingly with modernity and progress. This meeting follows shortly after Japan's achievement of article VIII status in the Fund—another major achievement in Japan's almost incredible record of rapid economic growth over the 12 years since she joined the International Monetary Fund.

The past year has witnessed a gratifying movement by most countries toward the financial equilibrium for which we have been striving. Continued leadership by the International Monetary Fund under the skillful guidance of its Managing Director [Pierre-Paul Schweitzer] and effective cooperation in the foreign exchange markets have contained the new pressures that have occurred and reinforced the strength which has been developing.

As for my own country, during fiscal year 1964 the United States set in operation the latest elements of a new and many-sided economic program begun in 1961—a program designed to

promote internal expansion, enlarge employment opportunities, and, at the same time, facilitate orderly and steady progress toward balance in our external accounts. Our program places major emphasis upon improved productivity and greater competitiveness, upon incentives, rather than upon restrictions and controls, and, perhaps most important, upon the healthy functioning of a dynamic system of free enterprise.

Significant—and, I believe, sustained—results are now clearly apparent.

The United States economy continues to expand in what is now the longest, strongest, and best balanced advance of any peacetime period in this century. During the past fiscal year the rate of growth in industrial production, and in our economy as a whole, was better than 5 percent in real terms. Our gross national product increased by more than \$40 billion. Job opportunities began to overtake the rapid growth in our adult labor force and, in July of this year, unemployment dropped below 5 percent for the first time since 1957—despite the accelerating automation of farms and factories.

Improved productivity, in agriculture and in manufacturing alike, has made possible substantial gains in our trade position over this past fiscal year—gains that were, as we well know, in some part fortuitous, but gains, nevertheless, that we expect to sustain and eventually enlarge.

We are also persisting in our efforts to reduce

¹ Made at Tokyo, Japan, on Sept. 8 before the annual meeting of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund. Mr. Dillon was head of the U.S. delegation to the annual meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, the International Monetary Fund, the International Finance Corporation, and the International Development Association, held at Tokyo Sept. 7-11.

dollar outlays abroad for defense and development assistance, without impairing essential elements in the defense of the free world or in our vital assistance programs. The balance-of-payments costs of those programs will have shrunk by an annual rate of \$1 billion by the end of this calendar year.

When we last met, it was our capital accounts that posed the greatest threat to our balance of payments. A cascading outflow of portfolio capital had forced us to propose the interest equalization tax in the summer of 1963.² That tax is now law. It has worked out as planned and can be expected to hold portfolio capital outflows to a reasonable figure, while leaving our markets open to foreign borrowers willing to assume interest costs considered normal—and even low—in most other industrial countries.

With our trade position improving, Government expenditures overseas continuing to decline, capital outflows restrained—and with our earnings on services expanding at roughly the same rate as our rising net outpayments on tourist account—we have been moving back toward external balance.

Meanwhile, our prices have remained virtually stable. The indices of wholesale prices are still at the levels of 6 years ago. Consumer price indices have edged upward but very slowly—only a little more than 1 percent per year. At the same time, almost alone among the leading industrial countries, we are now for the third straight year experiencing a decline in unit labor costs for manufacturing industries as a whole.

Monetary policy and debt management have struck a noninflationary balance between supply and demand for liquidity instruments. Commercial bank holdings of Federal Government debt continued to decline over the past fiscal year by more than \$4 billion—even though the administrative budget deficit exceeded \$8 billion. What is more, less than a month after the end of the fiscal year, the full amount of that budget deficit was, in effect, financed out of real savings as we added nearly \$9 billion to our longer term Government securities.

Efforts To Improve U.S. Payments Position

It was within this domestic framework that the United States continued its efforts to restore balance in its international accounts. In discussing those efforts it should always be borne in mind that the United States has the ability to achieve balance in its international payments at any time through the use of drastic measures of a restrictive nature. But—as we have consistently pointed out—we have neither the desire nor the intention of utilizing such measures, since they could bring harsh repercussions throughout the world. Instead, we are working to achieve balance gradually through normal market processes, without injury to our friends in other nations.

For example, our gross deficit on regular transactions in fiscal 1964 was \$1.750 billion. This was a heartening gain over the results of the past 6 calendar years, when comparable deficits ranged from \$3.1 billion to \$4.2 billion. And it was a vast improvement over the first half of calendar year 1963, when accelerating demands from abroad for long-term funds led to a dollar outflow at an annual rate of \$5 billion—a rate we simply could not sustain and that far surpassed any legitimate worldwide requirements for dollars. But, despite this improvement, we are only half way back to external balance. We cannot relax—nor do we intend to.

In seeking to improve our payments position, we readily recognize that we must carefully weigh—and, wherever practicable and appropriate, minimize—the impact of our gross deficits upon the liquidity of the rest of the world. With the cooperation of other monetary authorities we have, therefore, in large part absorbed dollar balances wherever they have tended to outrun requirements. Last year, for example, through sales of gold, use of foreign currency balances, drawings on the International Monetary Fund, and a variety of other special transactions, we absorbed more than \$1.250 billion that had flowed to some European countries. At the same time, demands by certain monetary authorities outside Europe—and, to some extent, the demands of private banks and traders everywhere—called for more dollars than could be supplied out of our deficit. Those demands,

² For background, see BULLETIN of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 250.

amounting to several hundred million dollars, were met by transfers from European dollar monetary reserves.

Expanding the Resources of the Fund

It was within the environment of a shrinking United States payments deficit that the International Monetary Fund conducted its study of the international monetary system over the past year. Concurrently, another study was being carried forward by the "Group of 10" countries, which had, in 1961, accepted special responsibility for providing supplemental resources to the Fund in the event that unusual strains were to develop in the international monetary system.³ It is highly significant that both studies concluded that the present system is functioning well and that any changes should be designed, in the words of the Fund report, to "supplement and improve the system where changes are indicated, rather than to look for a replacement of the system by a totally different one."

The two studies also agreed on the advisability of expanding the resources of the Fund through a combination of general and selective quota increases. Such increases seem clearly appropriate in view of the conclusion in chapter 3 of the Fund report that the next decade is likely to see a steady rise in the demand for international liquidity, coupled with a slower annual rate of growth in the types of liquidity on which chief reliance has been placed during recent years.

The United States hopes that the Governors at this meeting will request the Executive Directors to study the need for such increases and the ways in which they might best be carried out. It is our hope that the Executive Directors could, as they did in 1958, complete their work and make such recommendations as they find appropriate to the Governors of the Fund by the end of this year, thus allowing time for member countries to complete necessary legislative action during 1965.

An increase in Fund quotas seems to us the right move as member countries enter the next

phase in the evolutionary development of the international monetary system—a phase in which the greater needs are likely to center, at least for a time, on the enlargement and elaboration of credit facilities for transferring reserves among countries, rather than upon increases in the overall supply of reserves. In this regard our thinking once again parallels the findings in the Fund's annual report regarding the need for increases in what the report labels "conditional liquidity."

Today, even in the free industrialized countries, there is no common economic pattern but a mix, varying from nation to nation, of productivity, prices, trade restrictions, and capital market facilities. As a result, the bulk of the increases in reserves have, for the past several years, flowed to a few of the industrialized countries, and particularly to Western Europe. Further substantial increases in reserves would, for the most part, only increase that flow—unless and until those countries reduce their chronic surpluses through a relative rise in imports, an increase in their capital exports, or any other acceptable combination of actions that would overcome their propensity to absorb whatever new liquidity may be added to the system in the form of owned reserves.

Economic disparities between countries are no doubt inevitable in a dynamic world. In time, so long as all countries actively pursue the objectives of liberal, multilateral trade policies, the needed adjustments will surely be accomplished. Meanwhile, we must be as careful in developing our international financial arrangements as we are in designing monetary measures for our domestic needs. And we must constantly guard against the oversimplified conclusion that a simple addition to the international money supply, or an agreed limitation upon it, or a contraction of it, will provide an adequate solution.

As the free world's financial officials, we must be as concerned with credit as we are with money. Liquidity consists not only of owned reserves but of credit facilities. And it seems to me to be as important today to shift the emphasis toward credit as it was in the first years after World War II. Then, total reserves were ample by any absolute standard,

³ For background, see *ibid.*, Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187; Oct. 21, 1963, p. 615; and Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323.

but most of them were in the United States. During that period, while the processes of readjustment were getting underway, little would have been gained by further increases in owned reserves, for those, too, would have flowed to the United States. Instead, a redistribution was needed. It was largely accomplished through the massive credits and grants which the United States Government extended, not only bilaterally and multilaterally but through dollars used in the drawings which other countries requested of the Monetary Fund.

Some 7 years ago, the international monetary system entered a second phase in which a succession of large United States payments deficits became the principal source of additions to the primary reserves of other countries. And now, with overall international reserves at an adequate level and with the United States moving toward balance in its payments, this second phase is also coming to an end. Once again, the need is for additional credit facilities.

Exchange of Information Essential

That is why it has been both appropriate and necessary to set up bilateral credit arrangements to handle the volatile movements of funds which now occur among industrialized countries with convertible currencies. There is no impairment of the Fund's role when those facilities are used instead of, or sometimes in advance of, recourse to the Fund itself. Rather, there is an economy of resources and a minimizing of strains. The risk is that a country might drift into heavy and continuous reliance upon such essentially short-term credit facilities, delaying too long the necessary corrective action that should be taken to adjust its balance of payments.

As in any banking operation, that type of risk must be averted. The way to do it is to provide for a full—though initially largely confidential—exchange of information among the countries directly affected and to assure frequent opportunities for discussion among their monetary authorities. It is essential to review and appraise together the actions each is taking to finance its deficit or to carry its surplus—including the degree of direct impingement of one upon the other.

That is what I understand to be the meaning of the "multilateral surveillance" which the countries in the "Group of 10" have undertaken to pursue jointly and in close liaison with the Bank for International Settlements, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and, of course, the International Monetary Fund itself. It fulfills, more systematically, the objectives which the United States has long pursued in its full reporting of its own activities. In our view this pattern of information and consultation, systematically extended among industrialized countries subject to volatile flows of capital, can add an important dimension to the prudent use of such credit facilities.

The scope for greater reliance upon purely bilateral credit facilities, under the aegis of "multilateral surveillance," may even be wider. We support the suggestion made in the "Group of 10" report that countries with large and growing reserves should actively explore the possibility of long-term lending to other industrialized countries in need of additional reserves but whose prospects for reserve growth, though promising, may only be for relatively small annual increments stretched out over many years.

Such lending would not only be of value to the stability of the currencies of the industrialized countries; it would also facilitate an adequate and uninterrupted flow of development assistance from advanced nations to developing countries. In addition, countries with large and persistent surpluses should—in their own interests and in the interests of accelerated economic development—carefully re-examine the possibility of increasing the level and quality of their assistance programs.

But, aside from continuing programs of economic assistance, the credit facilities that will be of most direct use to the nonindustrialized members of the Fund are those of the Fund itself. That is why the United States believes that prompt consideration should be given to a general enlargement of quotas. In addition, special increases would seem appropriate in a number of cases, particularly for those members whose currencies have become stronger and more widely used over the 6 years since ques-

tions of this kind were last discussed in New Delhi.⁴ We welcome the attainment by other countries of situations where they can now provide a greater proportion of the Fund's resources, with a corresponding reduction in our share of the Fund's responsibility. We have been hopeful that the members of the European Economic Community, in particular, will assume a larger share and are gratified that some readiness to do so has been indicated.

We also believe it inevitable that a growing international monetary system must find new ways to economize the supply of gold, just as individual nations have done for so long in their internal monetary systems. The fixed price of gold is, of course, the anchor of price stability for the world. But world trade and capital movements seem certain to expand—and at a faster pace than the stock of gold, thus imposing the most careful economy in its use. That is why the United States, as the only country which maintains the essential link with gold on which the entire IMF system rests, welcomes the reference in the Fund report, and in that of the "Group of 10," to measures for so handling Fund quota subscriptions as "to mitigate the repercussions of gold payments on the gold reserves of the contributing members and of the reserve centers that may be affected."

While an increase in Fund quotas will meet the current requirements of the international monetary system, we cannot rest on our oars. Both the "Group of 10" and the Fund reports recognize the possibility that new and additional measures may become necessary. We particularly appreciate the concluding statement in the liquidity section of the Fund's report, indicating that the Executive Directors intend to carry forward the Fund's studies of new approaches, including easier access to a portion of the credit tranches, the possible use of gold certificates in place of the presently required gold subscription, and the possibility of Fund investments. Meanwhile, the "Group of 10" will be carrying on parallel studies of these and other possibilities, including the use of composite reserves. The results of these studies should put us in a position to meet any need for enlarged supplies of unconditional liquidity

that may develop over the coming years.

In conclusion, let me say that it is within our capacity to achieve both adequate monetary support and continuing monetary stability. Let us do so as our proper contribution toward the steady expansion of free and unrestricted world trade and the steady and rapid growth of all of our national economies.

U.S. Calls for Negotiation of Malaysia-Indonesia Dispute

Statement by Adlai E. Stevenson

U.S. Representative in the Security Council¹

My delegation and my Government take a very serious view of the complaint before the Security Council in this case. The Government of Indonesia, a member of the United Nations, has sanctioned the use of force in the pursuit of its quarrel with the sovereign state of Malaysia, which is also a member of the United Nations. The distinguished representative of Indonesia has, indeed, expressed pride in the guerrillas and suggested that his Government will continue to use force until there is a *settlement* of its *quarrel* with Malaysia. And we are all aware of the announced objective of Indonesia to "crush Malaysia"—a fellow member of the United Nations.

But Indonesia's *quarrel* seems to be with the United Kingdom because it sponsored the independence and federation of its dependent territories in the area and is committed to their defense. And the *settlement* proposed by Indonesia seems to be that Malaysia must change its paternity in a manner satisfactory to Indonesia.

But, Mr. President, this is not a paternity case. This is an accusation by Malaysia that Indonesia has violated its territorial integrity by force. And the fact, which has not been denied, is that on the night of September 2, 1964, an armed band of significant size—equipped and transported by Indonesia and intended for violence—landed on the sovereign territory of Malaysia.

¹ Made in the U.N. Security Council on Sept. 10 (U.S./U.N. press release 4436).

⁴ *Ibid.*, Nov. 17, 1958, p. 793.

This incursion is the complaint before this Council. And it is this specific act of violence which my delegation specifically deploras.

Malaysia is a member of the United Nations which at the time of its creation voluntarily submitted its territories to examination by the United Nations to make certain that it was indeed the desire of their inhabitants to join the new state. Malaysia is therefore to an unusual degree a child of the United Nations.

Mr. President, the deterioration of relations between Indonesia and Malaysia must be distressing to every member of the United Nations. None is more distressed than my Government.

My Government recognizes both Indonesia and Malaysia as independent nations; we have tried to maintain friendly relations with both—relations based on mutual respect and seeking no more than mutual benefit. The test of our intentions does not depend upon faith in words: It is certified by a long record of useful and cooperative deeds.

We were an active member of the United Nations commission which helped bring about the birth of the Indonesian nation; we welcomed the independence of Malaya in 1957 and the proclamation of Malaysia just over a year ago this month. We welcomed Malaysia's admission to the United Nations just as we earlier welcomed the admission of Indonesia. With both of these ancient peoples we have sought to work in friendly harmony from the very moment they joined the lengthening list of newly independent nations. We have participated with both of them on the tangible tasks of nation building—the construction of roads and industries, the development of university education, the modernization of agriculture, the improvement of health and child welfare, the training of security forces. And we have been proud to be associated with military contingents from both of these nations in U.N. peacekeeping operations in other parts of the world.

Hence we are all the more distressed by the spectacle of one of these countries organizing and employing force as an instrument of its policy toward the other. We have welcomed the efforts of these neighbors, together with the

assistance of the Philippines and Thailand, to work out a peaceful resolution of their differences. Our President has even sent out a personal representative to help bring about a cease-fire, to get the conflict out of the jungles and back to the negotiating table.²

My Government has believed from the beginning that if there is any legitimate dispute between these two states, which share common problems and enjoy a close ethnic and cultural affinity, it should be settled by negotiation between themselves, with the assistance of whatever good offices they may find mutually helpful.

Against this background, Mr. President, our attitude on the complaint before us grows directly from the obligation each member of this organization has under the charter.

This Council cannot condone the use of force in international relations outside the framework of the charter.

This Council must try to re-create the conditions of peace and security in the area of conflict, to enable the processes of peaceful settlement to move these two nations away from the precipice of war.

Yesterday the distinguished representative of Indonesia was very frank about the fact that force had in fact been used by his Government. He argued that in dealing with neighbors whose policies Indonesia does not like, the use of force on the territory of those neighbors was justified.

He made all too clear that the announced goal to "crush Malaysia" leads in practice to the arming of military units to operate in the territories of a neighboring nation. This is a new and dangerous doctrine of international law, outside the Charter of the United Nations and foreign to everything that man has learned about the danger of escalation from little wars to big wars and the crucial importance of maintaining the peace.

In the world about us there are, this very afternoon, half a hundred active disputes between neighbors—23 of them in Asia, 10 in Africa, 3 in Europe, and 12 in the Western

² For background on a 13-day mission to the Far East of Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy in January 1964, see BULLETIN of Feb. 17, 1964, p. 239.

Hemisphere. If other nations involved in these disputes were to take the law into their own hands and drop armed forces on the territory of their neighbors, the precarious peace of our inflammable world would soon go up in smoke.

The distinguished representative of Indonesia said we are faced here with a political problem, not a legal one. But you cannot separate politics and law—and the first law of politics is that there must be some minimum agreement to abide by the rules of the game. The way in which the Indonesian case has been stated here makes it even more necessary that this Council, which is entrusted by the charter with the maintenance of peace and security, clearly identify as inadmissible the armed action of the Indonesian Government against Malaysia on September 2.

The Government of Malaysia, while exercising its inherent right of self-defense also has met its obligation under the charter to bring this matter to the Security Council while there is yet time to escape the fateful consequences of violence and counterviolence.

It is now the duty of this Council to fulfill its obligations to the world community.

Let us focus on the fact that a collision has occurred—a collision which is part of a pattern of hostility which promises to recur and which threatens to expand.

Let us then get on with our duty. And our duty, Mr. President, goes far beyond the angry pointing of a finger at a violation of the charter. Our larger duty is to devise measures to keep these flames from spreading. For it is unmistakably clear that the outer limits of restraint have been reached. And we are face to face with the dread prospect of escalating violence, with unforeseeable consequences for us all.

Mr. President, this Council can do two practical things. I suggest we get right to work on them.

First, the Council should call for the cessation of armed attack on Malaysia.

Second, the Council should help the parties to this dispute establish the condition and climate in which a negotiation on the merits of the disputed issues can be pursued with any

prospect of success. This Council and the Secretary-General may well have a role to play in the establishment of such conditions. And the first condition is, of course, compliance with the call of the Security Council to cease hostilities. Once this improved climate has been created, efforts could then be made to resolve the entire dispute by nonviolent means.

Instruments for peaceful settlement are available. Our task under the charter as members of this Council is to see to it that an agreed instrument is chosen at the earliest possible date and that the parties take steps to pave the way for a return to diplomacy.

The United States delegation has no interest in recriminations about what has happened in the past; we are concerned with the present and the future of peace, and the means of restoring peace and keeping peace in this case. The United States is ready to work constructively and promptly with a deep sense of concern and a sharp sense of urgency for action by the Security Council to put a stop to violence, to create the conditions for peaceful settlement. And I am sure that, as in so many previous cases, there are practical and effective measures available to the United Nations and the Secretary-General to help attain these objectives.³

Correction

BULLETIN of September 7, 1964, p. 338: The paragraph beginning at the top of the right-hand column should read:

"Now, we have had a continuing program of assistance to Indonesia. Because of Indonesia's policy of what they call 'confrontation' with Malaysia, the volume of this assistance was very sharply reduced about a year ago, and it consists of such programs as malaria eradication, education programs, and training programs for military people."

Current U.N. Documents

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publications may be purchased from the Sales Section of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Cambodia-South Viet-Nam Border Dispute:

Report of the Security Council Mission to the Kingdom of Cambodia and the Republic of Viet-Nam. S/5832, July 27, 1964, 15 pp.; and S/5832/Corr. 1, July 31, 1964, 1 p.

³ A resolution which, *inter alia*, deplored "the incident of 2nd September 1964" was vetoed on Sept. 17 by the Soviet Union. The vote was 9 to 2 (Czechoslovakia, U.S.S.R.).

- Letter dated July 21 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council. S/5833. July 27, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated July 22 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council. S/5834. July 27, 1964. 1 p.
- Cable dated July 28 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council charging the spreading of "toxic powder" on villages in Cambodian territory by U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. S/5839. July 28, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 3 from the Deputy U.S. Representative to the President of the Security Council denying that any U.S. or Republic of Viet-Nam aircraft "conducted chemical operations of any character whatever" either adjacent to or over Cambodian territory. S/5847. August 3, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 2 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council also replying to Cambodian charge of chemical warfare. S/5852. August 5, 1964. 3 pp.
- Letter dated August 10 from the U.S. Representative to the President of the Security Council denying the Cambodian charge. S/5877. August 10, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 6 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council referring to a letter dated June 19 from the Representative of the U.K. (S/5777). S/5886. August 12, 1964. 3 pp.
- Letter dated August 14 from the U.S. Representative to the President of the Security Council, reaffirming the U.S. Government's denial (S/5847) of Cambodian charges (S/5839) concerning the spreading of poisonous chemicals. S/5894. August 14, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 13 from the Deputy Representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council. S/5895. August 14, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 13 from the Deputy Representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council. S/5896. August 14, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 12 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council. S/5900. August 17, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 18 from the Deputy Representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council. S/5905. August 19, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 4 from the U.S. Representative to the President of the Security Council requesting that a meeting of the Security Council be convened "to consider the serious situation created by deliberate attacks of the Hanoi Regime on United States naval vessels in international waters." S/5849. August 5, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 12 from the Acting Representative of the U.S.S.R. to the President of the Security Council, transmitting texts of North Vietnamese statements regarding action by planes of the U.S. 7th Fleet on August 5. S/5888. August 12, 1964. 6 pp.
- Note by the Secretary-General, enclosing text of a letter dated August 13 received from the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam regarding the U.S. complaint against the Hanoi regime. S/5892. August 14, 1964. 3 pp.
- Telegram dated August 19 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council. S/5907. August 20, 1964. 5 pp.
- Letter dated August 15 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Viet-Nam to the President of the Security Council regarding the U.S. complaint against the Hanoi regime. S/5906. August 20, 1964. 3 pp.
- The Cyprus Question :**
- Letter dated August 12 from the Representative of Greece addressed to the President of the Security Council. S/5889. August 12, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 12 from the Representative of Turkey to the President of the Security Council. S/5890. August 12, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 13 from the Representative of Turkey, transmitting the text of a telegram dated August 11 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Vice President of Cyprus. S/5893. August 14, 1964. 4 pp.
- Letter dated August 13 from the Representative of Turkey, transmitting the text of a message dated August 12 addressed to the Secretary-General by the Prime Minister of Turkey. S/5897. August 14, 1964. 4 pp.
- Note by the Secretary-General regarding observance of the cease-fire in Cyprus. S/5898. August 15, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 14 from the Representative of Greece to the President of the Security Council, transmitting the text of a message sent to the Prime Minister of Turkey by the Prime Minister of Greece. S/5899. August 17, 1964. 2 pp.
- Letter dated August 17 from the Representative of Turkey to the Secretary-General. S/5902. August 18, 1964. 4 pp.
- Letter dated August 18 from the Representative of Turkey, transmitting the text of a message sent to the Heads of Government by the Prime Minister of Turkey. S/5904. August 18, 1964. 5 pp.
- Report by the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the financial situation in respect of the U.N. peacekeeping operation in Cyprus as of August 21. S/5910. August 21, 1964. 6 pp.
- Letter dated August 17 from the Representative of Czechoslovakia to the President of the Security Council concerning the resolution with regard to Cuba adopted July 26 by the Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Organization of American States. S/5901. August 17, 1964. 3 pp.
- Letter dated August 20 from the Representative of Greece to the Secretary-General regarding "violations of Greek air space by Turkish military aircraft." S/5909. August 21, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 6 to the Secretary-General from the Minister of External Affairs of Malawi, making application for U.N. membership for Malawi. S/5908. August 21, 1964. 1 p.
- Letter dated August 21 from the Representative of India regarding the Kashmir situation. S/5911. August 21, 1964. 14 pp.

General Assembly

- Comments received from governments and international organizations and institutions regarding technical assistance to promote the teaching, study, dissemination and wider appreciation of international law. A/5455/Add.8. July 17, 1964. 42 pp.
- Consideration of principles of international law concerning friendly relations and cooperation among states in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Comments received from governments. A/5725. July 22, 1964. 51 pp.
- Letter dated August 5, 1964, from the Representative

of the United Kingdom to the Secretary-General replying to the Soviet memorandum on United Nations peacekeeping operations (A/5721). A/5726. August 5, 1964. 5 pp.

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. Letter dated August 3, 1964, from the Deputy Representative of the United States to the Secretary-General furnishing information on U.S. space vehicles in orbit or beyond as of June 15. A/AC.105/INF. 74. August 11, 1964. 2 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Inquiry among governments on problems resulting from the reciprocal action of economic development and population changes. E/3895/Add. 1. June 30, 1964. 19 pp.

Report of the Technical Assistance Committee to the Economic and Social Council. E/3933. July 8, 1964. 40 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Income Tax Convention With Sweden Enters Into Force

Press release 398 dated September 11

On September 11 Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Hubert de Besche of Sweden exchanged the instruments of ratification of the supplementary convention between the United States and Sweden relating to income and other taxes, signed at Stockholm on October 22, 1963.

The supplementary convention, brought into force by the exchange of instruments of ratification, modifies and supplements the convention and accompanying protocol of March 23, 1939,¹ for the avoidance of double taxation and the establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in the case of income and other taxes. By the terms of the supplementary convention, its provisions (other than article I(a) thereof) become effective with respect to taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1963. Article VII of the 1939 convention, as revised by article I(a) of the supplementary convention, becomes effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1965.

¹ 54 Stat. 1759.

The supplementary convention is designed to effect certain modifications in the 1939 convention in order to reflect more recent developments in the tax legislation of the two countries and in their more recently negotiated income tax conventions. It adds to the existing convention provisions that are, for the most part, similar to those found in other income tax conventions to which the United States is a party. The revisions effected by the supplementary convention deal with the following matters: dividends; interest; exemptions to encourage the exchange of students, teachers, apprentices, and research workers; credits and the means by which double taxation shall be avoided; definitions of "permanent establishment" and "competent authorities"; and a restatement of the national-treatment provision.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on the international recognition of rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.

Adherence deposited: Algeria, August 10, 1964.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 10, 1964.

Proclaimed by the President: September 8, 1964.

Narcotics

Convention for limiting the manufacture and regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, and protocol of signature. Concluded at Geneva July 13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 Stat. 1543.

Notification received that it considers itself bound: Rwanda, August 5, 1964.

Safety at Sea

International regulations for preventing collisions at sea. Approved by the International Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Enters into force September 1, 1965.

Acceptances deposited: Belgium, March 29, 1961; Burma, January 27, 1961; Cameroon, July 10, 1961; Canada, March 24, 1963; Denmark, July 10, 1961; Finland, April 12, 1962; France, May 18, 1961; Ghana, March 22, 1962; Greece, April 16, 1963; India, July 28, 1964; Ireland, April 6, 1964; Israel, August 5, 1964; Japan, August 7, 1964; Liberia, May 26, 1964; Madagascar, November 8, 1963; Netherlands, including Surinam and Netherlands Antilles, March 4, 1963; Norway, August 23, 1961; Pakistan, May 14, 1963; Paraguay, September 11, 1963; Peru, November 15, 1961; Philippines, January 25, 1962; Poland, March 14, 1963; Portu-

gal, April 9, 1962; Rumania, February 6, 1964; Spain, April 21, 1964; Sweden, July 12, 1961; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, May 24, 1961; United Arab Republic, May 29, 1964; United Kingdom, August 28, 1963; United States, March 12, 1964; Viet-Nam, January 8, 1962; Yugoslavia, July 26, 1961.

BILATERAL

Ceylon

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs. Signed at Colombo August 29, 1964. Entered into force August 29, 1964.

Agreement for financing certain educational exchange programs, as amended (TIAS 4376, 5373). Signed at Colombo November 17, 1952. Entered into force November 17, 1952. TIAS 2652.

Terminated: August 29, 1964 (superseded by agreement of August 29, 1964, *supra*).

Congo (Léopoldville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities agreement of April 28, 1964 (TIAS 5565). Effected by exchange of notes at Léopoldville August 25, 1964. Entered into force August 25, 1964.

France

Amendment to the agreement of June 19, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3689, 3883, 4313, 4694, 5128), for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington June 22, 1964.
Entered into force: August 31, 1964.

Japan

Protocol modifying and supplementing the convention of April 16, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3176, 3901), for the avoidance of double taxation and the prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income. Signed at Tokyo May 7, 1960. Entered into force September 2, 1964.

Proclaimed by the President: September 8, 1964.

Sweden

Convention supplementing convention and protocol for avoidance of double taxation and establishment of rules of reciprocal administrative assistance in income and other taxes of March 23, 1939 (54 Stat. 1759). Signed at Stockholm October 22, 1963.
Ratifications exchanged: September 11, 1964.
Entered into force: September 11, 1964.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Designations

James V. Martin, Jr., as Political Adviser to the U.S. High Commissioner of the Ryukyu Islands, effective September 27. (For biographic details, see Department of State press release 392 dated September 10.)

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Documents, except in the case of free publications, which may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

Trade—Cereals, Cereal Products, and By-Products. Agreement with United Kingdom. Exchange of notes—Signed at London April 15, 1964. Entered into force April 15, 1964. TIAS 5581. 13 pp. 10¢

Cultural Relations—Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1964-1965. Agreement with the U.S.S.R.—Signed at Moscow February 22, 1964. Entered into force February 22, 1964, with effect from January 1, 1964. With annexes. TIAS 5582. 87 pp. 30¢

Port of Monrovia—Transfer of Title to Liberia. Agreement with Liberia. Exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia April 13 and 14, 1964. Entered into force April 14, 1964. TIAS 5583. 3 pp. 5¢

Trade—Beef and Veal. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 14, 1964. Entered into force May 14, 1964. With Mexican letter. TIAS 5584. 6 pp. 5¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Brazil, amending the agreement of September 11, 1963. Exchange of notes—Signed at Rio de Janeiro May 15, 1964. Entered into force May 15, 1964. With agreed minutes and exchange of notes. TIAS 5585. 10 pp. 10¢

Education—Financing of Educational and Cultural Programs. Agreement with Liberia—Signed at Monrovia May 8, 1964. Entered into force May 8, 1964. TIAS 5586. 5 pp. 5¢

Continental Radar Defense System—Phaseout of Certain Stations. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington May 25, 1964. Entered into force May 25, 1964. TIAS 5587. 2 pp. 5¢

Agricultural Commodities—Sales Under Title IV. Agreement with China, amending the agreement of August 31, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, 1964. TIAS 5588. 11 pp. 10¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with China—Signed at Taipei June 3, 1964. Entered into force June 3, 1964. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5589. 21 pp. 15¢

Defense—Military Assistance. Agreement with the Dominican Republic—Signed at Santo Domingo March 8, 1962. Entered into force June 10, 1964. TIAS 5590. 9 pp. 10¢

Military Mission. Agreement with Liberia, renewing and amending the agreement of January 11, 1951, as extended and amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Monrovia December 17, 1963, and April 24, 1964. Entered into force April 24, 1964. Effective January 11, 1963. TIAS 5591. 3 pp. 5¢

Trade. Interim agreement with Iceland, revising

Schedule I to the agreement of August 27, 1943. Exchange of notes—Dated at Reykjavik May 29 and June 2, 1964. Entered into force June 2, 1964. TIAS 5592. 5 pp. 5¢

Combined Military Exercises, 1964. Agreement with China. Exchange of letters—Signed at Taipei December 9 and 19, 1963. Entered into force December 19, 1963. TIAS 5593. 3 pp. 5¢

Defense—Military Assistance. Agreement with Argentina. Exchange of notes—Signed at Buenos Aires May 10, 1964. Entered into force May 10, 1964. TIAS 5594. 8 pp. 10¢

Electricity Tax on Surplus Commodity Housing. Agreement with France. Exchange of notes—Dated at Paris August 1, 1963. Entered into force August 1, 1963. TIAS 5595. 3 pp. 5¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Israel, amending the agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended. Exchange of notes—Signed at Washington June 23, 1964. Entered into force June 23, 1964. TIAS 5596. 2 pp. 5¢

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the Republic of Korea, amending the agreement of March 18, 1964. Exchange of notes—Signed at Seoul June 15, 1964. Entered into force June 15, 1964. TIAS 5597. 2 pp. 5¢

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Spain, amending the agreement of July 16, 1963. Exchange of notes—Dated at Washington June 15 and 17, 1964. Entered into force June 17, 1964. TIAS 5598. 4 pp. 5¢

Check List of Department of State Press Releases: September 7-13

Press releases may be obtained from the Office of News, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.

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393	9/10	Rusk: news conference of September 10.
*394	9/10	Greenfield sworn in as Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs (biographic details).
398	9/11	Income tax convention with Sweden enters into force.

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